Summary:
Rivals in Honduras agreed to a plan brokered by the Organization of American States that would bring an end to the political crisis in that country. At issue was the reinstatement of ousted President Manuel Zelaya to power ahead of fresh presidential elections. Since the June 2009 coup that deposed Zelaya from office, Honduras has been regarded as something of a regional pariah with the countries of the Americas virtually united in its call for the restoration of democratic order.
Background:
On June 28, 2009, the military ousted President Manuel Zelaya -- the president of the Central American country of Honduras -- from office, forcing him into exile in Costa Rica. President Zelaya was then taken from his home and flown to Costa Rica.
The de facto coup d'état occurred in reaction to the ongoing power struggle over the president's plans to change the constitution of the country. At issue was his plan to constitutionally extend his four-year non-renewable term in office. A referendum on the matter had been planned for June 28, 2009, but before it could be held, the Supreme Court ruled that it was illegal. President Zelaya decided to go forward with a non-binding referendum to ascertain the popular will of the people. But the situation took an acrimonious turn when President Zelaya refused a court ruling to re-instate the chief of the army, General Romeo Vasquez, who refused to comply with the president's order that he assist with the organization of the referendum. Ahead of the opening of the polls on voting day, the military had short-circuited the process in what amounted to an effective coup d'état.
The Supreme Court later defended the actions of the military, claiming it was defending democracy. It was unlikely that the court and the military would be contradicted by the legislative branch of government since the referendum had been resisted by the Congress of Honduras, including members of the president's own party. A resolution was read in the Congress, which accused Zelaya of "manifest irregular conduct" and representing a "danger" to state law, presumably in response to the president's decision to move forward with the referendum, despite the Supreme Court's ruling against it. The Congress then voted to accept a letter of resignation, purported to be from President Zelaya, by a show of hands. That letter, which the congressional secretary Jose Alfredo Saavedra claimed was written by the president, indicated that Zelaya was resigning because of "the polarized political situation" and "insuperable health problems." Whether or not the letter, which was dated days earlier, was actually genuine, was a matter of debate. Nevertheless, the legislative body then appointed congressional president, Roberto Micheletti, as the new president of Honduras.
Meanwhile, upon arriving at the airport in Costa Rica, deposed President Zelaya said he was awakened by the sound of gunfire and that he had to dodge flying bullets between soldiers and his own security guards for about twenty minutes. Zelaya said he was then kidnapped by soldiers and forced to board an air force jet, which took him to Costa Rica. Zelaya denied writing any letter of resignation, and made it clear that he would not recognize any interim government and was holding onto power until the end of his term in January 2010. During a telephone interview on the Venezuela-based Telesur television network, Zelaya said, "There is no way to justify an interruption of democracy, a coup d'état." He continued, "This kidnapping is an extortion of the Honduran democratic system." Zelaya blamed the situation on the Honduran elite, whom he said opposed his plans to try to bring economic relief to the impoverished masses. To that end, he said, " This was a plot by a very voracious elite, which wants to keep this country in an extreme level of poverty."
In other developments, there were reports that Honduran military leaders and other key politicians had been in contact with the United States, seeking support for their plan to wrest power from Zelaya. According to the Associated Press, the United States made clear it would not support any coup. This scenario indirectly coincided with statements made by Zelaya himself ahead of the actual coup. In an interview with Spain's El Pais newspaper that took place before his removal, Zelaya appeared to be aware of efforts by his opponents to oust him from power, but believed at the time that such efforts had been thwarted because the United States would not sanction such action. "Everything was in place for the coup and if the U.S. embassy had approved it, it would have happened. But they did not." He continued, "I'm only still here in office thanks to the United States." But apparently, significant military and political players in Honduras decided to go forward with the coup days later, even though the United States refused to support any moves aimed at deposing Zelaya from power.
Meanwhile, the international community responded to the news from Honduras with outrage. Mercosur -- the regional bloc made up of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay -- condemned the coup and said it would not recognize any Honduran authority besides Manuel Zelaya. President Zelaya's ally in the region, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, said the deposed Honduran leader had been the victim of an illegal coup d'état. Chavez' outrage was echoed by the European Union, which decried the undemocratic transfer of power. Spain also moved to recall its ambassador to Honduras. Making clear the United States' position, United States President Barack Obama characterized the removal of Zelaya from the presidency as "illegal."
For its part, the United Nations General Assembly approved a resolution demanding the reinstatement of ousted Honduran President Manuel Zelaya, while the World Bank said it would institute a "pause" in lending to Honduras. In addition, the Organization of American States (OAS) issued a condemnation of the ousting of President Zelaya, characterizing it as "a coup." The OAS also asserted it would not recognize the illegal authority of the new government and the body's Permanent Council called for the "immediate, safe and unconditional return" of Zelaya to his office as president. Jose Miguel Insulza, the head of the OAS, decried the removal of Zelaya saying, "We thought we were in an era when military coups were no longer possible in this hemisphere." Explaining the decision to take action against Honduras, he said, "We need to show clearly that military coups will not be accepted. "Soon thereafter, the OAS issued a three-day deadline to Honduras to restore exiled Zelaya to power. Failure to comply resulted in the suspension of Honduras from the OAS and that country's new position as a regional pariah.
Mediation:
In mid-July 2009, Costa Rican President Oscar Arias acted as mediator in talks between ousted Honduran President Manuel Zelaya and interim leader Roberto Micheletti, aimed at resolving the political crisis gripping Honduras. Those initial talks ended without any breakthrough. For his part, Zelaya demanded his immediate restoration as president of Honduras. On the other side of the equation, Micheletti said that Zelaya should relinquish all claims to the presidency. The only area where Zelaya and Micheletti could find concurrence was in regard to their respect for the Honduran constitution, however, their interpretation of the country's law was likely to be quite different. President Arias, the 1987 Nobel Peace Prize winner who helped resolve the civil war plaguing Central America, said: "We have no illusions, this may take longer than what was imagined."
A week later, Costa Rican President Oscar Arias called on the two sides to participate in a new round of talks. That new round of negotiations ended indecisively, but did reveal the provisions of the reconciliation deal that Arias was trying to advance. Central to that proposal was a provision for "the legitimate restitution" of Zelaya as the head of a reconciliation government, which was described as "a post where he will remain until the end of the constitutional term for which he was elected." The proposal made clear that this term would end on Jan. 27, 2010, and would be followed by the selection of a new president "chosen freely and democratically by the people in elections supervised and recognized by the international community," as described by Arias. The Costa Rican mediator also proposed the creation of a unity government, which would be composed of representatives of all political parties. Finally, Arias proposed an amnesty for political crimes associated with the coup d'état of June 2009 that ousted Zelaya from office.
For his part, deposed President Zelaya said the negotiations being led by Arias constituted the only path to reach a reconciliation agreement. To that end, he was said to be seriously considering Arias' proposals. While Zelaya and his cadre were reported to have agreed, in principle, to Arias' terms, there were remaining reservations about giving concessions to those who participated in the coup. In addition, Zelaya warned that even if no deal was forged, he had every intention of returning home to Honduras. On the other side of the equation, the interim government said that it would arrest Zelaya if he set foot on Honduran terrain. As well, the interim government, led by Micheletti, was reported to have rejected the proposal on the grounds that the notion of Zelaya's reinstatement was "impossible" and "not negotiable."
By the close of July 2009, negotiations in Costa Rica aimed at resolving the ongoing political crisis ended with no agreement between the two sides. Yet even as Micheletti rejected this proposal, he was nonetheless faced with increased pressure to hand power back to Zelaya, as a result of mounting threats by the United States to cut its aid to Honduras. Despite this warning from the United States, Zelaya expressed frustration with the international community's failure to reinstate him to presidential power, even going so far as to criticize the United States for not doing enough. For his part, Zelaya, who was now based in Nicaragua, made a symbolic gesture by taking a few steps across the border into Honduras. United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton responded by describing the move as "reckless." She explained that Zelaya's symbolic excursion into Honduran territory was "not conducive to the broader effort to restore constitutional order."
Meanwhile, post-coup Honduras was pressing forward with its plans to hold elections in November 2009. Internationally, the election was being frowned upon since many countries now viewed post-coup Honduras as having abrogated constitutional strictures. To that end, the OAS, which suspended Honduras in July 2009, made it clear that it would not recognize the results of the Nov. 29, 2009, vote for a new president. Individual countries also made it clear they would not recognize the election results.
Adding to Honduras' poor standing in the international community was the decision by the United States to cut all non-humanitarian aid to Honduras in a clear bid to register discontent over the country's slippage into undemocratic governance. The move by the United States earned rare praise from Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who has typically been a harsh critic of American foreign policy.
On Sept. 14, 2009, the Honduran ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva said he had been ordered out of the United Nations Human Rights Council. The situation emerged after several other Latin American countries accused envoy J. Delmer Urbizo of representing an "illegal" regime. It was a clear reference to the fact that the current government of Honduras ousted the elected President Zelaya from office in a coup d'état. The incident cast a shadow on the start of the three-week session of the multi-national Human Rights Council. As Urbizo left the hall, he shouted "We will be back! Volveremos!"
Zelaya Returns:
Ousted President Manuel Zelaya returned unexpectedly to Honduras on Sept. 22, 2009. He was reported to have sought refuge at the Brazilian embassy in Tegucigalpa. The interim authorities appeared willing to stakeout even more alienated terrain once Zelaya was at the Brazilian embassy. According to reports from the ground in Tegucigalpa, the interim authorities, led by Roberto Micheletti, were demanding that Brazil "immediately take measures to ensure that Zelaya stops using the protection offered by the diplomatic mission to instigate violence in Honduras." The interim government also warned it would take unspecified "additional measures" if Zelaya's status remained undefined within 10 days. For its part, Brazil decided to reject the ultimatum by Honduras' interim authorities on the basis that its embassy was protected under international law. Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva personally entered the fray when he asserted, "Brazil will not comply with an ultimatum from a government of coup mongers."
The situation took a disturbing turn when it was reported that hundreds of Honduran soldiers and riot police had surrounded the Brazilian embassy. While Micheletti said he had no plans to storm the embassy and arrest Zelaya, there were intimations that the Brazilian diplomatic mission was, indeed, under siege. Zelaya himself accused the interim authorities of pumping toxic gas into the building, however, Red Cross personnel on the ground could not confirm the allegation. Still, the United Nations Security Council appeared to acknowledge the "siege" effect when it demanded that the interim authorities of Honduras "cease harassing" the Brazilian embassy.
Resolution:
In the second week of October 2009, diplomats from 10 countries from across the Western Hemisphere, as well as Jose Insulza, chief of the Organization of American States (OAS), commenced fresh talks aimed at resolving the political crisis in Honduras. The diplomats were hoping to broker direct talks between deposed President Manuel Zelaya and interim leader Roberto Micheletti.
At issue has been ousted President Manuel Zelaya's demand that he be reinstated to power for the remaining three months of his term, juxtaposed with the insistence of the coup regime, led by Roberto Micheletti, that Zelaya should not be allowed to do so. Zelaya has said he would meet with Micheletti only if there was an agreement forged in advance that would allow him to return to power. On the other side of the equation, Micheletti showed no sign of compromise as he insisted that Zelaya was a threat to the constitution. That being said, there were some members of the coup regime in Honduras who were showing some indications that the ongoing crisis in Honduras might only be resolved, and international recognition would be possible, if only they did indeed reinstate Zelaya for the three remaining months of his term.
Part of the pressure on the coup regime was the fact that it had scheduled parliamentary and presidential elections for later in the year, in the face of international warnings that the election results would not be recognized. To that end, Insulza said, "Those who thought it was possible to depose a president and normalize life in the country before starting an election campaign should realize that this has not been possible."
On Oct. 15, 2009, there were reports that the two camps -- that of ousted Honduran President Jose Manuel Zelaya and that of interim leader Roberto Micheletti -- were edging towards some sort of compromise. While no specific details of the compromise deal were furnished, negotiators from the two sides respectively informed the media in Honduras that there was a plan in the works to restore Zelaya to the presidency ahead of fresh presidential elections set for Nov. 29, 2009.
Yet to be seen was whether or not the general framework for negotiations, known as the San Jose Accord, due to mediation by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias (as discussed above) was still viable. The accord, named for the capital of Costa Rica where compromise was first spurred, has the backing of the Organization of American States and the Obama administration in the United States. Central to the accord is the provision for Zelaya to head a national unity government until his end of his term in January 2010, followed by his exit from the political scene and amnesty from charges of abuse of power. The accord also offers Micheletti amnesty for orchestrating the de facto coup d'état against Zelaya.
By the close of 2009, a resolution had been forged, based on the OAS-backed San Jose Accord, and was met with concurrence by both rivals, Zelaya and Micheletti. The agreement would return Zelaya to power, create a power-sharing government, and require both camps to recognize the result the presidential election set for November, 2009.
Zelaya said that he would sign the accord, which would bring an end to the political crisis. Of course, Zelaya's restitution to the presidency was contingent upon a congressional vote in favor of this move, which itself would have to be authorized by the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, Zelaya described the agreement as a "triumph for Honduran democracy," and expressed his optimism about returning to power. Interim leader, Roberto Micheletti, also indicated he intended to sign the agreement, saying, "I have authorized my negotiating team to sign a deal that marks the beginning of the end of the country's political situation."
Reports suggested that Micheletti was finally ready to acquiesce to the agreement after United States Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Shannon warned that some sort of agreement was mandatory if Honduras wished international sanction of the impending election. Now with an apparently successful conclusion to the mediation process, United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton conveyed her congratulations to both sides on "reaching an historic agreement."
Editor's Note:
President Manual Zelaya of the left-leaning Liberal Party came to power in 2006. His term in office was scheduled to end in 2010, barring a constitutional change that would allow him to extend his tenure. Zelaya wanted that issue to be put to the voters in a referendum. However, all quarters of the Honduran establishment -- the military, the Supreme Court, and even the Congress -- acted to ensure that such a move would not take place in a de facto coup d'état and the subsequent exile of Zelaya. Diverse governments ranging from those in Washington D.C., to Caracas condemned the coup and called for Zelaya's reinstatement. Meanwhile, Honduras was suspended from the Organization of American States, and also subject to a resolution by the United Nations General Assembly demanding the reinstatement of Zelaya. Honduras additionally had to deal with a halt in funding from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Honduras also faced further international sanctions if the Micheletti interim government continued to defy the international community's demand for Zelaya to be reinstated, if only within the context of the San Jose Accord. To that end, concurrence was reached on the San Jose Accord at the close of October 2009. Until the 2009 coup d'état, Honduras -- a poor country dependent in the export of coffee and bananas -- endured military coups two times before; in 1963 and 1972, the military overthrew the elected presidents of Honduras. Civilian governance was not restored following the 1972 coup d'état until 1981, largely as a result of pressure from the United States. But this latest military coup d'état was the first undemocratic transfer of power in Honduras in almost three decades. Indeed it is one of few undemocratic transfers of power in the Western Hemisphere in recent times.
-- Denise Youngblood Coleman Ph.D.
Houston, Texas
October 31, 2009
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