Summary 1: Conflict Between North and South (see Summary 2 below for information about Darfur)
Sudan has suffered a deadly civil war between the north and the south since gaining its independence in 1956. Many religious, economic, and political factors have contributed to the severity of the conflict. Christians and animists in southern Sudan have resisted efforts by the Arab-dominated, Islamist government in Khartoum to impose Sharia law on non-Muslim areas. Religious tensions have also been exacerbated the presence of oil. Conflict over the past two decades, when the civil war resumed after an eleven year hiatus following the Addis Ababa Accords, has resulted in the death of two million people from war related causes and famine in southern Sudan, while millions more have been displaced. The conflict has significantly retarded Sudan’s political and economic development. In July 2005, the Sudanese government and the rebels in the south signed a comprehensive peace agreement, which includes a permanent ceasefire and protocols on sharing oil wealth and political power. The agreement established a six-year interim period, after which southern Sudan will decide its future political status in a referendum. However, the boundaries of southern Sudan have yet to be formally defined and the issue of three disputed areas in central Sudan – where there is considerable oil wealth – could spark conflict in the future.
Background/Context
From 1899 to 1955, Sudan was under joint British-Egyptian rule. During this time, the British administered northern and southern Sudan as separate regions. In 1946, the two regions were merged into a single administrative entity, despite having had limited economic and political linkages. Northern Sudan was primarily populated by Muslims who identified as Arabs. Southern Sudan, however, was mainly populated by black Christians and animists. It is estimated that of Sudan’s current population of 35 million, approximately 70% are Sunni Muslims, while the remaining 30% are Christian and animists.
In February 1953, the U.K. and Egypt reached an agreement under which Sudan would be self-governed for an interim period before becoming independent. The first Sudanese government was inaugurated in 1954. On January 1, 1956, Sudan became independent under a provisional constitution. Southerners in Sudan were displeased with the constitution because it did not address whether the government would be secular or Islamic and also did not specify if Sudan would have a federal or unitary political system. The Arab-led, northern-dominated government in Khartoum eventually reneged on its promise to create a federal system, which sparked a mutiny by southern military officers in the Equatoria province.
In 1958, General Ibrahim Abboud seized power in a coup and pursued a policy of Arabization and Islamization in the south, which strengthened southern opposition to northern rule. The main rebel movement became known as Anya Nya. Anya Nya received military and financial support from Ethiopia, Uganda, Israel, and Sudanese exile communities in the Middle East, Western Europe, and North America. The movement eventually splintered into two factions – one supported autonomy within Sudan and another supported self-determination in the form of secession. Anya Nya controlled most of the countryside in the south, while the Sudanese government controlled the major towns. By the late 1960s, over 500,000 people had died as a result of the conflict.
In 1964, popular riots against Abboud’s rule toppled the military regime. A provisional civilian government led by Prime Minister Muhammad Ahmad Mahjoub then took power. However, the series of Islamist-based governments in Khartoum that followed failed to enact a permanent constitution or deal with the widespread problems of economic stagnation and ethnic turmoil. Colonel Jaafar Muhhamad Nimeiri seized power in Sudan’s second military coup in May 1969 and established a socialist government. Government operations against the rebels declined after the coup, despite a massive influx of Soviet military aid and equipment.
In 1971, Joseph Lagu, the leader of the southern forces opposed to the Sudanese government, established the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM). Although the SSLM created a governing infrastructure throughout southern Sudan, Anya Nya retained control over much of the movement’s political power. Colonel Nimeiri established contacts with SSLM leaders in October 1971 with the hope of ending the insurgency by offering regional autonomy and pursuing an economic development program. In February 1972, SSLM and Sudanese government delegations met for talks in Addis Ababa mediated by Ethiopia’s Emperor Haile Selassie. The SSLM initially demanded a federal system under which southern Sudan would have its own government and an army that would only come under the federal government’s command in response to an external threat to the country.
In March 1972, the SSLM and the Sudanese government came to an agreement and signed the Addis Ababa Accords. Though many SSLM leaders opposed the settlement, Lagu approved it anyway. The accords guaranteed autonomy for southern Sudan – defined as the three provinces of Equatoria, Bahr al Ghazal, and Upper Nile. A regional president would be appointed by the national president at the recommendation of an elected Southern Regional Assembly. The regional president’s cabinet would be responsible for all aspects of the government in the region except those concerning foreign affairs and defense, which would remain under the authority of a national government (that would include southern representation). Southern military forces would be integrated into the southern command of the national army, which would have equal representation of northerners and southerners. The accords recognized Arabic as the official language of Sudan and English as southern Sudan’s principle working language. The Sudanese government established an international commission to oversee the resettlement of internally displaced persons and granted amnesty, retroactive to 1955, to former insurgents.
However, northern opposition to the Addis Ababa Accords, especially among Islamist parties, created pressure on President Nimeiri to revoke the agreement and establish an Islamist, Arab-dominated state. The discovery of oil in the south by the Chevron corporation exacerbated political pressure to discard the accords, which had given the south autonomy in its economic and financial affairs. In 1983, President Nimeiri unilaterally abrogated the Addis Ababa Accords, revoked the south’s autonomous status, imposed Islamic Sharia law across all of Sudan, declared Arabic the official language of the south, and transferred control of the southern Sudanese army to the national government. In response, southern soldiers mutinied against the north, thus resuming the civil war after an eleven-year period of relative peace. Lieutenant Colonel John Garang founded the Sudan’s People Liberation Army (SPLA), the military arm of the Sudan’s People Liberation Movement (SPLM). In addition to religious motivations, the SPLM claimed that oil revenue was only benefiting the north.
In April 1985, widespread discontent with the economic situation in Sudan led to the removal of President Nimeiri’s regime from power through a military coup. The new military government suspended the 1983 constitution. In April 1986, the military transferred power to a newly elected civilian government, led by Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi of the Umma party. Mahdi’s government made significant overtures to make peace with the south, though it did not revoke the enforcement of Sharia law. In May 1986, the government began negotiations with the SPLM. Later that year, the SPLM and a number of Sudanese political opposition parties met in Ethiopia and signed the Koka Dam declaration, which called for ending Sharia law and convening a constitutional conference.
Across the next few years, the violence in southern Sudan intensified and the economic situation in Sudan as a whole deteriorated as a result. The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) reached a peace agreement with the SPLM in 1988, though Mahdi was at first reluctant to sign it. Mahdi eventually gave into pressure from the army, but was overthrown by the National Islamic Front (NIF), lead by then-Colonel Omar al-Bashir, in June 1989. The new government’s commitment to the Islamist cause further exacerbated the conflict with the south. Though the NIF held negotiations with the SPLM in August and December 1989, little progress was made. That year, a consortium of United Nations (U.N.) agencies, donor countries, and nongovernmental organizations initiated Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) to provide vital humanitarian support to locations throughout Sudan, which was undergoing a severe drought and famine in addition to the dire conditions brought about by the civil war. When Sudan announced its support of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, many donor countries suspended their funding of OLS.
The NIF passed the Criminal Act of 1991, which instituted harsh punishments, like amputation and stoning, nationwide. The NIF claimed that non-Muslim regions would be exempt, though the 1991 act provides for the possible imposition of Sharia law in the south in the future. The NIF eventually replaced non-Muslims judges in the south.
In 1991, opponents of Colonel John Garang’s leadership created the Nasir faction of the SPLA. Two other groups joined the effort. In 1993, the dissident factions created an umbrella group called SPLA United. President Bashir sought to highlight tribal differences to weaken the insurgent movement.
Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea provided aid the SPLM out of fear of the NIF regime’s “pan-Islamic” foreign policy that provided support for neighboring radical Islamist groups. In 1993, the three countries, however, spearheaded a regional effort to end the conflict under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD). The IGAD initiative drafted the 1994 Declaration of Principles, which identified the essential elements of a just and comprehensive peace agreement to end the conflict, such as the relationship between religion and the state, power-sharing, wealth-sharing, and the right of self-determination for the south. The Sudanese government did not sign the Declaration of Principles until 1997, after it sustained major battlefield loses to the SPLA.
In 1995, a coalition of internal and exiled opposition groups based in the north and the south, including the SPLA, formed the National Democratic Alliance as an umbrella group opposed to the NIF regime in Khartoum. In 1996, the U.S. began sending $20 million in military aid through Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda to the National Democratic Alliance, though it denied that any of this aid was intended for the SPLA. In November 1997, the Clinton administration imposed comprehensive sanctions on the Sudanese government for its involvement in international terrorism, including harboring Osama bin Laden. These sanctions were later renewed by the George W. Bush administration in 2001.
After adopting the Declaration of Principles in 1997, the Sudanese government signed a series of agreements with various rebel factions as part of its “Peace from Within” initiative. The South Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A), which had broken away form the SPLA, and several smaller southern factions reached a peace agreement with the government. These groups merged to form the United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF) and were given marginal roles in the central government and collaborated in military efforts against the SPLA. The SPLA said that the agreement was a tactical ploy on the part of the Sudanese government to enlist southerners to the northern side.
In 1999, Sudan began exporting oil for the first time. As a result of increased oil revenue, the Sudanese government was able to substantially increase its military spending.
In July 2000, Sudan and Libya launched a joint initiative to achieve peace in Sudan. The initiative called for the establishment of an interim government, powersharing, constitutional reform, and new elections. Southern Sudanese leaders criticized the initiative for failing to address the relationship between religion and state and for neglecting to mention the right of self-determination. Furthermore, many felt that the initiative aimed mostly to resolve the differences of northern political parties and promote Egypt’s preference for maintaining the unity of Sudan.
In 2000 and 2001, the international community again responded to a severe drought in Sudan that threatened widespread famine. Operation Lifeline Sudan has nonetheless been hindered by aerial bombings in southern Sudan, which may have indicated a concerted effort on the part of the Sudanese government to restrict humanitarian access to the south
In June 2002, retired Kenyan General Lazaro Sumbeiywo mediated talks between the Sudanese government and the SPLM in Machakos, Kenya under the auspices of the IGAD. The U.S., the U.K., Italy, and Norway observed the negotiations. In July 2002, the two sides reached an historic agreement, known as the Machakos Protocol, on the role of state and religion and the right of southern Sudan to self-determination. Talks resumed on the subject of wealth-sharing and the three contested areas. In October 2002, the two sides signed a memorandum of understanding, which called for a cessation of hostilities for three months and unimpeded access for humanitarian workers. In February 2003, following international pressure to end renewed fighting in the West Nile province, the two sides agreed to strengthen provisions in cessation of hostilities, including the creation of a new international verification and monitoring team.
On November 19, 2004, the Sudanese government and the SPLM signed an agreement that committed each side to signing a comprehensive peace agreement by the end of the year. The U.N. Security Council convened in Nairobi (only the fifth time it had ever met outside of New York) and passed resolution 1574, which welcomed the Sudanese government and the SPLM’s commitment to reaching an agreement by the end of 2004 and reiterated the international community’s intension to assist Sudan and support the implementation of a comprehensive peace plan.
After two and a half years of negotiations, the NCP and the SPLM signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005. The agreement established a six-year interim period during which southern Sudan would remain autonomous. During the interim period, the agreement mandates a political and economic power sharing arrangement to guarantee southern representation in the national government and address the South’s economic marginalization. At the end of the interim period, the southern Sudanese people will hold a referendum on self-determination in which they can choose to secede from the North, even in Khartoum, where two million non-Muslim southerners currently live. A key sticking point in the negotiations was the distribution of government and civil service jobs between the two sides, which ultimately agreed to a 70:30 split of all jobs in the central government in favor of the NCP. Oil wealth is split equally between the north and south.
The SPLM accepted that Sharia law would continue to be enforced in the north, though the south will be exempt. Some criticized the agreement because it was signed only between the NPC and the SPLM, excluding other opposition parties based in other parts of the country. National, regional, and local elections are scheduled to take place during the second half of the interim period.
In June 2005, a drafting commission completed a draft constitution and presented it to the Sudanese government and the SPLM. In July 2005, the National Assembly in Khartoum and the SPLM leadership council ratified the Interim National Constitution. The agreement established a power sharing arrangement in which northerners and southerners share judicial, legislative, and executive power. The agreement also established a 39,000-strong national unity army consisting of fighters from both sides.
That same month, the Abyei Boundary Commission, established to define the boundaries of nine Dinka chiefdoms, finished its work and submitted its recommendations to President Bashir. Bashir has yet to enact the recommendations, even though the Comprehensive Peace Agreement requires that he do so. The United Nations has deployed military personnel to the area to ease tensions, but hostility between the Ngok Dinka and the Arab Misseriya remain high. .
Only July 30, 2005, First Vice President John Garang was killed in a plane crash in southern Sudan. His death triggered violence between government security forces and southerners in Khartoum and Juba in which more than 100 people were killed. The Sudanese government has established a commission to investigate the violence. A team from Sudan, Uganda, Russia, the U.S., and the U.N. investigated the crash and concluded that it was an accident. In early August 2005, the SPLM Leadership Council appointed Garang’s former deputy, Salva Kiir, the new First Vice President and Chairman of the SPLM. Kiir said that he was still committed to following through on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
On August 31, 2005, the National Assembly was inaugurated. Under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the NCP was allocated 52% (234) of the seats, while the SPLM was allocated 28% (126). The remaining 20% was allocated to northern and southern opposition groups.
In late September 2005, the SPLM and the National Congress Party (former the Islamic National Front) agreed on a cabinet after weeks of contentious negotiations on the distribution of key economic portfolios. The National Congress Party (NCP) insisted on keeping the Energy and Finance ministries, while the SPLM wanted the ministries to be divided between the two sides. Eventually, the SPLM dropped its demand, though the SPLM did secure eight ministries, including Foreign Affairs, Cabinet Affairs, Labor, Transportation, Health, Education, Humanitarian Affairs, and Trade. Elements within the SPLM and the southern Sudanese community responded negatively to the arrangement, arguing that with the exception of Foreign Affairs, the NCP maintained control of the most important ministries. Kiir acknowledged the unequal distribution and that it would likely strengthen the political position of those in favor of secession.
Update
In October 2007, the two-year old peace agreement between the ruling parties of northern Sudan and the former rebels of the southern part of the country, appeared to be at risk of collapse. Of concern was the decision by the southern former rebel movement, known as the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), to withdraw from the unity government.
For its part, the SPLM was calling for the provisions ensconced in the 2005 peace deal to be honored. Specifically, the SPLM called for boundary demarcations, redeployment of northern troops from the south, and more control over cabinet changes. While some within the northern National Congress Party (NCP) expressed dismay and confusion over the SPLM's actions, others including the chairman of the NCP's Consultative Council, accused the SPLM of making a tactical play. Meanwhile, within the southern Sudanese community itself, there was criticism of the leadership over the handling of the situation. Many southerners reportedly would have preferred the grievances to have been resolved using mediators, rather than jeopardizing the overall state of peace.
The international community responded to the situation by urging both sides to exercise restraint. The African Union warned that the breakdown of trust between the two sides could lead to the unraveling of the fragile peace in Sudan.
By November 2007, a panel charged with resolving the political stand-off between the two sides ended in failure only days after commencement. Although agreement had been forged to implement the provisions of the 2005 peace deal, there was no concurrence about border issues or control over the oil-rich region of Abyei.
Current Situation
Many observers believe that the political situation in Sudan is still tenuous and fragile. Although over 500,000 southern Sudanese who were displaced by the conflict are expected to return home in 2006, the economic infrastructure throughout much of the country remains poor despite aid pledges from international donors. Many opposition leaders in Sudan have criticized the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for being far from comprehensive because the agreement was made only between the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan’s People Liberation Movement (SPLM), two largely undemocratic political entities. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement lacks widespread support throughout much of the country, especially among opposition parties in the north. Ongoing violence in the Darfur province threatens to destabilize the rest of Sudan. Some attribute the severity of the Darfur conflict to the failure to include representatives from Darfur in the negotiations that lead to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the north and the south. The Blue Nile, Nuba mountains, and Abyei provinces are currently jointly administered, though their unresolved political status could cause problems in the future should southern Sudan chose independence at some point in the future. A significant amount of Sudan’s oil is found in the three disputed regions. Some analysts believe that southern Sudan is not receiving its fair share of oil revenue and the SPLM is too weak to challenge the NCP on the matter. It appears increasingly likely that southern Sudan will choose independence when it holds its referendum on self-determination in 2011.
Foreign Policy Positions of Key Players
Sudan
The Sudanese government, through plagued by decades of coups and political turmoil, has long attempted to assert its authority in southern Sudan for a combination of religious and economic reasons. Islamist-oriented governments, such as the National Islamic Front, have sought to assert a common Islamic-based Arab identity in Sudan, despite a significant portion of the population being neither Muslim nor Arab. The discovery of oil in southern Sudan has heightened the importance of the economic dimensions of the conflict. Despite recognizing southern Sudan’s right to self-determination by signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, it is unclear what northern Sudan’s precise reaction will be if the south votes for secession in 2011. Many in northern-based political opposition parties remain opposed to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
The SPLM argues that successive civilian and military governments in Sudan have only made superficial attempts to address grievances in the south without ultimately compromising the north’s political and economic dominance. The SPLM also opposed the imposition of Islamic Sharia law in non-Muslim parts of Sudan. The SPLM has been criticized for being undemocratic and for doing little to better the lives of the people for which it claims to be fighting. Following the death of Joseph Garang, the SPLM has been significantly weakened and has faced difficulties in transitioning from a rebel movement to a functioning government.
Darfur
Many Darfur rebels felt excluded from the talks between the SPLM and the Sudanese government.
Uganda
The Ugandan government has provided support to the SPLM. In retaliation, the Sudanese government has provided sanctuary and material support to the Lord’s Liberation Army (LRA), which seeks to topple the Ugandan government and rule Uganda according to the Ten Commandments. The Carter Center has since negotiated the Nairobi agreement, in which both countries pledged to stop supporting proxies. In 2002, the Sudanese government authorized the Ugandan military to enter southern Sudan to attack LRA rebels. In July 2006, the government of southern Sudan facilitated peace talks between the Ugandan government and the LRA.
United States
The U.S. has played an active role in the negotiations between the North and South. In September 2001, President Bush appointed former U.S. Senator John Danforth as his Presidential Envoy for Peace in the Sudan. President Bush, Secretary Powell, special envoy John Danforth, and other senior state department officials put diplomatic pressure on both sides during the negotiations that led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The U.S. pledged $1.7 billion to Sudan at a donor conference in Oslo, Norway in April 2005. In the past, the issue of terrorism has complicated U.S.-Sudanese relations. .
Kenya
Kenya has been a supporter of the peace process. Kenya has played an active role in rebuilding Kenya’s educational infrastructure by providing English-language instructors and training Sudanese teachers.
Egypt
Egypt is opposed to southern Sudan’s independence because it does not want another country on the River Nile, which it regards as its economic lifeline.
Israel
In the past, Israel has provided support to southern rebels to keep pressure on the Arab world. As far back as 1969, Israel trained southern rebels and shipped weapons to the movement from Ethiopia and Uganda.
United Nations
The U.N. Security Council has established the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to monitor the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement during the interim period. UNMIS is authorized to have up to 10,000 military personnel and up to 715 civilian police personnel.
Written by Ryan Holliway, Researcher and Writer, CountryWatch Inc. and Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief, CountryWatch Inc.
Summary 2: Focus on Darfur
United Nations (U.N.) officials have described the Darfur conflict in Sudan as the worst humanitarian crisis in the world, while United States (U.S.) officials have alleged that genocide is taking place. The conflict started in February 2003 when a rebel group in the impoverished Darfur region began attacking government targets, accusing the Sudanese government in Khartoum of oppressing black Africans and neglecting the region’s economic development. In response, government-backed Arab militias known as the Janjaweed began burning villages, conducting large-scale massacres, and committing atrocities against the civilian population. To date, the conflict has resulted in the deaths of upwards of 400,000 people and the displacement of over two million. An African Union peacekeeping mission, which lacks adequate funding, sufficient equipment, and enough troops, has failed to stop the violence and may eventually be replaced by a U.N. mission. In May 2006, the largest rebel group in Darfur agreed to a peace deal with the government, but two smaller groups are still demanding more concessions. The peace agreement has not significantly improved humanitarian and security conditions in Darfur. Darfurians are still at great risk of widespread starvation, disease, and violence. The conflict has greatly exacerbated tensions between Sudan and Chad and has threatened to undermine regional stability.
Background/Context
Darfur is located in western Sudan along the border with Chad. Darfur is home to over thirty ethnic groups, which, though all Muslim, increasingly identify themselves as Arab or African in ancestry. Darfur has faced many years of tension over land and grazing rights between nomadic Arabs and sedentary African farmers. At the root of the conflict is competition over fertile land and water throughout the impoverished region, which has often been afflicted by devastating droughts since the 1970s. As a result of diminishing grazing lands caused by desertification, the nomadic Arabs moved southward into areas populated by African farmers. These encounters sometimes became violent.
Confrontations increased in frequency as a result of a particularly severe drought in 1983. That same year, the government sought to assert its authority in Darfur as it battled a bloody insurgency in southern Sudan. The government’s later policy toward Darfurian rebels originated in the conflict with the rebels in the south. The government was able to successfully strengthen its military position and secure the oilfields of the Western Upper Nile by arming local militias to fight the southern rebels.
African tribes in Darfur increasingly viewed the central government’s neglect of the region’s economic development as discriminatory. Throughout the next decade, the Sudanese government began to rely on Arab militias known as the Janjaweed to serve as its proxy in the region. This transformed an environmental, resource-based confrontation to a violent conflict with ethnic and racial dimensions. Each side accused the other of seeking to ethnically cleanse the areas in the region for its own economic benefit. In 1987, a group of 23 Darfurian leaders of Arab extraction organized the Arab Gathering, which complained of under-representation of Arabs in local, regional, and national governments. The Arab Gathering extolled the virtues of the “Arab race” as the only civilizing force in the region. Non-Arabs accused the Arab Gathering of seeking to engineer the forced displacement of African tribes.
In 1994, the Sudanese government redrew Darfur’s administrative boundaries, splitting the region into Northern, Southern, and Western Darfur. The new boundaries divided ethnic groups at the expense of black African tribes, further fueling tensions.
In February 2003, the present conflict erupted when a loose alliance between the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan’s Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) started attacking various government targets throughout the region, demanding autonomy. The initial attack, in which the SLA seized the town of Gula, came just a week after the first round of negotiations in Kenya between the Sudanese government and the Sudan’s People Liberation Army (SPLA), a southern secessionist rebel group. Many attribute the timing of the attacks to concerns that Darfurians would be excluded from power-sharing and wealth-sharing arrangements between the north and south. Initially, the rebels sought the support of Arab Darfurians, arguing that Arabs and Africans alike had suffered from the central government’s neglect of the region’s economic development.
In September 2003, Chad negotiated a ceasefire agreement between the government and the SLA/JEM. With few military resources available to combat the rebels in Darfur, the Sudanese government started again providing support to the Janjaweed, who waged a scorched-earth campaign against civilians in villages populated by African Masalit, Fur, and Zaghawa tribes. When the ceasefire collapsed in December 2003, the government escalated its support of the Janjaweed. Janjaweed militants attacked villages by killing men, raping women, and stealing goods. Millions fled destroyed villages, mostly heading toward camps near Darfur’s main towns. However, the camps often lacked adequate food, water, and medicine. The Janjaweed patrolled the area around the camps, killing men and raping women if they ventured outside to collect firewood. According to U.N. Undersecretary-General Jon Egeland, “rape is systematically used as a weapon of warfare” in Darfur. International nongovernmental organizations had very little access to civilians as the humanitarian crisis became more severe.
In April 2004, Chad negotiated a humanitarian ceasefire agreement between the Sudanese government, the SLA, and the JEM under African Union auspices. U.S. and European Union (E.U.) officials also participated in the negotiations. The parties to the agreement committed to ensuring that humanitarian aid workers have free access to civilians. They also agreed to free prisoners of war on both sides and to disarm the militias. The African Union created a Ceasefire Commission to monitor the implementation of the agreement. Despite the ceasefire, security and humanitarian conditions failed to improve. However, the agreement failed to stop the violence.
In June 2005, the International Court of Justice in The Hague, Netherlands announced that it would begin a large-scale inquiry into alleged human rights abuses in Darfur.
The seventh round of negotiations began in November 2005, but went nowhere for two months. In February 2006, the African Union initiated separate talks between Abdel Wahid’s SLA faction and the government. The African Union, the European Union, and the United States hoped that if they could arrange a deal between Wahid and the government, the other two rebel factions would embrace a similar agreement to avoid being marginalized. Wahid, however, announced his faction would abandon the negotiations.
The Darfur conflict has had an adverse effect on Chadian-Sudanese relations. Sudan has often accused Chad of backing the rebel movements in Darfur. Tensions between the two countries mounted in December 2005 when Chad accused the Sudanese government of providing support and sanctuary to the United Force for Change, a rebel group based in eastern Chad that seeks to overthrow the government. Chad also claimed that Janjaweed militants had launched attacks on Chadian civilians. On December 23, Chad declared a “state of belligerency” with Sudan. In April 2006, the United Force for Change advanced toward the Chadian capital, N'Djamena, before being pushed back by Chadian and French troops. Chad accused Sudan of being behind the coup attempt and, in response, closed its borders and threatened to expel the 200,000 Darfurian refugees currently in Chad. Chad and Sudan signed an agreement to stop hosting each other’s rebel groups on their territory in July 2006. Though the two countries have not resumed diplomatic relations, they did agree to establish a joint military commission to monitor their long border. It is currently unclear whether the two countries have actually stopped supporting their proxies in each other’s countries.
Current Initiative
On May 5, 2006, a faction of the Sudan Liberation Army signed a peace agreement with the Sudanese government. The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) consists of protocols on power sharing, wealth sharing, and security arrangements. The Sudanese government promised to channel more government money to Darfur. The government agreed to a one-time payment of $300 million and an annual aid package of $200 million a year for the region. The deal also created a Transitional Darfur Regional Authority, in which rebels will take part. The African Union Peace and Security Council gave the other two factions until May 31 to join the accord, but the deadline passed without an agreement. The DPA has since been criticized for lacking adequate compliance and verification provisions, a situation which is exacerbated by the inability of the African Union to perform such a role. The security arrangement requires the complete and verifiable disarmament of the Janjaweed and other government militias by October 2006 before the rebels start to disarm. However, the precise definition of Janjaweed militants was left vague. The International Crisis Group has accused the Sudanese government of hiding considerable numbers of Janjaweed militants by quietly integrating them into the state security services without actually disarming them.
In May 2006, the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed a resolution calling for the transfer of the African Union peacekeeping mission to U.N. authority. A new U.N. force would likely include mostly African soldiers as well as troops from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. NATO has been asked to provide air support and logistics. Sudan, however, has not yet agreed to allow a U.N. peacekeeping mission into its territory, despite pressure from the U.N. Secretary-General. In July 2006, Jan Pronk, the U.N. special representative for the Darfur conflict, said that the Darfur Peace Agreement was in danger of collapse and that significant revisions need to made in order to win support of the rebel groups who refused to sign the agreement. Pronk, who previously supported the agreement, called for better security guarantees, more disarmament, and compensation for victims of the conflict.
See "Update" below for most recent developments
Foreign Policy Positions of Key Players
Sudan
The Sudanese government worries that the insurgency in Darfur could inspire other discontented regions in Sudan to launch armed rebellions against the regime in Khartoum. Though most African Darfurians are Muslims, the Sudanese government holds the form of Islam they practice in contempt because it is infused with animist and Sufi influences. The Sudanese government has tried to portray the conflict as an internal tribal struggle rather than a civil war between a regional insurgency and the central government. The Sudanese government in Khartoum has admitted to mobilizing “self-defense militias,” but denies any links to the Janjaweed. Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir has called the Janjaweed “thieves and gangsters.” Human rights organizations, however, allege that the Sudanese government has taken an active role in brutalizing civilians through its Janjaweed proxies. After strong international pressure and the threat of sanctions, the government promised to disarm the Janjaweed, but has yet to take any such steps. The Sudanese government has announced trials in Khartoum against some security forces suspected of abuses, but some view this as merely a ploy against U.N. efforts to get 50 key suspects tried at the International Court of Justice in The Hague, Netherlands. Sudan opposes allowing the U.N. to take over control of the African Union peacekeeping mission because it would violate Sudanese sovereignty. The Sudanese government provides support to Chadian rebels and allegedly backed a coup attempt in Chad in April 2006.
Janjaweed
The Janjaweed are mainly recruited from the Baggara tribe, which identifies as Arab. The Janjaweed have been accused of trying to ethnically “cleanse” black Africans from the region. Refugees in Darfur allege that following air raids by government aircraft, the Janjaweed ride into village on horses and camels, killing men, raping women, and stealing whatever they can find.
Sudan Liberation Movement/Army
The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) was formed in the late 1980s when the Sudanese government began arming Arab militias in Darfur to oppose African farming communities. The official mission of the SLM is to create a unified, democratic Sudan with an “economic and a political system that addresses the uneven development and marginalization that have plagued the country since independence." The group has since split into two factions. The SLA faction led by Minni Arkou Minawi signed a peace agreement with the Sudanese government in May 2006. The SLA faction led by Abdel Wahid Mohamed Nur, generally recognized to have the widest base of support in Darfur, refused to sign the May 2006 agreement. The Abdel Wahid faction demands that the Darfur region be given the right to nominate a vice-president in the central government in Khartoum. The faction also demands that the two million people displaced by the scorched earth campaign conducted by the Janjaweed be given greater financial compensation.
Justice and Equality Movement
The Justice and Equality Movement refused to sign the May 2006 peace agreement because its leaders demanded a vice-president position for Darfur in the Khartoum and wanted a greater share of national wealth.
Chad
Over 200,000 refugees are currently in Chad, though most reside in camps not far from the border and are thus still vulnerable to attack. For decades, Chadian exiles have used Darfur as a staging ground to launch attacks against the Chadian government. Some of the ethnic groups found in Darfur are also found in Chad. In April 2006, the United Front for Change, an insurgent rebel group, tried to overthrow the Chadian government. Chad has accused Sudan of arming and financing the rebels that tried to overthrow the Chadian government in April 2006. In June 2006, Chadian President Idriss Deby has accused the Sudanese government of exporting its war to Chad while meeting with U.N. Security Council officials.
African Union
The African Union originally sent monitors to oversee the 2003 peace negotiations. When the negotiations failed, the African Union deployed 3,000 troops to protect the monitors and provide security. 7,000 troops African Union troops are currently deployed in Darfur, with the approval of the Sudanese government, but have a limited mandate and limited capabilities. Military experts believe that the peacekeeping mission has too few troops and not enough funding. In October 2005, two African Union soldiers from Nigeria and two contractors were killed in an ambush. The next day, 38 African Union soldiers were taken hostage. The U.S. and the E.U. have funded the African Union mission in Darfur, but are reluctant to give more funding until the U.N. takes over because they think a U.N. mission would be bigger, better equipped, and more capable of aggressively responding to the Darfur’s various armed groups. At the request of U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, the African Union will remain in Darfur at least until the end of 2006. The African Union continues to play an important role in mediating talks between the government and rebel groups, though it has not yet been successful in brokering a comprehensive peace agreement.
United States
The U.S. advocates a greater peacekeeping role for the U.N. and has taken part in peace negotiations between the Sudanese government and rebel factions. The U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Congress have declared that the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed are responsible for genocide. The White House first condemned the atrocities in Darfur on April 7, 2004. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, who played an active role in peace negations in Darfur, resigned from his position in June 2006. A new envoy for the Darfur conflict has not yet been named. Outside of government, New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof, Hollywood celebrities, and private advocacy organizations have all sought to draw attention to the issue.
China
China has extensive oil interests in Sudan, purchasing about 50% of Sudan’s exports. While some argue that China’s oil interests have motivated China to block U.N. efforts to address the atrocities in Darfur, other argue that China has an interest in promoting political stability in Sudan and not being seen as the benefactor of a genocidal regime that has been widely condemned by the international community.
United Nations
The U.N. has stopped shorting of call the situation genocide. A U.N. investigation team dispatched to the region concluded that war crimes were taking place, though they could find no intent to commit genocide. In April 2006, the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution imposing sanctions against four Sudanese nationals accused of perpetrating war crimes in Darfur. A dossier of evidence compiled by the U.N. has been given to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. In May 2006, the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed a resolution calling for the African Union peacekeeping mission to be replaced by a U.N. peacekeeping mission (with mostly African troops) by September 30, 2006. Despite many attempts to lobby the Sudanese government, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan has yet to secure Sudanese support for a U.N. peacekeeping mission. The U.N. World Food Program announced that, as of May 2006, it would be forced to make drastic cuts in food rations in Sudan because of a severe funding shortage.
Update
The African Union (AU) said on August 20, 2006 that two of its peacekeepers had been killed in Darfur. The AU also said that three peacekeepers were injured. The casualties were attributed to an incident in which one of its fuel convoys en route to AU headquarters in northern Darfur was ambushed by armed gunmen. The AU promised to hold those responsible to account for the "despicable attack." would be held personally accountable. In the backdrop of this development, the government of Sudan was experiencing increased pressure to allow a United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping force to be established in conflict-ridden Darfur where Arab "Janjaweed" militias aligned with the government have been carrying out heinous attacks against the black African population of Darfur.
By the start of September 2006, the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council had voted to create a peacekeeping force in the Darfur region of Sudan. The U.N. resolution called for the deployment of 20,000 U.N. troops to Darfur, to replace the 7,000 poorly-equipped exiting African Union (AU) troops. The resolution also stipulated that the peacekeeping force could only be deployed with the concurrence of the government of Sudan. Such a measure was viewed as unlikely to occur in the near future since the government in Khartoum was strenuously opposed to the notion of U.N. forces functioning within its jurisdiction. Indeed, on September 4, 2006, the Sudanese government in Khartoum rejected the provisions in the resolution.
With the AU confirming its intent to leave Darfur by the close of the month, there were worries about the prospects for the security situation on the ground. The announcement by Khartoum that it would deploy its own troops to monitor the situation did nothing to alleviate such anxieties. This was partially due to the fact that government-sponsored militias have been blamed for the increased violence in the region. Moreover, these developments ensued at a time when Sudanese troops were carrying out an offensive into the region.
By September 10, 2006, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan was increasing his pressure on the Sudanese government in Khartoum over the conflicted area of Darfur. The U.N. chief warned the Sudanese leadership that it would be held personally responsible for whatever transpired in Darfur. Annan said that conditions in the conflict area were already dire and that death on a mass scale was likely to occur in the absence of international peacekeepers. Annan's warning came in the aftermath of Khartoum's refusal to accept international peacekeepers in Darfur to replace outgoing AU troops, and, amidst increasing international pressure to resolve the crisis there.
Although a peace deal had been signed in May 2006 between the government and one of the rebel groups, there had been little improvement in the level of violence on the ground in Darfur. Instead, the violence has been increasing with attacks on aid workers taking place on an almost daily basis, and the number of deaths rising at an alarming rate. The fighting and violence aside, Darfur has been suffering a humanitarian crisis and aid agencies have warned that without an international peacekeeping force in the area, their work would be rendered virtually impossible. To this end, the head of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), Antonio Guterres, said, "I think we are facing a terrible disaster. War is starting again, violations of human rights are massive, situations of rape - these have all kinds of devastating forms of impact in the lives of this population and make us feel more and more uncomfortable because we are not able to help them. We cannot even have access to them. This is unacceptable, this has to stop."
Meanwhile, there were fears that the increasing violence might be a sign that the government was set to launch a major attack against certain rebel enclaves. Such a move would result in another wave of refugees from Darfur into nearby areas, such as the country of Chad, where the UNHCR was already dealing with the daunting task of caring for hundreds of thousands of refugees. Further humanitarian pressures on the areas surrounding Darfur could very well result in regional destabilization.
In mid-September 2006, protests and demonstrations took place from New York to London and across the world to draw attention to the crisis in Darfur. Activists particularly called for Sudan's government to allow United Nations peacekeepers into Darfur. The demand for action in Darfur was also made by the likes of United Kingdom Prime Minister Tony Blair, former United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu. The government in Khartoum, however, appeared unmoved by the rallies. Instead, they dismissed the activists as being victims of manipulation by the international media.
Also in mid-September, the AU said that it would consider continuing its presence in Sudan despite its previously scheduled exit. The gesture was offered in the hopes that the presence of some international forces on the ground in Sudan would mitigate the dire security conditions in Darfur.
Reports on October 22, 2006 stated that the government of Sudan expelled the U.N. envoy to that country, Jan Pronk. Khartoum's order stating that U.N. envoy had to leave within three days was issued on the heels on a website entry by Pronk. In that specific entry, Pronk noted that the morale of the Sudanese army was low following a series of defeats in the Darfur region. His words were as follows: "Morale in the government army in north Darfur has gone down. Some generals have been sacked; soldiers have refused to fight." He went on to note that the Sudanese army had lost two major defeats against rebel groups in the western region. He also suggested that Arab "Janjaweed" militias were being mobilized -- a move that would directly violate U.N. resolutions.
In response, Sudan's army decried Pronk's words, saying that they functioned as psychological warfare; the army also called for an apology. As well, Sammani al-Wasila, the Sudanese Foreign Minister, said in an interview with British media (BBC) that Pronk had moved beyond his expressed mandate and was not exhibiting neutrality. To this end, he said, "His role as personal envoy to the secretary general means he should be neutral to help solving problems, rather than creating problems."
Meanwhile, the U.N. said that Pronk was conveying his own views of the situation. Nevertheless, Pronk has had a history of expressing controversial views on his website, even leading to a request by the U.N. that he refrain from doing so. Bypassing the three day deadline, the U.N. immediately recalled Pronk to New York for consultations on the matter.
The international community was quick to condemn the expulsion of Pronk. According to the BBC, the British Foreign Office Minister, Lord Tiresman, said, "This step is counter-productive and will contribute nothing to solving the problems of Sudan." Meanwhile, Amadeu Altafaj Tardio, a spokesperson for the European Union said, "The presence of the United Nations is vital to hundreds of thousands of citizens of the Darfur region."
The action by Khartoum was the latest manifestation of resistance against global pressure, and particularly, U.N. influence. As noted above, Khartoum has resisted the provisions of a U.N. Security Council resolution calling for the deployment of U.N. troops in the Darfur region of Sudan.
In November 2006, there was a possible breakthrough between Khartoum and the U.N. on the matter of international peacekeeping forces in Darfur. Specifically, Sudan said that it welcomed a compromise deal brokered by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan in which a hybrid U.N.-AU force would be established to takeover the peacekeeping effort in Sudan. As noted above, Khartoum had strenuously objected to the notion of a U.N. force in its country, and had been more amenable to the notion of AU forces staying there. But the AU operation had been woefully equipped to handle its duties, and augmentation by U.N. forces would likely be very helpful in strengthening peacekeeping efforts. Sudan's leader was quick to characterize the deal as the U.N.'s augmentation of the existing AU effort and not as a joint force, saying, "The government of Sudan welcomes all financial, material, logistic or technical assistance from the U.N. in order to strengthen the AU mission in Darfur." Disagreement remained as regards the size of the force; where as Sudan has said that 12,000 troops would be sufficient, the U.N. has called for at least 17,000.
Meanwhile, on the ground in Darfur, the violence was escalating. Indeed, U.N. humanitarian chief, Jan Egeland, was forced to cut his visit to Darfur short after the Sudanese government warned him that it was too dangerous for him to travel in the region. Then he was later stopped from traveling into areas with refugees -- a move that led to suspicion about the government's motives.
Approximately 30 civilians were among the dead following an apparent attack on December 10, 2006 by the pro-government Janjaweed militia in the Darfur region of Sudan. The attack was carried out against a convoy carrying medical and relief supplies. Radhia Achouri, a spokesperson for the United Nations said, "Some people were shot, others were burned to death." Despite intensifying international pressure on the government of Darfur to deal with the violence in Darfur, there has been an increase in the number of pro-government "Janjaweed" militias along the border with Chad. As well, there have been an increased number of reports about the destruction of villages in the region.
In early 2007, a 60-day cease-fire was forged between the Sudanese government and the rebels in Darfur. As well, both sides agreed to participate in a peace summit, which would be sponsored jointly by the AU and the U.N. and held no later than March 2007. Other elements of the emerging concord involved journalists' re-entry into Darfur after a two month ban, and the removal of exit visas for aid and humanitarian workers. The agreement, which was intended to stop the violence in that region and assist in humanitarian efforts, was largely brokered by Bill Richardson -- the Democratic governor of the state of New Mexico in the United States, who had once served in former President Bill Clinton's cabinet.
Richardson said, "President Bashir agreed to the start of a peace process that includes a 60-day cessation of hostilities." The American politician and diplomat also said that he had met with rebel commanders in Darfur, and that they had also agreed to the ceasefire. The Sudanese government issued a joint statement with Richardson, noting that Sudanese authorities would not use military aircraft emblazoned in white colors, typically reserved for humanitarians, and that Darfur rebel commanders could convene meetings in a field that would be monitored by the AU and U.N.
While no agreement had yet been reached on the matter of allowing U.N. troops into Sudan, Richardson noted that President Bashir was no longer maintaining a hard-line position. To this end, he explained, "I note flexibility in his position. When I first was here five months ago he was dead set against any U.N. troops. Now there's some flexibility as ... there are technical U.N. blue-helmeted troops that will be permitted. Not fighting troops ... but it is progress."
In March 2007, a United Nations (U.N.) human rights mission accused the Sudanese government of both orchestrating and being involved in human rights abuses and crimes, such as mass murder and rape, in Darfur. The 35-page report by the mission said, "The situation is characterized by gross and systematic violations of human rights and grave breaches of international humanitarian law." It went on to make the following conclusion: "The mission further concludes that the government of Sudan has manifestly failed to protect the population of Darfur from large-scale international crimes and has itself orchestrated and participated in these crimes."
The Sudanese government denied the charges, saying that the Arab "Janjaweed" militias were responsible for any abuses that might have occurred. It also charged that the media and international community had exagerrated the situation in Darfur, presenting it as far more dire than the reality. Additionally, it rejected frequently-made accusations that the attacks on the Black African population of Darfur amounted to a genocide. Finally, the Sudanese government said that it did not intend to cooperate with the investigation by the International Criminal Court (ICC) into the matter.
In June 2007, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir relented somewhat on his refusal to allow international peacekeepers in Darfur. The Sudanese president agreed to allow a joint force of United Nations and African Union peacekeepers to operate in conflict-ridden Darfur, on the condition that the majority of troops would come from African countries.
Disagreement regarding how long the forces would function in Sudan was resolved after the Sudan and the United Nations said they would review the situation periodically. The Sudanese government also said that non-African troops should be used only as a last resort -- a condition that could potentially impair the functioning of peacekeepers at full strength.
Nevertheless, the African Union (AU) hailed the decision by Sudan as a breakthrough. Indeed, Noureddine Menzi, a spokesperson for the African bloc said, "It is a breakthrough moment." However, critics noted that such pledges had been made earlier -- and always with disappointing results.
By August 2007, African Union (AU) commission chairman Alpha Oumar Konare noted that there were sufficient African troops available to make up a joint AU-U.N. peacekeeping force of 26,000 without including non-African troops. Critics questioned the viability of the plan, pointing to the lack of trained African forces and also the lack of clarity regarding the actual African countries that would be providing the requisite forces. Until this announcement, the inclusion of U.N. troops from Asia had been expected, and the U.N. had released a list of countries in Asia -- Indonesia, Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh -- that had already pledged troops.
In late September 2007, an attack on African Union (AU) peacekeepers at an army base in Darfur left at least 10 dead, and more than 40 missing. The attack was blamed on a breakaway rebel faction. The international community reacted with strong condemnation. United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon characterized the killings as "outrageous." Attention immediately turned to the viability of the peacekeeping mission in Darfur, especially since Senegal warned that it might withdraw from the effort. Meanwhile, a delegation of notable international dignitaries, including South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu, United Nations Envoy to Iraq Lakhdar Brahimi, and former United States President Jimmy Carter, traveled to Sudan to meet with President Omar al-Bashir and opposition leaders to discuss the crisis. They were expected to then leave Khartoum and travel on to Darfur where they would visit refugee camps.
In October 2007, peace talks in Libya sponsored by the United Nations and the African Union, aimed at ending the conflict in Darfur between rebels and the government, were at risk of collapsing due to the boycott of key rebel groups including SLA-Unity and the Justice and Equality Movement (Jem). International mediators, including United Nations envoy Jan Eliasson, tried to salvage the situation by offering more time to rebel groups for the purpose of preparing for negotiations with the Sudanese government. As well, mediators were expected to consult with the principle rebel groups in Darfur in anticipation of the actual negotiations.
Originally, it was hoped that the talks in Libya would constitute the first stage of negotiations. Given the boycott of the rebel groups, however, the Libya summit had to be recast as a consultation ahead of actual negotiations. Placing the situation in its most favorable light, Eliasson said, "I refuse to state that the peace process is interrupted." He went on to state, "The real substantial negotiations will start when the parties are prepared." Still, there was no sense of when the next stage would commence.
In the background of these developments was an announcement by the Sudanese government of a unilateral ceasefire. This apparently positive development was somewhat overshadowed by reports of hundreds of people being removed -- by force -- from a refugee camp just outside the city of Nyala in southern Darfur. The government of Sudan sent that the people were being taken to another camp, however, this assertion could not be verified since United Nations personnel were not allowed to communicate with the refugees.
At the close of 2007, Gillian Gibbons, a British woman working in Sudan was arrested and eventually found guilty of blasphemy for allowing her students to name a teddy bear Mohammed. The Sudanese diplomat in the United Kingdom declined to intervene, saying that the legal process had to run its course. That course ended with a guilty verdict and punishment of imprisonment for 15 days. Some Sudanese took to the streets to complain of the leniency of her sentence and to call for her execution. Indeed, worries about her safety led to Gibbons' detainment at a secret location.
Meanwhile, two British parliamentarians -- Baroness Warsi and Lord Ahmed (both of whom were Muslims) -- traveled to Sudan to attempt to secure Gibbons' release. By December 3, 2007, following talks with Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, Gibbons' pardon and release had been secured much to the delight of British Prime Minister Gordon Brown who had characterized her detainment as "completely unacceptable." Brown also thanked Warsi and Ahmed for their efforts. For her part, Gibbons apologized for any "distress" she may have caused and was taken into care of the British diplomats.
In December 2007, rebels in Sudan's Darfur region claimed a military victory against the Sudanese army. The clash took place close to the border with Chad and the rebels said that they had fought two battalions, ultimately capturing 29 soldiers, and taking possession of 32 vehicles and several weapons. Abdel Aziz el-Nur Ashr, a commader for Justice and Equality Movement (Jem), said that among those captured was a lieutenant-colonel. He also claimed to have attacked Sudan's oil field at Defra. It was the second time in days that Jem rebels claimed to have enjoyed a military victory against Sudanese troops. The earlier attack was said to have been against an army garrison in central Sudan. For its part, the Sudanese military army confirmed that it engaged in a clash with rebels but denied further claims, including significant losses.
At the start of 2008, an American diplomat, John Granville, along with his driver, were shot to death in the Sudanese capital of Khartoum. The Sudanese government condemned the killing, although it said that Granville's death was not an act of terrorism. The United States (U.S.) authorities noted that it was premature to determine the motivation behind Granville's killing. Granville's death occurred one day after a joint African Union-United Nations force took over peacekeeping responsibilities in Darfur. With anti-Western sentiment at an all-time high in Sudan due to international recrimination about the situation in Darfur, and given the timing of Granville's death just after the handover of the peacekeeping mission, there was speculation that Darfur may have been the key motivating factor for the attackers.
Also in January 2008, clan leader Musa Hilal was named as a top adviser to Sudan's Minister of Federal Affairs, Abdel Basit Sabderat. The United States Department of State as well as several human rights agencies condemned the move, noting that Hilal was a leaded of the "Janjaweed" Arab militia accused of carrying out war crimes and genocide against the Black African population in Darfur. Meanwhile, the move by the Sudanese government clearly indicated that it was not particularly interested in bowing to international pressure as regards Darfur.
In February 2008, there was an offensive by the Sudanese authorities into Darfur. The government said that the offensive was directed at the rebels, however the Justice and Equality Movement said that more than 200 civilians died when military troops and Janjaweed militias had attacked three villages, which were also battered by aerial bombardment. The United Nations confirmed the bombardment of the villages in Darfur and also noted that 12,000 people were fleeing western Sudan and taking refuge in Chad. By the close of the month, the Sudanese government was reported to have renewed its air strikes in Darfur. The United Nations African Union mission in Sudan confirmed that it received reports of aerial bombings in the area of Jebel Moun, and that it was very concerned about the safety of the civilians in the region.
In May 2008, a rebel attack on the suburb of Omdurman in the Sudanese capital of Khartoum led to the devolution of ties with the neighboring country of Chad. At issue was Sudan's accusation that Chad's assistance to Justice and Equality Movement (Jem) rebels in Darfur directly contributed to the attack. There were conflicting claims about the success of the attack. While Jem rebels from Darfur claimed to have taken control over the area, Sudanese officials said that they defeated the rebel fighters. There were reports that fighting had abated in Khartoum, however, there were also suggestions that clashes were continuing to the west of the city. Regardless, civilians have been ordered to stay off the streets.
For their parts, Chad, as well as Darfur's Jem rebels, denied having a connection. Indeed, the Legislative Council Chairman of Jem, Eltahir Adam Elfaki, asserted that the group acted alone. He said, "Jem is self-dependent. It is a force that built itself from the equipment of the Sudan government following our activities against the Sudan government." Sudan, however, was not receptive to this claim and Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir announced that his country was cutting off diplomatic ties with Chad on state television. He said, "These forces [behind the Omdurman attack] are all basically Chadian forces supported and prepared by Chad and they moved from Chad under the leadership of [rebel chief] Khalil Ibrahim." An award offer for information leading to the arrest of Khalil Ibrahim was issued. President Bashir also ominously noted that Sudan reserved the right to retaliate against Chad.
On July 9, 2008, it was reported that seven members of the joint United Nations-African Union peacekeeping mission in Sudan's conflict-ridden region of Darfur were killed. More than 22 others were injured in the attack. According to reports, 40 armoured vehicles ambushed the peacekeeping forces who were on patrol in the northern part of Darfur. Since the volatile region is the site of activity for several rebel factions and the notorious pro-government Islamic "Janjaweed" militias, there was no immediate sense of who was responsible for the deadly attack. However, since the government has been hostile to the presence of peacekeeping forces in Darfur, speculation ran rampant that the Janjaweed may have been to blame; there was no confirmation of this theory at the time of writing.
May 2009 saw already-strained relations between Chad and Sudan devolve to new lows. First, Chad accused its neighbor, Sudan, of backing rebels who have sought to overthrow the government of President Idriss Deby. This has not been a new development since Chad has for some time charged Sudan with supporting the rebels, who have indeed operated from across the border in Sudanese territory. But less than two weeks later after Chad's latest condemnation, Sudan accused Chad of launching air raids inside Sudanese territory. One Sudanese spokesperson said that such action would constitute not only a violation of sovereignty, but a declaration of war. There were conflicting reports as to whether or not the strikes resulted in casualties. That said, Sudan reportedly demanded a meeting with the Chadian ambassador and notified the United Nations Security Council, the Arab League, and the African Union of its claims. Ironically, these events transpired at a time when Khartoum and N'Djamena were supposedly trying to forge a reconciliation agreement in Qatar.
The boundary region between Chad and Sudan has been home to hundreds of thousands of displaced persons and refugees as a result of the conflict in Darfur and as a result, has become a hotbed for cross-border violence. The situation has also resulted in strained relations with Sudan since rebels attempting to oust Chadian President Idriss Deby have operated from Sudanese terrain. As well, the Chadian government has accused Sudan and the rebels of trying to undermine the peacekeeping operations in Darfur. The situation in the eastern part of Chad (close to the border with Sudan), resulted in the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people in the last year, according to the United Nations. But on the other side of the equation, Sudan has accused Chad of backing rebels in Darfur while Chad has denied these charges. A May 2008 rebel attack on a suburb in the Sudanese capital of Khartoum led to diplomatic ties being cut between the two countries. It was yet to be seen how the evolving imbroglio of May 2009 would unfold.
In mid-July 2008, the United Nations' (U.N.) International Criminal Court (ICC), based in The Hague in the Netherlands, charged Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir with crimes against humanity and genocide in Darfur. The chief prosecutor of the ICC was set to present evidence against President Bashir for his alleged involvement in the orchestration of genocide and his alleged participation in crimes against humanity.
The indictment of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir would mark the first time that the ICC in The Hague has charged a sitting head of state. While other sitting heads of state, such as Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Liberian President Charles Taylor, were charged by war crimes tribunals, never before has the world's first permanent war crimes body – the ICC -- taken such drastic action.
Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo intimated his intent to target the top echelon of the Sudanese government, which he believed to have been behind a violent campaign against the Black African population of Sudan's Darfur region. Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo has accused the Sudanese government of backing the Islamist Arab "Janjaweed" militias who roamed Darfur and unleashed a reign of terror and bloodshed on the region’s people since 2003. The chief prosecutor for the ICC said that his evidence has been derived from reports of investigators based in the neighboring country of Chad, as well as supporting evidence from more than 100 witnesses from across 18 countries. In June 2008, he told the U.N. Security Council that "evidence shows that the commission of such crimes on such a scale, over a period of five years, and throughout Darfur, has required the sustained mobilization of the entire Sudanese state apparatus."
In response, a spokesman for Sudan's president, Mahjoub Fadul Badry, characterized the ICC prosecutor as a "terrorist," and said that the investigation was predicated on biased testimony from rebel leaders. Badry also dismissed the case and said that the government would not hand over any suspects to the ICC. Meanwhile, Abdalmahmood Abdalhaleem Mohamed, Sudan's ambassador to the United Nations (U.N.), condemned the case by the ICC and warned of consequences. He said: "We condemn it [the ICC case] in the strongest of terms. It will have far-reaching, bad implications for the entire country, and all options are open for our reactions," He then ominously noted, "If you indict our head of state, the symbol of our country, the symbol of our dignity, then the sky's the limit for our reactions."
A spokesperson for the United States Department of State, Sean McCormack, said that the Sudanese government should not resort to violence. He said, "Violence perpetrated by the government against those on the ground performing humanitarian missions, performing duties on behalf of their governments serves — certainly does not serve the purposes of the Sudanese government."
In the wake of the International Criminal Court's (ICC) decision to charge Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir with war crimes and genocide, attention turned to the safety of peacekeepers and humanitarian workers in the Darfur region of Sudan.
With many international aid workers and peacekeepers from the United Nations and the African Union (AU) working in Sudan, there was a degree of risk to consider in launching those charges against President Bashir. Indeed, foreign nationals in Sudan were already being deleteriously affected by the unstable and violent landscape of Darfur. In early July 2008, joint U.N.-AU peacekeepers were the victims of a violent ambush, which the U.N. blamed on the government-backed "Janjaweed" militias. Eight peacekeepers were killed and 22 others were injured as a result of that attack. Now, with the international community poised to take action against the Sudanese leader, there were fears that such attacks on foreign nationals could increase. To that end, the United Nations decided to withdraw some of its non-essential staff deployed in Darfur as a precautionary measure.
The move by the United Nations seemed prudent after Sudan warned that it could not guarantee the safety of U.N. and AU peacekeepers functioning in Darfur. The warning appeared to be precipitously close to a threat against international personnel. Indeed, a presidential advisor said that if the ICC indicted Bashir, then Sudan would not be responsible for the well-being of the international forces operating under U.N. mandate in Darfur.
Nevertheless, even with such risks in sight, human rights groups have said that such action was necessary. Richard Dicker, the director of international justice for Human Rights Watch noted, "If the prosecutor requests an arrest warrant against the president of Sudan for genocide or crimes against humanity or both, it will a huge step in limiting the impunity for horrific acts committed against innocent people in Darfur." He continued, "It would send the message that no one is above the law for these kinds of crimes including a sitting president."
In August 2008, Chairman of the African Union (AU) Commission Jean Ping said that the International Criminal Court's (ICC) decision to indict Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir would hamper peace efforts in Darfur. At issue were the ICC's charges against Bashir for war crimes and genocide related to the Sudanese government's actions in Darfur. Ping accused the ICC of "pouring oil on the fire" and suggested that the ongoing peace efforts by the AU in Darfur would not be helped as a result. He said, "While we are trying to extinguish the fire here with our troops, we don't understand very well that they chose that moment to put more oil on the fire by taking the decision."
Ping's statements came after a meeting with Bashir at the presidential palace in the Sudanese capital of Khartoum and appeared to reflect some of the anxieties of regional leaders. While human rights groups have welcomed the indictment of Bashir for gross human rights abuses against the Black African population of Darfur, regional leaders have worried that the ICC's action could anger Sudanese officials enough to obstruct peace efforts, and could very well present safety challenges for international peacekeeping forces operating in Darfur. To that latter issue, Sudan's government already warned that it would no longer guarantee the safety of international peacekeepers and aid workers in western Sudan, as discussed above.
In October 2008, Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo wanted the ICC to issue an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, however, judges from the ICC were asking for further supporting materials regarding some confidential aspects of the case. To that end, Ocampo was afforded 30 days to provide the additional evidence dealing with the charges that include: genocide against the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups; crimes against humanity including extermination, rape, torture and forcible transfer; and war crimes including attacks on civilians and the pillaging of villages.
In early 2009, as the International Criminal Court (ICC) prepared to issue an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir on charges that he orchestrated a genocide in Darfur, a Sudanese official warned of retaliatory attacks on foreigners.
The head of Sudan's National Security and Intelligence Service, Salah Gosh, warned that if the ICC pursued its case against President Bashir, his government would not be responsible for the angry reaction of the Sudanese citizens. He also warned that foreigners would be the likely target of that public anger. Salah Gosh also reiterated the oft-repeated accusation of the Sudanese government that the ICC chief prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, was a political activist, and that the ICC's decision would therefore be of the political rather than legal variety.
Meanwhile, as the International Criminal Court ICC prepared to issue an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir on charges that he orchestrated genocide in Darfur, two Sudanese groups officially launched a challenge to the ICC case. The Sudan Workers Trade Unions Federation and the Sudan International Defense Group -- both of which are regarded as proxies for the Sudanese government -- requested that the ICC refrain from issuing the arrest warrant for President Bashir. It was a move that contained the potential to delay the legal proceedings.
The Sudanese government has itself been calling on the United Nations Security Council to delay the case against President Bashir. This call has been backed by the African Union as well as the Arab League.
In Sudan, a well-known Islamist opposition leader, Hassan al-Turabi, said that President Bashir should voluntarily face the charges launched by the ICC. The Sudanese authorities then arrested him and, according to his family, he was being held in solitary confinement.
A ruling by the ICC regarding an arrest warrant for President Bashir was expected to be rendered by 2009.
On March 4, 2009, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an international arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur. It was the first time the ICC, based in The Hague in the Netherlands, has decided to issue an arrest warrant for a sitting head of state since its establishment in 2002.
At a news conference in The Hague, Laurence Blairon -- the ICC spokesperson -- announced that an arrest warrant for Bashir had been issued on the basis of alleged "war crimes and crimes against humanity" committed in Sudan's western Darfur region between April 2003 and July 2008. Blairon said Bashir was suspected of being criminally responsible for "intentionally directing attacks against an important part of the civilian population of Darfur, Sudan, murdering, exterminating, raping, torturing and forcibly transferring large numbers of civilians and pillaging their property." The ICC spokesperson also said that the violence in Darfur was believed to be the result of a plan that had been orchestrated at the highest level of the Sudanese government.
Blairon noted that the ICC would soon transmit a request for Bashir's arrest and surrender to the government of Sudan. Silvana Arbia, the ICC's registrar, said that she would request cooperation in this endeavor to not only Sudan, but the 108 states that are party to the Rome Statute -- the founding treaty of the ICC. The request for cooperation would also be sent to the United Nations Security Council members that are not party to the Rome Statute. Arbia noted that if Sudan does not comply with the ICC's arrest warrant, the court would refer the matter to the United Nations Security Council for action.
President Bashir's charge sheet included five counts of crime against humanity: murder, extermination, torture, rape and forcible transfer, and two counts of war crimes: intentional direction of attacks against civilians and pillaging. Notably absent from the charge sheet, however, was the charge of genocide, which had been alleged in the original indictment by ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo in 2008. In mid-July 2008, the ICC had officially charged President Bashir with crimes against humanity and genocide in Darfur, but there was a decision to delay issuing an arrest warrant for the purpose of gathering further evidence, specifically with regard to genocide.
Now, months later, the ICC was moving forward with an arrest warrant against the Sudanese leader. But genocide was omitted from this warrant because two of the three-member pre-trial chamber found the prosecutor "failed to provide reasonable grounds to believe that the government of Sudan acted with specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups [three ethnic groups in Darfur]." Nevertheless, the judges found that Bashir, "as the de jure and de facto president of Sudan and commander-in-chief of the Sudanese armed forces, is suspected of having coordinated the design and implementation of the counter-insurgency campaign," by which the civilian population composed of the three ethnic groups in Darfur were "unlawfully attacked." The judges concluded that Bashir's position as a sitting head of state did not "exclude his criminal responsibility, nor does it grant him immunity against prosecution before the ICC."
ICC Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo hailed the judges' decision to issue an arrest warrant for the Sudanese president as historic, and cast Bashir in pariah territory. He said, "Like Slobodan Milosevic or Charles Taylor, Omar Al Bashir's destiny is to face justice." Meanwhile, the government of the United States welcomed the development, along with international human rights groups. Richard Dicker of Human Rights Watch characterized Bashir as "a wanted man" while Amnesty International urged all countries to do their duty and arrest the Sudanese leader if he entered their jurisdiction. Not surprisingly, Darfur's Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rebel group characterized the ICC's decision as a "victory for international law" and urged Bashir to surrender.
As might be expected, President Bashir had quite a different response. Ahead of the announcement, President Bashir made his contempt for the ICC and its proceedings known by saying that the tribunal at The Hague could "eat" the arrest warrant. He also characterized any arrest warrant as "not worth the ink it is written on." In a show of disregard for his potentially precarious legal footing, he then danced for thousands of supporters. Later, in an interview with the Sudanese media, he said, "This decision is exactly what we have been expecting from the court, which was created to target Sudan and to be part of the new mechanism of neo-colonialism." Throughout, President Bashir has denied the charges against him and he has dismissed decisions by the ICC as being without merit. Indeed, Sudan is not a member of the ICC and does not recognize the court's jurisdiction.
Many African and Arab countries have opposed the notion of an arrest warrant for Bashir, warning that it could negatively affect peace negotiations in Darfur and exacerbate tensions in Sudan and the wider region. Accordingly, Egypt initiated an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council, with a bid to delay the implementation of the arrest warrant against President Bashir. But United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called on Sudan to "cooperate fully" with the ICC and all United Nations institutions. Such cooperation was not likely to occur voluntarily. Indeed, Sudan's foreign ministry said that President Bashir intended to ignore the arrest warrant and attend an Arab summit scheduled for late March 2009 in Qatar. To date, Sudan has ignored prevailing arrest warrants for its Humanitarian Affairs Minister Ahmed Haroun and Ali Abdul Rahman, the Janjaweed militia leader.
Meanwhile, in the wake of the war crimes arrest warrant against him, President Bashir issued a warning to peacekeepers, humanitarian aid workers and diplomats in Sudan. Speaking in Darfur, he said, "I have a message to all the diplomatic missions in Sudan, the non-governmental organizations and the peacekeepers.They have to respect the rule of the country. If anyone goes further than the rule of the country, we will kick them out directly." His defiant tone was well-received by supporters who chanted the president's name while railing against ICC, ICC Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo and the international community.
President Bashir's comments appeared to be more than bluster as he had already expelled 13 aid agencies whom he accused of being "spies" and "thieves." The United Nations decried the move, noting that more than a million people would be left in jeopardy as a result.
On March 7, 2009, the United Nations Security Council met to forge a statement asking Sudan to reverse the decision to expel the 13 aid agencies. That effort resulted in failure as China objected to the move. Analysts have noted that China may have its own economic self-interest at stake since it purchases oil from Sudan and exports its own weapons to Sudan.
The status of international workers in Sudan took a grave turn days later when three workers from the humanitarian group, Medecins Sans Frontieres, were kidnapped at gunpoint from their office in the Darfur region of Sudan. The kidnapped workers included a Canadian nurse, an Italian doctor and a French organizer. While the workers were from a chapter of Medecins Sans Frontieres who were not among the 13 expelled aid agencies, there were other chapters of the group on the expulsion list. Given the inhospitable climate for foreign nationals in Sudan, there was a sense of anxiety about the situation. However, days later, the Italian government released a statement announcing that the three were “free.” The terms of their release were not made public although authorities in Darfur blamed the abductions on bandits seeking ransom.
A joint delegation from the Arab League and the African Union was expected to call on the United Nations Security Council to suspend the war crimes case against President Bashir.
In June 2009, Sudan said that it would allow four aid agencies, which were previously expelled from the country months earlier, to return to the conflict zone in Darfur. Care International, Save the Children, Mercy Corps, and Padco were among the 13 organizations that were expelled from Sudan in March 2009 in the midst of accusations of spying and thievery. The claims were made in a climate of increased tensions shortly after the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for President Bashir in relation to charges of crimes against humanity.
The United Nations humanitarian chief, John Holmes, said that after reviewing its request for the groups’ reinstatement, Sudan had allowed the non-government organizations to return to Darfur under the aegis of new registration. Holmes noted that the other nine aid agencies could endeavor to re-enter the country by re-registering as well. Holmes noted that there was some progress made in improving relations between the Sudanese government in Khartoum and the United Nations since the indictment of President Bashir.
Editor's Note: --
In 2003, rebel groups attacked government targets in the Darfur region of Sudan. The government of Sudan responded by launching a military campaign against the rebels, but gained international notoriety when the government began to use militias to carry out its crackdown. To date, over 300,000 people have been killed and more than 2,000,000 people have been displaced as a result of violence in the region, largely spurred by the actions of government-sponsored Arab "Janjaweed" militias against the Black African and rebel-backed population of the region.
A United Nations Security Council resolution was passed, authorizing the deployment of United Nations troops to Darfur, however, the Sudanese government at first rejected this measure. Instead, a small and ill-equipped peacekeeping force from the African Union functioned as the only form of protection for civilians in Darfur against rampaging "Janjaweed" militias. Then, in June 2007, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir relented somewhat on his refusal to allow international peacekeepers in Darfur. The Sudanese president agreed to allow a joint force of United Nations and African Union peacekeepers to operate in conflict-ridden Darfur, on the condition that the majority of troops would come from African countries.
Meanwhile, efforts to negotiate peace with the rebels have been fraught with difficulty. In October 2007, peace talks in Libya sponsored by the United Nations and the African Union, aimed at ending the conflict in Darfur between rebels and the government, were not significantly advanced due to the boycott of key rebel groups including SLA-Unity and the Justice and Equality Movement (Jem).
As noted above, in 2008, the International Criminal Court at The Hague charged Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir with crimes against humanity and genocide in Darfur. In March 2009, the ICC finally issued an arrest warrant from Bashir on the basis of a modified charge sheet of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Human rights groups hailed the development while the Sudanese authorities dismissed the news and promised to ignore the arrest warrant.
The situation in Darfur gained attention in the mainstream United States press largely due to coverage in the New York Times by columnist Nicholas Kristof. For his efforts in bringing attention to the most marginalized parts of the world, such as Darfur, Kristof won a Pulitzer Prize.
Written by Ryan Holliway, Researcher and Writer, CountryWatch Inc. and Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief, CountryWatch Inc.
Sources: BBC, International Crisis Group, Reuters, New York Times, Council on Foreign Relations, Giving Meaning to Never Again: Seeking an Effective Response to the Crisis in Darfur and Beyond (Cheryl O. Igiri and Princeton N. Lyman, September 2004). Council on Foreign Relations special report.