

Guinea-Bissau



2016 Country Review

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Chapter 1

Country Overview

Country Overview

GUINEA-BISSAU

Since gaining independence from Portugal in 1974, Guinea-Bissau has been subject to considerable political instability. This political climate combined with mismanagement have contributed to a poor economy, and Guinea-Bissau holding the dubious distinction of being one of the most impoverished countries in the world. It has also become a major hub for the trafficking of narcotics from Latin America to Europe.

In 1980, a military coup d'etat established authoritarian dictator Joao Bernardo 'Nino' Vieira as president. Several coup attempts through the 1980s and early 1990s failed to unseat him, and in 1994 Vieira was elected president in the country's first free elections. But four years later he was ousted from office following his decision to dismiss his army chief. The scenario triggered something of a civil war, which eventually ended thanks to foreign mediation, an ensuing truce, and elections in January 2000. The next month saw the transitional government turning over power to opposition leader Kumba Yala following two rounds of transparent presidential elections. In September 2003, after only three years in office, Yala was ousted by the military in a bloodless coup, and businessman Henrique Rosa was sworn in as interim president. Former President Vieira was re-elected president in 2005.

By 2008, the country had devolved into a state of alarming instability once again including a gun attack on the president himself and an attempted overthrow of the president. To that end, in 2008, the country successfully thwarted an attempted coup d'etat by Rear Admiral Jose Americo Bubo Na Tchuto, who would later resurface as a player in the political instability unfolding in 2010 and again in 2011. In the meanwhile, March 2009 saw the assassination of President Vieira.

Ultimately, Malam Bacai Sanha won the June 2009 presidential election and the July runoff, thus taking power as the new head of state. Several presidential contenders were assassinated or threatened in the period leading up to that election.

In 2012, attention was on forthcoming elections to determine who would succeed President Sanha, who had died in Paris of medical complications at the start of the year. In the interim, the country was under the leadership of Raimundo Pereira, the speaker of the parliament in conformity with the Constitution. The first round of the anticipated elections was held in March 2012 and was headed to a runoff, or second round, when the democratic process was short-circuited by a

military coup in April 2012 and the installation of a junta at the helm of government.

In the aftermath of that coup that deposed the government, an agreement was reached between ECOWAS mediators and the military junta to name Manuel Sherifo Nhamadjo as the transitional president at the helm of the country for a one-year term. The transitional government has scheduled a presidential election for late 2013 with new election date subsequently set for 2014. Those elections were won by President Josse Mario Vaz who became the country's new president.

Note: Guinea-Bissau has never had an elected president finish his term in office since the introduction of multi-party elections in 1994.

Key Data

Key Data	
Region:	Africa
Population:	1726170
Climate:	Tropical; generally hot and humid with monsoon-like rainy season and a dry season with harmattan winds
Languages:	Portuguese (Official) Criolo Indigenous Languages
Currency:	CFA franc
Holiday:	Independence Day is 10 September (1974) {it is celebrated on 24 September}, Colonization Martyr's Day is 3 August
Area Total:	36120
Area Land:	28000
Coast Line:	350

Guinea-Bissau

Country Map



Africa

Regional Map



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Chapter 2

Political Overview

History

The rivers of Guinea and the Cape Verde islands were among the first areas in Africa explored by the Portuguese in the 15th century. Portugal claimed Portuguese Guinea in 1446, but few trading posts were established before 1600. In 1630, a "captaincy-general" of Portuguese Guinea was established to administer the territory.

With the cooperation of self-seeking local leadership, the Portuguese entered the slave trade and exported large numbers of Africans to the Western Hemisphere via the Cape Verde Islands. Cacheu became one of the major slaving centers (a small fort still stands in the town). The slave trade declined in the 19th century, and Bissau, originally founded as a military and slave-trading center in 1765, grew to become the major commercial center.

Portuguese conquest and consolidation of the interior did not begin until the latter half of the 19th century. Portugal lost part of Guinea to French West Africa (including the center of earlier Portuguese commercial interest, the Casamance River region). A dispute with Great Britain over the island of Bolama was settled in Portugal's favor with the involvement of United States President Ulysses S. Grant.

Before World War I, Portuguese forces under Maj. Teixeira Pinto, with some assistance from the Muslim population, subdued animist tribes and eventually established the territory's borders. The interior of Portuguese Guinea was brought under control after more than 30 years of fighting; final subjugation of the Bijagos Islands did not occur until 1936. The administrative capital was moved from Bolama to Bissau in 1941, and in 1952, by constitutional amendment, the colony of Portuguese Guinea became an overseas province of Portugal.

In 1956, Amilcar Cabral and Raphael Barbosa organized the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde, or PAIGC, clandestinely. The PAIGC moved its headquarters to Conakry, Guinea in 1960 and started an armed rebellion against the Portuguese in 1961.

Despite the presence of Portuguese troops, a contingent that grew to more than 35,000, the PAIGC steadily expanded its influence, and by 1968 it controlled most of the country. It established civilian rule in the territory under its control and held elections for a National Assembly. Portuguese forces and civilians increasingly were confined to their garrisons and larger towns. The Portuguese

governor and commander in chief from 1968 to 1973, Gen. Antonio de Spínola, returned to Portugal and led the movement that brought democracy to Portugal and independence for its colonies.

Amílcar Cabral was assassinated in Conakry in 1973, and party leadership fell to Aristides Pereira, who later became the first president of the Republic of Cape Verde. The PAIGC National Assembly met at Boé in the southeastern region and declared the independence of Guinea-Bissau on Sept. 24, 1973. Portugal, following its April 1974 revolution, granted independence to Guinea-Bissau on Sept. 10, 1974. Luís Cabral, Amílcar Cabral's half-brother, became president of Guinea-Bissau.

Supplementary sources: United States (U.S.) State Department, Reliefweb and the United States Institute of Peace Library, Peace Agreements Digital Collection.

Note on History: In certain entries, open source content from the State Department Background Notes and Country Guides have been used. A full listing of sources is available in the Bibliography.

Political Conditions

1980-1999

In late 1980, the government was overthrown in a relatively bloodless coup led by João Bernardo Vieira, the prime minister and former armed forces commander.

From November 1980 to May 1984, a provisional government held power, responsible to a revolutionary council headed by President João Bernardo Vieira. In 1984, the council was dissolved, and the 150-member "Assembleia Nacional Popular" (National Popular Assembly or ANP) was reconstituted. The single-party assembly approved a new constitution; elected President Vieira to a new five-year term; and elected the Council of State, the executive agent of the ANP. Under this system, the president would preside over the Council of State and serve as both head of state and head of government. The president would also be commander in chief of the armed forces.

There were alleged coup plots against the Vieira government in 1983, 1985 and 1993. In 1986, first Vice President Paulo Correia and five others were executed for treason following a lengthy trial. In

1989, the ruling PAIGC under the direction of President Vieira began to outline a political liberalization program; the National Popular Assembly, or ANP, approved the plan in 1991. Reforms paved the way for multiparty democracy. The repeal of articles of the constitution enshrining the leading role of the PAIGC was particularly important. Laws were ratified to allow the formation of additional (i.e. opposition) political parties, a free press and independent trade unions with the right to strike. The political liberalization program ended one-party dominance in Guinea-Bissau. A national elections law was approved in February 1993, and a month later a national elections commission was established. By 1994, 12 political parties had been recognized and that year also witnessed the first multiparty presidential and legislative elections. The elections, tentatively planned for March, ultimately took place on July 3, 1994, following a nationwide voter registration process.

From 1995 to 1997, the government of Guinea-Bissau faced several crises. The public's discontent with wage levels and the state of the economy in general precipitated a number of strikes and demonstrations. The government responded to the civil unrest with three different wage increases, in May and then October 1995, and once more in August 1997.

In the midst of these wage increases, the government was attempting to join the "Union Economique et Monetaire Ouest-Africaine" (UEMOA or the Economic Union of West Africa). In November 1996, the National People's Assembly rejected membership in the UEMOA, arguing that it would be at least two years before Guinea-Bissau's economic and financial situation would enable it to successfully integrate with its French-speaking neighbors. Eventually, however, President Vieira was able to persuade the National People's Assembly to allow Guinea-Bissau to request membership. In January 1997, Guinea-Bissau acceded to the UEMOA, entering the Franc Zone on May 2, 1997.

In addition to dealing with civil unrest and international economic policy changes, the government also underwent several internal crises. President Vieira dismissed then Prime Minister da Costa in May 1997. Without obtaining the assembly members' consent, President Vieira replaced da Costa with Carlos Correia on May 30. Opposition assembly members were outraged at what they saw as President Vieira's circumvention of the constitution. The Supreme Court examined the issue in August 1997, ruling against President Vieira in October. In a rare sign of governing efficacy, on Oct. 11, 1997, to the satisfaction of assembly members, President Vieira dismissed Prime Minister Correia. President Vieira then consulted extensively with assembly members, obtained their approval, and reappointed Correia on Oct. 13, 1997.

In December 1997 and January 1998, the government arrested approximately 20 people (civilians and soldiers) for alleged arms trafficking. Among those accused was Brig. Gen. Ansumane Mane, who was subsequently suspended from active duty.

Five months later, on June 6, 1998, President Vieira dismissed Mane. Mane's dismissal precipitated

an uprising the next day, as approximately 90 percent of the armed forces rallied behind Mane in an attempt to oust Vieira. These forces were engaged by the remaining 10 percent of troops loyal to Vieira, supported by troops called in from neighboring Republic of Guinea (Conakry) and Senegal. Some 300,000 residents of the capital city, Bissau, were forced to flee from the conflict centered there, and intensive artillery battles ensued within the urban center.

By July 1998, with the mediation of Portugal (specifically, the "Comunidade dos Países da Língua Portuguesa" or CPLP) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the two sides agreed to a negotiated cease-fire. Finally, a cease-fire between the Vieira government and the military junta of Gen. Mane was signed on Aug. 26, 1998, in Praia, Cape Verde.

The crisis, however, was not over. Follow-up peace talks on Sept. 11 and 12 in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire were unsuccessful. The two sides agreed that a peacekeeping force needed to be positioned in Guinea-Bissau; however, they could not agree on the details of such a force. The main point of contention was the involvement, at the request of President Vieira, of troops from Senegal and the Republic of Guinea (Conakry).

President Vieira justified these two countries' involvement based on an earlier security agreement between the governments of Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, the Republic of Guinea (Conakry) and Senegal that dated back to the previous year. The military junta, however, viewed the involvement of Guinea, The Gambia and Senegal as a violation of Guinea-Bissau's sovereignty in the name of garnering presidential support. Ultimately, these foreign troops were admitted.

In October 1998, the fragile cease-fire eroded and the conflict resumed in the capital city of Bissau. Soon thereafter, another peace agreement was signed on Nov. 1, 1998, in Abuja, Nigeria, calling for the withdrawal of Senegalese and Guinean troops, and for new elections the following year.

By the end of 1998, the civil war resulted in approximately 300,000 internally displaced people (mostly from the capital city of Bissau) and 13,000 refugees. Most people were suffering from food and water shortages and a lack of medical supplies. Malaria and cholera were spreading at exponential rates, and the capital city, Bissau, had been largely destroyed.

Although Senegalese and Guinean troops withdrew from Guinea-Bissau in early January 1999, as stipulated in the peace agreement, by the end of that month a shooting on the front line of the conflict ruptured the very fragile cease-fire. In February 1999, shooting intensified and residents of the capital city were again forced to flee.

Diplomatic efforts by various entities, including ECOWAS and the European Union, to negotiate an end to the civil strife followed. By mid-February 1999, an agreement was reached including the condition that violent and armed conflict would never again be used between the two parties to settle disputes. The agreement also called for disarmament of troops, and the creation of a national

unity government. At the end of February 1999, a transitional government and cabinet, headed by Prime Minister Francisco Fadul, was sworn in. Vieira and Mane, respectively, nominated five and four ministers to the cabinet.

Although elections were scheduled for March 1999, Fadul announced that the date could not be adhered to because the refugee population had not been repatriated, and a full census had not been taken. Further, the framework for the elections, including the institution of polling stations and the training of polling agents, had not yet taken place. Thus, Fadul suggested that the elections take place in September instead, but this proposal was not immediately accepted. Also in March 1999, the process of disarmament began, and discussions ensued about prospective aid packages.

New peacekeeping forces, the West African Peace Monitoring Group, or ECOMOG, were established, and the election date drew near. The presidential and general elections failed to take place, however, and uneasiness rose. Finally, on May 6, 1999, Mane's forces violated the agreement to avoid armed conflict in settling disputes, and resumed their armed attacks, claiming that the presidential guards had not been disarmed. The fighting damaged the French, Swedish, Cuban and Senegalese diplomatic missions and residences.

A day later, the existing military regiment in Guinea-Bissau surrendered to Mane's forces, and Vieira was compelled to seek protection at the French Embassy. He was later transferred to the protection of the Portuguese Embassy, and on May 9, 1999, he was granted political asylum by Portugal. Meanwhile, up to 500 civilians have been detained by the military junta now in power. New elections were scheduled for November 1999, and the military junta requested the help of ECOMOG in preparing for the elections. Although Mane assumed power at the time of the coup, on May 14, 1999, Malam Bacai Sanhá was appointed as the acting president, a post he was authorized to hold until the elections.

The new armed forces chief of staff declared that the governing junta would not tolerate any attempts by external forces to destabilize the country. In the face of this warning, in June 1999, Amnesty International exhorted Guinea-Bissau to deal with the formidable task of establishing a lasting peace. The statement emphasized that this was an opportunity for the country to demonstrate to the world its commitment to reconciliation, stability, the protection of human rights, and the establishment of reformed and accountable institutions. The army reiterated that they intended to hold power only temporarily until a new president was elected by fair and democratic means.

In July 1999, the EU granted almost three million euros to Guinea-Bissau for humanitarian assistance. The aid was aimed at providing medical assistance, food and other requisites. Shortly after, the IMF approved an assistance package worth US\$3 million to help rebuild the war torn country. In addition several international humanitarian organizations contributed US\$4.4 million to assist refugees and displaced people. These donors were confident civilian rule would return shortly

in light of the U.N.-organized presidential elections to be held in late 1999. Elections were held on November 28, 1999, and Kumba Yala was elected president.

1999-2003

President Kumba Yala came to power through the presidential elections of Nov. 28, 1999. There were 12 presidential candidates and 13 parties running in the presidential and parliamentary elections. The two main candidates vying for the presidency were acting President Malam Bacai and Kumba Yala. On election day there were some delays at various polling stations throughout the nation, but international observers deemed the procedures fair. The results indicated that both candidates failed to secure a majority of votes, prompting a second round of elections.

Meanwhile, in the parliamentary elections, Kumba Yala's party "Partido para a Renovacao Social" (PRS) secured 38 seats of the 102 seats in the National Assembly.

A presidential run-off seemed unlikely when the electoral commission announced that financial resources were scarce. However, international organizations agreed to donate money and the elections proceeded, with the second-round presidential election held on Jan. 16, 2000. Kumba Yala emerged victorious with 72 percent of the votes, while Malam Bacai Sanha received 28 percent. The United Nations (U.N.) reported that international observers assessed the voting as free, fair and transparent.

President Kumba Yala's government faced a host of challenges from the outset. Notably, a former junta leader, General Ansumane Mane, did not accept the election results -- sparking a divide between the military and the executive. The divide continued to be a source of political instability.

From January until December 2000, there were significant tensions between the government and the portion of the military under the command of the aforementioned Gen. Mane. At the heart of the crisis was the right to hire and fire military leaders. President Yala's civilian authorities attempted to remove Commander Mohammed Lamine Sanha, chief of Guinea-Bissau's navy, in May 2000, but Sanha refused to vacate the position. The junta, far from being disbanded, instead supported Sanha with arms as necessary. They found assistance in a rival rebel group in the separatist Casamance region; this group had thrown their support behind Sanha as a fellow enemy of the central government.

Mane and his junta continued to vie for power even though they had ultimately agreed to respect the electoral outcome. In effect, they controlled the Guinea-Bissau military, a significant dilution of President Yala's power. The military, in turn, used its position to extort from civilians and foster corruption.

In September 2000, attempts were made to create a coalition government between the Guinea-Bissau resistance and the Yala government in an effort to diffuse mounting tensions. These coalition attempts failed and tensions between Yala and Mane came to a head on Nov. 24, 2000. Gen. Mane fired the country's chief of staff, Lt. Col. Varissimo Seabra Correa and took over his position -- a move which necessitated influence well beyond his powers as a military leader. In addition, he cancelled 30 military promotions made by President Yala and promoted his own officers instead.

The government reacted to Mane's actions immediately by calling it an attempted coup d'etat. The Organization of African Unity backed the Yala government by releasing a statement urging military leaders to show respect for the national constitution and solving political disputes with the government through dialogue. An OAU spokesman said that "this new development, which evokes memories of the violence and chaos of 1998 and 1999, could lead to a crisis that may undermine the process of consolidating peace and democracy in Guinea-Bissau." Further to the condemnation of Gen. Mane, the Yala government arrested a number of opposition leaders alleging that they were working with Mane to attempt to carry out a coup d'etat.

Gen. Mane entered into gun battles with government forces in Bissau. Having lost these battles, he retreated presumably to regroup. On Nov. 30, 2000, government forces caught up with him in Blon de Biombo, 70 km outside Bissau. A gun battle ensued in which Mane and two close advisors were shot and killed. The opposition leaders were released without charges.

The death of Gen. Mane was viewed by many as the result of a hunt by government forces more than an unfortunate outcome of the swift hand of justice. However, it appeared to give President Yala an unprecedented opportunity to allow growth in Guinea-Bissau's young democracy. By January 2001, he resumed the process of restructuring the armed forces.

In another development, a constitutional crisis was brewing. On Sept. 7, 2001, President Yala dismissed three supreme court justices, including Supreme Court President Emiliano Nosolini dos Reis, on the grounds they were corrupt. This immediately sparked a constitutional crisis. According to Articles 120 and 123 of the constitution the president does not hold the power to dismiss judges. Article 123 specifies that the Higher Council of Magistrates is the only authority that can appoint, dismiss, transfer, or promote supreme court justices.

Amnesty International, Reporters Without Borders, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, and Portugal joined with opposition leaders in condemning the president for removing judges without recourse to due process. Amnesty International went further to say that the dismissals "seriously undermine the authority of the judiciary and the rule of law in Guinea-Bissau" and "may have been carried out for political reasons."

Shortly after their dismissal the former justices were detained pending criminal prosecution. In

reaction, the other supreme court justices launched a 30-day strike in protest. In the next two months, the political situation decayed so terribly that the United Nations Security Council appealed to the international community for renewed economic support in the country in the name of security.

The removal of the judges came on the heels of existing political disputes between the president and the court. In August 2001, President Yala suspended the activities of the Ahmadiyya Muslim group and moved to expel its leaders. He argued that the group, which long opposed him, contributed to instability in Guinea-Bissau. The supreme court reinstated the organization, ruling that this action was taken without due process and no grounds were demonstrated.

There were also a series of decisions by the court that ruled for opposition parties. President Kumba Yala charged several parties with posing a threat to democracy and the courts ruled that there was insufficient evidence, leaving the parties intact.

In reaction to the constitutional crisis, the opposition-led parliament took a vote of non confidence in President Yala on Oct. 23, 2001. The vote was adopted 56 for, 34 against, and four abstentions. President Yala reacted by threatening to dissolve the parliament. Several Members of Parliament (MPs) were quick to question whether the president was, in fact, mentally ill since his actions at that time seemed somewhat irrational. Indeed, reports emerged suggesting that in order to avert a coup, Yala had ordered that any political leader who tried to enter a military barrack should be shot. Further, the MPs cited the president's plan to sack as much as 60 percent of Guinea-Bissau's civil servants on charges of corruption.

Sane or not, on Nov. 21, 2001, President Yala removed Foreign Minister Antonieta Rosa Gomes by presidential decree. He stated that there was "confusion within her ministry." This came immediately following his November 20 statement that he would restructure the military. Several days later, on Dec. 8, 2001, President Yala removed Prime Minister Faustino Fudut Imbali. He argued that Imbali had shown a "lack of transparency in managing public affairs." Imbali had been in power only nine months, following Yala's sacking of his cousin, Caetano N'Tchama, in April 2001. The president appointed Interior Minister Alamara Nhasse to the post.

By mid-2002, however, the new prime minister was busy denying reports that he was responsible for a spate of political instability, characterized by the dismissal of a number of cabinet ministers, including the Minister of Transport and Communications and the Fisheries Minister. The Fisheries Minister's dismissal was not well-received by members of the ruling party since the dismissed minister was also the head of that party. President Yala, who founded the ruling party, claimed that the prime minister was responsible for recent cabinet shuffles, although Prime Minister Nhasse stated otherwise. Indeed, Nhasse not only denied responsibility for the changes in cabinet, he also stated that he was neither notified nor consulted about the cabinet shuffles. He even went so far as to accuse President Yala of abusing power, and pointing to the eroding relationship between

governmental factions, he called on the ruling party to initiate a national dialogue aimed at solving the problems facing Guinea-Bissau.

In November 2002, parliament was dissolved, Prime Minister Nhasse was dismissed, and Mario Pires was appointed to head of caretaker government until new elections were held. Elections were scheduled for February 2003 and then postponed until April. Later, there was a subsequent postponement until July. In preparation for elections, the process of voter registration was started under the aegis of multiple government ministries. The electoral process has been marred by a lack of funds. Estimates suggest that the country needed \$3.2 billion to finance the parliamentary election. In this regard, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) donated US\$ 900,000.

Two subsequent dismissals were issued in the first part of 2003. But also in 2003, President Yala unveiled a significantly enlarged cabinet that involved a cabinet shuffle. According to several reports, Yala replaced the Education Minister Filomena Lopes with Antonio Cumba Dias, the head of the Guinean Red Cross. Three new state secretaries were also created, including that of state secretary of tourism. The position was filled by a well-known newspaper proprietor and journalist Joao de Barros. This choice was considered most unexpected as de Barros was repeatedly jailed for criticizing Yalla regime. Other additions to the newly-announced government announced were the post of state secretary for agriculture and a state secretary of international cooperation. Critics of Yala postulated the view that the newly enlarged cabinet was intended to consolidate executive power prior to new elections. Yala, however, stated that the inclusion of his own critics, such as de Barros, within the government, should increase the "value" of his government.

In a separate development, the opposition United Social and Democratic Party (PUSD) called for a consensus government made up of all political parties in Guinea-Bissau. Referring to the current regime as "illegitimate," the PUSD encouraged Yalla to form a broad-based government to prepare early parliamentary elections slated for later in the year.

Meanwhile, the window of opportunity for healing wounds (discussed above) between the military and the executive closed rapidly. On Dec. 2, 2001, former deputy chief of general staff and the second in command within General Mane's military junta, Almami Allan Camara allegedly launched another coup attempt. President Yala asserted that this coup attempt had been planned for more than six months. There was a conspiracy to assassinate some 30 politicians including former president Joao Bernardo Vieira, former Prime Minister Manuel Saturnino, and former Minister of Economy and Finance Manuel dos Santos. Included also in the proposed plan was the removal of various institutions of government.

The opposition reacted with incredulity stating that the coup attempt was actually a ruse designed by President Yala. As stated by former prime minister and leader of the opposition party, Francisco Fadul, "I am not convinced that this alleged coup d'etat stems from anything more than creative

imagination [sic] in any totalitarian regime, those in power need to feed themselves, and in this case it has been by inventing stories. They are traveling down a road with no return and are therefore terrified. People are eating badly, public institutions are unmanageable and the military is unhappy."

While President Yala promised to produce incontrovertible proof that the coup d'etat attempt was real, he did not produced any material that satisfied the opposition. In fact, by 2003, the Guinea-Bissau Human Rights League (LGDH) accused Yalla's regime of torturing several persons allegedly involved in the plotting of the coup d'etat. They claimed that the alleged suspects, who had been questioned or detained, were "seriously ill." They made one such claim where a corporal actually died on the basis of several documents and visuals received from the corporal's family. Whether or not the allegations by the LGDH are legitimate or not remained unknown, however, the scenario exemplified how the fallout from the supposed coup d'etat have been had many longer-term effects.

Also in 2003, tensions between the executive branch and the military increased when Yala sacked the Defense Minister Marcelino Lopes Cabral and then detained him. A court subsequently found that there was insufficient evidence to hold the former minister, however, the government initially ignored the court order.

Rumors also began to emerge about a possible coup d'etat aimed at ousting the government. The chief of Guinea-Bissau's armed forces, General Verissimo Correia Seabra, was mentioned in conjunction with such rumors but denied the allegations. Many foreign nationals quickly left the country amidst the suspicions of possible political unrest. Yalla held emergency meetings with high level officials of the military, however, the outcome of the meetings was not publicized at that time. Speculation arose that the meeting was connected to the rumors about a possible coup d'etat.

The situation with the military was not helped by the fact that various government workers, including those in military service, were not paid salaries for up to six months.

In 2003, concerns over the economic crisis continued, eventually prompting overtures from the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) to help Guinea Bissau deal with poverty and unemployment. The economic crisis had escalated in 2001 when the International Monetary Fund suspended all cooperation with Guinea-Bissau on the grounds that it "lacked seriousness" in addressing economic crises. The Guinea Bissau newspaper "Gazeta de noticias de Bissau" stated that the primary cause was really the 15 months of shaky economic management by former Prime Minister Ntchama. The IMF refused to return until Guinea Bissau demonstrated that it could "control" its public finances. While political factors -- such as corruption -- contributed dramatically to the dire economic scenario itself, the economic crisis had, itself, further fueled the political instability in the country. At the world summit in South Africa in September 2002, Prime Minister Nhasse requested that the international community assist the economy of Guinea-Bissau, which was in shambles as a consequence of years of political chaos. Explaining that dire poverty had

driven the population to over-exploit natural resources, Nhasse noted that help from richer countries was necessary in dealing with the world's inequities. He also spoke of the development of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), which would create a foundation for sustainable development in Africa.

Meanwhile, the international community, and most significantly, the European Union (EU), expressed grave dismay at the political situation in Guinea-Bissau, which increasingly seemed at odds with the notion of the rule of law. The EU criticized the country for detentions without trial of members of the opposition, former ministers, military and members of the media. The EU called on Guinea-Bissau to respect the rule of law and most particularly, the independence of the judiciary. They also urged the government to find a solution to the issue of elections to the Supreme Court. Ultimately, it was hoped that the country would function under a strong institutional and legal framework with transparency and good governance.

2003 to 2007

By mid-2003, delays regarding the scheduling of new elections were on-going and evoked warnings from the international community.

Just a month ahead of the latest scheduled election date of July 2003, pressure increased for another postponement because of the lack of preparation. Although the first part of the process of registering voters had commenced, very little had been accomplished. In response, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, warned that the inter-nation body would suspend electoral aid because of the country's lack of preparedness, and also because of allegations that members of the opposition and the media had been harrassed. Preparations were so behind schedule that it appeared the election could not legally take place. In this regard, Annan warned that he would send another assessment mission to the Guinea-Bissau to "examine the situation" and to determine if conditions existed for free and fair elections.

Soon thereafter, President Yala announced that parliamentary elections would again be postponed. The new date would be in August or September 2003, presumably when a complete review of voter registration was completed. In response, key members of the United Nations Security Council expressed grave dismay at the developments and urged that the provisions of the constitution be upheld. A new United Nations mission was expected in Guinea-Bissau to monitor and assess the situation.

Then, in September 2003, a bloodless coup d'etat, led by General Verissimo Correia Seabra, was carried out. President Kumba Yala then resigned from office and signed papers renouncing his presidential power. Various visiting West African foreign ministers condemned the coup d'etat but witnessed the signing ceremony. Frustration over the dissolution of parliament and postponed

elections led to the military junta. Plans to establish a transitional government are underway.

On Sept. 28, 2003, an interim civilian government was put in place. After a few weeks of deliberation, a National Transitional Council (NTC) was formed with businessman Henrique Rosa as president and Antonio Artur Sanha as prime minister. Sanha had previously served as secretary general of the Party for Social Renovation - the party of former president Kumba Yala. However, Sanha agreed to provisions requiring him to suspend his activities with the party while serving as prime minister. The United Nations Security Council formally recognized the NTC in November. In December, the NTC announced that parliamentary elections would be held in March 2004 followed by a presidential election in March 2005.

Once in place, the NTC's greatest challenge was to raise money to cover the budget and pay back wages to civil servants. A few countries gave financial assistance but aid was being provided at a slow pace.

Despite some setbacks, the March 2004 legislative elections went on as scheduled. The EU offered some support for the election but no money was available for the campaigns in the month before the election. Nearly one hundred international observers were in the country, mostly from West Africa and from French- and Portuguese-speaking countries.

According to the observers, the elections were free and transparent. However, a lack of voting materials resulted in an extension of voting into a second day. The African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC) won 45 seats in the parliament, and the Party for Social Renovation won 35. Of the remaining seats, the Social Democrat United Party (PUSD) won 17 seats; the Electoral Union Coalition (UE) won 2 seats; and the United Popular Alliance (APU) won a single seat. Two seats to represent nationals living in Europe and Africa were to be filled through polling in embassies in Senegal, Gambia, Mauritania, Portugal and France sometime before the end of 2004.

PRS officials rejected the results of the election citing irregularities that kept some PRS members from voting. In response to this and other complaints, the National Transitional Council set up an independent commission to investigate the claims. The commission included representatives from the U.N., the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and others. The results of the election were validated in April and soon thereafter the PAIGC, the PRS, and UE signed parliamentary accords in which they showed support for the PAIGC program.

Prime Minister Carlos Gomez Junior took office in mid-May 2004 and announced his cabinet. All of the cabinet members were selected from the PAIGC after failed negotiations to include other parties. The new government faced many challenges as it attempted to escape an economic crisis and restore Guineans confidence in a bureaucracy marred by decades of corruption.

In September 2004, preparations for the March 2005 presidential elections were underway. New voter rolls were being compiled and parties were putting forth possible candidates. It was ruled by the PRS party chairman that deposed president Kumba Yala would not be eligible to run for the presidency.

In October 2004, the domestic scene was disturbed when soldiers mutinied over pay arrears and marched in the streets of Bissau, the capital city. Events turned violent as the head of the country's armed forces was killed, as well as the head of human resources for the military. There was an ongoing debate about whether or not these events constituted a coup or not. With preparations still left to undertake for new elections and because of the prevailing political instability, the election was rescheduled for June 2005.

In 2005, attention was turned to the presidential elections. But another political twist would present itself, complicating the political scene in anticipation of the vote. In May 2005, former President Kumba Yala declared himself to be the leader once again, two years after being ousted in a coup. Yala spoke to reporters outside his home in the capital city of Bissau and explained that he had withdrawn his letter of resignation, stating that he had been forced to sign the letter following the military takeover in 2003. As such, he said he revoked his renunciation of power and intended to retake power that very day (May 15, 2005). His declaration appeared to have cast doubt on the prospects for the election process since he said that he intended to serve out the remaining 18 months of his five-year term of office, before new elections could be held. Although Yala's rationale was that the country was suffering from a "a political vacuum" in the country for the previous week, Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior said the country was stable and that there was no reason for worry.

The people of Guinea Bissau finally went to the polls in elections on June 19, 2005. After intense and enthusiastic campaigning, as election day approached, some observers worried that violent or unrest might erupt after the winner was announced in a country with a political legacy of instability.

There were seventeen candidates in contention for the presidency including the leader of the Social Renovation Party (PRS), Kumba Yala, who was overthrown in 2003; the independent candidate, Joao Bernardo Vieira, who ruled Guinea Bissau for 18 years until he was overthrown in a military coup d'etat in 1998; and Malam Bacai Sanha, who became interim president when Vieira was ousted.

In the first round of the presidential elections, Malam Bacai Sanha, won the most votes but failed to cross the requisite 50 percent threshold. Sanha, who was the candidate of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC), was supported by those who identify with the 1970s war of independence. He then had to contest a second round of the election along with his closest rival, former military ruler Joao Bernardo Vieira. Both of the top two candidates promised to work toward reconciliation, and to end years of political instability that

has plagued the former Portuguese colony. Former President Kumba Yala, who was ousted in a coup d'etat in 2003, did not secure enough votes to move on to the run-off.

The second and final round of presidential elections was held in Guinea-Bissau in late July 2005. Despite fears of violence, international election monitors said that the voting had been "calm and organized." Whomever was eventually declared to be the winner would be faced with the task of establishing unity, job creation and stewardship of the economy.

A week after the second round of elections were held the Guinea-Bissau National Electoral Commission declared candidate Joao Bernardo Vieira to be the winner with 55.25 percent of the vote.

The immediate aftermath of the election was characterized by ongoing dissonance between President Joao Bernardo Vieira and Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior. Indeed, by October 2005, the president sacked the prime minister, effectively ending months on ongoing conflict that had made governance difficult. But the president's decision to replace Gomes Junior with one of his closest allies, who had also functioned as his campaign director, raised the furor of Gomes Junior and his party, PAIGC, which held the largest number of seats in parliament, and thus claimed the right to nominate a new prime minister.

It was not until November 2005 that Guinea-Bissau got its new government, thusly ending weeks of systemic paralysis which had struck the nation. But the new government formation excluded the country's largest political party, meaning that the government would not have parliamentary support. As such, the new government began on a foundation of instability. Nevertheless, the counterpoint to this view has been that the new government was far more likely to cooperate with Viera. Heading the new government was Prime Minister Aristides Gomes who was inaugurated in the face of strong opposition from the PAIGC. Both the standing committee of the parliament as well as other interest groups called on Vieira to rescind Gomes' appointment, or, alternatively, dissolve the national assembly in anticipation of new elections within 90 days.

In the spring of 2006, Guinea-Bissau was dealing with the threat of a rebel activities on the border with Senegal. At issue was Senegal's Casamance region. The Senegalese government signed a peace deal with the Casamance Movement of Democratic Forces (MFDC) in 2004. However, the agreement was rejected by the hardline elements of the movement, which continued to fight for independence of Casamance. As such, infighting between rebels from the mainstream of MFDC were reported to have clashed with hardline factions, with the violence spilling over into the territory of Guinea-Bissau. Resultantly, troops from Guinea-Bissau became engaged in the ensuing fighting. In one case, troops from Guinea-Bissau were pulled in a violent exchange with an MFDC faction when it was discovered that they [MFDC] were attempting trying to purchase weapons in the town of Sao Domingos, within Guinea-Bissau. The situation marked the most significant violence in the region since the peace deal was forged. It also emphasized the challenge

faced by people of Casamance as they tried to reconstruct their lives after more than 20 years of separatist violence and the loss of more than 3,500 lives.

As the Casamance situation was unfolding, politics in Guinea-Bissau were also being affected. Notably, Guinea-Bissau's former Interior Minister, Marcelino Simoes Lopes Cabral, was arrested for suspected involvement in rebel activities attributed to the hardline faction of the MFDC. Indeed, the authorities in Guinea-Bissau charged that Cabral assisted the MFDC hardline faction as if fought the army of Guinea-Bissau. Cabral's motivation for involvement in the controversial situation may have been linked with the fact that he was a close associate of Guinea-Bissau military leader Ansumane Mane, who was believed to have backed the MFDC. It should be noted that both Casamance and the bordering area of Guinea-Bissau are home to people of similar ethnic backgrounds, thus suggesting that ethnic ties may have also been an additional explanatory dimension.

In mid-2006, domestic politics took center stage when a strike was called by teachers' unions over unpaid wages. In order to alleviate the crisis, the regional body, ECOWAS, said that it would pay the wage owed to the teachers.

In January 2007, Carlos Gomes Junior, the former prime minister of Guinea-Bissau, sought refuge in a United Nations diplomatic mission. Gomes, the head of the opposition PAIGC, went into hiding after he accused President Vieira of orchestrating the killing of a former military commander. It was a claim that the government denied and that many characterized as slanderous. The situation was sufficiently heated as to spur his quick exit from the political scene. Two weeks later, after learning that a warrant for his arrest had been dropped, he left the mission.

Recent Developments

In April 2007, Martinho N'Dafa Cabi became the country's prime minister. Cabi was appointed by the president after consultation with party leaders in the legislature.

The government of Guinea-Bissau said in the first week of August 2008 that it had successfully thwarted an attempted coup d'etat. Officials in Guinea-Bissau alleged that Rear Admiral Jose Americo Bubo Na Tehuto -- a top navy commander -- attempted to recruit other military officers to join his effort to oust President Joao Bernardo Vieira from office. The attempted ouster was foiled when the army chief of staff -- one of the senior military officials whom Jose Americo Bubo Na Tehuto hoped to recruit -- placed the coup leader under arrest instead. An army spokesperson released a statement that read: "We have foiled a coup attempt that should have been carried out early on Thursday by a group of officers led by Rear Admiral Jose Americo Bubo Na Tchuto, head of the navy." The spokesperson noted that Jose Americo Bubo Na Tchuto would remain under house arrest pending an investigation.

The attempted coup occurred at a time when Guinea-Bissau had been embroiled in political turmoil. Weeks earlier, one of the main political parties withdrew from the unity government, thus ushering in something of a political crisis and prompting President Vieira to dissolve parliament. President Vieira then named Carlos Correia as prime minister, replacing Martinho Dafa Cabi. Correia was tasked with forming a new government to run the daily affairs of the country ahead of parliamentary elections set for later in the year.

Elections of 2008

Guinea-Bissau's Parliamentary Elections

Summary:

Guinea-Bissau held a parliamentary election on Nov. 16, 2008. The political parties that were in contention included: African Independence Party of Guinea and Cape Verde, Party for Social Renewal, United Social Democratic Party, United Platform, Electoral Union, Democratic Socialist Party, Union for Change, Resistance of Guinea-Bissau-Bafata Movement, National Unity Party, United People's Alliance, National Union for Democracy and Progress, Worker's Party, Manifest Party of the People, Socialist Party of Guinea-Bissau, Guinean Democratic Movement, Guinean Civic Forum-Social Democracy, Guinean People's Party, among others.

Backgrounder:

On Nov. 16, 2008, the people of Guinea-Bissau were set to elect 100 members to the National People's Assembly to serve four-year terms.

Candidates:

The strongest political party during the past few elections has been the African Independence Party of Guinea and Cape Verde, winning 45 seats in the last election in 2004. This party, also known by the acronym PAIGC, governed Guinea-Bissau with the majority from 1974 until the late 1990s and again after its win in 2004. The PAIGC has been influenced by both Marxism and Nationalism. The Party for Social Renewal won 35 seats in the 2004 election. It was the first time another party saw electoral success since the political parties other than PAIGC were allowed to be formed. The United Social Democratic Party won 17 seats in the 2004 election.

Issues:

The financial and political unrest that plagued Guinea-Bissau in the early 2000s has seemingly cooled down due to the cooperation of the three strongest political parties. That said, one

emerging issue on the scene in Guinea-Bissau has been narcotics trafficking. To this end, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon warned of the threat this issue posed to the country's stability. Meanwhile, narcotics trafficking was a theme that dominated the election campaign with some political leaders even accusing their rivals of complicity in the illicit trade.

Results:

On Nov. 16, 2008, voters went to the polls in Guinea-Bissau to cast their ballots in the parliamentary elections. International monitors reported that there was high voter turnout, with most estimates suggesting that 70 percent to 80 percent of the electorate had participated in the election. International monitors also reported that the vote appeared to have been carried out in a calm and orderly manner. Before any official results were reported, President Joao Bernardo Vieira promised cooperation regardless of who ultimately won the election. He said, "We are all going to unite to support [the winning] party to govern and develop the country." To date, there has been some degree of dissonance between the executive and legislative branches of government.

According to the National Electoral Commission, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC) won 67 of the 100 National Assembly seats, effectively consolidating its political dominance. Coming in second place with 28 seats was the Social Renewal Party (PRS), led by Koumba Yala, who rejected the results and characterized them as fraudulent. Former leader Yala had strong ties and support from the military. The Republican Party for Independence and Development (PRID), which was allied with the president, won three seats.

Signs of Political Unrest

Late November 2008 saw President Joao Bernardo Vieira of Guinea-Bissau survive a gun attack at his home in what appeared to be a failed coup. Mutinous soldiers stormed the presidential compound resulting in a gun battle that lasted for three hours and left one presidential guard dead and several others wounded.

In a televised news conference, President Vieira said that the soldiers had stormed into the presidential complex with an intent to "liquidate" him. He assured the citizens of Guinea-Bissau that calm would prevail. He condemned the mutinous soldiers saying, "No-one has the right to massacre the people of Guinea-Bissau in order to steal power by means of the gun." The African Union (AU) echoed this statement, warning against any "attempt to seize power by force" in a country that has been plagued by coup d'etats. A spokesman for the AU, El-Ghassim Wane, emphasized that the African bloc rejected "all unlawful changes of government."

After the attack, President Veira assembled a 400-member personal bodyguard, tasked

with ensuring his safety. That enclave became the source of controversy when members of its ranks were accused of opening fire on the country's army commander in January 2009.

Note: This apparent attempted coup came just in the aftermath of parliamentary elections discussed above.

Special Report: President of Guinea-Bissau assassinated

On March 2, 2009, President Joao Bernardo Vieira, the long-standing leader of Guinea-Bissau, was assassinated by military troops. Notably, President Vieira was assassinated only days after the slaying of Guinea-Bissau's army chief, General Batista Tagme Na Wai. The president was hacked to death by machete-wielding soldiers who blamed him for the death of the aforementioned army chief. At the time, there was confusion as to whether there was one group acting against both men, or, if the military took the violent action because they blamed the president for the death of army chief.

Vieira's regime was being challenged by a growing sense of instability due to tensions between the presidency and the military leadership. For some time, President Vieira - a member of the minority Papel ethnic group -- had difficult relationship with the military, which was dominated by officers from the majority Balanta ethnic group. The situation has stoked fears about ethnic conflict in poverty-stricken Guinea-Bissau, which has been beset by political instability throughout the years. It has also gained notoriety increasingly as a narcotics transshipment hub.

Only months earlier in November 2008, President Joao Bernardo Vieira survived a gun attack on his home by mutinous military officers in what may well be regarded as a failed coup d'état. He then assembled a 400-member personal bodyguard to ensure his safety but that enclave was accused of opening fire on the country's army commander in January 2009. It was not known if that act was linked with the army chief's death, thus setting the stage for another assassination attempt, which, as has been noted here, ultimately ended in the president's death at the hands of military assassins.

Editor's Note on the late president --

Born on April 27, 1939, in the capital city of Bissau, Joao Bernardo Vieira was originally trained as an electrician. He joined the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) of Amílcar Cabral in 1960 and soon became a significant name in the country's guerrilla war against Portuguese colonial rule. During the war, he showed himself to be a skilled military leader. He also took on the name "Nino" during those years of struggle, a name that prevails today.

In 1972, Vieira was appointed president of the National People's Assembly. In 1978, he was

appointed Prime Minister of Guinea-Bissau. Then on Nov. 14, 1980, Vieira toppled the government of Luís Cabral -- half-brother of Amílcar Cabral -- in a bloodless military coup. It was only six years after the country gained independence from Portugal. President Veira served as the country's head of state for several years.

A failed coup attempt against the government in June 1998 resulted in the country's descent into a brief and violent civil war between forces loyal to Vieira and those loyal to rebel leader Ansumane Mané. Rebels ousted the government of Vieira on May 7, 1999. He took refuge in the Portuguese embassy and then sought exile in Portugal.

In April 2005, nearly two years after another military coup toppled the government of President Kumba Yalá, Vieira returned home to contest the elections, which he won.

In recent times, Veira's regime was being challenged by a growing sense of instability due to tensions between the presidency and the military leadership. As noted above, only months earlier in November 2008, President Joao Bernardo Vieira survived a gun attack on his home by mutinous military officers in what may well be regarded as a failed coup d'état. President Viera's luck ran out two months later and he was the victim of a plot by military assassins.

Political Murder

The death of the president left an immediate power chasm in a country whose modern history has been beset by a legacy of coups and unrest. But by March 4, 2008, National Assembly Speaker Raimundo Perreira was sworn into office as interim president. Perreira called on fellow citizens to help him restore stability of the country. Perreira was expected to function as the country's leader on a temporary basis until election could be held in 60 days.

In June 2009, presidential candidate, Baciro Dabo, was killed. Baciro Dabo, who had been a stalwart of the late president, was shot to death while in his own bed sleeping next to his wife. Reports on the ground indicated that "men in uniform" or members of the military may have been responsible. The killing took place weeks ahead of the presidential election, set for June 28, 2009. That election would decide on a successor to President Joao Bernardo Vieira, who was himself assassinated by soldiers in some months earlier in March 2009.

Dabo was a member of the ruling Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde Party (PAIGC), but he was contesting the election as an independent. He had served as Minister of Territorial Administration was a loyalist of the late President Veira. The connection between Dabo and the president was believed to be at the heart of the latest violence. Analysts speculated that high-ranking members of the military may have taken a pre-emptive strike against Dabo out of fear that if he won the election, he would prosecute those responsible for killing President Veira. As

indicated above, the president and military were involved in something of a power struggle and core members of the military were believed to be behind his assassination, and now Dabo's as well.

But elements in the government offered a different explanation of these developments. Specifically, the Interior Ministry issued a statement saying that an attempted coup d'etat had been thwarted. The statement placed the blame on the late Dabo and Helder Proenca, a former defense official, for being behind the plot. The statement also noted that both men had been killed in the effort to put down the coup. A number of other officials loyal to the late President Veira were also named as being part of the plot.

As suggested above, this explanation evoked skepticism among the late president's loyalists who believed that the deaths were politically-motivated and emblematic of the ongoing struggle between the late president's surviving stalwarts and the military.

Despite the deaths of President Joao Bernardo Vieira, General Batista Tagme Na Wai, presidential candidate, Baciro Dabo, and former Defense Minister Helder Proenca, the interim leader of Guinea-Bissau announced that the new presidential elections would go forward on June 28, 2009. Interim leader, Raimundo Pereira, said that he had consulted with the government and political parties and determined that the elections should take place as scheduled. But an independent presidential candidate, Paulo Mendoca, filed a complaint at the Supreme Court, claiming that a delay was constitutionally required in the case of the death a presidential candidate.

In other developments, another presidential candidate, Pedro Nfan da, withdrew from Guinea Bissau's presidential elections, reducing the number of candidates from 13 to 11. Nfanda, of the Ecological Party (LIPE), explained that he was withdrawing from the race for "security reasons." Sources close to the Nfanda noted that he was beaten by suspected soldiers in March 2009 after characterizing the appointment of Jos é Zamora Induta as head of the country's army as unconstitutional. Thus, it was inferred that as reports were emerging about the role of soldiers in the spate of political deaths in Guinea-Bissau in 2009.

Meanwhile, the wife of another candidate, Faustino Fudut Imbali, said that he had been missing since the day of Dabo's assassination. His wife said he had been abducted by young men in uniform. Imbali had served as the country's prime minister in 1980 but was most recently working as a researcher at the National Research Institute (INEP).

It was clear that the political climate ahead of the election to chose a successor to Veira was one of fear, intimidation and violence.

Election of 2009

Guinea-Bissau held a presidential election on June 28, 2009. The poll came in the aftermath of the March 2009 assassination of President Joao Bernardo Vieira, which was thought to be an act of revenge by the military for the death of the army chief. A spate of political assassinations, also believed to have been carried out by the military, marked the period leading up to the election. As a result, a climate of intimidation and insecurity characterized the election landscape.

Eleven candidates were contesting the election, although the main contenders were believed to be Malam Bacai Sanha of the ruling party, former President Henrique Rosa, and former President Kumba Yala.

- Sanha, of the ruling Independence of Guinea- Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC), served as the president of the National Assembly between 1994 and 1999. He was named to head the transitional authority from 1999 to 2000. A candidate for the president in 1999 and 2005, he lost to Yala and Vieira respectively. He has been regarded as the front runner in the 2009 election.

- Rosa, with no party affiliation, led the National Electoral Commission in 1994. He functioned as interim president of Guinea-Bissau from September 2003 to October 2005, and organized the legislative elections in 2004 and the presidential election in 2005.

- Yala, of the opposition Party of Social Renovation (PRS), was a teacher of philosophy and a former member of the PAIGC. Elected president in 2000 and ousted in September 2003 in a coup d'etat, he went in exile in Morocco. He returned to Guinea-Bissau in October 2006 and was elected the leader of the PRS in 2008. All three main contenders have vowed to bring stability to Guinea-Bissau.

By July 2, 2009, it was announced that no candidate won an outright majority and so Guinea-Bissau would go to a second election round. Sanha of the ruling PAIGC gained the most votes and close to 40 percent of the vote share, but fell short of the majority threshold. Yala of the PRS took second place with 29.4 percent. As the two top vote getters, Sanha and Yala would contest the second round or run-off election, which was slated to take place within 30 days. To that end, election authorities in Guinea-Bissau suggested that the possible date could be July 26, 2009.

On that date of July 26, 2009, thousands of soldiers, police and paramilitary forces had been deployed across the country to ensure that the election went off in a context of security. To that end, when the polls closed, there were no reports of violence or egregious incidences at polling stations across the country. Turnout was said to be moderately high -- between "55 and 60 percent" according to the head of the European Union observer mission. In fact, the head of the European Union's observer mission, Johan Van Hecke, said that the election ensued in a "calm and orderly" atmosphere. Other monitors from the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP), said that the election went off in a free and democratic manner.

Days later, Guinea-Bissau's electoral commission announced that Malam Bacai Sanha had won the country's presidential election, garnering 63 percent of the votes in second round. Kumba Yala trailed behind with 37 percent of the votes. There were widespread hopes that the election of a new president would usher in a sense of stability. To that end, interim President Raimundo Pereira said, "This election is very important because it will lead to the normalization of the country."

Apparent attempted coups in Guinea-Bissau; PM refuses to resign

On April 1, 2010, army officers in the African country of Guinea-Bissau carried out what appeared to be an attempted coup d'etat. General Antonio Indjai was identified as the coup leader. Another key player in the apparent coup plot was the former navy chief and suspected leader of a 2008 coup plot, Rear Admiral Jose Americo Bubo Na Tchuto. According to reports from the scene, he had returned to the country from a year-long exile in the Gambia and had sought refuge since December 2009 in the United Nations building in Bissau.

The military cabal -- led by Indjai and Na Tchuto -- reportedly detained the army's Chief of Staff Gen Jose Zamora Induta along with 40 other officers and ordered them to be held in the capital of Bissau. As well, the military cabal arrested Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior with the coup leader, General Antonio Indjai, asserting that the prime minister of Guinea-Bissau now be referred to as "Cadogo" or "criminal." He also said, "Cadogo is a criminal and he must be tried as one." These actions were not met by widespread public approval; instead, hundreds of people took to the streets to demand the release of Prime Minister Gomes, who was now under house arrest. On the other side of the equation, however, General Antonio Indjai warned that if the street protests did not end, the prime minister would be killed. According to media reports, the coup leader said: "If the people continue to go out into the streets to show their support for Carlos Gomes Junior, then I will kill Carlos Gomes Junior, or I will send someone to kill him."

Even as he was threatening to assassinate the country's head of government, General Antonio Indjai appeared to diminish the significance of the situation by making the claim that the actions of his military cabal did not constitute a coup d'etat at all, but was simply a problem in the military ranks. According to a report by Agence France Presse, Indjai said: "Events which occurred this Thursday morning are a purely military problem and do not concern the civil government."

But military problems appear to be a recurring challenge on the political landscape of Guinea-Bissau. Only a year earlier in 2009, army officers were behind the assassination of President Joao Bernardo Vieira. The current head of state, President Malam Bacai Sanha, who was elected to power in the aftermath of President Vieira's assassination, was also keen to downplay the situation, saying instead, "I will use my influence to find a friendly solution to this problem," and characterizing it as "a problem between soldiers" that simply collapsed into the realm of civilian governance.

The claim by coup leader, Indjai, that Guinea-Bissau was not being subject to an unconstitutional transition of government has not been accepted by the international community. Instead, the governments of Portugal -- Guinea-Bissau's former colonial power -- wasted no time in condemning the actions of the military cabal as a coup d'etat and demanding a return to constitutional order. In addition, a chorus of condemnation came from France, the European Union, the United States, and the African Union. Simultaneous with the collective international outcry was United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's call for the military and political leadership of Guinea-Bissau to "resolve differences by peaceful means and to maintain constitutional order and ensure respect for the rule of law.

One day after the apparent coup d'etat on April 2, 2010, Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior insisted he would not resign from power. He asserted that he was the democratically elected head of government and suggested that the developments that transpired the day before were simply "an incident." Indeed, Prime Minister Gomes Junior noted that government functions would return to normal and said: "The situation is now stable." This rapid shift appeared to have occurred in the aftermath of a meeting with President Malam Bacai Sanha. Whether or not the shift in fortune for the prime minister -- who was arrested only a day before -- would hold was yet to be determined as media reports noted that he was still under surveillance from members of the military corps.

In the background of these developments has been a critique of the military infrastructure of the country, which has been the consistent common denominator in many of Guinea-Bissau's episodes of unrest and instability. Accordingly, attention increasingly focused on the long-standing call from the West African bloc, Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS), for Guinea-Bissau to carry out military reform in the interests of the long-term stability of the country.

But stability did not soon arrive in Guinea-Bissau. In late December 2011, former navy chief, Rear Admiral Jose Americo Bubo Na Tchuto, who was a suspected conspirator in a 2008 attempted coup and the aforementioned 2009 fracas, was accused of attempting to seize political power as President Sanha was dealing with his medical problems. While the attempted coup was foiled and Bubo Na Tchuto was arrested, the situation illuminated the political turmoil that has characterized Guinea-Bissau's landscape since it gained independence from Portugal in 1974.

Update

On Jan. 9, 2012, the office of the President of Guinea-Bissau released a statement notifying the people of the African nation state that President Malam Bacai Sanha died in a hospital in Paris. While the statement did not specify the cause of his death or the reason he was seeking medical treatment in Paris, it was generally known that President Sanha suffered from diabetes.

Sanha became president in September 2009 -- months after long-serving President Joao Bernardo Vieira was assassinated by mutinous soldiers. Sanha served as interim president and then contested presidential elections. In that vote, Sanha defeated former President Kumba Yala, in a run-off election.

Since that time, Sanha's tenure in office has been marked by long absences from the political field as he was hospitalized due to his ill health. His tenure was also marked by political instability, typically emanating from the military ranks, some of whom were responsible for the 2009 assassination of former President Veira.

A year later in 2010, army officers, led by General Antonio Indjai, carried out what appeared to be an attempted coup d'etat, as discussed above. Indjai eventually distanced himself from the fracas, saying that there was no attempt to transition power unconstitutionally. But stability did not soon arrive in Guinea-Bissau. As discussed above, in late December 2011, former navy chief, Rear Admiral Jose Americo Bubo Na Tchuto, who was a suspected conspirator in a 2008 attempted coup and the aforementioned 2009 fracas, was accused of attempting to seize political power as President Sanha was dealing with his medical problems. That attempted coup was foiled and Bubo Na Tchuto was arrested.

Now at the start of 2012 with Sanha dead and concerns about a power vacuum in Guinea-Bissau, authorities in Guinea-Bissau announced that the head of the country's National Assembly, Raimundo Pereira, would take on the role of acting president and a presidential would take place in three months.

Primer on 2012 Presidential Election in Guinea-Bissau

A presidential election was set for March 18, 2012. The election would determine who would succeed President Malam Bacai Sanha, who died in Paris of medical complications at the start of the year. The election would be monitored by an observer mission from the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS).

Nine candidates were vying for presidency, including former President Kumba Yala, who was overthrown in a coup in 2003, and former Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior who resigned from his post to contest this election. He would likely have the support of the ruling PAIGC party. Another contender was Sherifo Nhamadjo -- an independent candidate who attracted the support of 75 members of PAIGC who defected from that camp to join Nhamadjo. If no one candidate secures an outright majority on March 18, 2012, the two top performers would contest a second round or a "runoff" election.

The immediate hours after the polls closed was marked by tragic violence when former military

intelligence chief Samba Diallo was killed. Nevertheless, the vote count commenced. After the votes were counted, provisional results showed that former Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Jr. narrowly missed an outright victory, securing just under 49 percent. Former President Kumba Yala took 23 percent and had garnered the second most votes. Accordingly, Gomes -- the ruling party candidate -- would contest a second round against the opposition leader -- Yala.

It should be noted that Yala and a number of other candidates alleged that the election was fraught with fraud and should be annulled due to the lack of credibility. However, that claim contradicted initial findings from international election observers, who deemed the election to be both free and fair. Nevertheless, Yala said he would not be participating in the runoff election because the first round was unfair. He said he would only contest the next round if there was new voter registration before the run-off vote. That second election round was scheduled to be held on April 22, 2012.

Before that second round could take place, Guinea-Bissau was hit by political turmoil. On April 12, 2012, a military coup d'etat ensued in Guinea-Bissau. The government was deposed and the military junta announced that an interim council, composed of opposition leaders, which would now rule the country. The new coup leadership dissolved all national institutions including the national parliament, and said that parliamentary and presidential elections would be held at some point in the future.

There was no immediate information available about the status of either Gomes or interim President Raimundo Pereira, who himself came to power in 2012 when then-President Malam Bacai Sanha died in Paris of medical complications. With Pereira -- the speaker of the parliament -- taking on the transitional post of president in conformity with the constitution, attention had been on the elections to determine the new leader of the country. Days after the coup, though, the coup leadership said that both Gomes and Pereira were in the custody of the military junta for "security reasons," and that neither man would be returning to power.

Given the political scene in Guinea-Bissau, the vote set for April 22, 2012, was now very much in doubt. Indeed, the democratic process had been effectively short-circuited by this military takeover and the installation of a junta at the helm of government.

See "Special Entry" below for details related to the coup d'etat of 2012.

Special Entry: Coup in Guinea-Bissau ahead of runoff presidential election

On April 12, 2012, a military coup d'etat appeared to have taken place in Guinea-Bissau. Reports from the ground indicated that soldiers were in control of much of the national capital city, including the state radio station, and the offices of the ruling party. They also shut down all air and maritime traffic. The junta subsequently announced that it had installed an interim council,

composed of opposition leaders, which would rule the country until parliamentary and presidential elections could be held at some point in the future. The new coup leadership had also dissolved all national institutions including the national parliament.

Heavy gunfire was reported close to the residence of outgoing Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Jr., who was the main contender in the March 2012 presidential election. There was no immediate information available about the status of either Gomes, or interim President Raimundo Pereira, who himself came to power in 2012 when then-President Malam Bacai Sanha died in Paris of medical complications. With Pereira -- the speaker of the parliament -- taking on the transitional post of president in conformity with the constitution, attention had been on the elections to determine the new leader of the country. Days after the coup, though, the coup leadership said that both Gomes and Pereira were in the custody of the military junta for "security reasons," and that neither man would be returning to power.

It should be noted that in the first round of voting for the 2012 presidential election, Gomes gained the plurality of the vote share but fell short of an outright victory. He was headed towards a runoff election round against the next top performer. However, Gomes' opponents alleged that the first election round was fraught with fraud and demanded that it be annulled due to the lack of credibility. Although that claim contradicted initial findings from international election observers, who deemed the election to be both free and fair, Gomes' likely rival in the second round -- former President Kumba Yala -- threatened to boycott the impending vote. Yala's stance raised tensions in Guinea-Bissau ahead of the second election round, which was set for April 22, 2012, but which now seemed very much in doubt due to these tumultuous recent developments. Indeed, the democratic process in Guinea-Bissau had been effectively short-circuited by this military takeover and the installation of a junta at the helm of government.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) responded to the news of the coup with condemnation. A spokesperson for ECOWAS issued a statement asserting that the regional African body had "zero tolerance for power obtained by unconstitutional means." As well, the African Union suspended the membership of Guinea-Bissau until a time when constitutional order would be restored in the West African country. The African Union's announcement, which came several days later after the military takeover, explained that in light of the "recurrence of illegal and unacceptable interference" in the country's politics, the country's membership was suspended "until the restoration of constitutional order." The United Nations Security Council took a similar tone as it strongly condemned the forcible seizure of power in Guinea-Bissau and demanded the immediate restoration of constitutional order. A statement by the powerful international body read as follows: "The members of the Security Council firmly denounce this incursion by the military into politics." The United States entered the fray with its own condemnation of the coup. Mark Toner, a spokesman for the United States Department of State, said: "We urge all parties to put down their weapons, release government leaders immediately, and restore the legitimate civilian leadership."

In the last week of April 2012, the military junta forged a deal with 20 opposition parties on the transitional leadership of the country, and called on Manuel Sherifo Nhamadjo, the deputy speaker of Guinea-Bissau's parliament, to be interim leader. Nhamadjo was one of the presidential candidates in the first round of the country's election and missed qualifying for the runoff round as he won third place. For his part, Nhamadjo rejected the offer, making note of the fact that his party -- the ruling party in the country prior to the coup -- was left out of negotiations on the formation of a transitional government. He said, "I was not consulted for the position of the transitional president of the republic. I remain the vice-president of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) and my party should not have been excluded from talks with the military leadership."

More than a week later in May 2012, Nhamadjo's name had been advanced once again as the choice to be the transitional leader -- this time with the backing of west African mediators from Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Now, with the blessing of ECOWAS, Nhamadjo finally assented to the post of transitional president and head of state, which he was expected to hold for about a year. Speaking of his new responsibility, he said: "I will continue to work to find a consensus on the prime minister who will be tasked with forming a transition government. I know it won't be an easy task but we will all buckle down." Prime Minister Rui Duarte Barros was soon named to be interim head of government.

It should be noted that the ousted ruling African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC) rejected the decision outright, saying that the appointment of Nhamadjo was unconstitutional and flew in the face of democracy.

Indeed, on May 15, 2012, several PAIGC members of parliament boycotted a session on the basis that it was a "violation of the country's constitution and laws." The party's parliamentary group leader, Rui Di-de Sousa, explained PAIGC's position saying, "PAIGC will not take part in any parliamentary session if the current laws governing the running of parliament are not respected." The boycott meant that only 39 members of parliament out of 100 were present and the session could not take place due to the fact that there was no quorum. The PAIGC position was boosted by the decision by the country's central workers' union to maintain its strike order until a legitimate government is put into place.

Meanwhile, despite ECOWAS' blessing of Nhamadjo as an interim leader, the wider international community was not quite ready to ignore the unconstitutional transfer of power. To that end, on May 18, 2012, the United Nations Security Council imposed a travel ban on five coup leaders. The resolution also demanded that Guinea-Bissau take immediate steps to restore democracy, and warned of future consequences, such as an arms embargo and financial sanctions, if Guinea-Bissau did not return to civilian rule. To that end, the transitional government has scheduled a presidential election for November 2013.

Update

Note that on Oct. 27, 2012, Captain Pansau N'Tchama was arrested in Guinea-Bissau over allegations that he was planning to carry out a coup d'etat against the interim government. According to authorities in Guinea-Bissau, N'Tchama was arrested on the island of Bolama and set to be transferred to detainment facilities in the country's capital. The arrest was linked with an eruption of violence at an army barracks a week prior that left six people dead. The country's interim authorities accused supporters of former Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior of being behind last week's attack. They also accused Portugal -- Guinea-Bissau's former colonial power -- of being involved in the incident, which was linked with the coup plot. It should be noted that the transitional government came to power around the time of the presidential election, which was supposed to have been held earlier in the year.

Return to Democratic Governance

Guinea-Bissau's transitional presidential election as well as the country's parliamentary elections were on the agenda. At stake would be the presidency as well as the composition of the parliament.

At the parliamentary level, attention would be on the unicameral "Assembleia Nacional Popular" (National People's Assembly), which was composed of 102 seats; members are elected in that legislative body by popular vote to serve four-year terms. Elections to the National People's Assembly were initially set to take place in November 2013 but that date passed without the elections being held as scheduled.

At the presidential level, the objective was to elect a president following a period of instability and the installation of an interim president. In the aftermath of the April 2012 coup by army chief Antonio Indjai that deposed the government of President Raimundo Pereira and Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior, an agreement was reached between ECOWAS mediators and the military junta to name Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo as the transitional president with a one-year term.

The transitional government initially scheduled a presidential election to be held in November 2013. That November 2013 date passed without the election being held as scheduled. Soon thereafter, all eyes were trained on March 16, 2014, as the date when the presidential contest would finally take place. A successful election would pave the way for the flow of international aid dollars; another political melodrama would naturally end in a less desirable result with international donors keeping their wallets shut.

At the start of 2014, the government in Guinea-Bissau confirmed that the presidential and parliamentary elections would go forward on March 16, 2014. With the March 2014 date approaching for the elections, voting was again postponed in Guinea-Bissau. The new date for the elections was April 13, 2014.

A month ahead of election day -- now set for April 13, 2014 -- Guinea-Bissau's attorney general was trying to block the candidate of the country's largest party from contesting the presidential election, on the basis of accusations of misappropriation of public funds. According to the attorney general, the candidate for the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) -- Jose Mario Vaz --- was suspected of embezzling a budget support grant from Angola in 2012 while he was finance minister. But Vaz was ultimately included in the final list of candidates approved to contest the presidency and still regarded as a favorite in the race.

Given the overall frustration by voters, coupled with disarray among the political parties, there was the growing possibility that an outsider contender could win the presidency. Harvard-educated Paulo Gomes, a former World Bank executive, was at the top of the final list of presidential contenders in Guinea-Bissau. With a youthful crop of new voters angling for change, Gomes could benefit at the polls.

Another top contender was Nuno Gomes Nabian, an independent candidate and the former chair of Bissau's civil aviation agency. He was banking on the support of the military.

Ultimately, on April 13, 2014, voters went to the polls in Guinea-Bissau in large numbers to cast their ballots in elections deemed mostly free and fair by international monitors, with only isolated incidences of issues. According to a statement by the the West African regional bloc ECOWAS: "The election was conducted according to international standards and the election was peaceful, free, fair and transparent." As such, Guinea-Bissau wasted little time in calling for the lifting of economic sanctions imposed on the country after the coup discussed above.

In the early vote count, former Finance Minister Vaz was reported to be in the lead. That advantage over Gomes and Nabian held once the vote count was complete as it was soon announced that Vaz and Nabiam would contest the second round. Vaz took 41 percent of the votes share while Nabiam had 26 percent; Gomes was trailing in third place with 10 percent. With no one candidate securing an outright majority, the two top poll performers would contest a second round to settle the presidency on May 18, 2014. On that day -- May 18, 2014 -- voters returned to the polls. After the votes were counted, it was Vaz who had won the presidency with against Nabiam. At first, Nabiam alleged election fraud but soon conceded defeat, saying, "For the sake of peace and stability, I accept the results published by the electoral commission." In fact the election result was not close -- Vaz secured close to 62 percent of the vote share against Nabiam who had just over 38 percent.

At the parliamentary level, the dominant African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) had been expected to secure a majority the 100-seat parliament thanks to its established party machinery. Those expectations were in line with reality as the ruling PAIGC was on track to secure a majority in parliament with 57 seats.

In October 2015, a political contretemps was rocking the African country of Guinea-Bissau as the president rejected the cabinet proposed by the prime minister. The political landscape was sparking anxieties about instability in Guinea-Bissau -- a country with a modern history characterized by coups and turmoil.

Since August 2015, Guinea-Bissau had been ensconced in a power struggle between President Jose Mario Vaz and Prime Minister Domingos Simoes Pereira. At issue were differing interpretations over their official powers in the country's executive branch of government. The dissonance added an element of instability to a country still recovering from the turbulence that rocked the country during a coup d'etat in 2012. While elections were held in 2014 and aimed to return the country to order, the political landscape remained fragile. Now, in 2015, President Jose Mario Vaz was leveraging his executive power and moving to dismiss the entire government, including Prime Minister Pereira, declaring that his decision was being made in response to "a breach of trust."

In September 2015, President Vaz announced a new government -- this time headed by Baciro Dja. However, the tenure of the new cabinet lasted only two days as the Supreme Court ruled that Vaz' appointment of a new prime minister was unconstitutional. By the middle of the month (September 2015), President Vaz had accepted the ruling party's candidate for prime minister -- Carlos Correia.

In October 2015, Prime Minister Correia had submitted his cabinet list to the president in the hopes that the country was now moving onto more stable group. However, President Vaz responded by rejecting the Correia's proposed cabinet on the basis of size and composition. A statement from the president's office read as follows: "The presidency asks Carlos Correia to reformulate his 34-member government because the state budget will not be able to cover the cost." But budgetary concerns aside, President Vaz was not inclined to sanction Correia's proposed cabinet list since it was made up mostly of the same ministers from Pereira's dismissed government who were facing allegations of corruption.

Editor's Note

Since gaining independence from Portugal in 1974, Guinea-Bissau has been subject to considerable political instability. This political climate combined with mismanagement have contributed to a poor economy, and Guinea-Bissau holding the dubious distinction of being one of

the most impoverished countries in the world. It has also become a major hub for the trafficking of narcotics from Latin America to Europe.

In 1980, a military coup d'etat established authoritarian dictator Joao Bernardo 'Nino' Vieira as president. Several coup attempts through the 1980s and early 1990s failed to unseat him, and in 1994 Vieira was elected president in the country's first free elections. But four years later he was ousted from office following his decision to dismiss his army chief. The scenario triggered something of a civil war, which eventually ended thanks to foreign mediation, an ensuing truce, and elections in January 2000. The next month saw the transitional government turning over power to opposition leader Kumba Yala following two rounds of transparent presidential elections. In September 2003, after only three years in office, Yala was ousted by the military in a bloodless coup, and businessman Henrique Rosa was sworn in as interim president. Former President Vieira was re-elected president in 2005.

By 2008, the country had devolved into a state of alarming instability once again including a gun attack on the president himself and an attempted overthrow of the president. To that end, in 2008, the country successfully thwarted an attempted coup d'etat by Rear Admiral Jose Americo Bubo Na Tchuto, who would later resurface as a player in the political instability unfolding in 2010 and again in 2011. In the meanwhile, March 2009 saw the assassination of President Vieira.

Ultimately, Malam Bacai Sanha won the June 2009 presidential election and the July runoff, thus taking power as the new head of state. Several presidential contenders were assassinated or threatened in the period leading up to that election.

In 2012, attention was on forthcoming elections to determine who would succeed President Sanha, who had died in Paris of medical complications at the start of the year. In the interim, the country was under the leadership of Raimundo Pereira, the speaker of the parliament in conformity with the Constitution. The first round of the anticipated elections was held in March 2012 and was headed to a runoff, or second round, when the democratic process was short-circuited by a military coup in April 2012 and the installation of a junta at the helm of government.

In the aftermath of that coup that deposed the government, an agreement was reached between ECOWAS mediators and the military junta to name Manuel Sherifo Nhamadjo as the transitional president at the helm of the country for a one-year term. The transitional government has scheduled a presidential election for late 2013 with new election date subsequently set for 2014. Those elections were won by President Josse Mario Vaz who became the country's new president.

Note: Guinea-Bissau has never had an elected president finish his term in office since the introduction of multi-party elections in 1994.

-- October 2015

Written by Dr. Denise Youngblood Coleman. General sources listed in Bibliography. Supplementary sources: FIRST, Reliefweb, All Africa, the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the U.N. General Assembly (records), Lexis-Nexis, the World Bank Group, the Africa Policy Information Center, U.S. State Department, Reliefweb and the United States Institute of Peace Library, Peace Agreements Digital Collection.

Political Risk Index

Political Risk Index

The **Political Risk Index** is a proprietary index measuring the level of risk posed to governments, corporations, and investors, based on a myriad of political and economic factors. The [Political Risk Index](#) is calculated using an established methodology by CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is based on varied criteria* including the following consideration: political stability, political representation, democratic accountability, freedom of expression, security and crime, risk of conflict, human development, jurisprudence and regulatory transparency, economic risk, foreign investment considerations, possibility of sovereign default, and corruption. Scores are assigned from 0-10 using the aforementioned criteria. A score of 0 marks the highest political risk, while a score of 10 marks the lowest political risk. Stated differently, countries with the lowest scores pose the greatest political risk. A score of 0 marks the most dire level of political risk and an ultimate nadir, while a score of 10 marks the lowest possible level of political risk, according to this proprietary index. Rarely will there be scores of 0 or 10 due to the reality that countries contain complex landscapes; as such, the index offers a range of possibilities ranging from lesser to greater risk.

Country	Assessment

Afghanistan	2
Albania	4
Algeria	6
Andorra	9
Angola	4
Antigua	8
Argentina	4
Armenia	4-5
Australia	9.5
Austria	9.5
Azerbaijan	4
Bahamas	8.5
Bahrain	6
Bangladesh	3.5
Barbados	8.5-9
Belarus	3
Belgium	9
Belize	8

Benin	5
Bhutan	5
Bolivia	5
Bosnia-Herzegovina	4
Botswana	7
Brazil	7
Brunei	7
Bulgaria	6
Burkina Faso	4
Burma (Myanmar)	4.5
Burundi	3
Cambodia	4
Cameroon	5
Canada	9.5
Cape Verde	6
Central African Republic	3
Chad	4
Chile	9

China	7
China: Hong Kong	8
China: Taiwan	8
Colombia	7
Comoros	5
Congo DRC	3
Congo RC	4
Costa Rica	8
Cote d'Ivoire	4.5
Croatia	7
Cuba	4-4.5
Cyprus	5
Czech Republic	8
Denmark	9.5
Djibouti	4.5
Dominica	7
Dominican Republic	6
East Timor	5

Ecuador	6
Egypt	5
El Salvador	7
Equatorial Guinea	4
Eritrea	3
Estonia	8
Ethiopia	4
Fiji	5
Finland	9
Fr.YugoslavRep.Macedonia	5
France	9
Gabon	5
Gambia	4
Georgia	5
Germany	9.5
Ghana	6
Greece	4.5-5
Grenada	8

Guatemala	6
Guinea	3.5
Guinea-Bissau	3.5
Guyana	4.5
Haiti	3.5
Holy See (Vatican)	9
Honduras	4.5-5
Hungary	7
Iceland	8.5-9
India	7.5-8
Indonesia	6
Iran	3.5-4
Iraq	2.5-3
Ireland	8-8.5
Israel	8
Italy	7.5
Jamaica	6.5-7
Japan	9

Jordan	6.5
Kazakhstan	6
Kenya	5
Kiribati	7
Korea, North	1
Korea, South	8
Kosovo	4
Kuwait	7
Kyrgyzstan	4.5
Laos	4.5
Latvia	7
Lebanon	5.5
Lesotho	6
Liberia	3.5
Libya	2
Liechtenstein	9
Lithuania	7.5
Luxembourg	9

Madagascar	4
Malawi	4
Malaysia	8
Maldives	4.5
Mali	4
Malta	8
Marshall Islands	6
Mauritania	4.5-5
Mauritius	7
Mexico	6.5
Micronesia	7
Moldova	5
Monaco	9
Mongolia	5
Montenegro	6
Morocco	6.5
Mozambique	4.5-5
Namibia	6.5-7

Nauru	6
Nepal	4
Netherlands	9.5
New Zealand	9.5
Nicaragua	5
Niger	4
Nigeria	4.5
Norway	9.5
Oman	7
Pakistan	3.5
Palau	7
Panama	7.5
Papua New Guinea	5
Paraguay	6.5-7
Peru	7
Philippines	6
Poland	8
Portugal	7.5

Qatar	7.5
Romania	5.5
Russia	5.5
Rwanda	5
Saint Kitts and Nevis	8
Saint Lucia	8
Saint Vincent and Grenadines	8
Samoa	7
San Marino	9
Sao Tome and Principe	5.5
Saudi Arabia	6
Senegal	6
Serbia	5
Seychelles	7
Sierra Leone	4.5
Singapore	9
Slovak Republic (Slovakia)	8
Slovenia	8

Solomon Islands	6
Somalia	2
South Africa	7
Spain	7.5
Sri Lanka	5
Sudan	3.5
Suriname	5
Swaziland	5
Sweden	9.5
Switzerland	9.5
Syria	2
Tajikistan	4.5
Tanzania	6
Thailand	6.5
Togo	4.5
Tonga	7
Trinidad and Tobago	8
Tunisia	6

Turkey	7
Turkmenistan	4.5
Tuvalu	7
Uganda	6
Ukraine	3.5-4
United Arab Emirates	7
United Kingdom	9
United States	9.5
Uruguay	8
Uzbekistan	4
Vanuatu	7
Venezuela	4
Vietnam	5
Yemen	3
Zambia	4.5
Zimbabwe	3

***Methodology**

The [Political Risk Index](#) is calculated by CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is based on the

combined scoring of varied criteria as follows --

1. political stability (record of peaceful transitions of power, ability of government to stay in office and carry out policies as a result of productive executive-legislative relationship, perhaps with popular support vis a vis risk of government collapse)
2. political representation (right of suffrage, free and fair elections, multi-party participation, and influence of foreign powers)
3. democratic accountability (record of respect for political rights, human rights, and civil liberties, backed by constitutional protections)
4. freedom of expression (media freedom and freedom of expression, right to dissent or express political opposition, backed by constitutional protections)
5. security and crime (the degree to which a country has security mechanisms that ensures safety of citizens and ensures law and order, without resorting to extra-judicial measures)
6. risk of conflict (the presence of conflict; record of coups or civil disturbances; threat of war; threats posed by internal or external tensions; threat or record of terrorism or insurgencies)
7. human development (quality of life; access to education; socio-economic conditions; systemic concern for the status of women and children)
8. jurisprudence and regulatory transparency (the impartiality of the legal system, the degree of transparency within the regulatory system of a country and the durability of that structure)
9. economic conditions (economic stability, investment climate, degree of nationalization of industries, property rights, labor force development)
10. corruption (the degree of corruption in a country and/or efforts by the government to address graft and other irregularities)

Editor's Note:

As of 2015, the current climate of upheaval internationally -- both politically and economically -- has affected the ratings for several countries across the world.

North Korea, [Afghanistan](#), [Somalia](#), and [Zimbabwe](#) -- retain their low rankings.

Several Middle Eastern and North African countries, such as [Tunisia](#), [Egypt](#), [Libya](#), [Syria](#), [Iraq](#) and [Yemen](#) were downgraded in recent years due to political instability occurring in the "season of unrest" sweeping the region since 2011 and continuing today. The worst downgrades affected [Syria](#) where civil war is at play, along with the rampage of terror being carried out by Islamist terrorists who have also seized control over part of Syrian territory. [Iraq](#) has been further downgraded due to the rampage of Islamist terrorists and their takeover of wide swaths of Iraqi territory. [Libya](#) has also been downgraded further due to its slippage into failed state status; at issue in [Libya](#) have been an ongoing power struggle between rival militias. [Yemen](#) continues to hold steady with a poor ranking due to continued unrest at the hands of Houthi rebels, secessionists, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, and Islamic State. Its landscape has been further complicated by the fact that it is now the site of a proxy war between [Iran](#) and [Saudi Arabia](#). Conversely, [Tunisia](#) and [Egypt](#) have seen slight upgrades as these countries stabilize.

In Africa, [Zimbabwe](#) continues to be one of the bleak spots of the world with the Mugabe regime effectively destroying the country's once vibrant economy, and miring [Zimbabwe](#) with an exceedingly high rate of inflation, debilitating unemployment, devolving public services, and critical food shortages; rampant crime and political oppression round out the landscape. [Somalia](#) also sports a poor ranking due to the continuing influence of the terror group, al-Shabab, which was not operating across the border in [Kenya](#). On the upside, [Nigeria](#), which was ineffectively dealing with the threat posed by the terror group, Boko Haram, was making some strides on the national security front with its new president at the helm. [Mali](#) was slightly upgraded due to its efforts to return to constitutional order following the 2012 coup and to neutralize the threat of separatists and Islamists. But the [Central African Republic](#) was downgraded due to the takeover of the government by Muslim Seleka rebels and a continued state of lawlessness in that country. South [Sudan](#) -- the world's newest nation state -- has not been officially included in this assessment; however, it can be unofficially assessed to be in the vicinity of "3" due to its manifold political and economic challenges. [Burkina Faso](#), [Burundi](#) and [Guinea](#) have been downgraded due to political unrest, with [Guinea](#) also having to deal with the burgeoning Ebola crisis.

In Europe, [Ukraine](#) was downgraded due to the unrest facing that country following its Maidan revolution that triggered a pro-Russian uprising in the eastern part of the country. [Russia](#) was also implicated in the Ukrainian crisis due to its intervention on behalf of pro-Russian separatists, as well as its annexation of the Ukrainian territory of Crimea. Strains on the infrastructure of southern and eastern European countries, such as [Serbia](#), [Croatia](#), and [Hungary](#), due to an influx of refugees was expected to pose social and economic challenges, and slight downgrades were made accordingly. So too, a corruption crisis for the Romanian prime minister has affected the ranking of that country. Meanwhile, the rankings for [Spain](#), [Portugal](#), [Ireland](#), and [Italy](#) were maintained due to debt woes and the concomitant effect on the euro zone. [Greece](#), another euro zone nation, was earlier downgraded due to its sovereign debt crisis; however, no further downgrade was added since the country was able to successfully forge a bailout rescue deal with creditor institutions. Cyprus' exposure to Greek banks yielded a downgrade in its case.

In Asia, [Nepal](#) was downgraded in response to continuous political instability and a constitutional crisis that prevails well after landmark elections were held. Both [India](#) and China retain their rankings; [India](#) holds a slightly higher ranking than [China](#) due to its record of democratic representation and accountability. Increasing violence and political instability in [Pakistan](#) resulted in a downgrade for this country's already low rating. Meanwhile, [Singapore](#) retained its strong rankings due to its continued effective stewardship of the economy and political stability.

In the Americas, ongoing political and economic woes, as well as crime and corruption have affected the rankings for [Mexico](#), [Guatemala](#), and [Brazil](#). [Argentina](#) was downgraded due to its default on debt following the failure of talks with bond holders. [Venezuela](#) was downgraded due to its mix of market unfriendly policies and political oppression. For the moment, the [United States](#) maintains a strong ranking along with [Canada](#), and most of the English-speaking countries of the Caribbean; however, a renewed debt ceiling crisis could cause the [United States](#) to be downgraded in a future edition. Finally, a small but significant upgrade was attributed to [Cuba](#) due to its recent pro-business reforms and its normalization of ties with the United States.

Source:

Dr. Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief, CountryWatch Inc. www.countrywatch.com

Updated:

2015

Political Stability

Political Stability

The **Political Stability Index** is a proprietary index measuring a country's level of stability, standard of good governance, record of constitutional order, respect for human rights, and overall strength of democracy. The [Political Stability](#) Index is calculated using an established methodology* by CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is based on a given country's record of peaceful transitions of power, ability of a government to stay in office and carry out its policies vis a vis risk credible risks of government collapse. Threats include coups, domestic violence and instability, terrorism, etc. This index measures the dynamic between the quality of a country's government

and the threats that can compromise and undermine stability. Scores are assigned from 0-10 using the aforementioned criteria. A score of 0 marks the lowest level of political stability and an ultimate nadir, while a score of 10 marks the highest level of political stability possible, according to this proprietary index. Rarely will there be scores of 0 or 10 due to the reality that countries contain complex landscapes; as such, the index offers a range of possibilities ranging from lesser to greater stability.

Country	Assessment
Afghanistan	2
Albania	4.5-5
Algeria	5
Andorra	9.5
Angola	4.5-5
Antigua	8.5-9
Argentina	7
Armenia	5.5
Australia	9.5
Austria	9.5
Azerbaijan	5
Bahamas	9
Bahrain	6

Bangladesh	4.5
Barbados	9
Belarus	4
Belgium	9
Belize	8
Benin	5
Bhutan	5
Bolivia	6
Bosnia-Herzegovina	5
Botswana	8.5
Brazil	7
Brunei	8
Bulgaria	7.5
Burkina Faso	4
Burma (Myanmar)	4.5
Burundi	4
Cambodia	4.5-5
Cameroon	6

Canada	9.5
Cape Verde	6
Central African Republic	3
Chad	4.5
Chile	9
China	7
China: Hong Kong	8
China: Taiwan	8
Colombia	7.5
Comoros	5
Congo DRC	3
Congo RC	5
Costa Rica	9.5
Cote d'Ivoire	3.5
Croatia	7.5
Cuba	4.5
Cyprus	8
Czech Republic	8.5

Denmark	9.5
Djibouti	5
Dominica	8.5
Dominican Republic	7
East Timor	5
Ecuador	7
Egypt	4.5-5
El Salvador	7.5-8
Equatorial Guinea	4.5
Eritrea	4
Estonia	9
Ethiopia	4.5
Fiji	5
Finland	9
Fr.YugoslavRep.Macedonia	6.5
France	9
Gabon	5
Gambia	4.5

Georgia	5
Germany	9.5
Ghana	7
Greece	6
Grenada	8.5
Guatemala	7
Guinea	3.5-4
Guinea-Bissau	4
Guyana	6
Haiti	3.5-4
Holy See (Vatican)	9.5
Honduras	6
Hungary	7.5
Iceland	9
India	8
Indonesia	7
Iran	3.5
Iraq	2.5

Ireland	9.5
Israel	8
Italy	8.5-9
Jamaica	8
Japan	9
Jordan	6
Kazakhstan	6
Kenya	5
Kiribati	8
Korea, North	2
Korea, South	8.5
Kosovo	5.5
Kuwait	7
Kyrgyzstan	5
Laos	5
Latvia	8.5
Lebanon	5.5
Lesotho	5

Liberia	3.5-4
Libya	2
Liechtenstein	9
Lithuania	9
Luxembourg	9.5
Madagascar	4
Malawi	5
Malaysia	8
Maldives	4.5-5
Mali	4.5-5
Malta	9
Marshall Islands	8
Mauritania	6
Mauritius	8
Mexico	6.5-7
Micronesia	8
Moldova	5.5
Monaco	9.5

Mongolia	6.5-7
Montenegro	8
Morocco	7
Mozambique	5
Namibia	8.5
Nauru	8
Nepal	4.5
Netherlands	9.5
New Zealand	9.5
Nicaragua	6
Niger	4.5
Nigeria	4.5
Norway	9.5
Oman	7
Pakistan	3
Palau	8
Panama	8.5
Papua New Guinea	6

Paraguay	8
Peru	7.5
Philippines	6
Poland	9
Portugal	9
Qatar	7
Romania	7
Russia	6
Rwanda	5
Saint Kitts and Nevis	9
Saint Lucia	9
Saint Vincent and Grenadines	9
Samoa	8
San Marino	9.5
Sao Tome and Principe	7
Saudi Arabia	6
Senegal	7.5
Serbia	6.5

Seychelles	8
Sierra Leone	4.5
Singapore	9.5
Slovak Republic (Slovakia)	8.5
Slovenia	9
Solomon Islands	6.5-7
Somalia	2
South Africa	7.5
Spain	9
Sri Lanka	5
Sudan	3
Suriname	5
Swaziland	5
Sweden	9.5
Switzerland	9.5
Syria	2
Tajikistan	4.5
Tanzania	6

Thailand	6
Togo	5
Tonga	7
Trinidad and Tobago	8
Tunisia	5
Turkey	7.5
Turkmenistan	5
Tuvalu	8.5
Uganda	6
Ukraine	3.5-4
United Arab Emirates	7
United Kingdom	9
United States	9
Uruguay	8.5
Uzbekistan	4
Vanuatu	8.5
Venezuela	4.5-5
Vietnam	4.5

Yemen	2.5
Zambia	5
Zimbabwe	3

*Methodology

The Political Stability Index is calculated by CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is based on the combined scoring of varied criteria as follows --

1. record of peaceful transitions of power (free and fair elections; adherence to political accords)
2. record of democratic representation, presence of instruments of democracy; systemic accountability
3. respect for human rights; respect for civil rights
4. strength of the system of jurisprudence, adherence to constitutional order, and good governance
5. ability of a government to stay in office and carry out its policies vis a vis risk credible risks of government collapse (i.e. government stability versus a country being deemed "ungovernable")
6. threat of coups, insurgencies, and insurrection
7. level of unchecked crime and corruption
8. risk of terrorism and other threats to national security
9. relationship with regional powers and international community; record of bilateral or multilateral cooperation
10. degree of economic strife (i.e. economic and financial challenges)

Editor's Note:

As of 2015, the current climate of upheaval internationally -- both politically and economically --

has affected the ratings for several countries across the world. The usual suspects -- North Korea, [Afghanistan](#), and [Somalia](#) -- retain their low rankings. The reclusive and ultra-dictatorial North Korean regime, which has terrified the world with its nuclear threats, has exhibited internal instability. Of note was a cut-throat purge of hundreds of high ranking officials deemed to be a threat to Kim Jung-un. Despite their attempts to recover from years of lawlessness, war, and warlordism, both [Afghanistan](#) and [Somalia](#) continue to be beset by terrorism and turmoil. In [Afghanistan](#), while international forces have seen success in the effort against the terror group, al-Qaida, the other Islamist extremist group, the Taliban, continues to carry out a vicious insurgency using terrorism. In [Somalia](#), while the government attempts to do the nation's business, the terror group, al-Shabab continues to make its presence known not only in [Somalia](#), but across the border into [Kenya](#) with devastating results/ Also in this category is [Iraq](#), which continues to be rocked by horrific violence and terrorism at the hands of Islamic State, which has taken over wide swaths of Iraqi territory.

Syria, [Libya](#), and [Yemen](#) have been added to this unfortunate echelon of the world's most politically unstable countries. [Syria](#) has been mired by the twin hazards of 1. a civil war as rebels oppose the Assad regime; and 2. the rampage of terror being carried out by Islamic State, which also seized control over vast portions of Syrian territory. Meanwhile, the post-Qaddhafi landscape of [Libya](#) has devolved into chaos as rival militias battle for control -- the elected government of the country notwithstanding. Rounding out this grim triad is [Yemen](#), which was dealing with a Houthi rebellion, secessionists in the south, as well as the threat of terrorism from al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula as well as Islamic State, while also being the site of a proxy war between Shi'a [Iran](#) and Sunni [Saudi Arabia](#).

Meanwhile, several Middle Eastern and North African countries, such as [Tunisia](#), [Egypt](#), and [Bahrain](#) were downgraded in recent years due to political instability occurring in the "season of unrest" sweeping the region since 2011 and continuing today. All three of these countries have stabilized in recent years and have been upgraded accordingly. In [Bahrain](#), the landscape had calmed. In [Egypt](#), the secular military-backed government has generated criticism for its crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood; however, the country had ratified the presidency via democratic elections and were on track to hold parliamentary elections as the country moved along the path of democratization. Perhaps the most impressive story was coming out of [Tunisia](#) -- the country whose Jasmine Revolution sparked the entire Arab Spring -- and where after a few years of strife, a new progressive constitution was passed into law and a secular government had been elected to power. [Tunisia](#), [Egypt](#), and [Bahrain](#) have seen slight upgrades as these countries stabilize.

In Africa, the [Central African Republic](#) was downgraded the previous year due to the takeover of the government by Muslim Seleka rebels. Although the country has been trying to emerge from this crisis, the fact of the matter was that it was difficult to halt the precipitous decline into lawlessness in that country. [Zimbabwe](#) has maintained its consistently poor ranking due to the

dictatorial regime of Mugabe, who continues to hold a tight grip on power, intimidates the opposition, squashes dissent, and oppresses the white farmer population of the country. Moving in a slightly improved direction is [Nigeria](#), which has sported abysmal ratings due to the government's fecklessness in dealing with the threat posed by the Islamist terror group, Boko Haram. Under its newly-elected government, there appears to be more of a concerted effort to make national security a priority action item. [Mali](#) was also slightly upgraded due to its efforts to return to constitutional order following the 2012 coup and to neutralize the threat of separatists and Islamists. Political instability has visited [Burkina Faso](#) and [Burundi](#) as the leaders of those countries attempted to side-step constitutional limits to hold onto power. In [Burundi](#), an attempted coup ensued but quelled, and the president won a (questionable) new term in office; unrest has since punctuated the landscape. In [Burkina Faso](#), the political climate has turned stormy as a result of a successful coup that ended the rule of the president, and then a putsch against the transitional government. These two African countries have been downgraded as a result.

It should be noted that the African country of South [Sudan](#) -- the world's newest nation state -- has not been officially included in this assessment; however, it can be unofficially assessed to be in the vicinity of "3" due to its manifold political and economic challenges. [Guinea](#) has endured poor rankings throughout, but was slightly downgraded further over fears of social unrest and the Ebola heath crisis.

In Europe, [Ukraine](#) was downgraded due to the unrest facing that country following its Maidan revolution that triggered a pro-Russian uprising in the eastern part of the country. [Russia](#) was also implicated in the Ukrainian crisis due to its intervention on behalf of pro-Russian separatists, as well as its annexation of the Ukrainian territory of Crimea. [Serbia](#) and [Albania](#) were slightly downgraded due to eruptions of unrest, while [Romania](#) was slightly downgraded on the basis of corruption charges against the prime minister. [Spain](#), [Portugal](#), [Ireland](#), and [Italy](#) were downgraded due to debt woes and the concomitant effect on the euro zone. [Greece](#), another euro zone nation, was downgraded the previous year due to its sovereign debt crisis; however, the country successfully forged a rescue deal with international creditors and stayed within the Euro zone. Greek voters rewarded the hitherto unknown upstart party at the polls for these efforts. As a result, [Greece](#) was actually upgraded slightly as it proved to the world that it could endure the political and economic storms. Meanwhile, [Germany](#), [France](#), [Switzerland](#), the [United Kingdom](#), the [Netherlands](#), and the Scandinavian countries continue to post impressive ranking consistent with these countries' strong records of democracy, freedom, and peaceful transfers of power.

In Asia, [Nepal](#) was downgraded in response to continuous political instability well after landmark elections that prevails today. [Cambodia](#) was very slightly downgraded due to post-election instability that has resulted in occasional flares of violence. Despite the "trifecta of tragedy" in [Japan](#) in 2011 -- the earthquake, the ensuing tsunami, and the resulting nuclear crisis -- and the appreciable destabilization of the economic and political terrain therein, this country has only slightly been downgraded. Japan's challenges have been assessed to be transient, the government

remains accountable, and there is little risk of default. Both [India](#) and China retain their rankings; [India](#) holds a slightly higher ranking than [China](#) due to its record of democratic representation and accountability. Increasing violence and political instability in [Pakistan](#) resulted in a downgrade for this country's already low rating.

In the Americas, [Haiti](#) retained its downgraded status due to ongoing political and economic woes. [Mexico](#) was downgraded due to its alarming rate of crime. [Guatemala](#) was downgraded due to charges of corruption, the arrest of the president, and uncertainty over the outcome of elections. [Brazil](#) was downgraded due to the corruption charges erupting on the political landscape, the stalling of the economy, and the increasingly loud calls for the impeachment of President Rousseff. [Argentina](#) was downgraded due to its default on debt following the failure of talks with bond holders. [Venezuela](#) was downgraded due to the fact that the country's post-Chavez government is every bit as autocratic and nationalistic, but even more inclined to oppress its political opponents. [Colombia](#) was upgraded slightly due to efforts aimed at securing a peace deal with the FARC insurgents. A small but significant upgrade was attributed to [Cuba](#) due to its recent pro-business reforms and its normalization of ties with the United States. Meanwhile, the [United States](#), [Canada](#), [Costa Rica](#), [Panama](#), and most of the English-speaking countries of the Caribbean retain their strong rankings due to their records of stability and peaceful transfers of power.

In the Pacific, [Fiji](#) was upgraded due to its return to constitutional order and democracy with the holding of the first elections in eight years.

In Oceania, [Maldives](#) has been slightly downgraded due to the government's continued and rather relentless persecution of the country's former pro-democracy leader - former President Nasheed.

Source:

Dr. Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief, CountryWatch Inc. www.countrywatch.com

Updated:

2015

Freedom Rankings

Freedom Rankings

Freedom in the World

Editor's Note: This ranking by Freedom House quantifies political freedom and civil liberties into a single combined index on each sovereign country's level of freedom and liberty. The initials "PR" and "CL" stand for Political Rights and Civil Liberties, respectively. The number 1 represents the most free countries and the number 7 represents the least free. Several countries fall in the continuum in between. The freedom ratings reflect an overall judgment based on survey results.

Country	PR	CL	Freedom Status	Trend Arrow
Afghanistan	6 ?	6	Not Free	
Albania*	3	3	Partly Free	
Algeria	6	5	Not Free	
Andorra*	1	1	Free	
Angola	6	5	Not Free	
Antigua and Barbuda*	3 ?	2	Free	
Argentina*	2	2	Free	
Armenia	6	4	Partly Free	
Australia*	1	1	Free	
Austria*	1	1	Free	

Azerbaijan	6	5	Not Free	
Bahamas*	1	1	Free	
Bahrain	6 ?	5	Not Free ?	
Bangladesh*	3 ?	4	Partly Free	
Barbados*	1	1	Free	
Belarus	7	6	Not Free	
Belgium*	1	1	Free	
Belize*	1	2	Free	
Benin*	2	2	Free	
Bhutan	4	5	Partly Free	
Bolivia*	3	3	Partly Free	
Bosnia-Herzegovina*	4	3	Partly Free	
Botswana*	3 ?	2	Free	
Brazil*	2	2	Free	
Brunei	6	5	Not Free	
Bulgaria*	2	2	Free	
Burkina Faso	5	3	Partly Free	
Burma	7	7	Not Free	

Burundi*	4	5	Partly Free	↑
Cambodia	6	5	Not Free	↓
Cameroon	6	6	Not Free	
Canada*	1	1	Free	
Cape Verde*	1	1	Free	
Central African Republic	5	5	Partly Free	
Chad	7	6	Not Free	
Chile*	1	1	Free	
China	7	6	Not Free	
Colombia*	3	4	Partly Free	
Comoros*	3	4	Partly Free	
Congo (Brazzaville)	6	5	Not Free	↓
Congo (Kinshasa)	6	6	Not Free	↓
Costa Rica*	1	1	Free	
Cote d'Ivoire	6	5	Not Free	
Croatia*	1 ?	2	Free	
Cuba	7	6	Not Free	
Cyprus*	1	1	Free	

Czech Republic*	1	1	Free	
Denmark*	1	1	Free	
Djibouti	5	5	Partly Free	
Dominica*	1	1	Free	
Dominican Republic*	2	2	Free	↓
East Timor*	3	4	Partly Free	
Ecuador*	3	3	Partly Free	
Egypt	6	5	Not Free	
El Salvador*	2	3	Free	
Equatorial Guinea	7	7	Not Free	
Eritrea	7	7 ?	Not Free	
Estonia*	1	1	Free	
Ethiopia	5	5	Partly Free	↓
Fiji	6	4	Partly Free	
Finland*	1	1	Free	
France*	1	1	Free	
Gabon	6	5 ?	Not Free ?	
The Gambia	5	5 ?	Partly Free	

Georgia	4	4	Partly Free	
Germany*	1	1	Free	
Ghana*	1	2	Free	
Greece*	1	2	Free	
Grenada*	1	2	Free	
Guatemala*	4 ?	4	Partly Free	
Guinea	7	6 ?	Not Free	
Guinea-Bissau*	4	4	Partly Free	
Guyana*	2	3	Free	
Haiti*	4	5	Partly Free	
Honduras	4 ?	4 ?	Partly Free	
Hungary*	1	1	Free	
Iceland*	1	1	Free	
India*	2	3	Free	
Indonesia*	2	3	Free	
Iran	6	6	Not Free	↓
Iraq	5 ?	6	Not Free	
Ireland*	1	1	Free	

Israel*	1	2	Free	
Italy*	1	2	Free	
Jamaica*	2	3	Free	
Japan*	1	2	Free	
Jordan	6 ?	5	Not Free ?	
Kazakhstan	6	5	Not Free	↓
Kenya	4	4 ?	Partly Free	
Kiribati*	1	1	Free	
Kosovo	5 ?	4 ?	Partly Free ?	
Kuwait	4	4	Partly Free	
Kyrgyzstan	6 ?	5 ?	Not Free ?	
Laos	7	6	Not Free	
Latvia*	2	1	Free	
Lebanon	5	3 ?	Partly Free	
Lesotho*	3 ?	3	Partly Free ?	
Liberia*	3	4	Partly Free	
Libya	7	7	Not Free	
Liechtenstein*	1	1	Free	

Lithuania*	1	1	Free	
Luxembourg*	1	1	Free	
Macedonia*	3	3	Partly Free	↑
Madagascar	6 ?	4 ?	Partly Free	
Malawi*	3 ?	4	Partly Free	
Malaysia	4	4	Partly Free	
Maldives*	3 ?	4	Partly Free	
Mali*	2	3	Free	
Malta*	1	1	Free	↓
Marshall Islands*	1	1	Free	
Mauritania	6	5	Not Free	
Mauritius*	1	2	Free	
Mexico*	2	3	Free	
Micronesia*	1	1	Free	
Moldova*	3 ?	4	Partly Free	
Monaco*	2	1	Free	
Mongolia*	2	2	Free	↑
Montenegro*	3	2 ?	Free ?	

Morocco	5	4	Partly Free	↓
Mozambique	4 ?	3	Partly Free	
Namibia*	2	2	Free	
Nauru*	1	1	Free	
Nepal	4	4	Partly Free	
Netherlands*	1	1	Free	
New Zealand*	1	1	Free	
Nicaragua*	4	4 ?	Partly Free	
Niger	5 ?	4	Partly Free	
Nigeria	5	4	Partly Free	↓
North Korea	7	7	Not Free	↓
Norway*	1	1	Free	
Oman	6	5	Not Free	
Pakistan	4	5	Partly Free	
Palau*	1	1	Free	
Panama*	1	2	Free	
Papua New Guinea*	4	3	Partly Free	
Paraguay*	3	3	Partly Free	

Peru*	2	3	Free	
Philippines	4	3	Partly Free	↓
Poland*	1	1	Free	
Portugal*	1	1	Free	
Qatar	6	5	Not Free	
Romania*	2	2	Free	
Russia	6	5	Not Free	↓
Rwanda	6	5	Not Free	
Saint Kitts and Nevis*	1	1	Free	
Saint Lucia*	1	1	Free	
Saint Vincent and Grenadines*	2	1	Free	
Samoa*	2	2	Free	
San Marino*	1	1	Free	
Sao Tome and Principe*	2	2	Free	
Saudi Arabia	7	6	Not Free	
Senegal*	3	3	Partly Free	
Serbia*	2 ?	2	Free	
Seychelles*	3	3	Partly Free	

Sierra Leone*	3	3	Partly Free	
Singapore	5	4	Partly Free	
Slovakia*	1	1	Free	↓
Slovenia*	1	1	Free	
Solomon Islands	4	3	Partly Free	
Somalia	7	7	Not Free	
South Africa*	2	2	Free	
South Korea*	1	2	Free	
Spain*	1	1	Free	
Sri Lanka*	4	4	Partly Free	
Sudan	7	7	Not Free	
Suriname*	2	2	Free	
Swaziland	7	5	Not Free	
Sweden*	1	1	Free	
Switzerland*	1	1	Free	↓
Syria	7	6	Not Free	
Taiwan*	1 ?	2 ?	Free	
Tajikistan	6	5	Not Free	

Tanzania	4	3	Partly Free	
Thailand	5	4	Partly Free	
Togo	5	4 ?	Partly Free	
Tonga	5	3	Partly Free	
Trinidad and Tobago*	2	2	Free	
Tunisia	7	5	Not Free	
Turkey*	3	3	Partly Free	↓
Turkmenistan	7	7	Not Free	
Tuvalu*	1	1	Free	
Uganda	5	4	Partly Free	
Ukraine*	3	2	Free	
United Arab Emirates	6	5	Not Free	
United Kingdom*	1	1	Free	
United States*	1	1	Free	
Uruguay*	1	1	Free	
Uzbekistan	7	7	Not Free	
Vanuatu*	2	2	Free	
Venezuela	5 ?	4	Partly Free	

Vietnam	7	5	Not Free	↓
Yemen	6 ?	5	Not Free ?	
Zambia*	3	4 ?	Partly Free	
Zimbabwe	6 ?	6	Not Free	

Methodology:

PR and CL stand for political rights and civil liberties, respectively; 1 represents the most free and 7 the least free rating. The ratings reflect an overall judgment based on survey results.

? ? up or down indicates a change in political rights, civil liberties, or status since the last survey.

↑ ↓ up or down indicates a trend of positive or negative changes that took place but that were not sufficient to result in a change in political rights or civil liberties ratings of 1-7.

* indicates a country's status as an electoral democracy.

Source:

This data is derived from the latest edition of Freedom House's Freedom in the World 2010 edition.

Available at URL: <http://www.freedomhouse.org>

Updated:

Reviewed in 2015

Human Rights

Overview of Human Rights in Guinea-Bissau

Guinea-Bissau is a multi-party republic. Since its 1974 independence from Portugal, Guinea-Bissau

has experienced much political, social and military upheaval. A 2003 coup attempt upset the already tenuous situation in the nation. The election of João Bernardo Vieira as president marked the path back to constitutional government.

The government works to respect the civil and human rights of its citizens. However, dire economic and social conditions hinder stability in the region. Current concerns include the following:

- The government uses suppression of political opposition and purging of political dissidents to maintain its control. The police are known to use violent means when dispersing otherwise peaceful demonstrations.
- Human rights activists are often arrested and beaten due to the work they are trying to promote.
- The abuse of children, including child labor, continues to be a problem in the region.
- Child trafficking is also an issue.

Human Development Index (HDI) Rank:

See full listing of the Human Development Index located in the Social Overview of this report for this country's current rank.

Human Poverty Index Rank:

93rd out of 103

Gini Index:

47.0

Life Expectancy at Birth (years):

48.7 years

Unemployment Rate:

N/A

Population living on \$1 a day (%):

N/A

Population living on \$2 a day (%):

N/A

Population living beneath the Poverty Line (%):

N/A

Internally Displaced People:

N/A

Note-8,000 refugees

Total Crime Rate (%):

N/A

Health Expenditure (% of GDP):

Public: 3.0%

% of GDP Spent on Education:

N/A

Human Rights Conventions Party to:

- International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Signed but not yet ratified)
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Signed but not yet ratified)
- International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
- Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
- Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Signed but not yet ratified)
- Conventions on the Rights of the Child
- Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
- International Convention on the Protection of All Migrants and Members of Their Families (Signed but not yet ratified)
- Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Signed but not yet ratified)

*Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index that measures the level of well-being in 177 nations in the world. It uses factors such as poverty, literacy, life-expectancy, education, gross domestic product, and purchasing power parity to assess the average achievements in each nation. It has been used in the United Nation's Human Development Report since 1993.

*Human Poverty Index Ranking is based on certain indicators used to calculate the Human Poverty Index. Probability at birth of not surviving to age 40, adult literacy rate, population without sustainable access to an improved water source, and population below income poverty line are the indicators assessed in this measure.

*The Gini Index measures inequality based on the distribution of family income or consumption. A value of 0 represents perfect equality (income being distributed equally), and a value of 100 perfect inequality (income all going to one individual).

*The calculation of the total crime rate is the % of the total population which has been effected by property crime, robbery, sexual assault, assault, or bribery (corruption) related occurrences.

Government Functions

Background

Guinea-Bissau is a republic. In the past, the government has been highly centralized and multiparty governance has been in effect since mid-1991.

Constitution

The constitution was first instituted in May 1984; amended May 1991, December 1991, February 1993, June 1993, and in 1996. The legal system is based on French civil law.

Branches of Government

The president is the head of state and the prime minister is the head of government. The president is elected by popular vote for a five-year term and has no term limits.

At the legislative level, there is a unicameral "Assembleia Nacional Popular" (National People's Assembly) made up of 102 members. They are popularly elected from multi-member constituencies to serve a four-year term.

At the judicial level, there is a Supreme Court or Supremo Tribunal da Justica (consists of nine justices appointed by the president and serve at his pleasure; final court of appeals in criminal and civil cases); Regional Courts (one in each of nine regions; first court of appeals for Sectoral Court decisions; hear all felony cases and civil cases valued at over \$1,000); 24 Sectoral Courts (judges are not necessarily trained lawyers; they hear civil cases under \$1,000 and misdemeanor criminal cases).

Government Structure

Names:

conventional long form:

Republic of Guinea-Bissau

conventional short form:

Guinea-Bissau

local long form:

Republica da Guine-Bissau

local short form:

Guine-Bissau

former:

Portuguese Guinea

Type:

Republic; formerly highly centralized; multiparty since mid-1991

Executive Branch:

Head of state:

President Josse Mario VAZ (since June 2014). See "Primer" below for details related to the 2014 presidential contest.

Note on Political Landscape and Elections:

In the aftermath of the April 2012 coup that deposed the government, an agreement was reached between ECOWAS mediators and the military junta to name Manuel Serifo NHAMADJO as transitional president with a one-year term.

The transitional government of Guinea-Bissau scheduled a presidential election for November 2013. This November 2013 date did not go forward, as scheduled. Indeed, given the climate of instability, there had doubts about the timeline of this presidential poll in the first place, and the credibility of the poll, if it actually occurred as scheduled.

By the start of the new year (2014), a new date (March 2014) was set for Guinea-Bissau's transitional presidential election as well as the country's parliamentary elections. That date was later postponed to April 2014. At stake in 2014 would be the presidency as well as the composition of the parliament. See "Primer" below.

It should be noted that no elected president of Guinea-Bissau has ever finished his term in office since the introduction of multi-party democracy in the 1990s.

Note on Government:

In October 2015, a political contretemps was rocking the African country of Guinea-Bissau as the president rejected the cabinet proposed by the prime minister. The political landscape was sparking anxieties about instability in Guinea-Bissau -- a country with a modern history characterized by coups and turmoil.

Since August 2015, Guinea-Bissau had been ensconced in a power struggle between President Jose Mario Vaz and Prime Minister Domingos Simoes Pereira. At issue were differing interpretations over their official powers in the country's executive branch of government. The dissonance added an element of instability to a country still recovering from the turbulence that rocked the country during a coup d'etat in 2012. While elections were held in 2014 and aimed to return the country to order, the political landscape remained fragile. Now, in 2015, President Jose Mario Vaz was leveraging his executive power and moving to dismiss the entire government, including Prime Minister Pereira, declaring that his decision was being made in response to "a breach of trust."

In September 2015, President Vaz announced a new government -- this time headed by Baciro Dja. However, the tenure of the new cabinet lasted only two days as the Supreme Court ruled that Vaz' appointment of a new prime minister was unconstitutional. By the middle of the month (September 2015), President Vaz had accepted the ruling party's candidate for prime minister -- Carlos Correia.

In October 2015, Prime Minister Correia had submitted his cabinet list to the president in the hopes

that the country was now moving onto more stable group. However, President Vaz responded by rejecting the Correia's proposed cabinet on the basis of size and composition. A statement from the president's office read as follows: "The presidency asks Carlos Correia to reformulate his 34-member government because the state budget will not be able to cover the cost." But budgetary concerns aside, President Vaz was not inclined to sanction Correia's proposed cabinet list since it was made up mostly of the same ministers from Pereira's dismissed government who were facing allegations of corruption.

Legislative Branch:

Unicameral "Assembleia Nacional Popular" (National People's Assembly):

102 total -- 100 members plus 2 seats for diaspora members; members are elected by popular vote to serve four-year terms

2014 Elections:

See below for information related to the 2014 elections

Primer on 2014 presidential and parliamentary elections:

(first round - April 13, 2014; second round - May 18, 2014)

March 16, 2014, was the date set for Guinea-Bissau's transitional presidential election as well as the country's parliamentary elections. At stake would be the presidency as well as the composition of the parliament.

At the parliamentary level, attention would be on the unicameral "Assembleia Nacional Popular" (National People's Assembly), which was composed of 102 seats ; members are elected in that legislative body by popular vote to serve four-year terms. Elections to the National People's Assembly were initially set to take place in November 2013 but that date passed without the elections being held as scheduled.

At the presidential level, the objective was to elect a president following a period of instability and the installation of an interim president. In the aftermath of the April 2012 coup by army chief Antonio Indjai that deposed the government of President Raimundo Pereira and Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior, an agreement was reached between ECOWAS mediators and the military junta to name Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo as the transitional president with a one-year term.

The transitional government initially scheduled a presidential election to be held in November 2013. That November 2013 date passed without the election being held as scheduled. Soon thereafter, all eyes were trained on March 16, 2014, as the date when the presidential contest would finally take place. A successful election would pave the way for the flow of international aid dollars;

another political melodrama would naturally end in a less desirable result with international donors keeping their wallets shut.

At the start of 2014, the government in Guinea-Bissau confirmed that the presidential and parliamentary elections would go forward on March 16, 2014. With the March 2014 date approaching for the elections, voting was again postponed in Guinea-Bissau. The new date for the elections was April 13, 2014.

A month ahead of election day -- now set for April 13, 2014 -- Guinea-Bissau's attorney general was trying to block the candidate of the country's largest party from contesting the presidential election, on the basis of accusations of misappropriation of public funds. According to the attorney general, the candidate for the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) -- Jose Mario Vaz --- was suspected of embezzling a budget support grant from Angola in 2012 while he was finance minister. But Vaz was ultimately included in the final list of candidates approved to contest the presidency and still regarded as a favorite in the race.

Given the overall frustration by voters, coupled with disarray among the political parties, there was the growing possibility that an outsider contender could win the presidency. Harvard-educated Paulo Gomes, a former World Bank executive, was at the top of the final list of presidential contenders in Guinea-Bissau. With a youthful crop of new voters angling for change, Gomes could benefit at the polls.

Another top contender was Nuno Gomes Nabian, an independent candidate and the former chair of Bissau's civil aviation agency. He was banking on the support of the military.

Ultimately, on April 13, 2014, voters went to the polls in Guinea-Bissau in large numbers to cast their ballots in elections deemed mostly free and fair by international monitors, with only isolated incidences of issues. According to a statement by the the West African regional bloc ECOWAS: "The election was conducted according to international standards and the election was peaceful, free, fair and transparent." As such, Guinea-Bissau wasted little time in calling for the lifting of economic sanctions imposed on the country after the coup discussed above.

In the early vote count, former Finance Minister Vaz was reported to be in the lead. That advantage over Gomes and Nabian held once the vote count was complete as it was soon announced that Vaz and Nabiam would contest the second round. Vaz took 41 percent of the votes share while Nabiam had 26 percent; Gomes was trailing in third place with 10 percent. With no one candidate securing an outright majority, the two top poll performers would contest a second round to settle the presidency on May 18, 2014. On that day -- May 18, 2014 -- voters returned to the polls. After the votes were counted, it was Vaz who had won the presidency with against Nabiam. At first, Nabiam alleged election fraud but soon conceded defeat, saying, "For the sake of peace and stability, I accept the results published by the electoral commission." In fact the

election result was not close -- Vaz secured close to 62 percent of the vote share against Nabiam who had just over 38 percent.

At the parliamentary level, the dominant African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) had been expected to secure a majority the 100-seat parliament thanks to its established party machinery. Those expectations were in line with reality as the ruling PAIGC was on track to secure a majority in parliament with 57 seats.

It should be noted that no elected president of Guinea-Bissau has ever finished his term in office since the introduction of multi-party democracy in the 1990s.

Judicial Branch:

Supreme Court or Supremo Tribunal da Justica (consists of nine justices appointed by the president and serve at his pleasure; final court of appeals in criminal and civil cases); Regional Courts (one in each of nine regions; first court of appeals for Sectoral Court decisions; hear all felony cases and civil cases valued at over \$1,000); 24 Sectoral Courts (judges are not necessarily trained lawyers; they hear civil cases under \$1,000 and misdemeanor criminal cases)

Constitution:

May 16, 1984; amended May 4, 1991, Dec. 4, 1991, Feb. 26, 1993, June 9, 1993 and most recently in 1996

Legal System:

Based on French civil law; accepts compulsory ICJ jurisdiction

Political Parties and Leaders:

African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde or PAIGC [Domingos Simoes PEREIRA]

Democratic Convergence Party or PCD [Victor MANDINGA]

New Democracy Party or PND [Iaia DJALO]

Party for Social Renewal or PRS [Filomeno Mendes PEREIRA]

Republican Party for Independence and Development or PRID [Aristides GOMES]

Union for Change or UM [Agnelo REGALA]

Suffrage:

18 years of age; universal

Administrative Divisions:

Nine (9) regions (regioes, singular - regiao); Bafata, Biombo, Bissau, Bolama, Cacheu, Gabu, Oio, Quinara, Tombali

Note:

Bolama may have been renamed Bolama/Bijagos

Principal Government Officials

Cabinet and Leadership of Guinea-Bissau

Head of state:

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-- as of 2015

Leader Biography

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Executive Branch of Government of Guinea-Bissau

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Foreign Relations

General Relations

Guinea-Bissau follows a non-aligned foreign policy and seeks friendly and cooperative relations

with a wide variety of nations and organizations. France, Portugal, Brazil, Egypt, Nigeria, Taiwan, Libya, Cuba, Sweden, the Palestine Liberation Organization, Russia and the U.S. have diplomatic offices in Bissau.

Guinea-Bissau is a member of the U.N. and many of its specialized and related agencies, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

The 1999 coup that ousted Joao Bernardo Viera from power and the subsequent elections in November 1999 drew significant foreign interest. A crisis from a shortage of electoral funds for a runoff was averted when the European Union agreed to sponsor the event.

As tensions and insecurity in Guinea-Bissau increased in April and May 2000, on May 19 the European Union declared support of President Yala, urging the military to take steps to respect the rule of law following the elections. The EU stressed the need for a peaceful environment and reminded the government that the successful governance of democratic institutions is a prerequisite for continued financial and economic aid as well as the continuation of foreign investment. The Central and Eastern European countries associated with the EU aligned themselves with the declaration. United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan also made similar remarks and appealed to the international community to provide aid to the Yala government.

Since then, the situation in Guinea-Bissau deteriorated. Allegations of a lack of respect for the rule of law, and the lack of preparedness for parliamentary elections have emerged. (Note: Parliament was dissolved in late 2002; new elections were scheduled and postponed repeatedly). The United Nations and the European Union expressed grave concerns about the situation. The United Nations Secretary General threatened to withdraw election aid if improvement was not realized.

After initially condemning the coup of September 2004, regional neighbors and other countries came out in support of the National Transitional Council. The European Union, the United Nations, the Economic Community of West African States and other regional and language-based organizations contributed aid and logistical support to the legislative elections of March 2004. The international community showed itself to be tentatively supportive of the new government as it attempted to prove itself as a viable democracy.

The implications of the results of recent elections are unfolding today.

Regional Relations:

Guinea-Bissau is a member of the African Development Bank, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the West African Economic Community, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Organization of African Unity, and the permanent Interstate Committee

for drought control in the Sahel. Guinea-Bissau helped to establish the "Comunidade dos Paises de Lingua Portuguesa" (CPLP), a group comprised of Portuguese-speaking countries, intended to benefit its member states in technical and social concerns.

ECOWAS

ECOWAS' Committee of Seven on Guinea-Bissau and the CPLP brokered a cease-fire between the Vieira government and the military junta of Gen. Mane on Aug. 26, 1998. Lansana Kouyate, then executive secretary of ECOWAS, was instrumental in bringing about elections held in November 1999, challenging Mane to resume the peaceful transition to civilian rule.

Africa Union

At its July 2-11, 2001, meeting in Lusaka, Zambia, the Organization of African Unity officially approved the transformation of the Organization of African Unity into the new African Union.

Former foreign minister of Cote d'Ivoire, Amara Essy, was elected the first Secretary-General of the Africa Union. United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan, reacted with the statement that, "This historic effort will require leadership, courage and willingness to depart from the ways of the past, if it is to do for Africa what the European Union has done for Europe." The goal of the African Union is to be a continental body that will pave the way to a better life for all Africans. Where the OAU was criticized for its lack of action on economic and social fronts, the African Union is charged with development as its primary task. Following a model based on the European Union, the Africa Union is intended to bridge the economic gaps between African countries and thrust the continent onto the world economic stage as a single entity. The African Union Bill was based on a convergence of South African president Thabo Mbeki's African development plan, and the Plan Omega prop osed by Senegalese president Abdoulaye Wade. It therefore adds to its economic mandate the political mandate that all of Africa should seek democratic consolidation.

There are significant criticisms to the new African Union, though. Some fear that too much faith is being placed in a document that makes more sense in theory than in practice. The strongest criticism, however, is that the Africa Union's largest force has been Libyan President Muammar al-Qadhafi. The U.S. has made its objections to the Union clear no doubt due to a lack of faith in Qadhafi's motives. Many African leaders backed the Union even though they also demonstrated a lack of trust in Qadhafi's motives. At the opening of the meeting of the OAU leaders noted that Qadhafi failed to mention Africa's founding fathers even though it was Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah who was the founder of pan-Africanism some forty years ago. Indeed, Qadhafi has backed groups that are markedly anti-pan-Africanist in his own country. Other comments challenged the controversial role Libyan nationals often play in sub-Saharan African countries. Yet the most controversial position of Qadhafi no doubt was his statement that, "We cannot be neutral here. We are here for the Africans, not the Europeans. We are here for the blacks, not for the whites." With

Louis Farrakhan, leader of the U.S.-based Nation of Islam movement, standing behind him, this statement was taken as an affront to increased western relations as opposed to the Union's goal of increasing economic ties with wealthier countries.

Senegal

In the spring of 2006, Guinea-Bissau was dealing with the threat of a rebel activities on the border with Senegal. At issue was Senegal's Casamance region. The Senegalese government signed a peace deal with the Casamance Movement of Democratic Forces (MFDC) in 2004. However, the agreement was rejected by the hardline elements of the movement, which continued to fight for independence of Casamance. As such, infighting between rebels from the mainstream of MFDC were reported to have clashed with hardline factions, with the violence spilling over into the territory of Guinea-Bissau. Resultantly, troops from Guinea-Bissau became engaged in the ensuing fighting. The situation marked the most significant violence in the region since the peace deal was forged. It also emphasized the challenge faced by people of Casamance as they tried to reconstruct their lives after more than 20 years of separatist violence and the loss of more than 3,500 lives.

As the Casamance situation was unfolding, politics in Guinea-Bissau were also being affected. Notably, Guinea-Bissau's former Interior Minister, Marcelino Simoes Lopes Cabral, was arrested for suspected involvement in rebel activities attributed to the hardline faction of the MFDC. Indeed, the authorities in Guinea-Bissau charged that Cabral assisted the MFDC hardline faction as if fought the army of Guinea-Bissau. Cabral's motivation for involvement in the controversial situation may have been linked with the fact that he was a close associate of Guinea-Bissau military leader Ansumane Mane, who was believed to have backed the MFDC. It should be noted that both Casamance and the bordering area of Guinea-Bissau are home to people of similar ethnic backgrounds, thus suggesting that ethnic ties may have also been an additional explanatory dimension.

Other Significant Relations:

United States

The United States (U.S.) recognized the independence of Guinea-Bissau on Sept. 10, 1974. The U.S. opened an embassy in Bissau in 1976, and the first U.S. ambassador presented credentials later that year. U.S. assistance began in 1975 with a one million dollar grant to the United Nations (U.N.) high commissioner for refugees for resettlement of refugees returning to Guinea-Bissau and for 25 training grants at African technical schools for Guinean students. Emergency food was a major element in U.S. assistance to Guinea-Bissau in the first years after independence. Since 1975, the U.S. has provided more than \$65 million in grant aid and other assistance.

Written by Dr. Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief at CountryWatch.com; see Bibliography for research sources. Supplementary sources: Global Studies, Africa; Reliefweb; Africanews.org; Africa Policy Information Center (APIC).

National Security

External Threats

A separatist movement in neighboring Senegal poses a threat to Guinea-Bissau. Senegal has been battling insurgents in the Casamance region since 1982. The violence periodically crosses the border into Guinea-Bissau. The conflict has contributed to the proliferation of illicit enterprises there, including arms smuggling. It has also prompted many Senegalese caught in the crossfire to seek refuge across the border.

Domestic political conditions have also given rise to an external threat. In essence, instability in Guinea-Bissau has obligated the United States to suspend various aid programs there, hampering the country's overall development. At the onset of the country's 1998 civil war, the Peace Corps withdrew and the United States (U.S.) Embassy in Guinea-Bissau closed. After Guinea-Bissau's September 2003 military coup, Section 508 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act prohibited the U.S. from providing any form of direct aid to its government. The U.S. was expected to resume aid programs when a democratically-elected government presided over Guinea-Bissau.

Note: The implications of the results of recent elections are unfolding today.

Crime

The U.S. Department of State reports an overall low incidence of street crime in Guinea-Bissau. It advises an added measure of caution at night and warns of the presence of pickpockets in urban areas.

Insurgencies

There are no active insurgent movements in Guinea-Bissau that directly threaten its national security. The country has a history of political instability, however.

Guinea-Bissau received its independence from Portugal in September 1974. Its first president, Luis Cabral, was overthrown in 1980. Joao Bernardo Vieira presided over a provisional government until 1984, when he was elected to a five-year term as president. The Vieira government uncovered alleged plots to overthrow it in 1983, 1985, and 1993. Vieira won the country's first multiparty presidential election in 1994. A June 1998 army uprising against Vieira escalated into a full-scale civil war that displaced hundreds of thousands of civilians. In May 1999, a military junta succeeded in ousting Vieira. Kumba Yala won the subsequent 2000 presidential election. His failure to implement democratic reforms in a timely fashion contributed to his downfall. Under the direction of Chief of Defense General Verrisimo Correia Seabra, elements of the army forced Yala's resignation in September 2003. Later that month, businessman Henrique Rosa was sworn in as president and he enjoyed widespread appeal. Elections in 2005 brought President Joao Bernardo Viera back to power.

In addition to domestic political instability, a separatist movement in neighboring Senegal has created security concerns for Guinea-Bissau (see section on external threats above). This issue came to the fore in 2006 when, despite the 2004 peace deal between Senegal and the Casamance Movement of Democratic Forces (MFDC) in 2004, fighting continued by hardline elements of the movement. As such, internal conflict between rebels from the mainstream of MFDC were reported to have clashed with hardline factions, with the violence spilling over into the territory of Guinea-Bissau. Resultantly, troops from Guinea-Bissau became engaged in the ensuing fighting. As the Casamance situation was unfolding, politics in Guinea-Bissau were also being affected. Notably, Guinea-Bissau's former Interior Minister, Marcelino Simoes Lopes Cabral, was arrested for suspected involvement in rebel activities attributed to the hardline faction of the MFDC.

Terrorism

Terrorism does not constitute a specific threat to Guinea-Bissau's security. Guinea-Bissau is party to two of the twelve international protocols and conventions pertaining to terrorism.

Defense Forces

Military Data

Military Branches:

People's Revolutionary Armed Force (FARP; includes Army, Navy, and Air Force), Presidential Guard

Eligible age to enter service:

18 for selective compulsory; 16 for voluntary with parental consent

Mandatory Service Terms:

N/A

Manpower in general population-fit for military service:

males age 16-49: 205,460

females age 16-49: 212,277

Manpower reaching eligible age annually:

male: 17,639

female: 17,865

Military Expenditures-Percent of GDP:

1.85%

Chapter 3

Economic Overview

Economic Overview

Overview

Guinea-Bissau gained its independence from Portugal in 1974 after a protracted liberation war that brought tremendous damages to the country's economic infrastructure. The devastating civil war in 1998 and 1999 and the ensuing prolonged political instability and weak institutions took a heavy toll on the country's economy. The physical infrastructure was destroyed, the economy stagnated, the government administrative capacity virtually collapsed, social conditions worsened, and poverty increased. Moreover, Guinea-Bissau's economy is highly dependent on the agricultural sector, namely on a single export product (cashew nuts) and market, which makes it vulnerable to external shocks. As such, Guinea-Bissau remains one of the world's poorest countries, with more than two-thirds of its population living below the poverty line.

After a decade of political instability, there were signs of stabilization in Guinea-Bissau as reflected by a representative civilian government and the peaceful presidential election that took place in July 2009 following the assassination of President Joao Bernardo Vieira by military troops in early March of the year. This provided an opportunity for the government to move toward the medium-term program of economic reforms aimed at accelerating growth and reducing poverty. Despite the difficult external environment and a challenging domestic political situation, Guinea-Bissau made progress in 2009 in stabilizing its economy through the IMF-supported EPCA (Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance) program. But 2010 and 2011 were again rocked by political turmoil in the country. In April 2010, Guinea-Bissau soldiers arrested the army chief, Jose Zamora Induta, and detained Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior in a coup bid. Then in July 2010, President Malam Bacai Sanha made an outspoken attack on the country's military and on high ranking officials allegedly involved in drugs trafficking. The summer of 2011 saw numerous protests by citizens demanding Gomes's resignation. By late December, an attack on military targets was being characterized as a failed "attempted coup," according to Prime Minister Gomes. Navy chief Bubo was detained and accused of being the mastermind behind the attack.

Still, the country made further progress in stabilizing its economy in 2010, supported by a rebound in the price of cashew exports and a pick-up in construction activity. In December, the country benefitted from more than US\$1 billion in debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. In September 2011, the IMF noted that Guinea Bissau's economy was still benefitting from a robust cashew harvest and better-than-expected prices for the nuts. Guinea-Bissau made progress with debt relief in 2011 when members of the Paris Club opted to write-off much of the country's obligations and overall, it made further progress in stabilizing its economy.

Economic growth climbed, driven by exceptional prices for cashew (the predominant export) and a robust cashew harvest. Overall, the IMF was predicting robust growth for 2011 and 2012, driven by climbing cashew production, higher cashew prices, and a continued rebuilding of infrastructure, especially roads, electricity, and water.

But then an April 2012 coup overthrew interim Prime Minister and presidential candidate Carlos Gomes Jr, and interim President Raimundo Pereira, disrupting cashew trade, increasing insecurity and making buyers reluctant to travel in the country. Cashew nut farmers and traders in Guinea-Bissau were left holding tons of produce after India slashed imports. The low prices were increasing hardship in the coup-prone West African country. Mama Samba Embalo, the head of the Guinea-Bissau Farmers Association, was quoted as saying “All of us - the farmers association, cashew nut producers and other operators - are trying to find a solution to this cashew nut export crisis. If we sell the cashew nuts at low prices, traders will not have the money to repay their bank loans.” In the wake of the April 2012, key lenders froze funds to the country and the junta leaders were under various sanctions, including travel bans and having their assets frozen. The UN Security Council and the Economic Community of West African States imposed restrictions on the coup leaders, and the African Union suspended the country from the pan-African bloc. On top of that, the United Nations Security Council was voicing concern over reports of a rise in drug trafficking since the coup.

The economy shrank in 2012 after a solid expansion in 2011 due to lower production and lower world prices of cashew nuts. The country was also suffering from less donor aid and other problems after the April 2012 coup d'état. In August 2013, Guinea-Bissau was forced to seek international food aid to help its farmers due to lagging demand for cashews, which accounted for about 90 percent of Guinea-Bissau's export revenues and employs some 80 percent of its population. Nearly half the population was facing food shortages, according to United Nations agencies.

In February 2014, Reuters reported that Guinea-Bissau's economic growth was still being hampered by political uncertainty and the struggling cashew nut sector. The country was still going through a political crisis after soldiers seized power days before the second round of a presidential poll. Elections had since been postponed numerous times.

“Economic activity has been severely affected by the enduring economic and political consequences of the 2012 coup,” the IMF mission to the country said in a statement.

While growth was expected to have barely been positive in 2013 but was projected to pick up in 2014 on the back of higher cashew export prices and a resumption of traditional donors' support.

The economy started to recover in 2014, as constitutional order was restored. The 2014 cashew marketing campaign went relatively smoothly and world prices remained buoyant. As a result, farm gate prices have improved which should improve domestic demand and moderate rural

poverty. The new government made a considerable effort to revive revenue administration and collect fees, such as fishing compensation, resulting in an increase in revenue collection of 40 percent in 2014, compared to 2013, according to the World Bank. Overall, growth was up in 2014, and was expected to further increase in 2015. Some international partners have resumed their budget support operations, supporting the restoration of a functioning public administration. Wage arrears were cleared in early 2015.

In late 2014, the National Assembly passed budgets for 2014 and 2015 in record time. The government also prepared a national strategy for the years 2015-2020 which it presented to a donor roundtable in Brussels on March 25, 2015. The international community appeared optimistic about development prospects in Guinea-Bissau and about \$ 1.5 billion was mobilized at the conference for the next five years, supporting the government's key priority reforms. The expected impact on investment, growth, and economic opportunity spelled good news for Guinea-Bissau's poor.

Economic Performance

Economic growth has been low in Guinea-Bissau in the last decade, reflecting political instability and unfavorable external environment. However, with recent signs of political stability, the country achieved economic stabilization in 2009 despite the difficult external environment. Real GDP growth was sustained in 2009, underpinned by a favorable cashew harvest despite lower world cashew prices and by a pick-up in construction. It climbed higher in 2010, thanks to rising cashew production and higher cashew prices. Meanwhile, inflation accelerated in 2008 due to rising world food and energy prices, but fell rapidly to a negative rate in 2009, before climbing again in 2010, mainly due to rising import prices for fuel and food. Fiscal performance was satisfactory in 2009 with improvement in tax collections, while the government kept expenditure under control. As a result, the fiscal balance (including grants) registered a surplus in 2009 and 2010, compared with a deficit in 2008.

According to CountryWatch estimated calculations for 2014:

Real GDP growth rate was: 2.7 percent

The fiscal deficit/surplus as percent of GDP (%) was: -2.7 percent

Inflation was measured at: 2.4 percent

Updated in 2015

Please note that the figures in our Economic Performance section are estimates or forecasts based on IMF-based data that are formulated using CountryWatch models of analysis.

Supplementary Sources: The International Monetary Fund, Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), African Development Bank, Reuters and Agence France Presse

Nominal GDP and Components

Nominal GDP and Components					
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)	520.776	489.523	467.673	505.476	610.109
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)	24.070	-6.0012	-4.4635	8.083	20.700
Consumption (LCU billions)	445.533	442.681	422.187	459.736	549.779
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)	68.272	59.595	44.521	46.344	55.420
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)	28.014	34.907	32.712	35.008	75.434
Exports of Goods & Services (LCU billions)	139.565	73.129	81.682	83.143	90.071
Imports of Goods & Services (LCU billions)	160.608	120.789	113.429	118.754	160.595

Population and GDP Per Capita

Population and GDP Per Capita					
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Population, total (million)	1.624	1.661	1.699	1.738	1.777
Population growth (%)	2.331	2.278	2.288	2.295	2.244
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)	320,674.88	294,715.83	275,263.68	290,837.74	343,336.52

Real GDP and Inflation

Real GDP and Inflation					
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005 base)	397.211	376.310	363.219	372.388	422.923
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)	9.024	-5.2620	-3.4789	2.525	13.571
GDP Deflator (2005=100.0)	131.108	130.085	128.758	135.739	144.260
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)	13.801	-0.7803	-1.0201	5.422	6.277

Government Spending and Taxation

Government Spending and Taxation					
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Government Fiscal Budget (billions)	91.205	69.512	68.047	122.836	119.425
Fiscal Budget Growth Rate (percentage)	16.108	-23.7849	-2.1075	80.516	-2.7769
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)	16.710	11.876	12.590	22.759	18.643
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU billions)	87.023	58.138	58.879	115.042	113.740
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)	-4.1820	-11.3740	-9.1680	-7.7940	-5.6850
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)	-0.8030	-2.3235	-1.9603	-1.5419	-0.9318

Money Supply, Interest Rates and Unemployment

Money Supply, Interest Rates and Unemployment					
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)	184.772	162.751	186.924	244.275	294.840
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)	55.916	-11.9179	14.853	30.681	20.700
Lending Interest Rate (%)	12.835	10.921	10.889	11.735	17.497
Unemployment Rate (%)	8.799	9.425	9.392	9.343	8.528

Foreign Trade and the Exchange Rate

Foreign Trade and the Exchange Rate					
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/\$US)	470.439	491.489	455.378	454.974	589.477
Trade Balance NIPA (\$US billions)	-0.0447	-0.0970	-0.0697	-0.0783	-0.1196
Trade Balance % of GDP	-4.0407	-9.7360	-6.7883	-7.0451	-11.5593
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves (\$US billions)	0.2200	0.1646	0.1863	0.2870	0.1763

Data in US Dollars

Data in US Dollars					
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Nominal GDP (\$US billions)	1.107	0.9960	1.027	1.111	1.035
Exports (\$US billions)	0.2967	0.1488	0.1794	0.1827	0.1528
Imports (\$US billions)	0.3414	0.2458	0.2491	0.2610	0.2724

Energy Consumption and Production Standard Units

Energy Consumption and Production Standard Units					
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Petroleum Consumption (TBDP)	2.661	2.661	2.700	2.778	2.845
Petroleum Production (TBDP)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Petroleum Net Exports (TBDP)	-2.6614	-2.6614	-2.7000	-2.7780	-2.8446
Natural Gas Consumption (bcf)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Natural Gas Production (bcf)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Natural Gas Net Exports (bcf)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Coal Consumption (1000s st)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Coal Production (1000s st)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Coal Net Exports (1000s st)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Nuclear Production (bil kwh)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Hydroelectric Production (bil kwh)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Renewables Production (bil kwh)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Energy Consumption and Production QUADS

Energy Consumption and Production QUADS					
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Petroleum Consumption (Quads)	0.0057	0.0057	0.0058	0.0059	0.0061
Petroleum Production (Quads)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Petroleum Net Exports (Quads)	-0.0057	-0.0057	-0.0058	-0.0059	-0.0061
Natural Gas Consumption (Quads)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Natural Gas Production (Quads)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Natural Gas Net Exports (Quads)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Coal Consumption (Quads)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Coal Production (Quads)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Coal Net Exports (Quads)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Nuclear Production (Quads)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Hydroelectric Production (Quads)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Renewables Production (Quads)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

World Energy Price Summary

World Energy Price Summary					
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Petroleum-WTI (\$/bbl)	95.054	94.159	97.943	93.112	48.709
Natural Gas-Henry Hub (\$/mmbtu)	3.999	2.752	3.729	4.369	2.614
Coal Thermal-Australian (\$/mt)	121.448	96.364	84.562	70.130	57.511

CO2 Emissions

CO2 Emissions					
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Petroleum Based (mm mt C)	0.1270	0.1270	0.1288	0.1325	0.1357
Natural Gas Based (mm mt C)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Coal Based (mm mt C)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Total CO2 Emissions (mm mt C)	0.1270	0.1270	0.1288	0.1325	0.1357

Agriculture Consumption and Production

Agriculture Consumption and Production					
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Corn Total Consumption (1000 metric tons)	8.002	7.197	8.097	7.566	7.075
Corn Production (1000 metric tons)	7.985	7.173	7.291	6.894	6.425
Corn Net Exports (1000 metric tons)	-0.0168	-0.0239	-0.8058	-0.6721	-0.6495
Soybeans Total Consumption (1000 metric tons)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Soybeans Production (1000 metric tons)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Soybeans Net Exports (1000 metric tons)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Rice Total Consumption (1000 metric tons)	175.213	198.504	209.717	183.000	166.707
Rice Production (1000 metric tons)	175.331	198.501	209.625	182.928	176.866
Rice Net Exports (1000 metric tons)	0.1182	-0.0032	-0.0919	-0.0719	10.160
Coffee Total Consumption (metric tons)	2.000	2.000	2.000	2.000	1.915

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Coffee Production (metric tons)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Coffee Net Exports (metric tons)	-2.0000	-2.0000	-2.0000	-2.0000	-1.9153
Cocoa Beans Total Consumption (metric tons)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Cocoa Beans Production (metric tons)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Cocoa Beans Net Exports (metric tons)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Wheat Total Consumption (1000 metric tons)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Wheat Production (1000 metric tons)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Wheat Net Exports (1000 metric tons)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

World Agriculture Pricing Summary

World Agriculture Pricing Summary					
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Corn Pricing Summary (\$/metric ton)	291.684	298.417	259.389	192.881	169.750
Soybeans Pricing Summary (\$/metric ton)	540.667	591.417	538.417	491.771	390.417
Rice Pricing Summary (\$/metric ton)	458.558	525.071	473.989	425.148	386.033
Coffee Pricing Summary (\$/kilogram)	5.976	4.111	3.076	4.424	3.526
Cocoa Beans Pricing Summary (\$/kilogram)	2.980	2.392	2.439	3.062	3.135
Wheat Pricing Summary (\$/metric ton)	316.264	313.242	312.248	284.895	203.177

Metals Consumption and Production

Metals Consumption and Production					
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Copper Consumption (1000 mt)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Copper Production (1000 mt)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Copper Net Exports (1000 mt)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Zinc Consumption (1000 mt)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Zinc Production (1000 mt)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Zinc Exports (1000 mt)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Lead Consumption (1000 mt)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Lead Production (1000 mt)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Lead Exports (1000 mt)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Tin Consumption (1000 mt)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Tin Production (1000 mt)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Tin Exports (1000 mt)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Nickel Consumption (1000 mt)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Nickel Production (1000 mt)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Nickel Exports (1000 mt)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Gold Consumption (kg)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Gold Production (kg)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Gold Exports (kg)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Silver Consumption (mt)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Silver Production (mt)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Silver Exports (mt)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

World Metals Pricing Summary

World Metals Pricing Summary					
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Copper (\$/mt)	8,828.19	7,962.35	7,332.10	6,863.40	5,510.46
Zinc (\$/mt)	2,193.90	1,950.41	1,910.26	2,160.97	1,931.68
Tin (\$/mt)	26,053.68	21,125.99	22,282.80	21,898.87	16,066.63
Lead (\$/mt)	2,400.81	2,064.64	2,139.79	2,095.46	1,787.82
Nickel (\$/mt)	22,910.36	17,547.55	15,031.80	16,893.38	11,862.64
Gold (\$/oz)	1,569.21	1,669.52	1,411.46	1,265.58	1,160.66
Silver (\$/oz)	35.224	31.137	23.850	19.071	15.721

Economic Performance Index

Economic Performance Index

The Economic Performance rankings are calculated by CountryWatch's editorial team, and are based on criteria including sustained economic growth, monetary stability, current account deficits, budget surplus, unemployment and structural imbalances. Scores are assessed from 0 to 100 using this aforementioned criteria as well as CountryWatch's proprietary economic research data and models.

	Bank stability risk	Monetary/ Currency stability	Government Finances	Empl./ Unempl.	Econ.GNP growth or decline/ forecast
	0 - 100	0 - 100	0 - 100	0 - 100	%
North Americas					
Canada	92	69	35	38	3.14%
United States	94	76	4	29	3.01%
Western Europe					
Austria	90	27	30	63	1.33%
Belgium	88	27	19	23	1.15%
Cyprus	81	91	16	80	-0.69%
Denmark	97	70	45	78	1.20%
Finland	89	27	41	33	1.25%

France	87	27	18	27	1.52%
Germany	86	27	22	21	1.25%
Greece	79	27	5	24	-2.00%
Iceland	90	17	2	34	-3.04%
Italy	85	27	37	24	0.84%
Ireland	92	27	11	10	-1.55%
Luxembourg	99	27	28	66	2.08%
Malta	77	27	41	51	0.54%
Netherlands	91	27	26	74	1.30%
Norway	98	44	10	76	1.08%
Portugal	77	27	13	20	0.29%
Spain	83	27	9	3	-0.41%
Sweden	94	72	54	32	1.23%
Switzerland	97	86	55	77	1.53%
United Kingdom	85	12	9	37	1.34%
Central and Eastern Europe					
Albania	44	60	33	6	2.30%
Armenia	45	59	49	30	1.80%

Azerbaijan	56	4	84	99	2.68%
Belarus	59	21	83	98	2.41%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	34	68	69	N/A	0.50%
Bulgaria	58	75	88	49	0.20%
Croatia	69	68	94	9	0.18%
Czech Republic	80	89	29	70	1.67%
Estonia	72	90	66	92	0.80%
Georgia	36	60	53	56	2.00%
Hungary	70	66	26	54	-0.16%
Latvia	67	100	65	44	-3.97%
Lithuania	65	91	87	79	-1.65%
Macedonia (FYR)	53	69	56	2	2.03%
Moldova	23	36	81	67	2.50%
Poland	74	74	38	12	2.72%
Romania	62	56	70	62	0.75%
Russia	73	18	90	8	4.00%
Serbia	48	49	52	5	1.97%

Montenegro	39	27	73	1	-1.70%
Slovak Republic	80	62	30	14	4.06%
Slovenia	81	27	36	65	1.12%
Ukraine	41	11	57	N/A	3.68%
Africa					
Algeria	57	18	96	7	4.55%
Angola	49	1	97	N/A	7.05%
Benin	19	91	20	N/A	3.22%
Botswana	68	58	76	N/A	6.33%
Burkina Faso	16	91	13	N/A	4.41%
Burundi	2	91	6	N/A	3.85%
Cameroon	26	91	91	N/A	2.58%
Cape Verde	52	87	4	N/A	4.96%
Central African Republic	9	91	32	N/A	3.18%
Chad	22	91	89	N/A	4.42%
Congo	52	87	87	N/A	12.13%
Côte d'Ivoire	25	91	82	28	2.98%
Dem. Republic					

Congo	4	91	47	N/A	5.44%
Djibouti	31	76	50	N/A	4.47%
Egypt	37	20	24	69	5.01%
Equatorial Guinea	82	91	85	N/A	0.94%
Eritrea	1	3	1	18	1.81%
Ethiopia	6	45	8	N/A	6.96%
Gabon	64	91	96	N/A	5.36%
Gambia	8	48	86	N/A	4.82%
Ghana	9	11	69	N/A	4.50%
Guinea	10	7	91	N/A	3.03%
Guinea-Bissau	5	91	46	N/A	3.47%
Kenya	20	41	59	N/A	4.11%
Lesotho	13	40	12	N/A	2.98%
Liberia	12	73	74	N/A	5.92%
Libya	73	2	94	N/A	5.22%
Madagascar	4	22	24	N/A	-1.02%
Malawi	7	25	55	N/A	5.96%
Mali	20	91	82	N/A	5.12%

Mauritania	15	13	93	N/A	4.58%
Mauritius	65	52	56	55	4.10%
Morocco	37	72	48	26	3.23%
Mozambique	12	23	71	N/A	6.45%
Namibia	40	39	62	N/A	1.70%
Niger	10	91	21	N/A	4.41%
Nigeria	30	6	61	N/A	6.98%
Rwanda	21	40	68	N/A	5.39%
Sao Tome & Principe	1	61	100	N/A	3.40%
Senegal	24	91	63	N/A	3.44%
Seychelles	60	67	97	N/A	4.01%
Sierra Leone	5	10	39	N/A	4.77%
Somalia	2	38	59	N/A	3.19%
South Africa	61	37	70	N/A	2.59%
Sudan	16	5	73	N/A	5.52%
Swaziland	32	44	79	N/A	1.09%
Tanzania	15	45	32	N/A	6.17%
Togo	8	91	92	N/A	2.56%

Tunisia	50	61	44	39	4.00%
Uganda	11	17	54	N/A	5.59%
Zambia	29	20	49	N/A	5.84%
Zimbabwe	0	8	16	N/A	2.24%
South and Central America					
Argentina	66	3	80	36	3.50%
Belize	47	76	80	N/A	1.00%
Bolivia	32	51	61	81	3.99%
Brazil	71	47	78	11	5.50%
Chile	78	25	92	73	4.72%
Columbia	47	52	34	47	2.25%
Costa Rica	60	42	39	57	3.45%
Ecuador	43	76	75	64	2.51%
El Salvador	35	76	67	N/A	1.04%
Guatemala	46	59	58	N/A	2.52%
Honduras	27	47	58	N/A	2.00%
Mexico	69	42	52	61	4.07%
Nicaragua	23	49	42	N/A	1.75%

Panama	66	76	72	45	5.00%
Paraguay	35	46	66	16	5.27%
Peru	59	66	75	22	6.33%
Suriname	58	26	81	59	4.02%
Uruguay	70	26	27	N/A	5.71%
Venezuela	55	1	28	13	-2.63%
Caribbean					
Antigua & Barbuda	72	76	15	N/A	-2.01%
Bahamas	74	76	45	87	-0.50%
Barbados	67	76	33	15	-0.50%
Bermuda	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Cuba	45	76	18	95	0.25%
Dominica	53	76	65	N/A	1.40%
Dominican Republic	54	39	43	4	3.50%
Grenada	63	76	48	N/A	0.80%
Guyana	28	56	17	N/A	4.36%
Haiti	11	27	89	N/A	-8.50%
Jamaica	42	9	85	19	-0.28%

St Lucia	55	76	67	N/A	1.14%
St Vincent & Grenadines	49	76	95	N/A	0.50%
Trinidad & Tobago	82	37	77	72	2.13%
Middle East					
Bahrain	84	76	62	91	3.48%
Iran	51	19	40	58	3.01%
Iraq	48	9	8	N/A	7.27%
Israel	87	62	12	48	3.20%
Jordan	41	51	3	N/A	4.10%
Kuwait	96	4	99	N/A	3.10%
Lebanon	63	54	2	N/A	6.00%
Oman	76	16	88	N/A	4.71%
Qatar	99	16	83	N/A	18.54%
Saudi Arabia	76	8	98	N/A	3.70%
Syria	61	24	40	N/A	5.00%
Turkey	75	23	27	60	5.20%
United Arab Emirates	96	24	98	94	1.29%

Yemen	28	2	78	N/A	7.78%
Asia					
Afghanistan	17	70	74	N/A	8.64%
Bangladesh	13	43	25	N/A	5.38%
Bhutan	24	55	5	N/A	6.85%
Brunei	78	19	99	75	0.48%
Cambodia	18	67	42	N/A	4.77%
China	54	90	19	68	11.03%
Hong Kong	89	76	14	82	5.02%
India	31	38	34	35	8.78%
Indonesia	42	46	37	31	6.00%
Japan	88	89	6	71	1.90%
Kazakhstan	62	13	76	42	2.40%
Korea North	18	65	23	N/A	1.50%
Korea South	83	63	22	85	4.44%
Kyrgyz Republic	24	15	84	88	4.61%
Laos	17	54	7	N/A	7.22%
Macao	91	76	14	82	3.00%

Malaysia	68	65	44	90	4.72%
Maldives	44	55	17	N/A	3.45%
Mongolia	33	5	77	93	7.22%
Myanmar	3	41	72	N/A	5.26%
Nepal	3	14	25	N/A	2.97%
Pakistan	19	15	31	41	3.00%
Papua New Guinea	75	50	11	N/A	7.96%
Philippines	30	48	53	43	3.63%
Singapore	93	75	63	40	5.68%
Sri Lanka	38	22	10	N/A	5.50%
Taiwan	84	88	35	89	6.50%
Tajikistan	6	6	60	97	4.00%
Thailand	56	64	90	96	5.46%
Turkmenistan	51	53	68	N/A	12.00%
Uzbekistan	40	10	60	100	8.00%
Vietnam	25	12	20	N/A	6.04%
Pacific					
Australia	96	63	31	46	2.96%

Fiji	46	53	3	N/A	2.06%
Marshall Islands	27	76	46	N/A	1.08%
Micronesia (Fed. States)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
New Caledonia	96	73	51	52	2.00%
New Zealand	98	73	51	52	2.00%
Samoa	34	88	64	N/A	-2.77%
Solomon Islands	14	71	1	N/A	3.36%
Tonga	26	57	38	N/A	0.60%
Vanuatu	33	58	47	N/A	3.80%

Source:

CountryWatch Inc. www.countrywatch.com

Updated:

This material was produced in 2010; it is subject to updating in 2012.

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Chapter 4

Investment Overview

Foreign Investment Climate

Background

One of the six poorest countries in the world, Guinea-Bissau depends mainly on farming and fishing. Cashew crops have increased remarkably in recent years, and the country now ranks fifth in cashew production. Guinea-Bissau exports fish and seafood along with small amounts of peanuts, palm kernels, and timber. Rice is the major crop and staple food. However, intermittent fighting between Senegalese-backed government troops and a military junta destroyed much of the country's infrastructure and caused widespread damage to the economy in 1998; the civil war led to a 28% drop in GDP that year, with partial recovery in 1999-2002. Before the war, trade reform and price liberalization were the most successful part of the country's structural adjustment program under IMF sponsorship. The tightening of monetary policy and the development of the private sector had also begun to reinvigorate the economy. Because of high costs, the development of petroleum, phosphate, and other mineral resources is not a near-term prospect. Offshore oil prospecting is underway in several sectors but has not yet led to commercially viable crude deposits. The inequality of income distribution is one of the most extreme in the world. The government and international donors continue to work out plans to forward economic development from a low base.

Foreign Investment Assessment

Openness to Foreign Investment

The Government of Guinea-Bissau is firmly dedicated to promoting foreign investment.

Distribution and marketing facilities are not yet fully developed, but a limited number of agents do currently conduct business with foreign firms. Opportunities do exist for companies willing to develop their own marketing, distribution, and maintenance networks.

Transparency of Regulatory System

A new investment code has been drafted which facilitates foreign investment. The primary objective of the legislation is to reduce the bureaucratic processing required of investors and provide incentives, mainly in the form of reduced import tariffs and tax exemptions, to attract foreign capital. The main areas of interest for the government are investments that reduce import

dependency, diversify exports, provide value-added goods, are labor intensive, promote professional development, and/or develop the country's infrastructure. Original requests for exemptions or reductions are channeled through the appropriate ministry; approval rests with the Cabinet for Investment Development within the Ministry of the Economy and Finance.

Labor Force

Total: 480,000

By occupation: agriculture 82%

Agriculture and Industry

Agriculture products: rice, corn, beans, cassava (tapioca), cashew nuts, peanuts, palm kernels, cotton; timber; fish

Industries: agricultural products processing, beer, soft drinks

Import Commodities and Partners

Commodities: foodstuffs, machinery and transport equipment, petroleum products

Partners: Senegal 20.6%, Portugal 16.7%, China 10.7%, Italy 10.1%, Spain 5.5%

Export Commodities and Partners

Commodities: cashew nuts, shrimp, peanuts, palm kernels, sawn lumber

Partners: India 66.9%, Nigeria 16.8%, Italy 7.7%

Telephone System

Telephones- main lines in use: 10,600

Telephones- mobile cellular: 1,300

General Assessment: small system

Domestic: combination of microwave radio relay, open-wire lines, radiotelephone, and cellular communications

International: country code - 245

Internet

Internet Hosts: 2

Internet users: 19,000

Roads, Airports, Ports and Harbors

Railways: NA

Highways: 4,400 km

Ports and harbors: Bissau, Buba, Cacheu, Farim

Airports: 28; w/paved runways: 3

Legal System and Considerations

N/A

Dispute Settlement

N/A

Corruption Perception Ranking

N/A; See Corruption Perception index reported by Transparency International elsewhere in this report, from least to most corrupt countries.

Cultural Considerations

It is important in Guinea-Bissau to never give or take anything or eat/drink anything with the left hand. It is also important to note that public displays of affection are frowned upon.

For More information see:

United States' State Department Commercial Guide

Foreign Investment Index

Foreign Investment Index

The Foreign Investment Index is a proprietary index measuring attractiveness to international

investment flows. The Foreign Investment Index is calculated using an established methodology by CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is based on a given country's economic stability (sustained economic growth, monetary stability, current account deficits, budget surplus), economic risk (risk of non-servicing of payments for goods or services, loans and trade-related finance, risk of sovereign default), business and investment climate (property rights, labor force and laws, regulatory transparency, openness to foreign investment, market conditions, and stability of government). Scores are assigned from 0-10 using the aforementioned criteria. A score of 0 marks the lowest level of foreign investment viability, while a score of 10 marks the highest level of foreign investment viability, according to this proprietary index.

Country	Assessment
Afghanistan	2
Albania	4.5
Algeria	6
Andorra	9
Angola	4.5-5
Antigua	8.5
Argentina	5
Armenia	5
Australia	9.5
Austria	9-9.5
Azerbaijan	5

Bahamas	9
Bahrain	7.5
Bangladesh	4.5
Barbados	9
Belarus	4
Belgium	9
Belize	7.5
Benin	5.5
Bhutan	4.5
Bolivia	4.5
Bosnia-Herzegovina	5
Botswana	7.5-8
Brazil	8
Brunei	7
Bulgaria	5.5
Burkina Faso	4
Burma (Myanmar)	4.5
Burundi	4

Cambodia	4.5
Cameroon	5
Canada	9.5
Cape Verde	6
Central African Republic	3
Chad	4
Chile	9
China	7.5
China: Hong Kong	8.5
China: Taiwan	8.5
Colombia	7
Comoros	4
Congo DRC	4
Congo RC	5
Costa Rica	8
Cote d'Ivoire	4.5
Croatia	7
Cuba	4.5

Cyprus	7
Czech Republic	8.5
Denmark	9.5
Djibouti	4.5
Dominica	6
Dominican Republic	6.5
East Timor	4.5
Ecuador	5.5
Egypt	4.5-5
El Salvador	6
Equatorial Guinea	4.5
Eritrea	3.5
Estonia	8
Ethiopia	4.5
Fiji	5
Finland	9
Former Yugoslav Rep. of Macedonia	5
France	9-9.5

Gabon	5.5
Gambia	5
Georgia	5
Germany	9-9.5
Ghana	5.5
Greece	5
Grenada	7.5
Guatemala	5.5
Guinea	3.5
Guinea-Bissau	3.5
Guyana	4.5
Haiti	4
Holy See (Vatican)	n/a
Hong Kong (China)	8.5
Honduras	5.5
Hungary	8
Iceland	8-8.5
India	8

Indonesia	5.5
Iran	4
Iraq	3
Ireland	8
Israel	8.5
Italy	8
Jamaica	5.5
Japan	9.5
Jordan	6
Kazakhstan	6
Kenya	5
Kiribati	5.5
Korea, North	1
Korea, South	9
Kosovo	4.5
Kuwait	8.5
Kyrgyzstan	4.5
Laos	4

Latvia	7
Lebanon	5
Lesotho	5.5
Liberia	3.5
Libya	3
Liechtenstein	9
Lithuania	7.5
Luxembourg	9-9.5
Madagascar	4.5
Malawi	4.5
Malaysia	8.5
Maldives	6.5
Mali	5
Malta	9
Marshall Islands	5
Mauritania	4.5
Mauritius	7.5-8
Mexico	6.5-7

Micronesia	5
Moldova	4.5-5
Monaco	9
Mongolia	5
Montenegro	5.5
Morocco	7.5
Mozambique	5
Namibia	7.5
Nauru	4.5
Nepal	4
Netherlands	9-9.5
New Zealand	9.5
Nicaragua	5
Niger	4.5
Nigeria	4.5
Norway	9-9.5
Oman	8
Pakistan	4

Palau	4.5-5
Panama	7
Papua New Guinea	5
Paraguay	6
Peru	6
Philippines	6
Poland	8
Portugal	7.5-8
Qatar	9
Romania	6-6.5
Russia	6
Rwanda	4
Saint Kitts and Nevis	8
Saint Lucia	8
Saint Vincent and Grenadines	7
Samoa	7
San Marino	8.5
Sao Tome and Principe	4.5-5

Saudi Arabia	7
Senegal	6
Serbia	6
Seychelles	5
Sierra Leone	4
Singapore	9.5
Slovak Republic (Slovakia)	8.5
Slovenia	8.5-9
Solomon Islands	5
Somalia	2
South Africa	8
Spain	7.5-8
Sri Lanka	5.5
Sudan	4
Suriname	5
Swaziland	4.5
Sweden	9.5
Switzerland	9.5

Syria	2.5
Tajikistan	4
Taiwan (China)	8.5
Tanzania	5
Thailand	7.5-8
Togo	4.5-5
Tonga	5.5-6
Trinidad and Tobago	8-8.5
Tunisia	6
Turkey	6.5-7
Turkmenistan	4
Tuvalu	7
Uganda	5
Ukraine	4.5-5
United Arab Emirates	8.5
United Kingdom	9
United States	9
Uruguay	6.5-7

Uzbekistan	4
Vanuatu	6
Venezuela	5
Vietnam	5.5
Yemen	3
Zambia	4.5-5
Zimbabwe	3.5

Editor's Note:

As of 2015, the global economic crisis (emerging in 2008) had affected many countries across the world, resulting in changes to their rankings. Among those countries affected were top tier economies, such as the [United Kingdom](#), [Iceland](#), [Switzerland](#) and [Austria](#). However, in all these cases, their rankings have moved back upward in the last couple of years as anxieties have eased. Other top tier countries, such as [Spain](#), [Portugal](#), [Ireland](#), and [Italy](#), suffered some effects due to debt woes and the concomitant effect on the euro zone. Greece, another euro zone nation, was also downgraded due to its sovereign debt crisis; however, Greece's position on the precipice of default incurred a sharper downgrade than the other four euro zone countries mentioned above. Cyprus' exposure to Greek bank yielded a downgrade in its case. Slovenia and [Latvia](#) have been slightly downgraded due to a mix of economic and political concerns but could easily be upgraded in a future assessment, should these concerns abate. Meanwhile, the crisis in eastern [Ukraine](#) fueled downgrades in that country and neighboring [Russia](#).

Despite the "trifecta of tragedy" in [Japan](#) in 2011 -- the earthquake, the ensuing tsunami, and the resulting nuclear crisis -- and the appreciable destabilization of the economic and political terrain therein, this country has only slightly been downgraded. Japan's challenges have been assessed to be transient, the government remains accountable, and there is little risk of default. Both [India](#) and China retain their rankings; [India](#) holds a slightly higher ranking than [China](#) due to its record of democratic representation and accountability.

There were shifts in opposite directions for [Mali](#) and [Nigeria](#) versus the [Central African Republic](#),

[Burkina Faso](#), and [Burundi](#). [Mali](#) was slightly upgraded due to its efforts to return to constitutional order following the 2012 coup and to neutralize the threat of separatists and Islamists. Likewise, a new government in [Nigeria](#) generated a slight upgrade as the country attempts to confront corruption, crime, and terrorism. But the [Central African Republic](#) was downgraded due to the takeover of the government by Seleka rebels and the continued decline into lawlessness in that country. Likewise, the attempts by the leaders of [Burundi](#) and [Burkina Faso](#) to hold onto power by by-passing the constitution raised eyebrows and resulted in downgrades.

Political unrest in [Libya](#) and [Algeria](#) have contributed to a decision to marginally downgrade these countries as well. [Syria](#) incurred a sharper downgrade due to the devolution into de facto civil war and the dire security threat posed by Islamist terrorists. [Iraq](#) saw a similar downgrade as a result of the takeover of wide swaths of territory and the threat of genocide at the hands of Islamist terrorists. [Yemen](#), likewise, has been downgraded due to political instability at the hands of secessionists, terrorists, Houthi rebels, and the intervention of external parties. Conversely, [Egypt](#) and [Tunisia](#) saw slight upgrades as their political environments stabilize.

At the low end of the spectrum, devolving security conditions and/or economic crisis have resulted in countries like [Pakistan](#), [Afghanistan](#), [Somalia](#), and [Zimbabwe](#) maintaining their low ratings.

The [United States](#) continues to retain its previous slight downgrade due to the enduring threat of default surrounding the debt ceiling in that country, matched by a conflict-ridden political climate. In the case of [Mexico](#), there is limited concern about default, but increasing alarm over the security situation in that country and the government's ability to contain it. In [Argentina](#), a default to bond holders resulted in a downgrade to that country. Finally, a small but significant upgrade was attributed to [Cuba](#) due to its recent pro-business reforms and its normalization of ties with the United States.

Source:

CountryWatch Inc. www.countrywatch.com

Updated:

2015

Corruption Perceptions Index

Corruption Perceptions Index

Transparency International: [Corruption Perceptions Index](#)

Editor's Note:

Transparency International's [Corruption Perceptions Index](#) is a composite index which ranks countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials. This index indicates the views of national and international business people and analysts about the levels of corruption in each country. The highest (and best) level of transparency is indicated by the number, 10. The lower (and worse) levels of transparency are indicated by lower numbers.

Rank	Country/Territory	CPI 2009 Score	Surveys Used	Confidence Range
1	New Zealand	9.4	6	9.1 - 9.5
2	Denmark	9.3	6	9.1 - 9.5
3	Singapore	9.2	9	9.0 - 9.4
3	Sweden	9.2	6	9.0 - 9.3
5	Switzerland	9.0	6	8.9 - 9.1
6	Finland	8.9	6	8.4 - 9.4
6	Netherlands	8.9	6	8.7 - 9.0
8	Australia	8.7	8	8.3 - 9.0
8	Canada	8.7	6	8.5 - 9.0
8	Iceland	8.7	4	7.5 - 9.4
11	Norway	8.6	6	8.2 - 9.1

12	Hong Kong	8.2	8	7.9 - 8.5
12	Luxembourg	8.2	6	7.6 - 8.8
14	Germany	8.0	6	7.7 - 8.3
14	Ireland	8.0	6	7.8 - 8.4
16	Austria	7.9	6	7.4 - 8.3
17	Japan	7.7	8	7.4 - 8.0
17	United Kingdom	7.7	6	7.3 - 8.2
19	United States	7.5	8	6.9 - 8.0
20	Barbados	7.4	4	6.6 - 8.2
21	Belgium	7.1	6	6.9 - 7.3
22	Qatar	7.0	6	5.8 - 8.1
22	Saint Lucia	7.0	3	6.7 - 7.5
24	France	6.9	6	6.5 - 7.3
25	Chile	6.7	7	6.5 - 6.9
25	Uruguay	6.7	5	6.4 - 7.1
27	Cyprus	6.6	4	6.1 - 7.1
27	Estonia	6.6	8	6.1 - 6.9
27	Slovenia	6.6	8	6.3 - 6.9

30	United Arab Emirates	6.5	5	5.5 - 7.5
31	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	6.4	3	4.9 - 7.5
32	Israel	6.1	6	5.4 - 6.7
32	Spain	6.1	6	5.5 - 6.6
34	Dominica	5.9	3	4.9 - 6.7
35	Portugal	5.8	6	5.5 - 6.2
35	Puerto Rico	5.8	4	5.2 - 6.3
37	Botswana	5.6	6	5.1 - 6.3
37	Taiwan	5.6	9	5.4 - 5.9
39	Brunei Darussalam	5.5	4	4.7 - 6.4
39	Oman	5.5	5	4.4 - 6.5
39	Korea (South)	5.5	9	5.3 - 5.7
42	Mauritius	5.4	6	5.0 - 5.9
43	Costa Rica	5.3	5	4.7 - 5.9
43	Macau	5.3	3	3.3 - 6.9
45	Malta	5.2	4	4.0 - 6.2
46	Bahrain	5.1	5	4.2 - 5.8
46	Cape Verde	5.1	3	3.3 - 7.0

46	Hungary	5.1	8	4.6 - 5.7
49	Bhutan	5.0	4	4.3 - 5.6
49	Jordan	5.0	7	3.9 - 6.1
49	Poland	5.0	8	4.5 - 5.5
52	Czech Republic	4.9	8	4.3 - 5.6
52	Lithuania	4.9	8	4.4 - 5.4
54	Seychelles	4.8	3	3.0 - 6.7
55	South Africa	4.7	8	4.3 - 4.9
56	Latvia	4.5	6	4.1 - 4.9
56	Malaysia	4.5	9	4.0 - 5.1
56	Namibia	4.5	6	3.9 - 5.1
56	Samoa	4.5	3	3.3 - 5.3
56	Slovakia	4.5	8	4.1 - 4.9
61	Cuba	4.4	3	3.5 - 5.1
61	Turkey	4.4	7	3.9 - 4.9
63	Italy	4.3	6	3.8 - 4.9
63	Saudi Arabia	4.3	5	3.1 - 5.3
65	Tunisia	4.2	6	3.0 - 5.5

66	Croatia	4.1	8	3.7 - 4.5
66	Georgia	4.1	7	3.4 - 4.7
66	Kuwait	4.1	5	3.2 - 5.1
69	Ghana	3.9	7	3.2 - 4.6
69	Montenegro	3.9	5	3.5 - 4.4
71	Bulgaria	3.8	8	3.2 - 4.5
71	FYR Macedonia	3.8	6	3.4 - 4.2
71	Greece	3.8	6	3.2 - 4.3
71	Romania	3.8	8	3.2 - 4.3
75	Brazil	3.7	7	3.3 - 4.3
75	Colombia	3.7	7	3.1 - 4.3
75	Peru	3.7	7	3.4 - 4.1
75	Suriname	3.7	3	3.0 - 4.7
79	Burkina Faso	3.6	7	2.8 - 4.4
79	China	3.6	9	3.0 - 4.2
79	Swaziland	3.6	3	3.0 - 4.7
79	Trinidad and Tobago	3.6	4	3.0 - 4.3
83	Serbia	3.5	6	3.3 - 3.9

84	El Salvador	3.4	5	3.0 - 3.8
84	Guatemala	3.4	5	3.0 - 3.9
84	India	3.4	10	3.2 - 3.6
84	Panama	3.4	5	3.1 - 3.7
84	Thailand	3.4	9	3.0 - 3.8
89	Lesotho	3.3	6	2.8 - 3.8
89	Malawi	3.3	7	2.7 - 3.9
89	Mexico	3.3	7	3.2 - 3.5
89	Moldova	3.3	6	2.7 - 4.0
89	Morocco	3.3	6	2.8 - 3.9
89	Rwanda	3.3	4	2.9 - 3.7
95	Albania	3.2	6	3.0 - 3.3
95	Vanuatu	3.2	3	2.3 - 4.7
97	Liberia	3.1	3	1.9 - 3.8
97	Sri Lanka	3.1	7	2.8 - 3.4
99	Bosnia and Herzegovina	3.0	7	2.6 - 3.4
99	Dominican Republic	3.0	5	2.9 - 3.2
99	Jamaica	3.0	5	2.8 - 3.3

99	Madagascar	3.0	7	2.8 - 3.2
99	Senegal	3.0	7	2.5 - 3.6
99	Tonga	3.0	3	2.6 - 3.3
99	Zambia	3.0	7	2.8 - 3.2
106	Argentina	2.9	7	2.6 - 3.1
106	Benin	2.9	6	2.3 - 3.4
106	Gabon	2.9	3	2.6 - 3.1
106	Gambia	2.9	5	1.6 - 4.0
106	Niger	2.9	5	2.7 - 3.0
111	Algeria	2.8	6	2.5 - 3.1
111	Djibouti	2.8	4	2.3 - 3.2
111	Egypt	2.8	6	2.6 - 3.1
111	Indonesia	2.8	9	2.4 - 3.2
111	Kiribati	2.8	3	2.3 - 3.3
111	Mali	2.8	6	2.4 - 3.2
111	Sao Tome and Principe	2.8	3	2.4 - 3.3
111	Solomon Islands	2.8	3	2.3 - 3.3
111	Togo	2.8	5	1.9 - 3.9

120	Armenia	2.7	7	2.6 - 2.8
120	Bolivia	2.7	6	2.4 - 3.1
120	Ethiopia	2.7	7	2.4 - 2.9
120	Kazakhstan	2.7	7	2.1 - 3.3
120	Mongolia	2.7	7	2.4 - 3.0
120	Vietnam	2.7	9	2.4 - 3.1
126	Eritrea	2.6	4	1.6 - 3.8
126	Guyana	2.6	4	2.5 - 2.7
126	Syria	2.6	5	2.2 - 2.9
126	Tanzania	2.6	7	2.4 - 2.9
130	Honduras	2.5	6	2.2 - 2.8
130	Lebanon	2.5	3	1.9 - 3.1
130	Libya	2.5	6	2.2 - 2.8
130	Maldives	2.5	4	1.8 - 3.2
130	Mauritania	2.5	7	2.0 - 3.3
130	Mozambique	2.5	7	2.3 - 2.8
130	Nicaragua	2.5	6	2.3 - 2.7
130	Nigeria	2.5	7	2.2 - 2.7

130	Uganda	2.5	7	2.1 - 2.8
139	Bangladesh	2.4	7	2.0 - 2.8
139	Belarus	2.4	4	2.0 - 2.8
139	Pakistan	2.4	7	2.1 - 2.7
139	Philippines	2.4	9	2.1 - 2.7
143	Azerbaijan	2.3	7	2.0 - 2.6
143	Comoros	2.3	3	1.6 - 3.3
143	Nepal	2.3	6	2.0 - 2.6
146	Cameroon	2.2	7	1.9 - 2.6
146	Ecuador	2.2	5	2.0 - 2.5
146	Kenya	2.2	7	1.9 - 2.5
146	Russia	2.2	8	1.9 - 2.4
146	Sierra Leone	2.2	5	1.9 - 2.4
146	Timor-Leste	2.2	5	1.8 - 2.6
146	Ukraine	2.2	8	2.0 - 2.6
146	Zimbabwe	2.2	7	1.7 - 2.8
154	Côte d'Ivoire	2.1	7	1.8 - 2.4
154	Papua New Guinea	2.1	5	1.7 - 2.5

154	Paraguay	2.1	5	1.7 - 2.5
154	Yemen	2.1	4	1.6 - 2.5
158	Cambodia	2.0	8	1.8 - 2.2
158	Central African Republic	2.0	4	1.9 - 2.2
158	Laos	2.0	4	1.6 - 2.6
158	Tajikistan	2.0	8	1.6 - 2.5
162	Angola	1.9	5	1.8 - 1.9
162	Congo Brazzaville	1.9	5	1.6 - 2.1
162	Democratic Republic of Congo	1.9	5	1.7 - 2.1
162	Guinea-Bissau	1.9	3	1.8 - 2.0
162	Kyrgyzstan	1.9	7	1.8 - 2.1
162	Venezuela	1.9	7	1.8 - 2.0
168	Burundi	1.8	6	1.6 - 2.0
168	Equatorial Guinea	1.8	3	1.6 - 1.9
168	Guinea	1.8	5	1.7 - 1.8
168	Haiti	1.8	3	1.4 - 2.3
168	Iran	1.8	3	1.7 - 1.9
168	Turkmenistan	1.8	4	1.7 - 1.9

174	Uzbekistan	1.7	6	1.5 - 1.8
175	Chad	1.6	6	1.5 - 1.7
176	Iraq	1.5	3	1.2 - 1.8
176	Sudan	1.5	5	1.4 - 1.7
178	Myanmar	1.4	3	0.9 - 1.8
179	Afghanistan	1.3	4	1.0 - 1.5
180	Somalia	1.1	3	0.9 - 1.4

Methodology:

As noted above, the highest (and best) level of transparency with the least perceived corruption is indicated by the number, 10. The lower (and worse) levels of transparency are indicated by lower numbers.

According to Transparency International, the [Corruption Perceptions Index](#) (CPI) table shows a country's ranking and score, the number of surveys used to determine the score, and the confidence range of the scoring.

The rank shows how one country compares to others included in the index. The CPI score indicates the perceived level of public-sector corruption in a country/territory.

The CPI is based on 13 independent surveys. However, not all surveys include all countries. The surveys used column indicates how many surveys were relied upon to determine the score for that country.

The confidence range indicates the reliability of the CPI scores and tells us that allowing for a margin of error, we can be 90% confident that the true score for this country lies within this range.

Note:

Kosovo, which separated from the Yugoslav successor state of [Serbia](#), is not listed above. No

calculation is available for [Kosovo](#) at this time, however, a future corruption index by Transparency International may include the world's newest country in its tally. Taiwan has been listed above despite its contested status; while Taiwan claims sovereign status, [China](#) claims ultimate jurisdiction over Taiwan. Hong Kong, which is also under the rubric of Chinese sovereignty, is listed above. Note as well that Puerto Rico, which is a [United States](#) domain, is also included in the list above. These inclusions likely have to do with the size and fairly autonomous status of their economies.

Source:

Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index; available at URL: <http://www.transparency.org>

Updated:

Uploaded in 2011 using most recent ranking available; reviewed in 2015.

Competitiveness Ranking

Competitiveness Ranking

Editor's Note:

The Global Competitiveness Report's competitiveness ranking is based on the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), which was developed for the World Economic Forum. The GCI is based on a number of competitiveness considerations, and provides a comprehensive picture of the competitiveness landscape in countries around the world. The competitiveness considerations are: institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, health and primary education, higher education and training, goods market efficiency, labour market efficiency, financial market development, technological readiness, market size, business sophistication, and innovation. The rankings are calculated from both publicly available data and the Executive Opinion Survey.

Country/Economy	GCI 2010 Rank	GCI 2010 Score	GCI 2009 Rank	Change 2009-2010
Switzerland	1	5.63	1	0

Sweden	2	5.56	4	2
Singapore	3	5.48	3	0
United States	4	5.43	2	-2
Germany	5	5.39	7	2
Japan	6	5.37	8	2
Finland	7	5.37	6	-1
Netherlands	8	5.33	10	2
Denmark	9	5.32	5	-4
Canada	10	5.30	9	-1
Hong Kong SAR	11	5.30	11	0
United Kingdom	12	5.25	13	1
Taiwan, China	13	5.21	12	-1
Norway	14	5.14	14	0
France	15	5.13	16	1
Australia	16	5.11	15	-1
Qatar	17	5.10	22	5
Austria	18	5.09	17	-1
Belgium	19	5.07	18	-1

Luxembourg	20	5.05	21	1
Saudi Arabia	21	4.95	28	7
Korea, Rep.	22	4.93	19	-3
New Zealand	23	4.92	20	-3
Israel	24	4.91	27	3
United Arab Emirates	25	4.89	23	-2
Malaysia	26	4.88	24	-2
China	27	4.84	29	2
Brunei Darussalam	28	4.75	32	4
Ireland	29	4.74	25	-4
Chile	30	4.69	30	0
Iceland	31	4.68	26	-5
Tunisia	32	4.65	40	8
Estonia	33	4.61	35	2
Oman	34	4.61	41	7
Kuwait	35	4.59	39	4
Czech Republic	36	4.57	31	-5
Bahrain	37	4.54	38	1

Thailand	38	4.51	36	-2
Poland	39	4.51	46	7
Cyprus	40	4.50	34	-6
Puerto Rico	41	4.49	42	1
Spain	42	4.49	33	-9
Barbados	43	4.45	44	1
Indonesia	44	4.43	54	10
Slovenia	45	4.42	37	-8
Portugal	46	4.38	43	-3
Lithuania	47	4.38	53	6
Italy	48	4.37	48	0
Montenegro	49	4.36	62	13
Malta	50	4.34	52	2
India	51	4.33	49	-2
Hungary	52	4.33	58	6
Panama	53	4.33	59	6
South Africa	54	4.32	45	-9
Mauritius	55	4.32	57	2

Costa Rica	56	4.31	55	-1
Azerbaijan	57	4.29	51	-6
Brazil	58	4.28	56	-2
Vietnam	59	4.27	75	16
Slovak Republic	60	4.25	47	-13
Turkey	61	4.25	61	0
Sri Lanka	62	4.25	79	17
Russian Federation	63	4.24	63	0
Uruguay	64	4.23	65	1
Jordan	65	4.21	50	-15
Mexico	66	4.19	60	-6
Romania	67	4.16	64	-3
Colombia	68	4.14	69	1
Iran	69	4.14	n/a	n/a
Latvia	70	4.14	68	-2
Bulgaria	71	4.13	76	5
Kazakhstan	72	4.12	67	-5
Peru	73	4.11	78	5

Namibia	74	4.09	74	0
Morocco	75	4.08	73	-2
Botswana	76	4.05	66	-10
Croatia	77	4.04	72	-5
Guatemala	78	4.04	80	2
Macedonia, FYR	79	4.02	84	5
Rwanda	80	4.00	n/a	n/a
Egypt	81	4.00	70	-11
El Salvador	82	3.99	77	-5
Greece	83	3.99	71	-12
Trinidad and Tobago	84	3.97	86	2
Philippines	85	3.96	87	2
Algeria	86	3.96	83	-3
Argentina	87	3.95	85	-2
Albania	88	3.94	96	8
Ukraine	89	3.90	82	-7
Gambia, The	90	3.90	81	-9
Honduras	91	3.89	89	-2

Lebanon	92	3.89	n/a	n/a
Georgia	93	3.86	90	-3
Moldova	94	3.86	n/a	n/a
Jamaica	95	3.85	91	-4
Serbia	96	3.84	93	-3
Syria	97	3.79	94	-3
Armenia	98	3.76	97	-1
Mongolia	99	3.75	117	18
Libya	100	3.74	88	-12
Dominican Republic	101	3.72	95	-6
Bosnia and Herzegovina	102	3.70	109	7
Benin	103	3.69	103	0
Senegal	104	3.67	92	-12
Ecuador	105	3.65	105	0
Kenya	106	3.65	98	-8
Bangladesh	107	3.64	106	-1
Bolivia	108	3.64	120	12
Cambodia	109	3.63	110	1

Guyana	110	3.62	104	-6
Cameroon	111	3.58	111	0
Nicaragua	112	3.57	115	3
Tanzania	113	3.56	100	-13
Ghana	114	3.56	114	0
Zambia	115	3.55	112	-3
Tajikistan	116	3.53	122	6
Cape Verde	117	3.51	n/a	n/a
Uganda	118	3.51	108	-10
Ethiopia	119	3.51	118	-1
Paraguay	120	3.49	124	4
Kyrgyz Republic	121	3.49	123	2
Venezuela	122	3.48	113	-9
Pakistan	123	3.48	101	-22
Madagascar	124	3.46	121	-3
Malawi	125	3.45	119	-6
Swaziland	126	3.40	n/a	n/a
Nigeria	127	3.38	99	-28

Lesotho	128	3.36	107	-21
Côte d'Ivoire	129	3.35	116	-13
Nepal	130	3.34	125	-5
Mozambique	131	3.32	129	-2
Mali	132	3.28	130	-2
Timor-Leste	133	3.23	126	-7
Burkina Faso	134	3.20	128	-6
Mauritania	135	3.14	127	-8
Zimbabwe	136	3.03	132	-4
Burundi	137	2.96	133	-4
Angola	138	2.93	n/a	n/a
Chad	139	2.73	131	-8

Methodology:

The competitiveness rankings are calculated from both publicly available data and the Executive Opinion Survey, a comprehensive annual survey conducted by the World Economic Forum together with its network of Partner Institutes (leading research institutes and business organizations) in the countries covered by the Report.

Highlights according to WEF --

- The [United States](#) falls two places to fourth position, overtaken by [Sweden](#) and [Singapore](#) in the rankings of the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011

- The People's Republic of [China](#) continues to move up the rankings, with marked improvements in several other Asian countries
- [Germany](#) moves up two places to fifth place, leading the Eurozone countries
- [Switzerland](#) tops the rankings

Source:

World Economic Forum; available at URL: <http://www.weforum.org>

Updated:

2011 using most recent ranking available; reviewed in 2015.

Taxation

Corporate tax

Corporate income is applied at 25 percent on taxable income.

Social security

Social security contributions are applied at 14 percent on gross salaries.

Workers compensation

Workers compensation is applied at eight percent on gross salaries.

Indirect tax

A value added tax (VAT) of 15 percent is applied on goods and services.

Stock Market

The Bourse Regionale des Valeurs Mobilieres (BRVM) was opened in September 1998 to serve as a regional financial market for the member-states of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UMOEa), which includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. At the end of the 1990s, the BRVM had 35 listed companies.

Listing requirements include: a share capital of CFAF 200-500 million; 15-20 percent public ownership; five annual reports; balance sheet.

The BRVM has computerized trading with satellite links. Trading occurs on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays. Trading is decentralized so that member-countries can trade simultaneously from their national bourse via satellite links.

Partner Links

Partner Links

Chapter 5

Social Overview

People

Population

The total population of Guinea-Bissau is over 1.5 million. The growth rate of Guinea-Bissau's population is relatively low in comparison with the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. The people are predominantly rural. More than two-fifths of them are less than 15 years old.

The population of Guinea-Bissau is ethnically diverse with distinct languages, customs and social structures. The various groups mix easily in urban areas, where there is a notable lack of ethnic tensions.

Among the population are farmers with traditional religious beliefs (animist). Principally Fula and Mandinga-speakers are concentrated in the north and northeast. Other important groups are the Balanta and Papel, living in the southern coastal regions, and the Manjaca and Mancanha, occupying the central and northern coastal areas. There are also a small number of Europeans and people of mixed (mulatto) ethnicity.

Half the population -- 50 percent -- holds animist indigenous beliefs. About 45 percent are Muslims belonging to the aforementioned Fula and Mandinga groups. Christianity is present among some of the population with adherents numbering about five percent.

Portuguese is the official language and a testament to the colonial past. Crioulo, a type of dialect, and a number of African languages, are also spoken.

Health and Welfare

In the 1994-1995 school year primary schools enrolled 100,369 students, 70 percent of the eligible students. Only 11 percent of secondary school-aged children were enrolled in school. The country has several teacher-training colleges. The government has undertaken a program to improve the literacy rate for the population age 15 and over, which stood at 42.4 percent in recent years. This rate belies the vast gender imbalance in which literate males number about 58 percent and literate females number only 27 percent.

The country's educational system is hampered by a lack of school facilities and trained teachers. Poor economic and political leadership in the 25 years since independence has left Guinea-Bissau unable to rectify the decades of Portuguese colonial neglect that preceded it. The nation's radio stations and major newspaper ("Nô Pintcha") are controlled by the government.

About 8.1 percent of GDP in this country is spent on health expenditures. Health conditions in Guinea-Bissau are among the worst in the world. Many people still suffer from such diseases as tuberculosis, whooping cough, typhoid fever, bacillary dysentery and malaria. The poor state of health is perhaps best reflected in the country's high infant mortality rate of 101.64 deaths per 1,000 live births, and a life expectancy of only 48.7 years of age (46.8 years for males and 50.67 years for females). It was estimated that up to 20,000 people were living with HIV/AIDs in recent years.

Human Development

A notable measure of human development is the Human Development Index (HDI), which is formulated by the United Nations Development Program. The HDI is a composite of several indicators, which measure a country's achievements in three main areas of human development: longevity, knowledge and education, as well as economic standard of living. The HDI places Guinea-Bissau near the bottom of its ranking in the low human development category, at 164th place, out of 169 countries and territories.

Note: Although the concept of human development is complicated and cannot be properly captured by values and indices, the HDI, which is calculated and updated annually, offers a wide-ranging assessment of human development in certain countries, not based solely upon traditional economic and financial indicators.

Written by Dr. Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief at CountryWatch.com; see Bibliography for research sources.

Human Development Index

Human Development Index

Human Development Index (Ranked Numerically)

The [Human Development Index](#) (HDI) is used to measure quality of life in countries across the world. The HDI has been compiled since 1990 by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) on a regular basis. The HDI is a composite of several indicators, which measure a country's achievements in three main arenas of human development: longevity, education, and economic standard of living. Although the concept of human development is complicated and cannot be properly captured by values and indices, the HDI offers a wide-ranging assessment of human development in certain countries, not based solely upon traditional economic and financial indicators. For more information about the methodology used to calculate the HDI, please see the "Source Materials" in the appendices of this review.

Very High Human Development	High Human Development	Medium Human Development	Low Human Development
1. Norway	43. Bahamas	86. Fiji	128. Kenya
2. Australia	44. Lithuania	87. Turkmenistan	129. Bangladesh
3. New Zealand	45. Chile	88. Dominican Republic	130. Ghana
4. United States	46. Argentina	89. China	131. Cameroon
5. Ireland	47. Kuwait	90. El Salvador	132. Myanmar (Burma)
6. Liechtenstein	48. Latvia	91. Sri Lanka	133. Yemen
7. Netherlands	49. Montenegro	92. Thailand	134. Benin
8. Canada	50. Romania	93. Gabon	135. Madagascar
9. Sweden	51. Croatia	94. Suriname	136. Mauritania
10. Germany	52. Uruguay	95. Bolivia	137. Papua New Guinea

11. Japan	53. Libya	96. Paraguay	138. Nepal
12. South Korea	54. Panama	97. Philippines	139. Togo
13. Switzerland	55. Saudi Arabia	98. Botswana	140. Comoros
14. France	56. Mexico	99. Moldova	141. Lesotho
15. Israel	57. Malaysia	100. Mongolia	142. Nigeria
16. Finland	58. Bulgaria	101. Egypt	143. Uganda
17. Iceland	59. Trinidad and Tobago	102. Uzbekistan	144. Senegal
18. Belgium	60. Serbia	103. Micronesia	145. Haiti
19. Denmark	61. Belarus	104. Guyana	146. Angola
20. Spain	62. Costa Rica	105. Namibia	147. Djibouti
21. Hong King	63. Peru	106. Honduras	148. Tanzania
22. Greece	64. Albania	107. Maldives	149. Cote d'Ivoire
23. Italy	65. Russian Federation	108. Indonesia	150. Zambia
24. Luxembourg	66. Kazakhstan	109. Kyrgyzstan	151. Gambia
25. Austria	67. Azerbaijan	110. South Africa	152. Rwanda
26. United Kingdom	68. Bosnia and Herzegovina	111. Syria	153. Malawi
27. Singapore	69. Ukraine	112. Tajikistan	154. Sudan

28. Czech Republic	70. Iran	113. Vietnam	155. Afghanistan
29. Slovenia	71. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	114. Morocco	156. Guinea
30. Andorra	72. Mauritius	115. Nicaragua	157. Ethiopia
31. Slovakia	73. Brazil	116. Guatemala	158. Sierra Leone
32. United Arab Emirates	74. Georgia	117. Equatorial Guinea	159. Central African Republic
33. Malta	75. Venezuela	118. Cape Verde	160. Mali
34. Estonia	76. Armenia	119. India	161. Burkina Faso
35. Cyprus	77. Ecuador	120. East Timor	162. Liberia
36. Hungary	78. Belize	121. Swaziland	163. Chad
37. Brunei	79. Colombia	122. Laos	164. Guinea-Bissau
38. Qatar	80. Jamaica	123. Solomon Islands	165. Mozambique
39. Bahrain	81. Tunisia	124. Cambodia	166. Burundi
40. Portugal	82. Jordan	125. Pakistan	167. Niger
41. Poland	83. Turkey	126. Congo RC	168. Congo DRC
		127. Sao Tome	

42. Barbados	84. Algeria	and Principe	169. Zimbabwe
	85. Tonga		

Methodology:

For more information about the methodology used to calculate the HDI, please see the "Source Materials" in the appendices of this Country Review.

Reference:

As published in United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Report 2010.

Source:

United Nations Development Programme's [Human Development Index](http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/) available at URL: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/>

Updated:

Uploaded in 2011 using ranking available; reviewed in 2015

Life Satisfaction Index

Life Satisfaction Index

Life Satisfaction Index

Created by Adrian G. White, an Analytic Social Psychologist at the University of Leicester, the "Satisfaction with Life Index" measures subjective life satisfaction across various countries. The data was taken from a metastudy (see below for source) and associates the notion of subjective happiness or life satisfaction with qualitative parameters such as health, wealth, and access to basic education. This assessment serves as an alternative to other measures of happiness that tend to rely on traditional and quantitative measures of policy on quality of life, such as GNP and GDP. The methodology involved the responses of 80,000 people across the globe.

Rank	Country	Score
1	Denmark	273.4
2	Switzerland	273.33
3	Austria	260
4	Iceland	260
5	The Bahamas	256.67
6	Finland	256.67
7	Sweden	256.67
8	Iran	253.33
9	Brunei	253.33
10	Canada	253.33
11	Ireland	253.33
12	Luxembourg	253.33
13	Costa Rica	250
14	Malta	250
15	Netherlands	250
16	Antiguaand Barbuda	246.67

17	Malaysia	246.67
18	New Zealand	246.67
19	Norway	246.67
20	Seychelles	246.67
21	Saint Kitts and Nevis	246.67
22	United Arab Emirates	246.67
23	United States	246.67
24	Vanuatu	246.67
25	Venezuela	246.67
26	Australia	243.33
27	Barbados	243.33
28	Belgium	243.33
29	Dominica	243.33
30	Oman	243.33
31	Saudi Arabia	243.33
32	Suriname	243.33
33	Bahrain	240
34	Colombia	240

35	Germany	240
36	Guyana	240
37	Honduras	240
38	Kuwait	240
39	Panama	240
40	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	240
41	United Kingdom	236.67
42	Dominican Republic	233.33
43	Guatemala	233.33
44	Jamaica	233.33
45	Qatar	233.33
46	Spain	233.33
47	Saint Lucia	233.33
48	Belize	230
49	Cyprus	230
50	Italy	230
51	Mexico	230
52	Samoa	230

53	Singapore	230
54	Solomon Islands	230
55	Trinidad and Tobago	230
56	Argentina	226.67
57	Fiji	223.33
58	Israel	223.33
59	Mongolia	223.33
60	São Tomé and Príncipe	223.33
61	El Salvador	220
62	France	220
63	Hong Kong	220
64	Indonesia	220
65	Kyrgyzstan	220
66	Maldives	220
67	Slovenia	220
68	Taiwan	220
69	East Timor	220
70	Tonga	220

71	Chile	216.67
72	Grenada	216.67
73	Mauritius	216.67
74	Namibia	216.67
75	Paraguay	216.67
76	Thailand	216.67
77	Czech Republic	213.33
78	Philippines	213.33
79	Tunisia	213.33
80	Uzbekistan	213.33
81	Brazil	210
82	China	210
83	Cuba	210
84	Greece	210
85	Nicaragua	210
86	Papua New Guinea	210
87	Uruguay	210
88	Gabon	206.67

89	Ghana	206.67
90	Japan	206.67
91	Yemen	206.67
92	Portugal	203.33
93	Sri Lanka	203.33
94	Tajikistan	203.33
95	Vietnam	203.33
96	Bhutan	200
97	Comoros	196.67
98	Croatia	196.67
99	Poland	196.67
100	Cape Verde	193.33
101	Kazakhstan	193.33
102	South Korea	193.33
103	Madagascar	193.33
104	Bangladesh	190
105	Republic of the Congo	190
106	The Gambia	190

107	Hungary	190
108	Libya	190
109	South Africa	190
110	Cambodia	186.67
111	Ecuador	186.67
112	Kenya	186.67
113	Lebanon	186.67
114	Morocco	186.67
115	Peru	186.67
116	Senegal	186.67
117	Bolivia	183.33
118	Haiti	183.33
119	Nepal	183.33
120	Nigeria	183.33
121	Tanzania	183.33
122	Benin	180
123	Botswana	180
124	Guinea-Bissau	180

125	India	180
126	Laos	180
127	Mozambique	180
128	Palestinian Authority	180
129	Slovakia	180
130	Myanmar	176.67
131	Mali	176.67
132	Mauritania	176.67
133	Turkey	176.67
134	Algeria	173.33
135	Equatorial Guinea	173.33
136	Romania	173.33
137	Bosnia and Herzegovina	170
138	Cameroon	170
139	Estonia	170
140	Guinea	170
141	Jordan	170
142	Syria	170

143	Sierra Leone	166.67
144	Azerbaijan	163.33
145	Central African Republic	163.33
146	Republic of Macedonia	163.33
147	Togo	163.33
148	Zambia	163.33
149	Angola	160
150	Djibouti	160
151	Egypt	160
152	Burkina Faso	156.67
153	Ethiopia	156.67
154	Latvia	156.67
155	Lithuania	156.67
156	Uganda	156.67
157	Albania	153.33
158	Malawi	153.33
159	Chad	150
160	Côte d'Ivoire	150

161	Niger	150
162	Eritrea	146.67
163	Rwanda	146.67
164	Bulgaria	143.33
165	Lesotho	143.33
166	Pakistan	143.33
167	Russia	143.33
168	Swaziland	140
169	Georgia	136.67
170	Belarus	133.33
171	Turkmenistan	133.33
172	Armenia	123.33
173	Sudan	120
174	Ukraine	120
175	Moldova	116.67
176	Democratic Republic of the Congo	110
177	Zimbabwe	110
178	Burundi	100

Commentary:

European countries, such as [Denmark](#), [Iceland](#), [Finland](#), [Sweden](#), [Switzerland](#), [Austria](#) resided at the top of the ranking with highest levels of self-reported life satisfaction. Conversely, European countries such as [Latvia](#), [Lithuania](#), [Moldova](#), [Belarus](#) and [Ukraine](#) ranked low on the index. African countries such as Democratic Republic of Congo, [Zimbabwe](#) and [Burundi](#) found themselves at the very bottom of the ranking, and indeed, very few African countries could be found in the top 100. [Japan](#) was at the mid-way point in the ranking, however, other Asian countries such as [Brunei](#) and [Malaysia](#) were in the top tier, while [Pakistan](#) was close to the bottom with a low level of self-identified life satisfaction. As a region, the Middle East presented a mixed bag with Saudi Arabians reporting healthy levels of life satisfaction and Egyptians near the bottom of the ranking. As a region, Caribbean countries were ranked highly, consistently demonstrating high levels of life satisfaction. The findings showed that health was the most crucial determining factor in life satisfaction, followed by prosperity and education.

Source:

White, A. (2007). A Global Projection of Subjective Well-being: A Challenge To Positive Psychology? *Psychiatry* 56, 17-20. The data was extracted from a meta-analysis by Marks, Abdallah, Simms & Thompson (2006).

Uploaded:

Based on study noted above in "Source" ; reviewed in 2015

Happy Planet Index

Happy Planet Index

The Happy Planet Index (HPI) is used to measure human well-being in conjunction with environmental impact. The HPI has been compiled since 2006 by the New Economics Foundation. The index is a composite of several indicators including subjective life satisfaction, life expectancy at birth, and ecological footprint per capita.

As noted by NEFA, the HPI "reveals the ecological efficiency with which human well-being is delivered." Indeed, the index combines environmental impact with human well-being to measure the environmental efficiency with which, country by country, people live long and happy lives. The countries ranked highest by the HPI are not necessarily the ones with the happiest people overall, but the ones that allow their citizens to live long and fulfilling lives, without negatively impacting this opportunity for either future generations or citizens of other countries. Accordingly, a country like the [United States](#) will rank low on this list due to its large per capital ecological footprint, which uses more than its fair share of resources, and will likely cause planetary damage.

It should be noted that the HPI was designed to be a counterpoint to other well-established indices of countries' development, such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which measures overall national wealth and economic development, but often obfuscates the realities of countries with stark variances between the rich and the poor. Moreover, the objective of most of the world's people is not to be wealthy but to be happy. The HPI also differs from the [Human Development Index](#) (HDI), which measures quality of life but not ecology, since it [HPI] also includes sustainability as a key indicator.

Rank	Country	HPI
1	Costa Rica	76.1
2	Dominican Republic	71.8
3	Jamaica	70.1
4	Guatemala	68.4
5	Vietnam	66.5
6	Colombia	66.1
7	Cuba	65.7
8	El Salvador	61.5

9	Brazil	61.0
10	Honduras	61.0
11	Nicaragua	60.5
12	Egypt	60.3
13	Saudi Arabia	59.7
14	Philippines	59.0
15	Argentina	59.0
16	Indonesia	58.9
17	Bhutan	58.5
18	Panama	57.4
19	Laos	57.3
20	China	57.1
21	Morocco	56.8
22	Sri Lanka	56.5
23	Mexico	55.6
24	Pakistan	55.6
25	Ecuador	55.5
26	Jordan	54.6

27	Belize	54.5
28	Peru	54.4
29	Tunisia	54.3
30	Trinidad and Tobago	54.2
31	Bangladesh	54.1
32	Moldova	54.1
33	Malaysia	54.0
34	Tajikistan	53.5
35	India	53.0
36	Venezuela	52.5
37	Nepal	51.9
38	Syria	51.3
39	Burma	51.2
40	Algeria	51.2
41	Thailand	50.9
42	Haiti	50.8
43	Netherlands	50.6
44	Malta	50.4

45	Uzbekistan	50.1
46	Chile	49.7
47	Bolivia	49.3
48	Armenia	48.3
49	Singapore	48.2
50	Yemen	48.1
51	Germany	48.1
52	Switzerland	48.1
53	Sweden	48.0
54	Albania	47.9
55	Paraguay	47.8
56	Palestinian Authority	47.7
57	Austria	47.7
58	Serbia	47.6
59	Finland	47.2
60	Croatia	47.2
61	Kyrgyzstan	47.1
62	Cyprus	46.2

63	Guyana	45.6
64	Belgium	45.4
65	Bosnia and Herzegovina	45.0
66	Slovenia	44.5
67	Israel	44.5
68	South Korea	44.4
69	Italy	44.0
70	Romania	43.9
71	France	43.9
72	Georgia	43.6
73	Slovakia	43.5
74	United Kingdom	43.3
75	Japan	43.3
76	Spain	43.2
77	Poland	42.8
78	Ireland	42.6
79	Iraq	42.6
80	Cambodia	42.3

81	Iran	42.1
82	Bulgaria	42.0
83	Turkey	41.7
84	Hong Kong	41.6
85	Azerbaijan	41.2
86	Lithuania	40.9
87	Djibouti	40.4
88	Norway	40.4
89	Canada	39.4
90	Hungary	38.9
91	Kazakhstan	38.5
92	Czech Republic	38.3
93	Mauritania	38.2
94	Iceland	38.1
95	Ukraine	38.1
96	Senegal	38.0
97	Greece	37.6
98	Portugal	37.5

99	Uruguay	37.2
100	Ghana	37.1
101	Latvia	36.7
102	Australia	36.6
103	New Zealand	36.2
104	Belarus	35.7
105	Denmark	35.5
106	Mongolia	35.0
107	Malawi	34.5
108	Russia	34.5
109	Chad	34.3
110	Lebanon	33.6
111	Macedonia	32.7
112	Republic of the Congo	32.4
113	Madagascar	31.5
114	United States	30.7
115	Nigeria	30.3
116	Guinea	30.3

117	Uganda	30.2
118	South Africa	29.7
119	Rwanda	29.6
120	Democratic Republic of the Congo	29.0
121	Sudan	28.5
122	Luxembourg	28.5
123	United Arab Emirates	28.2
124	Ethiopia	28.1
125	Kenya	27.8
126	Cameroon	27.2
127	Zambia	27.2
128	Kuwait	27.0
129	Niger	26.9
130	Angola	26.8
131	Estonia	26.4
132	Mali	25.8
133	Mozambique	24.6
134	Benin	24.6

135	Togo	23.3
136	Sierra Leone	23.1
137	Central African Republic	22.9
138	Burkina Faso	22.4
139	Burundi	21.8
140	Namibia	21.1
141	Botswana	20.9
142	Tanzania	17.8
143	Zimbabwe	16.6

Source: This material is derived from the Happy Planet Index issued by the New Economics Foundation (NEF).

Methodology: The methodology for the calculations can be found at URL: <http://www.happyplanetindex.org/>

Status of Women

Gender Related Development Index (GDI) Rank:

135th out of 140

Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) Rank:

Not Ranked

Female Population:

800,000

Female Life Expectancy at birth:

50.67 years

Total Fertility Rate:

7.1

Maternal Mortality Ratio (2000):

1,100

Total Number of Women Living with HIV/AIDS:

8,100-29,000

Ever Married Women, Ages 15-19 (%):

N/A

Mean Age at Time of Marriage:

N/A

Contraceptive Use Among Married Women, Any Method (%):

8%

Female Adult Literacy Rate:

27%

Combined Female Gross enrollment ratio for Primary, Secondary and Tertiary schools:

29%

Female-Headed Households (%):

N/A

Economically Active Females (%):

57.0%

Female Contributing Family Workers (%):

N/A

Female Estimated Earned Income:

\$466

Seats in Parliament held by women (%):*Lower or Single House:* 14.0%*Upper House or Senate:* N/A**Year Women Received the Right to Vote:**

1977

Year Women Received the Right to Stand for Election:

1977

*The Gender Development Index (GDI) is a composite index which measures the average achievement in a country. While very similar to the Human Development Index in its use of the same variables, the GDI adjusts the average achievement of each country in terms of life expectancy, enrollment in schools, income, and literacy in accordance to the disparities between males and females.

*The Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) is a composite index measuring gender inequality in three of the basic dimensions of empowerment; economic participation and decision-making, political participation and decision-making, and power over economic resources.

*Total Fertility Rate (TFR) is defined as the average number of babies born to women during their

reproductive years. A TFR of 2.1 is considered the replacement rate; once a TFR of a population reaches 2.1 the population will remain stable assuming no immigration or emigration takes place. When the TFR is greater than 2.1 a population will increase and when it is less than 2.1 a population will eventually decrease, although due to the age structure of a population it will take years before a low TFR is translated into lower population.

*Maternal Mortality Rate is the number of deaths to women per 100,000 live births that resulted from conditions related to pregnancy and or delivery related complications.

*Economically Active Females are the share of the female population, ages 15 and above, whom supply, or are able to supply, labor for the production of goods and services.

*Female Contributing Family Workers are those females who work without pay in an economic enterprise operated by a relative living in the same household.

*Estimated Earned Income is measured according to Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) in US dollars.

Global Gender Gap Index

Global Gender Gap Index

Editor's Note:

The Global Gender Gap Index by the World Economic Forum ranks most of the world's countries in terms of the division of resources and opportunities among males and females. Specifically, the ranking assesses the gender inequality gap in these four arenas:

1. Economic participation and opportunity (salaries and high skilled employment participation levels)
2. Educational attainment (access to basic and higher level education)
3. Political empowerment (representation in decision-making structures)
4. Health and survival (life expectancy and sex ratio)

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	2010 rank	2010 score	2010 rank among 2009 countries	2009 rank	2009 score	2008 rank	2008 score	2007 rank
Country								
Iceland	1	0.8496	1	1	0.8276	4	0.7999	4
Norway	2	0.8404	2	3	0.8227	1	0.8239	2
Finland	3	0.8260	3	2	0.8252	2	0.8195	3
Sweden	4	0.8024	4	4	0.8139	3	0.8139	1
New Zealand	5	0.7808	5	5	0.7880	5	0.7859	5
Ireland	6	0.7773	6	8	0.7597	8	0.7518	9
Denmark	7	0.7719	7	7	0.7628	7	0.7538	8
Lesotho	8	0.7678	8	10	0.7495	16	0.7320	26
Philippines	9	0.7654	9	9	0.7579	6	0.7568	6
Switzerland	10	0.7562	10	13	0.7426	14	0.7360	40
Spain	11	0.7554	11	17	0.7345	17	0.7281	10
South Africa	12	0.7535	12	6	0.7709	22	0.7232	20
Germany	13	0.7530	13	12	0.7449	11	0.7394	7
Belgium	14	0.7509	14	33	0.7165	28	0.7163	19

United Kingdom	15	0.7460	15	15	0.7402	13	0.7366	11
Sri Lanka	16	0.7458	16	16	0.7402	12	0.7371	15
Netherlands	17	0.7444	17	11	0.7490	9	0.7399	12
Latvia	18	0.7429	18	14	0.7416	10	0.7397	13
United States	19	0.7411	19	31	0.7173	27	0.7179	31
Canada	20	0.7372	20	25	0.7196	31	0.7136	18
Trinidad and Tobago	21	0.7353	21	19	0.7298	19	0.7245	46
Mozambique	22	0.7329	22	26	0.7195	18	0.7266	43
Australia	23	0.7271	23	20	0.7282	21	0.7241	17
Cuba	24	0.7253	24	29	0.7176	25	0.7195	22
Namibia	25	0.7238	25	32	0.7167	30	0.7141	29
Luxembourg	26	0.7231	26	63	0.6889	66	0.6802	58
Mongolia	27	0.7194	27	22	0.7221	40	0.7049	62
Costa Rica	28	0.7194	28	27	0.7180	32	0.7111	28
Argentina	29	0.7187	29	24	0.7211	24	0.7209	33
Nicaragua	30	0.7176	30	49	0.7002	71	0.6747	90
Barbados	31	0.7176	31	21	0.7236	26	0.7188	n/a

Portugal	32	0.7171	32	46	0.7013	39	0.7051	37
Uganda	33	0.7169	33	40	0.7067	43	0.6981	50
Moldova	34	0.7160	34	36	0.7104	20	0.7244	21
Lithuania	35	0.7132	35	30	0.7175	23	0.7222	14
Bahamas	36	0.7128	36	28	0.7179	n/a	n/a	n/a
Austria	37	0.7091	37	42	0.7031	29	0.7153	27
Guyana	38	0.7090	38	35	0.7108	n/a	n/a	n/a
Panama	39	0.7072	39	43	0.7024	34	0.7095	38
Ecuador	40	0.7072	40	23	0.7220	35	0.7091	44
Kazakhstan	41	0.7055	41	47	0.7013	45	0.6976	32
Slovenia	42	0.7047	42	52	0.6982	51	0.6937	49
Poland	43	0.7037	43	50	0.6998	49	0.6951	60
Jamaica	44	0.7037	44	48	0.7013	44	0.6980	39
Russian Federation	45	0.7036	45	51	0.6987	42	0.6994	45
France	46	0.7025	46	18	0.7331	15	0.7341	51
Estonia	47	0.7018	47	37	0.7094	37	0.7076	30
Chile	48	0.7013	48	64	0.6884	65	0.6818	86

Macedonia, FYR	49	0.6996	49	53	0.6950	53	0.6914	35
Bulgaria	50	0.6983	50	38	0.7072	36	0.7077	25
Kyrgyz Republic	51	0.6973	51	41	0.7058	41	0.7045	70
Israel	52	0.6957	52	45	0.7019	56	0.6900	36
Croatia	53	0.6939	53	54	0.6944	46	0.6967	16
Honduras	54	0.6927	54	62	0.6893	47	0.6960	68
Colombia	55	0.6927	55	56	0.6939	50	0.6944	24
Singapore	56	0.6914	56	84	0.6664	84	0.6625	77
Thailand	57	0.6910	57	59	0.6907	52	0.6917	52
Greece	58	0.6908	58	85	0.6662	75	0.6727	72
Uruguay	59	0.6897	59	57	0.6936	54	0.6907	78
Peru	60	0.6895	60	44	0.7024	48	0.6959	75
China	61	0.6881	61	60	0.6907	57	0.6878	73
Botswana	62	0.6876	62	39	0.7071	63	0.6839	53
Ukraine	63	0.6869	63	61	0.6896	62	0.6856	57
Venezuela	64	0.6863	64	69	0.6839	59	0.6875	55
Czech Republic	65	0.6850	65	74	0.6789	69	0.6770	64

Tanzania	66	0.6829	66	73	0.6797	38	0.7068	34
Romania	67	0.6826	67	70	0.6805	70	0.6763	47
Malawi	68	0.6824	68	76	0.6738	81	0.6664	87
Paraguay	69	0.6804	69	66	0.6868	100	0.6379	69
Ghana	70	0.6782	70	80	0.6704	77	0.6679	63
Slovak Republic	71	0.6778	71	68	0.6845	64	0.6824	54
Vietnam	72	0.6776	72	71	0.6802	68	0.6778	42
Dominican Republic	73	0.6774	73	67	0.6859	72	0.6744	65
Italy	74	0.6765	74	72	0.6798	67	0.6788	84
Gambia, The	75	0.6762	75	75	0.6752	85	0.6622	95
Bolivia	76	0.6751	76	82	0.6693	80	0.6667	80
Brunei Darussalam	77	0.6748	77	94	0.6524	99	0.6392	n/a
Albania	78	0.6726	78	91	0.6601	87	0.6591	66
Hungary	79	0.6720	79	65	0.6879	60	0.6867	61
Madagascar	80	0.6713	80	77	0.6732	74	0.6736	89
Angola	81	0.6712	81	106	0.6353	114	0.6032	110
Bangladesh	82	0.6702	82	93	0.6526	90	0.6531	100

Malta	83	0.6695	83	88	0.6635	83	0.6634	76
Armenia	84	0.6669	84	90	0.6619	78	0.6677	71
Brazil	85	0.6655	85	81	0.6695	73	0.6737	74
Cyprus	86	0.6642	86	79	0.6706	76	0.6694	82
Indonesia	87	0.6615	87	92	0.6580	93	0.6473	81
Georgia	88	0.6598	88	83	0.6680	82	0.6654	67
Tajikistan	89	0.6598	89	86	0.6661	89	0.6541	79
El Salvador	90	0.6596	90	55	0.6939	58	0.6875	48
Mexico	91	0.6577	91	98	0.6503	97	0.6441	93
Zimbabwe	92	0.6574	92	95	0.6518	92	0.6485	88
Belize	93	0.6536	93	87	0.6636	86	0.6610	94
Japan	94	0.6524	94	101	0.6447	98	0.6434	91
Mauritius	95	0.6520	95	96	0.6513	95	0.6466	85
Kenya	96	0.6499	96	97	0.6512	88	0.6547	83
Cambodia	97	0.6482	97	104	0.6410	94	0.6469	98
Malaysia	98	0.6479	98	100	0.6467	96	0.6442	92
Maldives	99	0.6452	99	99	0.6482	91	0.6501	99
Azerbaijan	100	0.6446	100	89	0.6626	61	0.6856	59

Senegal	101	0.6414	101	102	0.6427	n/a	n/a	n/a
Suriname	102	0.6407	102	78	0.6726	79	0.6674	56
United Arab Emirates	103	0.6397	103	112	0.6198	105	0.6220	105
Korea, Rep.	104	0.6342	104	115	0.6146	108	0.6154	97
Kuwait	105	0.6318	105	105	0.6356	101	0.6358	96
Zambia	106	0.6293	106	107	0.6310	106	0.6205	101
Tunisia	107	0.6266	107	109	0.6233	103	0.6295	102
Fiji	108	0.6256	108	103	0.6414	n/a	n/a	n/a
Guatemala	109	0.6238	109	111	0.6209	112	0.6072	106
Bahrain	110	0.6217	110	116	0.6136	121	0.5927	115
Burkina Faso	111	0.6162	111	120	0.6081	115	0.6029	117
India	112	0.6155	112	114	0.6151	113	0.6060	114
Mauritania	113	0.6152	113	119	0.6103	110	0.6117	111
Cameroon	114	0.6110	114	118	0.6108	117	0.6017	116
Nepal	115	0.6084	115	110	0.6213	120	0.5942	125
Lebanon*	116	0.6084	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Qatar	117	0.6059	116	125	0.5907	119	0.5948	109

Nigeria	118	0.6055	117	108	0.6280	102	0.6339	107
Algeria	119	0.6052	118	117	0.6119	111	0.6111	108
Jordan	120	0.6048	119	113	0.6182	104	0.6275	104
Ethiopia	121	0.6019	120	122	0.5948	122	0.5867	113
Oman	122	0.5950	121	123	0.5938	118	0.5960	119
Iran	123	0.5933	122	128	0.5839	116	0.6021	118
Syria	124	0.5926	123	121	0.6072	107	0.6181	103
Egypt	125	0.5899	124	126	0.5862	124	0.5832	120
Turkey	126	0.5876	125	129	0.5828	123	0.5853	121
Morocco	127	0.5767	126	124	0.5926	125	0.5757	122
Benin	128	0.5719	127	131	0.5643	126	0.5582	123
Saudi Arabia	129	0.5713	128	130	0.5651	128	0.5537	124
Côte d'Ivoire*	130	0.5691	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Mali	131	0.5680	129	127	0.5860	109	0.6117	112
Pakistan	132	0.5465	130	132	0.5458	127	0.5549	126
Chad	133	0.5330	131	133	0.5417	129	0.5290	127
Yemen	134	0.4603	132	134	0.4609	130	0.4664	128
Belarus	n/a	n/a	n/a	34	0.7141	33	0.7099	23

Uzbekistan	n/a	n/a	n/a	58	0.6913	55	0.6906	41

*new country 2010

Commentary:

According to the report's index, Nordic countries, such as [Iceland](#), [Norway](#), [Finland](#), and [Sweden](#) have continued to dominate at the top of the ranking for gender equality. Meanwhile, [France](#) has seen a notable decline in the ranking, largely as a result of decreased number of women holding ministerial portfolios in that country. In the Americas, the [United States](#) has risen in the ranking to top the region, predominantly as a result of a decreasing wage gap, as well as higher number of women holding key positions in the current Obama administration. [Canada](#) has continued to remain as one of the top ranking countries of the Americas, followed by the small Caribbean island nation of Trinidad and Tobago, which has the distinction of being among the top three countries of the Americans in the realm of gender equality. [Lesotho](#) and South African ranked highly in the index, leading not only among African countries but also in global context. Despite [Lesotho](#) still lagging in the area of life expectancy, its high ranking was attributed to high levels of female participation in the labor force and female literacy. The [Philippines](#) and [Sri Lanka](#) were the top ranking countries for gender equality for Asia, ranking highly also in global context. The [Philippines](#) has continued to show strong performance in all strong performance on all four dimensions (detailed above) of the index. Finally, in the Arab world, the [United Arab Emirates](#) held the highest-rank within that region of the world; however, its placement near the bottom of the global list highlights the fact that Arab countries are generally poor performers when it comes to the matter of gender equality in global scope.

Source:

This data is derived from the latest edition of The Global Gender Gap Report by the World Economic Forum.

Available at URL:

<http://www.weforum.org/en/Communities/Women%20Leaders%20and%20Gender%20Parity/Gende>

Updated:

Based on latest available data as set forth in chart; reviewed in 2014

Culture and Arts

Content to come!

Etiquette

Cultural Dos and Taboos

1. Never give or take anything with the left hand. Never eat or drink with the left hand.
2. Dress is casual but modest.
3. Public displays of affection are frowned upon.
4. Expect to haggle in the market.

Travel Information

Please Note: This is a generalized travel guide and it is intended to coalesce several resources, which a traveler might find useful, regardless of a particular destination. As such, it does not include travel warnings for specific "hot spot" destinations.

For travel alerts and warnings, please see the United States Department of State's listings available at URL:

<http://travel.state.gov/content/passports/english/alertswarnings.html>

Please note that travel to the following countries, based on these warnings, is ill-advised, or should be undertaken with the utmost precaution:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Honduras, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, Pakistan, Palestinian Territories of West Bank and Gaza, Philippines areas of Sulu Archipelago, Mindanao, and southern Sulu Sea, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Yemen.

International Travel Guide

Checklist for Travelers

1. Take out travel insurance to cover hospital treatment or medical evacuation. Overseas medical costs are expensive to most international travelers, where one's domestic, nationalized or even private health insurance plans will not provide coverage outside one's home country. Learn about "reciprocal insurance plans" that some international health care companies might offer.
2. Make sure that one's travel insurance is appropriate. If one intends to indulge in adventurous activities, such as parasailing, one should be sure that one is fully insured in such cases. Many traditional insurance policies do not provide coverage in cases of extreme circumstances.
3. Take time to learn about one's destination country and culture. Read and learn about the place one is traveling. Also check political, economic and socio-cultural developments at the destination by reading country-specific travel reports and fact sheets noted below.
4. Get the necessary visas for the country (or countries) one intends to visit - but be aware that a visa does not guarantee entry. A number of useful sites regarding visa and other entry requirements are noted below.
5. Keep in regular contact with friends and relatives back at home by phone or email, and be sure to leave a travel itinerary.
6. Protect one's personal information by making copies of one's passport details, insurance policy, travelers checks and credit card numbers. Taking copies of such documents with you, while leaving another collection copies with someone at home is also good practice for travelers. Taking copies of one's passport photograph is also recommended.
7. Stay healthy by taking all possible precautions against illness. Also, be sure to take extra supplies of prescription drugs along for the trip, while also taking time to pack general pharmaceutical supplies, such as aspirin and other such painkillers, bandages, stomach ailment medication, anti-

inflammatory medication and anti-bacterial medication.

8. Do not carry illicit drugs. Understand that the punishment for possession or use of illegal drugs in some countries may be capital punishment. Make sure your prescription drugs are legal in the countries you plan to visit.

9. Know the laws of one's destination country and culture; be sure to understand the repercussions of breaking those laws and regulations. Often the transparency and freedoms of the juridical system at home is not consistent with that of one's destination country. Become aware of these complexities and subtleties before you travel.

10. For longer stays in a country, or where the security situation is volatile, one should register one's self and traveling companions at the local embassy or consulate of one's country of citizenship.

11. Women should take care to be prepared both culturally and practically for traveling in a different country and culture. One should be sure to take sufficient supplies of personal feminine products and prescription drugs. One should also learn about local cultural standards for women, including norms of dressing. Be aware that it is simply inappropriate and unsafe for women to travel alone in some countries, and take the necessary precautions to avoid risk-filled situations.

12. If one is traveling with small children, one should pack extra supplies, make arrangements with the travel carrier for proper seating that would adequately accommodate children, infants or toddlers. Note also that whether one is male or female, traveling with children means that one's hands are thus not free to carry luggage and bags. Be especially aware that this makes one vulnerable to pickpockets, thieves and other sorts of crime.

13. Make proper arrangements for accommodations, well in advance of one's arrival at a destination. Some countries have limited accommodation, while others may have culturally distinctive facilities. Learning about these practicalities before one travels will greatly aid the enjoyment of one's trip.

14. Travel with different forms of currency and money (cash, traveler's checks and credit cards) in anticipation that venues may not accept one or another form of money. Also, ensuring that one's financial resources are not contained in one location, or by one person (if one is traveling with others) can be a useful measure, in the event that one loses a wallet or purse.

15. Find out about transportation in the destination country. In some places, it might be advisable to hire a local driver or taxi guide for safety reasons, while in other countries, enjoying one's travel experience may well be enhanced by renting a vehicle and seeing the local sights and culture independently. Costs may also be prohibitive for either of these choices, so again, prior planning is suggested.

Tips for Travelers

Guinea-Bissau is now generally peaceful following civil conflict in 1998 and 1999 and an attempted military coup in November 2000. However visitors should avoid the North Western border area with the Senegalese province of Casamance (west of Farim), including the border crossing at

Mpack/Sao Domingos. This area is subject to continuing insecurity involving Senegalese rebel groups and the Guinea-Bissau military. If traveling overland from Senegal use border crossings in eastern Senegal e.g. Salikenie.

Since there are minefields in Guinea-Bissau left over from the civil war, travelers should not leave designated roads and pathways.

There are frequent power outages in the capital, Bissau, and the lack of lighting at night makes careful driving necessary.

Although there is a fairly low incidence of normal daytime street crime, travelers should refrain from walking alone at night and should observe security precautions in the city, particularly with regard to pickpocket activity in marketplaces. Crime rates in Guinea-Bissau are not high but Guinea-Bissau is an extremely poor country and visitors should take sensible precautions. Do not carry valuables in public.

Traffic is generally light in Guinea-Bissau but road conditions (including in the capital) and driving standards are poor. Suitable precautions should be taken, especially in the rainy season (June-September).

Most foreign citizens require a visa to enter Guinea-Bissau.

Medical facilities in Guinea-Bissau are extremely limited. Malaria and other tropical diseases are prevalent. Contact your GP before traveling. Visitors should have comprehensive health insurance, covering the cost of medical evacuation and should carry some basic medical supplies.

We strongly recommend that all travelers abroad take out comprehensive insurance.

Note: This information is provided by the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the United States Department of State.

Sources: *United States Department of State, United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office*

Business Culture: Information for Business Travelers

For general information on etiquette in Guinea-Bissau see our Cultural Etiquette page.

Online Resources Regarding Entry Requirements and Visas

Foreign Entry Requirements for Americans from the United States Department of State

http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1765.html

Visa Services for Non-Americans from the United States Department of State

http://travel.state.gov/visa/visa_1750.html

Visa Bulletins from the United States Department of State

http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/bulletin/bulletin_1360.html

Visa Waivers from the United States Department of State

http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/without/without_1990.html - new

Passport and Visa Information from the Government of the United Kingdom

<http://www.bia.homeoffice.gov.uk/>

Visa Information from the Government of Australia

<http://www.dfat.gov.au/visas/index.html>

Passport Information from the Government of Australia

<https://www.passports.gov.au/Web/index.aspx>

Passport Information from the Government of Canada

http://www.voyage.gc.ca/preparation_information/passport_passeport-eng.asp

Visa Information from the Government of Canada

http://www.voyage.gc.ca/preparation_information/visas-eng.asp

Online Visa Processing by Immigration Experts by VisaPro

<http://www.visapro.com>

Sources: United States Department of State, United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Government of Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Government of Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

Useful Online Resources for Travelers

Country-Specific Travel Information from United States

http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1765.html

Travel Advice by Country from Government of United Kingdom

<http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travelling-and-living-overseas/travel-advice-by-country/>

General Travel Advice from Government of Australia

<http://www.smartraveller.gov.au/zw-cgi/view/Advice/General>

Travel Bulletins from the Government of Australia

<http://www.smartraveller.gov.au/zw-cgi/view/TravelBulletins/>

Travel Tips from Government of Australia

<http://www.smartraveller.gov.au/tips/index.html>

Travel Checklist by Government of Canada

http://www.voyage.gc.ca/preparation_information/checklist_sommaire-eng.asp

Travel Checklist from Government of United Kingdom

<http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travelling-and-living-overseas/staying-safe/checklist>

Your trip abroad from United States Department of State

http://travel.state.gov/travel/tips/brochures/brochures_1225.html

A safe trip abroad from United States Department of State

http://travel.state.gov/travel/tips/safety/safety_1747.html

Tips for expatriates abroad from United States Department of State

http://travel.state.gov/travel/living/residing/residing_1235.html

Tips for students from United States Department of State

http://travel.state.gov/travel/living/studying/studying_1238.html <http://travel.state.gov/travel/tips/broc>

Medical information for travelers from United States Department of State

http://travel.state.gov/travel/tips/health/health_1185.html

US Customs Travel information

<http://www.customs.gov/xp/cgov/travel/>

Sources: United States Department of State; United States Customs Department, United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Government of Australia; Government of Canada: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

Other Practical Online Resources for Travelers

Foreign Language Phrases for Travelers

<http://www.travlang.com/languages/>
<http://www.omniglot.com/language/phrases/index.htm>

World Weather Forecasts

<http://www.intellicast.com/>
<http://www.wunderground.com/>
<http://www.worldweather.org/>

Worldwide Time Zones, Map, World Clock

<http://www.timeanddate.com/>
<http://www.worldtimezone.com/>

International Airport Codes

<http://www.world-airport-codes.com/>

International Dialing Codes

<http://www.kropla.com/dialcode.htm>
<http://www.countrycallingcodes.com/>

International Phone Guide

<http://www.kropla.com/phones.htm>

International Mobile Phone Guide

<http://www.kropla.com/mobilephones.htm>

International Internet Café Search Engine

<http://cybercaptive.com/>

Global Internet Roaming

<http://www.kropla.com/roaming.htm>

World Electric Power Guide

<http://www.kropla.com/electric.htm>
<http://www.kropla.com/electric2.htm>

World Television Standards and Codes

<http://www.kropla.com/tv.htm>

International Currency Exchange Rates

<http://www.xe.com/ucc/>

Banking and Financial Institutions Across the World

<http://www.123world.com/banks/index.html>

International Credit Card or Automated Teller Machine (ATM) Locator

<http://visa.via.infonow.net/locator/global/>

<http://www.mastercard.com/us/personal/en/cardholderservices/atmlocations/index.html>

International Chambers of Commerce

<http://www.123world.com/chambers/index.html>

World Tourism Websites

<http://123world.com/tourism/>

Diplomatic and Consular Information

United States Diplomatic Posts Around the World

<http://www.usembassy.gov/>

United Kingdom Diplomatic Posts Around the World

<http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/embassies-and-posts/find-an-embassy-overseas/>

Australia's Diplomatic Posts Around the World

<http://www.dfat.gov.au/missions/>

<http://www.dfat.gov.au/embassies.html>

Canada's Embassies and High Commissions

<http://www.international.gc.ca/ciw-cdm/embassies-ambassades.aspx>

Resources for Finding Embassies and other Diplomatic Posts Across the World

<http://www.escapeartist.com/embassy1/embassy1.htm>

Safety and Security

Travel Warnings by Country from Government of Australia

<http://www.smarttraveller.gov.au/zw-cgi/view/Advice/>

Travel Warnings and Alerts from United States Department of State

http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_1764.html

http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/pa/pa_1766.html

Travel Reports and Warnings by Government of Canada

http://www.voyage.gc.ca/countries_pays/menu-eng.asp

http://www.voyage.gc.ca/countries_pays/updates_mise-a-jour-eng.asp

Travel Warnings from Government of United Kingdom

<http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travelling-and-living-overseas/travel-advice-by-country/>

<http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travelling-and-living-overseas/travel-advice-by-country/?action=noTravelAll#noTravelAll>

Sources: United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the United States Department of State, the Government of Canada: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Government of Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Other Safety and Security Online Resources for Travelers

United States Department of State Information on Terrorism

<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/>

Government of the United Kingdom Resource on the Risk of Terrorism

<http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?>

[pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1044011304926](http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1044011304926)

Government of Canada Terrorism Guide

<http://www.international.gc.ca/crime/terrorism-terrorisme.aspx?lang=eng>

Information on Terrorism by Government of Australia

<http://www.dfat.gov.au/icat/index.html>

FAA Resource on Aviation Safety

<http://www.faasafety.gov/>

In-Flight Safety Information for Air Travel (by British Airways crew trainer, Anna Warman)

<http://www.warman.demon.co.uk/anna/inflight.html>

Hot Spots: Travel Safety and Risk Information

<http://www.airsecurity.com/hotspots/HotSpots.asp>

Information on Human Rights

<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/hr/>

Sources: The United States Department of State, the United States Customs Department, the Government of Canada, the Government of United Kingdom, the Government of Australia, the Federal Aviation Authority, Anna Warman's In-flight Website, Hot Spots Travel and Risk Information

Diseases/Health Data

Please Note: Most of the entry below constitutes a generalized health advisory, which a traveler might find useful, regardless of a particular destination.

As a supplement, however, reader will also find below a list of countries flagged with current health notices and alerts issued by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

Please note that travel to the following countries, based on these 3 levels of warnings, is ill-advised, or should be undertaken with the utmost precaution:

Level 3 (highest level of concern; avoid non-essential travel) --

Guinea - Ebola

Liberia - Ebola

Nepal - Earthquake zone

Sierra Leone - Ebola

Level 2 (intermediate level of concern; use utmost caution during travel) --

Cameroon - Polio

Somalia - Polio

Vanuatu - Tropical Cyclone zone

Throughout Middle East and Arabia Peninsula - MERS ((Middle East Respiratory Syndrome)

Level 1 (standard level of concern; use practical caution during travel) -

Australia - Ross River disease

Bosnia-Herzegovina - Measles

Brazil - Dengue Fever

Brazil - Malaria

Brazil - Zika

China - H7N9 Avian flu

Cuba - Cholera

Egypt - H5N1 Bird flu

Ethiopia - Measles

Germany - Measles

Japan - Hand, foot, and mouth disease (HFMD)

Kyrgyzstan - Measles

Malaysia -Dengue Fever

Mexico - Chikungunya

Mexico - Hepatitis A

Nigeria - Meningitis

Philippines - Measles

Scotland - Mumps

Singapore - Hand, foot, and mouth disease (HFMD)

South Korea - MERS ((Middle East Respiratory Syndrome)

Throughout Caribbean - Chikungunya

Throughout Central America - Chikungunya

Throughout South America - Chikungunya

Throughout Pacific Islands - Chikungunya

For specific information related to these health notices and alerts please see the CDC's listing available at URL:

<http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/notices>

Health Information for Travelers to Guinea Bissau

An outbreak of meningitis recently occurred in several central, east, and west African countries, including Ethiopia, Chad, Cameroon, Burkino Faso, and Benin. For more information on this outbreak and recommendations, see the following sites:

Travelers' Health Information on Meningococcal Disease

(<http://www.cdc.gov/travel/diseases/menin.htm>)

World Health Organization Disease Outbreak News

(<http://www.who.int/disease-outbreak-news/>)

Food and waterborne diseases are the number one cause of illness in travelers. Travelers' diarrhea can be caused by viruses, bacteria, or parasites, which are found throughout the region and can contaminate food or water. Infections may cause diarrhea and vomiting (*E. coli*, *Salmonella*, cholera, and parasites), fever (typhoid fever and toxoplasmosis), or liver damage (hepatitis). Make sure your food and drinking water are safe. (See below.)

Malaria is a preventable infection that can be fatal if left untreated. Prevent infection by taking prescription antimalarial drugs and protecting yourself against mosquito bites (see below). Most travelers to malaria risk areas in this region should take mefloquine to prevent malaria. Your risk of malaria is high in all parts of these countries, including cities, except for most of the Cape Verde Islands. For more detailed information about the risk in specific locations, see Malaria in West Africa (<http://www.cdc.gov/travel/regionalmalaria/wafrica.htm>).

Yellow fever vaccination is recommended and may be **required** for entry into certain of these countries. If you travel to West Africa, the easiest and safest thing to do is get a yellow fever vaccination and a signed certificate. For detailed information, see Comprehensive Yellow Fever Vaccination Requirements (<http://www.cdc.gov/travel/yelfever.htm>).

Dengue, filariasis, leishmaniasis, onchocerciasis, and trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness) are diseases carried by insects that also occur in this region. Protecting yourself against insect bites (see below) will help to prevent these diseases.

Schistosomiasis, a parasitic infection, is found in fresh water in the region. Do not swim in fresh water (except in well-chlorinated swimming pools) in these countries. (For more information, please see the Swimming Precautions on the Making Travel Safe page at URL <http://www.cdc.gov/travel/safety.htm>.)

Because motor vehicle crashes are a leading cause of injury among travelers, walk and drive defensively. Avoid nighttime travel if possible and always use seat belts.

CDC Recommends the Following Vaccines (as Appropriate for Age):

See your doctor at least 4-6 weeks before your trip to allow time for shots to take effect.

- Hepatitis A or immune globulin (IG).
- Hepatitis B, if you might be exposed to blood (for example, health-care workers), have sexual contact with the local population, stay longer than 6 months, or be exposed through medical treatment.
- Meningococcal meningitis, for travel to most of these countries (see meningitis map at URL <http://www.cdc.gov/travel/meninmap.htm>) from December through June.
- Yellow fever.
- Rabies, if you might be exposed to wild or domestic animals through your work or recreation.
- Typhoid, particularly if you are visiting developing countries in this region.
- As needed, booster doses for tetanus-diphtheria, measles, and a one-time dose of polio vaccine for adults. Hepatitis B vaccine is now recommended for all infants and for children ages 11-12 years who did not complete the series as infants.

To Stay Healthy, Do:

- Wash hands often with soap and water.
- Drink only bottled or boiled water, or carbonated (bubbly) drinks in cans or bottles. Avoid tap water, fountain drinks, and ice cubes. If this is not possible, make water safer by BOTH filtering through an "absolute 1-micron or less" filter AND adding iodine tablets to the filtered water. "Absolute 1-micron filters" are found in camping/outdoor supply stores.
- Eat only thoroughly cooked food or fruits and vegetables you have peeled yourself. Remember: **boil it, cook it, peel it, or forget it.**
- Take your malaria prevention medication before, during, and after travel, as directed. (See your doctor for a prescription.)
- Protect yourself from insects by remaining in well-screened areas, using repellents (applied sparingly at 4-hour intervals) and permethrin-impregnated mosquito nets, and wearing long-sleeved shirts and long pants from dusk through dawn.
- To prevent fungal and parasitic infections, keep feet clean and dry, and do not go barefoot.
- Always use latex condoms to reduce the risk of HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases.

To Avoid Getting Sick:

- Don't eat food purchased from street vendors.
- Don't drink beverages with ice.
- Don't eat dairy products unless you know they have been pasteurized.
- Don't share needles with anyone.
- Don't handle animals (especially monkeys, dogs, and cats), to avoid bites and serious diseases (including rabies and plague). (For more information, please see the Animal-Associated Hazards on the Making Travel Safe page.)
- Don't swim in fresh water. Salt water is usually safer. (For more information, please see the Swimming Precautions on the Making Travel Safe page.)

What You Need To Bring with You:

- Long-sleeved shirt and long pants to wear while outside whenever possible, to prevent illnesses carried by insects (e.g., malaria, dengue, filariasis, leishmaniasis, and onchocerciasis).
- Insect repellent containing DEET (diethylmethylnolamide), in 30%-35% strength for adults and 6%-10% for children. Unless you are staying in air-conditioned or well-screened housing, purchase a bed net impregnated with the insecticide permethrin. (Bed nets can be purchased in camping or military supply stores.)
- Over-the-counter antidiarrheal medicine to take if you have diarrhea.
- Iodine tablets and water filters to purify water if bottled water is not available. See Do's above for more details about water filters.
- Sunblock, sunglasses, hat.
- Prescription medications: make sure you have enough to last during your trip, as well as a copy of the prescription(s).

After You Return Home:

If you have visited an area where there is risk for malaria, continue taking your malaria medication weekly for 4 weeks after you leave the area.

If you become ill after your trip-even as long as a year after you return-tell your doctor where you have traveled.

For More Information:

Ask your doctor or check the CDC web sites for more information about how to protect yourself against diseases that occur in West Africa, such as:

For information about diseases- Carried by Insects

Dengue Malaria - General Information - Prescription Drugs Yellow Fever **Carried in Food or Water**

Cholera *Escherichia coli* diarrhea Hepatitis A Schistosomiasis Typhoid Fever **Person-to-Person Contact**

Hepatitis B HIV/AIDS - Prevention - HIV-Infected Travelers

For more information about these and other diseases, please check the Diseases (<http://www.cdc.gov/travel/diseases.htm>) section and the Health Topics A - Z (<http://www.cdc.gov/health/diseases.htm>).

Note:

This country is located in the West Africa health region.

Sources:

The Center for Disease Control Destinations Website:

<http://www.cdc.gov/travel/indianrg.htm>

Chapter 6

Environmental Overview

Environmental Issues

Current Issues:

- deforestation
- soil erosion
- overgrazing
- over fishing

Total Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Mtc):

0.5

Country Rank (GHG output):

159th

Natural Hazards:

- hot, dry, dusty harmattan haze that may reduce visibility
- brush fires

Environmental Policy

Regulation and Jurisdiction:

The regulation and protection of the environment in Guinea-Bissau is under the jurisdiction of the following:

- Ministry of Rural Development, Natural Resources, and Environment

Major Non-Governmental Organizations:

N/A

International Environmental Accords:

Party to:

- Biodiversity
- Climate Change
- Desertification
- Endangered Species
- Law of the Sea
- Nuclear Test Ban
- Wetlands

Signed but not ratified:

- None

Kyoto Protocol Status (year ratified):

Guinea-Bissau is not a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol

Greenhouse Gas Ranking

Greenhouse Gas Ranking

GHG Emissions Rankings

Country Rank	Country
1	United States
2	China
4	Russia
5	Japan
6	India
7	Germany
8	United Kingdom
9	Canada
10	Korea, South
11	Italy
12	Mexico
13	France
14	South Africa

15	Iran
16	Indonesia
17	Australia
18	Spain
19	Brazil
20	Saudi Arabia
21	Ukraine
22	Poland
23	Taiwan
24	Turkey
25	Thailand
26	Netherlands
27	Kazakhstan
28	Malaysia
29	Egypt
30	Venezuela
31	Argentina
32	Uzbekistan

33	Czech Republic
34	Belgium
35	Pakistan
36	Romania
37	Greece
38	United Arab Emirates
39	Algeria
40	Nigeria
41	Austria
42	Iraq
43	Finland
44	Philippines
45	Vietnam
46	Korea, North
47	Israel
48	Portugal
49	Colombia
50	Belarus

51	Kuwait
52	Hungary
53	Chile
54	Denmark
55	Serbia & Montenegro
56	Sweden
57	Syria
58	Libya
59	Bulgaria
60	Singapore
61	Switzerland
62	Ireland
63	Turkmenistan
64	Slovakia
65	Bangladesh
66	Morocco
67	New Zealand
68	Oman

69	Qatar
70	Azerbaijan
71	Norway
72	Peru
73	Cuba
74	Ecuador
75	Trinidad & Tobago
76	Croatia
77	Tunisia
78	Dominican Republic
79	Lebanon
80	Estonia
81	Yemen
82	Jordan
83	Slovenia
84	Bahrain
85	Angola
86	Bosnia & Herzegovina

87	Lithuania
88	Sri Lanka
89	Zimbabwe
90	Bolivia
91	Jamaica
92	Guatemala
93	Luxembourg
94	Myanmar
95	Sudan
96	Kenya
97	Macedonia
98	Mongolia
99	Ghana
100	Cyprus
101	Moldova
102	Latvia
103	El Salvador
104	Brunei

105	Honduras
106	Cameroon
107	Panama
108	Costa Rica
109	Cote d'Ivoire
110	Kyrgyzstan
111	Tajikistan
112	Ethiopia
113	Senegal
114	Uruguay
115	Gabon
116	Albania
117	Nicaragua
118	Botswana
119	Paraguay
120	Tanzania
121	Georgia
122	Armenia

123	Congo, RC
124	Mauritius
125	Nepal
126	Mauritius
127	Nepal
128	Mauritania
129	Malta
130	Papua New Guinea
131	Zambia
132	Suriname
133	Iceland
134	Togo
135	Benin
136	Uganda
137	Bahamas
138	Haiti
139	Congo, DRC
140	Guyana

141	Mozambique
142	Guinea
143	Equatorial Guinea
144	Laos
145	Barbados
146	Niger
147	Fiji
148	Burkina Faso
149	Malawi
150	Swaziland
151	Belize
152	Afghanistan
153	Sierra Leone
154	Eritrea
155	Rwanda
156	Mali
157	Seychelles
158	Cambodia

159	Liberia
160	Bhutan
161	Maldives
162	Antigua & Barbuda
163	Djibouti
164	Saint Lucia
165	Gambia
166	Guinea-Bissau
167	Central African Republic
168	Palau
169	Burundi
170	Grenada
171	Lesotho
172	Saint Vincent & the Grenadines
173	Solomon Islands
174	Samoa
175	Cape Verde
176	Nauru

177	Dominica
178	Saint Kitts & Nevis
179	Chad
180	Tonga
181	Sao Tome & Principe
182	Comoros
183	Vanuatu
185	Kiribati
Not Ranked	Andorra
Not Ranked	East Timor
Not Ranked	Holy See
Not Ranked	Hong Kong
Not Ranked	Liechtenstein
Not Ranked	Marshall Islands
Not Ranked	Micronesia
Not Ranked	Monaco
Not Ranked	San Marino
Not Ranked	Somalia

Not Ranked

Tuvalu

* European Union is ranked 3rd

Cook Islands are ranked 184th

Niue is ranked 186th

Global Environmental Snapshot

Introduction

The countries of the world face many environmental challenges in common. Nevertheless, the nature and intensity of problem vary from region to region, as do various countries' respective capacities, in terms of affluence and infrastructure, to remediate threats to environmental quality.

Consciousness of perils affecting the global environment came to the fore in the last third or so of the 20th century has continued to intensify well into the new millennium. According to the United Nations Environment Programme, considerable environmental progress has been made at the level of institutional developments, international cooperation accords, and public participation. Approximately two-dozen international environmental protection accords with global implications have been promulgated since the late 1970s under auspices of the United Nations and other international organizations, together with many additional regional agreements. Attempts to address and rectify environmental problems take the form of legal frameworks, economic instruments, environmentally sound technologies and cleaner production processes as well as conservation efforts. Environmental impact assessments have increasingly been applied across the globe.

Environmental degradation affects the quality, or aesthetics, of human life, but it also displays potential to undermine conditions necessary for the sustainability of human life. Attitudes toward the importance of environmental protection measures reflect ambivalence derived from this bifurcation. On one hand, steps such as cleaning up pollution, dedicating parkland, and suchlike, are seen as embellishments undertaken by wealthy societies already assured they can successfully perform those functions deemed, ostensibly, more essential-for instance, public health and education, employment and economic development. On the other hand, in poorer countries, activities causing environmental damage-for instance the land degradation effects of unregulated logging, slash-and-burn agriculture, overgrazing, and mining-can seem justified insofar as such activities provide incomes and livelihoods.

Rapid rates of resource depletion are associated with poverty and high population growth, themselves correlated, whereas consumption per capita is much higher in the most developed countries, despite these nations' recent progress in energy efficiency and conservation. It is impossible to sequester the global environmental challenge from related economic, social and political challenges.

First-tier industrialized countries have recently achieved measurable decreases in environmental pollution and the rate of resource depletion, a success not matched in middle income and developing countries. It is believed that the discrepancy is due to the fact that industrialized countries have more developed infrastructures to accommodate changes in environmental policy, to apply environmental technologies, and to invest in public education. The advanced industrialized countries incur relatively lower costs in alleviating environmental problems, in comparison to developing countries, since in the former even extensive environmental programs represent a rather minuscule percentage of total expenditures. Conversely, budget constraints, lagged provision of basic services to the population, and other factors such as debt service and militarization may preclude institution of minimal environmental protection measures in the poorest countries.

A synopsis for the current situation facing each region of the world follows:

Regional Synopsis: Africa

The African continent, the world's second-largest landmass, encompasses many of the world's least developed countries. By global standards, urbanization is comparatively low but rising at a rapid rate. More heavily industrialized areas at the northern and southern ends of the continent experience the major share of industrial pollution. In other regions the most serious environmental problems typically stem from inefficient subsistence farming methods and other forms of land degradation, which have affected an increasingly extensive area under pressure of a widely impoverished, fast-growing population. Africa's distribution of natural resources is very uneven. It is the continent at greatest risk of desertification, especially in the Sahel region at the edge of the Sahara but also in other dry-range areas. Yet at the same time, Africa also harbors some of the earth's richest and most diverse biological zones.

Key Points:

Up to half a billion hectares of African land are moderately to severely degraded, an occurrence reflecting short-fallow shifting cultivation and overgrazing as well as a climatic pattern of recurrent droughts.

Soil degradation is severe along the expanse directly south of the Sahara, from the west to the east coasts. Parts of southern Africa, central-eastern Africa, and the neighboring island of Madagascar

suffer from serious soil degradation as well.

Africa contains about 17 percent of the world's forest cover, concentrated in the tropical belt of the continent. Many of the forests, however, are severely depleted, with an estimated 70 percent showing some degree of degradation.

Population growth has resulted in continuing loss of arable land, as inefficient subsistence farming techniques affect increasingly extensive areas. Efforts to implement settled, sustainable agriculture have met with some recent success, but much further progress in this direction is needed. Especially in previously uninhabited forestlands, concern over deforestation is intensifying.

By contrast, the African savanna remains the richest grassland in the world, supporting a substantial concentration of animal and plant life. Wildlife parks are sub-Saharan Africa's greatest tourist attraction, and with proper management-giving local people a stake in conservation and controlling the pace of development-could greatly enhance African economies.

Significant numbers of mammal species in parts of northern, southern and eastern Africa are currently threatened, while the biological diversity in Mauritania and Madagascar is even further compromised with over 20 percent of the mammal species in these two countries currently under threat.

With marine catch trends increasing from 500,000 metric tons in the 1950s to over 3,000,000 metric tons by 2000, there was increasing concern about the reduction in fisheries and marine life, should this trend continue unabated.

Water resource vulnerability is a major concern in northeastern Africa, and a moderate concern across the rest of the continent. An exception is central Africa, which has plentiful water supplies.

Many Africans lack adequate access to resources, not just (if at all) because the resources are unevenly distributed geographically, but also through institutional failures such as faulty land tenure systems or political upheaval. The quality of Africa's natural resources, despite their spotty distribution, is in fact extraordinarily rich. The infrastructure needed to protect and benefit from this natural legacy, however, is largely lacking.

Regional Synopsis: Asia and the Pacific

Asia-earth's largest landmass-and the many large and nearly innumerable small islands lying off its Pacific shore display extraordinarily contrasting landscapes, levels of development, and degrees of environmental stress. In the classification used here, the world's smallest continent, Australia, is also included in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Asia-Pacific region is home to 9 of the world's 14 largest urban areas, and as energy use for utilities, industry and transport increases in developing economies, urban centers are subject to worsening air quality. Intense population density in places such as Bangladesh or Hong Kong is the quintessential image many people have of Asia, yet vast desert areas such as the Gobi and the world's highest mountain range, the Himalayas, span the continent as well. Forested areas in Southeast Asia and the islands of Indonesia and the Philippines were historically prized for their tropical hardwood, but in many places this resource is now severely depleted. Low-lying small island states are extremely vulnerable to the effects of global warming, both rising sea levels and an anticipated increase in cyclones.

Key Points:

Asian timber reserves are forecast to be depleted in the next 40 years. Loss of natural forest is irreversible in some areas, but plantation programs to restore tree cover may ameliorate a portion of the resulting land degradation.

Increased usage of fossil fuels in China and other parts of southern Asia is projected to result in a marked increase in emissions, especially in regard to carbon dioxide. The increased usage of energy has led to a marked upsurge in air pollution across the region.

Acidification is an emerging problem regionally, with sulfur dioxide emissions expected to triple by 2010 if the current growth rate is sustained. China, Thailand, India, and Korea seem to be suffering from particularly high rates of acid deposition. By contrast, Asia's most highly developed economy, Japan, has effected substantial improvements in its environmental indicators.

Water pollution in the Pacific is an urgent concern since up to 70 percent of the water discharged into the region's waters receives no treatment. Additionally, the disposal of solid wastes, in like manner, poses a major threat in a region with many areas of high population density.

The Asia-Pacific region is the largest expanse of the world's land that is adversely affected by soil degradation.

The region around Australia reportedly suffers the largest degree of ozone depletion.

The microstates of the Pacific suffer land loss due to global warming, and the consequent rise in the levels of ocean waters. A high-emissions scenario and anthropogenic climate impact at the upper end of the currently predicted range would probably force complete evacuation of the lowest-elevation islands sometime in this century.

The species-rich reefs surrounding Southeast Asia are highly vulnerable to the deleterious effects of

coastal development, land-based pollution, over-fishing and exploitative fishing methods, as well as marine pollution from oil spills and other activities.

With marine catch trends increasing from 5,000,000 metric tons in the 1950s to over 20,000,000 metric tons by 2000, there was increasing concern about the reduction in fisheries and marine life, should this trend continue unabated.

Significant numbers of mammal species in parts of China and south-east Asia are currently threatened, while the biological diversity in India, Japan, Australia, the Philippines, Indonesia and parts of Malaysia is even further compromised with over 20 percent of the mammal species in these countries currently under threat.

Water resource vulnerability is a serious concern in areas surrounding the Indian subcontinent.

Regional Synopsis: Central Asia

The Central Asian republics, formerly in the Soviet Union, experience a range of environmental problems as the result of poorly executed agricultural, industrial, and nuclear programs during the Soviet era. Relatively low population densities are the norm, especially since upon the breakup of the U.S.S.R. many ethnic Russians migrated back to European Russia. In this largely semi-arid region, drought, water shortages, and soil salinization pose major challenges.

Key Points:

The use of agricultural pesticides, such as DDT and other chemicals, has contributed to the contamination of soil and groundwater throughout the region.

Land and soil degradation, and in particular, increased salinization, is mostly attributable to faulty irrigation practices.

Significant desertification is also a problem in the region.

Air pollution is prevalent, mostly due to use of low octane automobile fuel.

Industrial pollution of the Caspian Sea and the Aral Sea, as a result of industrial effluents as well as mining and metal production, presents a challenge to the countries bordering these bodies of water.

One of the most severe environmental problems in the region is attributable to the several billion tons of hazardous materials stored in landfills across Central Asia.

Uzbekistan's particular problem involves the contraction of the Aral Sea, which has decreased in size by a third, as a consequence of river diversions and poor irrigation practices. The effect has been the near-total biological destruction of that body of water.

Kazakhstan, as a consequence of being the heartland of the former Soviet Union's nuclear program, has incurred a high of cancerous malignancies, biogenetic abnormalities and radioactive contamination.

While part of the Soviet Union, the republics in the region experienced very high levels of greenhouse gas emissions, as a consequence of rapid industrialization using cheap but dirty energy sources, especially coal.

By contrast, however, there have recently been substantial reductions in the level of greenhouse gas emissions, especially those attributable to coal burning, with further decreases anticipated over the next decade. These changes are partially due to the use of cleaner energy technologies, such as natural gas, augmented by governmental commitment to improving environmental standards.

Regional Synopsis: Europe

Western Europe underwent dramatic transformation of its landscape, virtually eliminating large-scale natural areas, during an era of rapid industrialization, which intensified upon its recovery from World War II. In Eastern Europe and European Russia, intensive land development has been less prevalent, so that some native forests and other natural areas remain. Air and water pollution from use of dirty fuels and industrial effluents, however, are more serious environmental problems in Eastern than in Western Europe, though recent trends show improvement in many indicators. Acid rain has inflicted heavy environmental damage across much of Europe, particularly on forests. Europe and North America are the only regions in which water usage for industry exceeds that for agriculture, although in Mediterranean nations agriculture is the largest water consumer.

Key Points:

Europe contributes 36 percent of the world's chlorofluorocarbon emissions, 30 percent of carbon dioxide emissions, and 25 percent of sulfur dioxide emissions.

Sulfur and nitrogen oxide emissions are the cause of 30 to 50 percent of Central and Eastern Europe's deforestation.

Acid rain has been an environmental concern for decades and continues to be a challenge in parts of Western Europe.

Overexploitation of up to 60 percent of Europe's groundwater presents a problem in industrial and urban areas.

With marine catch trends increasing from 5,000,000 metric tons in the 1950s to over 20,000,000 metric tons by 2000, there was increasing concern about the reduction in fisheries and marine life, should this trend continue unabated.

Significant numbers of mammal species in parts of western Europe, Eastern Europe and Russia are currently threatened, while the biological diversity on the Iberian Peninsula is even further compromised with over 40 percent of the mammal species in this region currently under threat. As a result, there has been a 10 percent increase in protected areas of Europe.

A major environmental issue for Europe involves the depletion of various already endangered or threatened species, and most significantly, the decline of fish stocks. Some estimates suggest that up to 50 percent of the continent's fish species may be considered endangered species. Coastal fisheries have been over-harvested, resulting in catch limits or moratoriums on many commercially important fish species.

Fortunately, in the last few years, these policies have started to yield measurable results with decreasing trends in marine fish catch.

Recently, most European countries have adopted cleaner production technologies, and alternative methods of waste disposal, including recycling.

The countries of Eastern Europe have made air quality a major environmental priority. This is exemplified by the Russian Federation's addition to the 1995 "Berlin Mandate" (transnational legislation based on resolutions of the Rio Earth Summit) compelling nations to promote "carbon sinks" to absorb greenhouse gases.

On a relative basis, when compared with the degree of industrial emissions emitted by many Eastern European countries until the late 1980s, there has been some marked increase in air quality in the region, as obsolete plants are closed and a transition to cleaner fuels and more efficient energy use takes place.

Regional Synopsis: The Middle and Near East

Quite possibly, the Middle East will exemplify the adage that, as the 20th century was a century fixated on oil, the 21st century will be devoted to critical decisions about water. Many (though far from all) nations in the Middle East rank among those countries with the largest oil and gas

reserves, but water resources are relatively scarce throughout this predominantly dry region. Effects of global warming may cause moderately high elevation areas that now typically receive winter "snowpack" to experience mainly rain instead, which would further constrain dry-season water availability. The antiquities and religious shrines of the region render it a great magnet for tourism, which entails considerable economic growth potential but also intensifies stresses on the environment.

Key Points:

Water resource vulnerability is a serious concern across the entire region. The increased usage of, and further demand for water, has exacerbated long-standing water scarcity in the region. For instance, river diversions and industrial salt works have caused the Dead Sea to shrink by one-third from its original surface area, with further declines expected.

The oil industry in the region contributes to water pollution in the Persian Gulf, as a result of oil spills, which have averaged 1.2 million barrels of oil spilt per year (some sources suggest that this figure is understated). The consequences are severe because even after oil spills have been cleaned up, environmental damage to the food webs and ecosystems of marine life will persist for a prolonged period.

The region's coastal zone is considered one of the most fragile and endangered ecosystems of the world. Land reclamation, shoreline construction, discharge of industrial effluents, and tourism (such as diving in the Red Sea) contribute to widespread coastal damage.

Significant numbers of mammal species in parts of the Middle East are currently threatened.

Since the 1980s, 11 percent of the region's natural forest has been depleted.

Regional Synopsis: Latin America and the Caribbean

The Latin American and Caribbean region is characterized by exceedingly diverse landforms that have generally seen high rates of population growth and economic development in recent decades. The percentage of inhabitants residing in urban areas is quite high at 73.4 percent; the region includes the megacities of Mexico City, Sao Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro. The region also includes the world's second-highest mountain range, the Andes; significant expanses of desert and grassland; the coral reefs of the Caribbean Sea; and the world's largest contiguous tropical forest in the Amazon basin. Threats to the latter from subsistence and commercial farming, mineral exploitation and timbering are well publicized. Nevertheless, of eight countries worldwide that still retain at least 70 percent of their original forest cover, six are in Latin America. The region accounts for nearly half (48.3 percent) of the world's greenhouse gas emissions derived from land clearing, but as yet a

comparatively minuscule share (4.3 percent) of such gases from industrial sources.

Key Points:

Although Latin America is one of the most biologically diverse regions of the world, this biodiversity is highly threatened, as exemplified by the projected extinction of up to 100,000 species in the next few decades. Much of this loss will be concentrated in the Amazon area, although the western coastline of South America will also suffer significant depletion of biological diversity. The inventory of rainforest species with potentially useful commercial or medical applications is incomplete, but presumed to include significant numbers of such species that may become extinct before they are discovered and identified.

Up to 50 percent of the region's grazing land has lost its soil fertility as a result of soil erosion, salinization, alkalinization and overgrazing.

The Caribbean Sea, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Pacific Ocean have all been contaminated by agricultural wastes, which are discharged into streams that flow into these major waters. Water pollution derived from phosphorous, nitrates and pesticides adversely affects fish stocks, contributes to oxygen depletion and fosters overgrowth of aquatic vegetation. Marine life will continue to be severely compromised as a result of these conditions.

Due to industrial development in the region, many beaches of eastern Latin America and the Caribbean suffer from tar deposits.

Most cities in the region lack adequate sewage treatment facilities, and rapid migration of the rural poor into the cities is widening the gap between current infrastructure capacity and the much greater level needed to provide satisfactory basic services.

The rainforest region of the Amazon Basin suffers from dangerously high levels of deforestation, which may be a significant contributory factor to global warming or "the greenhouse effect." In the late 1990s and into the new millennium, the rate of deforestation was around 20 million acres of rainforest being destroyed annually.

Deforestation on the steep rainforest slopes of Caribbean islands contributes to soil erosion and landslides, both of which then result in heavy sedimentation of nearby river systems. When these sedimented rivers drain into the sea and coral reefs, they poison the coral tissues, which are vital to the maintenance of the reef ecosystem. The result is marine degradation and nutrient depletion. Jamaica's coral reefs have never quite recovered from the effects of marine degradation.

The Southern Cone of Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay) suffers the effects of greatly increased ultraviolet-B radiation, as a consequence of more intense ozone

depletion in the southern hemisphere.

Water resource vulnerability is an increasingly major concern in the northwestern portion of South America.

Regional Synopsis: North America

North American nations, in particular the United States and Canada, rank among the world's most highly developed industrial economies-a fact which has generated significant pollution problems, but also financial resources and skills that have enabled many problems to be corrected. Although efforts to promote energy efficiency, recycling, and suchlike have helped ease strains on the environment in a part of the world where per capita consumption levels are high, sprawling land development patterns and recent preferences many households have demonstrated for larger vehicles have offset these advances.

Meanwhile, a large portion of North America's original forest cover has been lost, though in many cases replaced by productive second-growth woodland. In recent years, attitudes toward best use of the region's remaining natural or scenic areas seem to be shifting toward recreation and preservation and away from resource extraction. With increasing attention on the energy scarcity in the United States, however, there is speculation that this shift may be short-lived. Indeed, the energy shortage on the west coast of the United States and associated calls for energy exploration, indicate a possible retrenchment toward resource extraction. At the same time, however, it has also served to highlight the need for energy conservation as well as alternative energy sources.

Despite generally successful anti-pollution efforts, various parts of the region continue to suffer significant air, water and land degradation from industrial, vehicular, and agricultural emissions and runoff. Mexico, as a middle-income country, displays environmental problems characteristic of a developing economy, including forest depletion, pollution from inefficient industrial processes and dirty fuels, and lack of sufficient waste-treatment infrastructure.

Key Points:

Because of significantly greater motor vehicle usage in the United States (U.S.) than in the rest of the world, the U.S. contribution of urban air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions, especially carbon dioxide, is disproportionately high in relation to its population.

Acid rain is an enduring issue of contention in the northeastern part of the United States, on the border with Canada.

Mexico's urban areas suffer extreme air pollution from carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, sulfur

dioxide, and other toxic air pollutants. Emissions controls on vehicles are in their infancy, compared to analogous regulations in the U.S.

The cities of Mexico, including those on the U.S. border, also discharge large quantities of untreated or poorly treated sewage, though officials are currently planning infrastructure upgrades.

Deforestation is noteworthy in various regions of the U.S., especially along the northwest coastline. Old growth forests have been largely removed, but in the northeastern and upper midwestern sections of the United States, evidence suggests that the current extent of tree cover probably surpasses the figure for the beginning of the 20th century.

Extreme weather conditions in the last few years have resulted in a high level of soil erosion along the north coast of California; in addition, the coastline itself has shifted substantially due to soil erosion and concomitant landslides.

Agricultural pollution-including nitrate contamination of well water, nutrient runoff to waterways, and pesticide exposure-is significant in various areas. Noteworthy among affected places are California's Central Valley, extensive stretches of the Midwest, and land in the Chesapeake Bay watershed.

Inland waterways, especially around the Great Lakes, have substantially improved their water quality, due to concentrated efforts at reducing water pollution by governmental, commercial and community representatives. Strict curbs on industrial effluents and near-universal implementation of sewage treatment are the chief factors responsible for this improvement.

A major environmental issue for Canada and the United States involves the depletion of various already endangered or threatened species, and most significantly, the decline of fish stocks. Coastal fisheries have been over-harvested, resulting in catch limits or moratoriums on many commercially important fish species. In the last few years, these policies have started to yield measurable results with decreasing trends in marine fish catch.

Due to the decay of neighboring ecosystems in Central America and the Caribbean, the sea surrounding Florida has become increasingly sedimented, contributing to marine degradation, nutrient depletion of the ecosystem, depletion of fish stocks, and diseases to coral species in particular.

Polar Regions

Key Points:

The significant rise in sea level, amounting 10 to 25 centimeters in the last 100 years, is due to the melting of the Arctic ice sheets, and is attributed to global warming.

The Antarctic suffers from a significant ozone hole, first detected in 1976. By 1985, a British scientific team reported a 40 percent decrease in usual regeneration rates of the ozone. Because a sustained increase in the amount of ultraviolet-B radiation would have adverse consequences upon all planetary life, recent environmental measures have been put into effect, aimed at reversing ozone depletion. These measures are projected to garner significant results by 2050.

Due to air and ocean currents, the Arctic is a sink for toxic releases originally discharged thousands of miles away. Arctic wildlife and Canada's Inuit population have higher bodily levels of contaminants such as PCB and dioxin than those found in people and animals in much of the rest of the world.

Global Environmental Concepts

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1. Global Warming and Greenhouse Gases

The Greenhouse Effect:

In the early 19th century, the French physicist, Jean Fourier, contended that the earth's atmosphere functions in much the same way as the glass of a greenhouse, thus describing what is now understood as the "greenhouse effect." Put simply, the "greenhouse effect" confines some of the sun's energy to the earth, preserving some of the planet's warmth, rather than allowing it to flow back into space. In so doing, all kinds of life forms can flourish on earth. Thus, the "greenhouse effect" is necessary to sustain and preserve life forms and ecosystems on earth.

In the late 19th century, a Swedish chemist, Svante Arrhenius, noticed that human activities, such as the burning of coal and other fossil fuels for heat, and the removal of forested lands for urban development, led to higher concentrations of greenhouse gases, like carbon dioxide and methane, in the atmosphere. This increase in the levels of greenhouse gases was believed to advance the "greenhouse effect" exponentially, and might be related to the trend in global warming.

In the wake of the Industrial Revolution, after industrial development took place on a large scale and the total human population burgeoned simultaneously with industrialization, the resulting

increase in greenhouse gas emissions could, many scientists believe, be significant enough to have some bearing on climate. Indeed, many studies in recent years support the idea that there is a linkage between human activities and global warming, although there is less consensus on the extent to which this linkage may be relevant to environmental concerns.

That said, some scientists have argued that temperature fluctuations have existed throughout the evolution of the planet. Indeed, Dr. S. Fred Singer, the president of the Science and Environment Policy Project has noted that 3,000-year-old geological records of ocean sediment reveal changes in the surface temperature of the ocean. Hence, it is possible that climate variability is merely a normal fact of the planet's evolution. Yet even skeptics as to anthropogenic factors concur that any substantial changes in global temperatures would likely have an effect upon the earth's ecosystems, as well as the life forms that inhabit them.

The Relationship Between Global Warming and Greenhouse Gases:

A large number of climatologists believe that the increase in atmospheric concentrations of "greenhouse gas emissions," mostly a consequence of human activities such as the burning of fossil fuels, are contributing to global warming. The cause notwithstanding, the planet has reportedly warmed 0.3°C to 0.6°C over the last century. Indeed, each year during the 1990s was one of the very warmest in the 20th century, with the mean surface temperature for 1999 being the fifth warmest on record since 1880.

In early 2000, a panel of atmospheric scientists for the National Research Council concluded in a report that global warming was, indeed, a reality. While the panel, headed by Chairman John Wallace, a professor of atmospheric sciences at the University of Washington, stated that it remained unclear whether human activities have contributed to the earth's increasing temperatures, it was apparent that global warming exists.

In 2001, following a request for further study by the incoming Bush administration in the [United States](#), the National Academy of Sciences again confirmed that global warming had been in existence for the last 20 years. The study also projected an increase in temperature between 2.5 degrees and 10.4 degrees Fahrenheit by the year 2100. Furthermore, the study found the leading cause of global warming to be emissions of carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels, and it noted that greenhouse gas accumulations in the earth's atmosphere was a result of human activities.

Within the scientific community, the controversy regarding has centered on the difference between surface air and upper air temperatures. Information collected since 1979 suggests that while the earth's surface temperature has increased by about a degree in the past century, the atmospheric temperature five miles above the earth's surface has indicated very little increase. Nevertheless, the panel stated that this discrepancy in temperature between surface and upper air does not invalidate the conclusion that global warming is taking place. Further, the panel noted that natural events,

such as volcanic eruptions, can decrease the temperature in the upper atmosphere.

The major consequences of global warming potentially include the melting of the polar ice caps, which, in turn, contribute to the rise in sea levels. Many islands across the globe have already experienced a measurable loss of land as a result. Because global warming may increase the rate of evaporation, increased precipitation, in the form of stronger and more frequent storm systems, is another potential outcome. Other consequences of global warming may include the introduction and proliferation of new infectious diseases, loss of arable land (referred to as "desertification"), destructive changes to existing ecosystems, loss of biodiversity and the isolation of species, and concomitant adverse changes in the quality of human life.

International Policy Development in Regard to Global Warming:

Regardless of what the precise nature of the relationship between greenhouse gas emissions and global warming may be, it seems that there is some degree of a connection between the phenomena. Any substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and global warming trends will likely involve systematic changes in industrial operations, the use of advanced energy sources and technologies, as well as global cooperation in implementing and regulating these transformations.

In this regard, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) stipulated the following objectives:

1. To stabilize "greenhouse gas" concentrations within the atmosphere, in such a manner that would preclude hazardous anthropogenic intervention into the existing biosphere and ecosystems of the world. This stabilization process would facilitate the natural adaptation of ecosystems to changes in climate.
2. To ensure and enable sustainable development and food production on a global scale.

*** See section on "International Environmental Agreements and Associations" for information related to international policies related to limiting greenhouse gases and controlling climate change emanating from historic summits at Kyoto, Copenhagen, Doha, and Paris. ***

2. Air Pollution

Long before global warming reared its head as a significant issue, those concerned about the environment and public health noted the deleterious effects of human-initiated combustion upon the atmosphere. Killer smogs from coal burning triggered acute health emergencies in London and

other places. At a lower level of intensity motor vehicle, power plant, and industrial emissions impaired long-range visibility and probably had some chronic adverse consequences on the respiratory systems of persons breathing such air.

In time, scientists began associating the sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides released from coal burning with significant acid deposition in the atmosphere, eventually falling as "acid rain." This phenomenon has severely degraded forestlands, especially in Europe and a few parts of the [United States](#). It has also impaired some aquatic ecosystems and eaten away the surface of some human artifacts, such as marble monuments. Scrubber technology and conversion to cleaner fuels have enabled the level of industrial production to remain at least constant while significantly reducing acid deposition. Technologies aimed at cleaning the air and curtailing acid rain, soot, and smog may, nonetheless, boomerang as the perils of global warming become increasingly serious. In brief, these particulates act as sort of a sun shade -- comparable to the effect of volcanic eruptions on the upper atmosphere whereby periods of active volcanism correlate with temporarily cooler weather conditions. Thus, while the carbon dioxide releases that are an inevitable byproduct of combustion continue, by scrubbing the atmosphere of pollutants, an industrial society opens itself to greater insolation (penetration of the sun's rays and consequent heating), and consequently, it is likely to experience a correspondingly greater rise in ambient temperatures.

The health benefits of removing the sources of acid rain and smog are indisputable, and no one would recommend a return to previous conditions. Nevertheless, the problematic climatic effects of continually increasing emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases pose a major global environmental challenge, not as yet addressed adequately.

3. Ozone Depletion

The stratospheric ozone layer functions to prevent ultraviolet radiation from reaching the earth. Normally, stratospheric ozone is systematically disintegrated and regenerated through natural photochemical processes. The stratospheric ozone layer, however, has been depleted unnaturally as a result of anthropogenic (man-made) chemicals, most especially chlorine and bromide compounds such as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), halons, and various industrial chemicals in the form of solvents, refrigerants, foaming agents, aerosol propellants, fire retardants, and fumigants. Ozone depletion is of concern because it permits a greater degree of ultraviolet-B radiation to reach the earth, which then increases the incidences of cancerous malignancies, cataracts, and human immune deficiencies. In addition, even in small doses, ozone depletion affects the ecosystem by disturbing food chains, agriculture, fisheries and other forms of biological diversity.

Transnational policies enacted to respond to the dangers of ozone depletion include the 1985 Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. The Montreal Protocol was subsequently amended in

London in 1990, Copenhagen in 1992 and Vienna in 1995. By 1996, 155 countries had ratified the Montreal Protocol, which sets out a time schedule for the reduction (and eventual elimination) of ozone depleting substances (OPS), and bans exports and imports of ODS from and to non-participant countries.

In general, the Protocol stipulates that developed countries must eliminate halon consumption by 1994 and CFC consumption by 1996, while developing countries must eliminate these substances by 2010. Consumption of methyl bromide, which is used as a fumigant, was to be frozen at the 1995 in developed countries, and fully eliminated in 2010, while developing countries are to freeze consumption by 2002, based on average 1995-1998 consumption levels. Methyl chloroform is to be phased out by 2005. Under the Montreal Protocol, most ODS will be completely eliminated from use by 2010.

4. Land Degradation

In recent decades, land degradation in more arid regions of the world has become a serious concern. The problem, manifest as both "desertification" and "devegetation," is caused primarily by climate variability and human activities, such as "deforestation," excessive cultivation, overgrazing, and other forms of land resource exploitation. It is also exacerbated by inadequate irrigation practices. Although the effects of droughts on drylands have been temporary in the past, today, the productivity and sustainability of these lands have been severely compromised for the long term. Indeed, in every region of the world, land degradation has become an acute issue.

Desertification and Devegetation:

"Desertification" is a process of land degradation causing the soil to deteriorate, thus losing its nutrients and fertility, and eventually resulting in the loss of vegetation, known as "devegetation." As aforementioned, "desertification" and "devegetation" are caused by human activities, yet human beings are also the greatest casualties. Because these forms of land degradation affect the ability of the soil to produce crops, they concomitantly contribute to poverty. As population increases and demographic concentrations shift, the extent of land subject to stresses by those seeking to wrest subsistence from it has inexorably risen.

In response, the United Nations has formed the Convention to Combat Desertification-aimed at implementing programs to address the underlying causes of desertification, as well as measures to prevent and minimize its effects. Of particular significance is the formulation of policies on transboundary resources, such as areas around lakes and rivers. At a broader level, the Convention has established a Conference of Parties (COP), which includes all ratifying governments, for directing and advancing international action.

To ensure more efficacious use of funding, the Convention intends to reconfigure international aid to utilize a consultative and coordinated approach in the disbursement and expenditure of donor funds. In this way, local communities that are affected by desertification will be active participants in the solution-generation process. In-depth community education projects are envisioned as part of this new international aid program, and private donor financing is encouraged. Meanwhile, as new technologies are developed to deal with the problem of desertification, they need to be distributed for application across the world. Hence, the Convention calls for international cooperation in scientific research in this regard.

Desertification is a problem of sustainable development. It is directly connected to human challenges such as poverty, social and economic well-being and environmental protection as well. Broader environmental issues, such as climate change, biological diversity, and freshwater supplies, are indirectly related, so any effort to resolve this environmental challenge must entail coordinated research efforts and joint action.

Deforestation:

Deforestation is not a recent phenomenon. For centuries, human beings have cut down trees to clear space for land cultivation, or in order to use the wood for fuel. Over the last 200 years, and most especially after World War II, deforestation increased because the logging industry became a globally profitable endeavor, and so the clearing of forested areas was accelerated for the purposes of industrial development. In the long term, this intensified level of deforestation is considered problematic because the forest is unable to regenerate itself quickly. The deforestation that has occurred in tropical rainforests is seen as an especially serious concern, due to the perceived adverse effects of this process upon the entire global ecosystem.

The most immediate consequence of deforestation is soil degradation. Soil, which is necessary for the growth of vegetation, can be a fragile and vital property. Organically, an extensive evolution process must take place before soil can produce vegetation, yet at the same time, the effects of natural elements, such as wind and rain, can easily and quickly degrade this resource. This phenomenon is known as soil erosion. In addition, natural elements like wind and rain reduce the amount of fertile soil on the ground, making soil scarcity a genuine problem. When fertile topsoil that already exists is removed from the landscape in the process of deforestation, soil scarcity is further exacerbated. Equally significant is the fact that once land has been cleared so that the topsoil can be cultivated for crop production, not only are the nutrient reserves in the soil depleted, thus producing crops of inferior quality, but the soil structure itself becomes stressed and deteriorates further.

Another direct result of deforestation is flooding. When forests are cleared, removing the cover of

vegetation, and rainfall occurs, the flow of water increases across the surface of land. When extensive water runoff takes place, the frequency and intensity of flooding increases. Other adverse effects of deforestation include the loss of wildlife and biodiversity within the ecosystem that supports such life forms.

At a broader level, tropical rainforests play a vital role in maintaining the global environmental system. Specifically, destruction of tropical rainforests affects the carbon dioxide cycle. When forests are destroyed by burning (or rotting), carbon dioxide is released into the air, thus contributing to an intensified "greenhouse effect." The increase in greenhouse gas emissions like carbon dioxide is a major contributor to global warming, according to many environmental scientists. Indeed, trees themselves absorb carbon dioxide in the process of photosynthesis, so their loss also reduces the absorption of greenhouse gases.

Tropical rainforest destruction also adversely affects the nitrogen cycle. Nitrogen is a key nutrient for both plants and animals. Plants derive nitrogen from soil, while animals obtain it via nitrogen-enriched vegetation. This element is essential for the formation of amino acids, and thereby for proteins and biochemicals that all living things need for metabolism and growth. In the nitrogen cycle, vegetation acquires these essential proteins and biochemicals, and then cyclically returns them to the atmosphere and global ecosystem. Accordingly, when tropical rainforest ecosystems are compromised, not only is vegetation removed; the atmosphere is also affected and climates are altered. At a more immediate level, the biodiversity within tropical rainforests, including wildlife and insect species and a wealth of plant varieties, is depleted. Loss of rare plants is of particular concern because certain species as yet unknown and unused could likely yield many practical benefits, for instance as medicines.

As a result of the many challenges associated with deforestation, many environmental groups and agencies have argued for government policies on the sustainable development of forests by governments across the globe. While many countries have instituted national policies and programs aimed at reducing deforestation, and substantial research has been advanced in regard to sustainable and regenerative forestry development, there has been very little progress on an international level. Generally speaking, most tropical rainforests are located in developing and less developed countries, where economic growth is often dependent upon the exploitation of tropical rainforests. Timber resources as well as wildlife hunting tend to be particularly lucrative arenas.

In places such as the Amazon, where deforestation takes place for the construction of energy plants aimed at industrialization and economic development, there is an exacerbated effect on the environment. After forests are cleared in order to construct such projects, massive flooding usually ensues. The remaining trees then rot and decay in the wake of the flooding. As the trees deteriorate, their biochemical makeup becomes more acidic, producing poisonous substances such as hydrogen sulphide and methane gases. Acidified water subsequently corrodes the mechanical equipment and operations of the plants, which are already clogged by rotting wood after the

floodwaters rise.

Deforestation generally arises from an economically plausible short-term motivation, but nonetheless poses a serious global concern because the effects go beyond national boundaries. The United Nations has established the World Commission on Forest and Sustainable Development. This body's task is to determine the optimal means of dealing with the issue of deforestation, without unduly affecting normal economic development, while emphasizing the global significance of protecting tropical forest ecosystems.

5. Water Resources

For all terrestrial fauna, including humans, water is the most immediate necessity to sustain life. As the population has increased and altered an ever-greater portion of the landscape from its natural condition, demand on water resources has intensified, especially with the development of industrialization and large-scale irrigation. The supply of freshwater is inherently limited, and moreover distributed unevenly across the earth's landmasses. Moreover, not just demand for freshwater but activities certain to degrade it are becoming more pervasive. By contrast, the oceans form a sort of "last wilderness," still little explored and in large part not seriously affected by human activity. However, coastal environments - the biologically richest part of the marine ecosystem-are experiencing major depletion due to human encroachment and over-exploitation.

Freshwater:

In various regions, for instance the Colorado River in the western [United States](#), current withdrawals of river water for irrigation, domestic, and industrial use consume the entire streamflow so that almost no water flows into the sea at the river's mouth. Yet development is ongoing in many such places, implying continually rising demand for water. In some areas reliant on groundwater, aquifers are being depleted at a markedly faster rate than they are being replenished. An example is the San Joaquin Valley in California, where decades of high water withdrawals for agriculture have caused land subsidence of ten meters or more in some spots. Naturally, the uncertainty of future water supplies is particularly acute in arid and semi-arid regions. Speculation that the phenomenon of global warming will alter geographic and seasonal rainfall patterns adds further uncertainty.

Water conservation measures have great potential to alleviate supply shortages. Some city water systems are so old and beset with leaking pipes that they lose as much water as they meter. Broad-scale irrigation could be replaced by drip-type irrigation, actually enhancing the sustainability of agriculture. In many areas where heavy irrigation has been used for decades, the result is deposition of salts and other chemicals in the soil such that the land becomes unproductive for

farming and must be abandoned.

Farming is a major source of water pollution. Whereas restrictions on industrial effluents and other "point sources" are relatively easy to implement, comparable measures to reform hydraulic practices at farms and other "nonpoint sources" pose a significantly knottier challenge. Farm-caused water pollution takes the following main forms:

- Nitrate pollution found in wells in intensive farming areas as a consequence of heavy fertilizer use is a threat to human health. The most serious danger is to infants, who by ingesting high-nitrate water can contract methemoglobinemia, sometimes called "blue baby syndrome," a potentially fatal condition.
- Fertilizer runoff into rivers and lakes imparts unwanted nutrients that cause algae growth and eventual loss of oxygen in the body of water, degrading its ability to support fish and other desirable aquatic life.
- Toxic agricultural chemicals - insecticides, herbicides, and fungicides - are detectable in some aquifers and waterways.

In general, it is much easier to get a pollutant into water than to retrieve it out. Gasoline additives, dry cleaning chemicals, other industrial toxins, and in a few areas radionuclides have all been found in water sources intended for human use. The complexity and long time scale of subterranean hydrological movements essentially assures that pollutants already deposited in aquifers will continue to turn up for decades to come. Sophisticated water treatment processes are available, albeit expensive, to reclaim degraded water and render it fit for human consumption. Yet source protection is unquestionably a more desirable alternative.

In much of the developing world, and even some low-income rural enclaves of the developed world, the population lacks ready access to safe water. Surface water and shallow groundwater supplies are susceptible to contamination from untreated wastewater and failing septic tanks, as well as chemical hazards. The occurrence of waterborne disease is almost certainly greatly underreported.

Marine Resources:

Coastal areas have always been desirable places for human habitation, and population pressure on them continues to increase. Many types of water degradation that affect lakes and rivers also affect coastal zones: industrial effluents, untreated or partially treated sewage, nutrient load from agriculture figure prominently in both cases. Prospects for more extreme storms as a result of global warming, as well as the pervasiveness of poorly planned development in many coastal areas,

forebode that catastrophic hurricanes and landslides may increase in frequency in the future. Ongoing rise in sea levels will force remedial measures and in some cases abandonment of currently valuable coastal property.

Fisheries over much of the globe have been overharvested, and immediate conservation measures are required to preserve stocks of many species. Many governments subsidized factory-scale fishing fleets in the 1970s and 1980s, and the resultant catch increase evidently surpassed a sustainable level. It is uncertain how much of the current decline in fish stocks stems from overharvesting and how much from environmental pollution. The deep ocean remains relatively unaffected by human activity, but continental shelves near coastlines are frequently seriously polluted, and these close-to-shore areas are the major biological nurseries for food fish and the smaller organisms they feed on.

6. Environmental Toxins

Toxic chemical pollution exploded on the public consciousness with disclosure of spectacularly polluted industrial areas such as Love Canal near Buffalo, New York. There is no question that pollutants such as organophosphates or radionuclides can be highly deleterious to health, but evidence to date suggests that seriously affected areas are a localized rather than universal problem.

While some explore the possibilities for a lifestyle that fully eschews use of modern industrial chemicals, the most prevalent remediative approach is to focus on more judicious use. The most efficient chemical plants are now able to contain nearly all toxic byproducts of their production processes within the premises, minimizing the release of such substances into the environment. Techniques such as Integrated Pest Management (IPM) dictate limited rather than broadcast use of pesticides: application only when needed using the safest available chemical, supplemented as much as possible with nontoxic controls.

While heightened public awareness and growing technical sophistication suggest a hopeful outlook on limiting the damage from manmade environmental toxins, one must grant that previous incidents of their misuse and mishandling have already caused environmental damage that will have to be dealt with for many years to come. In the case of the most hazardous radioactive substances, the time scale for successful remediation actually extends beyond that of the recorded history of civilization. Moreover, in this era of high population density and rapid economic growth, quotidian activities such as the transport of chemicals will occasionally, seemingly inevitably result in accidents with adverse environmental consequences.

7. "Islandization" and Biodiversity

With increased awareness regarding the adverse effects of unregulated hunting and habitat depletion upon wildlife species and other aspects of biodiversity, large-scale efforts across the globe have been initiated to reduce and even reverse this trend.

In every region of the world, many species of wildlife and areas of biodiversity have been saved from extinction. Nationally, many countries have adopted policies aimed at preservation and conservation of species, and one of the most tangible measures has been the proliferation of protected habitats. Such habitats exist in the form of wildlife reserves, marine life reserves, and other such areas where biodiversity can be protected from external encroachment and exploitation.

Despite these advances in wildlife and biodiversity protection, further and perhaps more intractable challenges linger. Designated reserves, while intended to prevent further species decline, exist as closed territories, fragmented from other such enclaves and disconnected from the larger ecosystem. This environmental scenario is referred to as "islandization." Habitat reserves often serve as oversized zoos or game farms, with landscapes and wildlife that have effectively been "tamed" to suit. Meanwhile, the larger surrounding ecosystem continues to be seriously degraded and transformed, while within the islandized habitat, species that are the focus of conservation efforts may not have sufficient range and may not be able to maintain healthy genetic variability.

As a consequence, many conservationists and preservationists have demanded that substantially larger portions of land be withheld as habitat reserves, and a network of biological corridors to connect continental reserves be established. While such efforts to combat islandization have considerable support in the [United States](#), how precisely such a program would be instituted, especially across national boundaries, remains a matter of debate. International conservationists and preservationists say without a network of reserves a massive loss of biodiversity will result.

The concept of islandization illustrates why conservation and preservation of wildlife and biodiversity must consider and adopt new, broader strategies. In the past, conservation and preservation efforts have been aimed at specific species, such as the spotted owl and grizzly bear in North America, the Bengal tiger in Southeast Asia, the panda in [China](#), elephants in Africa. Instead, the new approach is to simultaneously protect many and varied species that inhabit the same ecosystem. This method, referred to as "bio-regional conservation," may more efficaciously generate longer-term and more far-reaching results precisely because it is aimed at preserving entire ecosystems, and all the living things within.

More About Biodiversity Issues:

This section is directly taken from the United Nations Environmental Program: "[Biodiversity Assessment](#)"

The Global Biodiversity Assessment, completed by 1500 scientists under the auspices of United Nations Environmental Program in 1995, updated what is known (or unknown) about global biological diversity at the ecosystem, species and genetic levels. The assessment was uncertain of the total number of species on Earth within an order of magnitude. Of its working figure of 13 million species, only 13 percent are scientifically described. Ecological community diversity is also poorly known, as is its relationship to biological diversity, and genetic diversity has been studied for only a small number of species. The effects of human activities on biodiversity have increased so greatly that the rate of species extinctions is rising to hundreds or thousands of times the background level. These losses are driven by increasing demands on species and their habitats, and by the failure of current market systems to value biodiversity adequately. The Assessment calls for urgent action to reverse these trends.

There has been a new recognition of the importance of protecting marine and aquatic biodiversity. The first quantitative estimates of species losses due to growing coral reef destruction predict that almost 200,000 species, or one in five presently contributing to coral reef biodiversity, could die out in the next 40 years if human pressures on reefs continue to increase.

Since Rio, many countries have improved their understanding of the status and importance of their biodiversity, particularly through biodiversity country studies such as those prepared under the auspices of UNEP/GEF. The [United Kingdom](#) identified 1250 species needing monitoring, of which 400 require action plans to ensure their survival. Protective measures for biodiversity, such as legislation to protect species, can prove effective. In the USA, almost 40 percent of the plants and animals protected under the Endangered Species Act are now stable or improving as a direct result of recovery efforts. Some African countries have joined efforts to protect threatened species through the 1994 Lusaka Agreement, and more highly migratory species are being protected by specialized cooperative agreements among range states under the Bonn Agreement.

There is an emerging realization that a major part of conservation of biological diversity must take place outside of protected areas and involve local communities. The extensive agricultural areas occupied by small farmers contain much biodiversity that is important for sustainable food production. Indigenous agricultural practices have been and continue to be important elements in the maintenance of biodiversity, but these are being displaced and lost. There is a new focus on the interrelationship between agrodiversity conservation and sustainable use and development practices in smallholder agriculture, with emphasis on use of farmers' knowledge and skills as a source of information for sustainable farming.

Perhaps even more important than the loss of biodiversity is the transformation of global biogeochemical cycles, the reduction in the total world biomass, and the decrease in the biological productivity of the planet. While quantitative measurements are not available, the eventual economic and social consequences may be so significant that the issue requires further attention.

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Online resources used generally in the Environmental Overview:

Environmental Protection Agency Global Warming Site. URL: <http://www.epa.gov/globalwarming>

Food and Agriculture Organization of United Nations: Forestry. URL: <http://www.fao.org/forestry/site/sofo/en/>

Global Warming Information Page. URL: <http://globalwarming.org>

U n i t e d N a t i o n s E n v i r o n m e n t a l P r o g r a m . U R L : http://www.unep.org/GEO/GEO_Products/Assessment_Reports/

United Nations Global Environmental Outlook. URL: <http://www.unep.org/geo/geo4/media/>

Note on Edition Dates:

The edition dates for textual resources are noted above because they were used to formulate the original content. We also have used online resources (cited above) to update coverage as needed.

Information Resources

For more information about environmental concepts, CountryWatch recommends the following resources:

The United Nations Environmental Program Network (with country profiles)

[<http://www.unep.net/>](http://www.unep.net/)

The United Nations Environment Program on Climate Change

[<http://climatechange.unep.net/>](http://climatechange.unep.net/)

The United Nations Environmental Program on Waters and Oceans

[<http://www.unep.ch/earthw/Pdepwat.htm>](http://www.unep.ch/earthw/Pdepwat.htm)

The United Nations Environmental Program on Forestry: "Forests in Flux"

[<http://www.unep-wcmc.org/forest/flux/homepage.htm>](http://www.unep-wcmc.org/forest/flux/homepage.htm)

FAO "State of the World's Forests"

[<http://www.fao.org/forestry/FO/SOFO/SOFO99/sofo99-e.stm>](http://www.fao.org/forestry/FO/SOFO/SOFO99/sofo99-e.stm)

World Resources Institute.

[<http://www.wri.org/>](http://www.wri.org/)

Harvard University Center for Health and the Global Environment

[<http://www.med.harvard.edu/chge/the-review.html>](http://www.med.harvard.edu/chge/the-review.html)

The University of Wisconsin Center for Sustainability and the Global Environment

<http://sage.aos.wisc.edu/>

International Environmental Agreements and Associations

International Policy Development in Regard to Global Warming:

Introduction

Regardless of what the precise nature of the relationship between greenhouse gas emissions and global warming may be, it seems that there is some degree of a connection between the phenomena. Any substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and global warming trends will likely involve systematic changes in industrial operations, the use of advanced energy sources and technologies, as well as global cooperation in implementing and regulating these transformations.

In this regard, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) stipulated the following objectives:

1. To stabilize "greenhouse gas" concentrations within the atmosphere, in such a manner that would preclude hazardous anthropogenic intervention into the existing biosphere and ecosystems of

the world. This stabilization process would facilitate the natural adaptation of ecosystems to changes in climate.

2. To ensure and enable sustainable development and food production on a global scale.

Following are two discussions regarding international policies on the environment, followed by listings of international accords.

Special Entry: The Kyoto Protocol

The UNFCCC was adopted at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, and entered into force in 1994. Over 175 parties were official participants.

Meanwhile, however, many of the larger, more industrialized nations failed to reach the emissions' reduction targets, and many UNFCCC members agreed that the voluntary approach to reducing emissions had not been successful. As such, UNFCCC members reached a consensus that legally binding limits were necessitated, and agreed to discuss such a legal paradigm at a meeting in Kyoto, [Japan](#) in 1997. At that meeting, the UNFCCC forged the Kyoto Protocol. This concord is the first legally binding international agreement that places limits on emissions from industrialized countries. The major greenhouse gas emissions addressed in the Kyoto Protocol include carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, sulfur hexafluoride, and methane.

The provisions of the Kyoto Protocol stipulate that economically advanced nations must reduce their combined emissions of greenhouse gases, by approximately five percent from their 1990 levels, before the 2008-2010 deadline. Countries with the highest carbon dioxide emissions, such as the [United States](#) (U.S.), many of the European Union (EU) countries, and [Japan](#), are to reduce emissions by a scale of 6 to 8 percent. All economically advanced nations must show "demonstrable progress" by 2005. In contrast, no binding limits or timetable have been set on developing countries. Presumably, this distinction is due to the fact that most developing countries - with the obvious exceptions of [India](#) and [China](#) -- simply do not emit as many greenhouse gases as do more industrially advanced countries. Meanwhile, these countries are entrenched in the process of economic development.

Regardless of the aforementioned reasoning, there has been strong opposition against the asymmetrical treatment assigned to emissions limits among developed and developing countries. Although this distinction might be regarded as unfair in principle, associations such as the Alliance of Small Island States have been vocal in expressing how global warming -- a result of greenhouse gas emissions - has contributed to the rise in sea level, and thus deleteriously affected their very existence as island nation states. For this reason, some parties have suggested that economically advanced nations, upon returning to their 1990 levels, should be required to further reduce their

greenhouse gas emissions by a deadline of 2005. In response, interested parties have observed that even if such reductions were undertaken by economically advanced nations, they would not be enough to completely control global warming. Indeed, a reduction in the rate of fossil fuel usage by developing nations would also be necessary to have substantial ameliorative effect on global warming. Indeed, a reduction in the rate of fossil fuel usage by developing nations would also be necessary to have substantial ameliorative effect on global warming.

As such, the Protocol established a "Clean Development Mechanism" which permits developed countries to invest in projects aimed at reducing emissions within developing countries in return for credit for the reductions. Ostensibly, the objective of this mechanism is to curtail emissions in developing countries without unduly penalizing them for their economic development. Under this model, the countries with more potential emissions credits could sell them to other signatories of the Kyoto Protocol, whose emissions are forecast to significantly rise in the next few years. Should this trading of emissions credits take place, it is estimated that the Kyoto Protocol's emissions targets could still be met.

In 1999, the International Energy Outlook projected that Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and Newly Independent States, as well as parts of Asia, are all expected to show a marked decrease in their level of energy-related carbon emissions in 2010. Nations with the highest emissions, specifically, the U.S., the EU and [Japan](#), are anticipated to reduce their emissions by up to 8 percent by 2012. By 2000, however, the emissions targets were not on schedule for achievement. Indeed, the U.S. Department of Energy estimates forecast that by 2010, there will be a 34 percent increase in carbon emissions from the 1990 levels, in the absence of major shifts in policy, economic growth, energy prices, and consumer trends. Despite this assessment in the U.S., international support for the Kyoto Protocol remained strong, especially among European countries and island states, who view the pact as one step in the direction away from reliance on fossil fuels and other sources of greenhouse gases.

In 2001, U.S. President, George W. Bush, rejected his country's participation in the Kyoto Protocol, saying that the costs imposed on the global economic system, and especially, on the US, overshadowed the benefits of the Protocol. He also cited the unfair burden on developed nations to reduce emissions, as another primary reasons for withdrawal from the international pact, as well as insufficient evidence regarding the science of global warming. Faced with impassioned international disapproval for his position, the U.S. president stated that his administration remained interested in dealing with the matter of global warming, but would endorse alternative measures to combat the problem, such as voluntary initiatives limiting emissions. Critics of Bush's position, however, have noted that it was the failure of voluntary initiatives to reduce emissions following the Rio Summit that led to the establishment of the Kyoto Protocol in the first place.

In the wake of the Bush administration's decision, many participant countries resigned themselves to the reality that the goals of the Kyoto Protocol might not be achieved without U.S. involvement.

Nevertheless, in Bonn, [Germany](#), in July 2001, the remaining participant countries struck a political compromise on some of the key issues and sticking points, and planned to move forward with the Protocol, irrespective of the absence of the U.S. The key compromise points included the provision for countries to offset their targets with carbon sinks (these are areas of forest and farmland which can absorb carbon through the process of photosynthesis). Another compromise point within the broader Bonn Agreement was the reduction of emissions cuts of six gases from over 5 percent to a more achievable 2 percent. A third key change was the provision of funding for less wealthy countries to adopt more progressive technologies.

In late October and early November 2001, the UNFCCC's 7th Conference of the Parties met in Marrakesh, [Morocco](#), to finalize the measures needed to make the Kyoto Protocol operational. Although the UNFCCC projected that ratification of the Protocol would make it legally binding within a year, many critics noted that the process had fallen short of implementing significant changes in policy that would be necessary to actually stop or even slow climate change. They also maintained that the absence of U.S. participation effectively rendered the Protocol into being a political exercise without any substance, either in terms of transnational policy or in terms of environmental concerns.

The adoption of the compromises ensconced within the Bonn Agreement had been intended to make the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol more palatable to the U.S. In this regard, it failed to achieve its objective as the Bush administration continued to eschew participation in the international accord. Still, however, the Bonn Agreement did manage to render a number of other positive outcomes. Specifically, in 2002, key countries, such as [Russia](#), [Japan](#) and [Canada](#) agreed to ratify the protocol, bringing the number of signatories to 178. The decision by key countries to ratify the protocol was regarded as "the kiss of life" by observers.

By 2005, on the eve of a climate change conference in London, British Prime Minister Tony Blair was hoping to deal with the problems of climate change beyond the provisions set forth in the Kyoto Protocol. Acknowledging that the Kyoto Protocol could not work in its current form, Blair wanted to open the discussion for a new climate change plan.

Blair said that although most of the world had signed on to Kyoto, the protocol could not meet any of its practical goals of cutting greenhouse gas emissions without the participation of the United States, the world's largest polluter. He also noted that any new agreement would have to include India and China -- significant producers of greenhouse gas emissions, but exempt from Kyoto because they have been classified as developing countries. Still, he said that progress on dealing with climate change had been stymied by "a reluctance to face up to reality and the practical action needed to tackle problem."

Blair also touted the "huge opportunities" in technology and pointed toward the possibilities offered by wind, solar and nuclear power, along with fuel cell technology, eco-friendly biofuels, and

carbon capture and storage which could generate low carbon power. Blair also asserted that his government was committed to achieving its domestic goal of reducing carbon dioxide emissions by 20 percent by 2010.

In the United States, President George W. Bush has said that global warming remained a debatable issue and despite conclusions reached by his own Environmental Protection Agency, he has not agreed with the conclusion that global warming and climate change are linked with human activities. Bush has also refused to ratify Kyoto on the basis of its economic costs.

Australia, an ally of the United States, has taken a similarly dim view of the Kyoto Protocol. Ahead of the November 2005 climate change meeting in Canada in which new goals for the protocol were to be discussed, Australia's Environment Minister, Ian Campbell, said that negotiating new greenhouse gas emission levels for the Kyoto Protocol would be a waste of time. Campbell said, "There is a consensus that the caps, targets and timetables approach is flawed. If we spend the next five years arguing about that, we'll be fiddling and negotiating while Rome burns." Campbell, like the Bush administration, has also advocated a system of voluntary action in which industry takes up new technologies rather than as a result of compelling the reduction of emissions. But the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) has called on its government to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, to establish a system of emissions trading, and to set binding limits on emissions. Interestingly, although it did not sign on to Kyoto, Australia was expected to meet its emissions target by 2012 (an 8 percent increase in 1990 levels in keeping with the country's reliance on coal). But this success has nothing to do with new technologies and is due to state-based regulations on land clearing.

Note: The Kyoto Protocol calls for developed nations to cut greenhouse emissions by 5.2 percent of 1990 levels by 2012.

Special Entry: Climate Change Summit in Copenhagen (2009) --

In December 2009, the United Nations Climate Change Summit opened in the Danish capital of Copenhagen. The summit was scheduled to last from Dec. 7-18, 2009. Delegates from more than 190 countries were in attendance, and approximately 100 world leaders, including British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and [United States](#) President Barack Obama, were expected to participate. At issue was the matter of new reductions targets on greenhouse gas emissions by 2020.

Despite earlier fears that little concurrence would come from the conference, effectively pushing significant actions forward to a 2010 conference in [Mexico](#) City, negotiators were now reporting that the talks were productive and several key countries, such as [South Africa](#), had pledged to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The two main issues that could still lead to cleavages were questions of agreement between the industrialized countries and the developing countries of the world, as well as the overall effectiveness of proposals in seriously addressing the perils of climate

change.

On Dec. 9, 2009, four countries -- the [United Kingdom](#), [Australia](#), [Mexico](#) and [Norway](#) -- presented a document outlining ideas for raising and managing billions of dollars, which would be intended to help vulnerable countries dealing with the perils of climate change. Described as a "green fund," the concept could potentially help small island states at risk because of the rise in sea level. [Bangladesh](#) identified itself as a potential recipient of an assistance fund, noting that as a country plagued by devastating floods, it was particularly hard-hit by climate change. The "green fund" would fall under the rubric of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, for which developed countries have been committed to quantifying their emission reduction targets, and also to providing financial and technical support to developing countries.

The [United Kingdom](#), [Australia](#), [Mexico](#) and [Norway](#) also called for the creation of a new legal treaty that would replace the Kyoto Protocol. This new treaty, which could go into force in 2012, would focus largely on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2020. But [Australia](#) went even further in saying that the successor treaty to the Kyoto Protocol, should be one with provisions covering all countries. Such a move would be a departure from the structure of the Kyoto Protocol, which contained emissions targets for industrialized countries due to the prevailing view that developed countries had a particular historic responsibility to be accountable for climate change. More recently, it has become apparent that substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions demanded by scientists would only come to pass with the participation also of significant developing nation states, such as [China](#) and [India](#). Indeed, one of the most pressing critiques of the Kyoto Protocol was that it was a "paper tiger" that failed to address the impact of the actions of emerging economies like [China](#) and [India](#), with its focus on the developed economies.

Now, in 2009, [China](#) -- as the world's biggest greenhouse gas emitter -- was responding this dubious distinction by vocalizing its criticism of the current scenario and foregrounding its new commitments. Ahead of the Copenhagen summit, [China](#) had announced it would reduce the intensity of its carbon emissions per unit of its GDP in 2020 by 40 to 45 percent against 2005 levels. With that new commitment at hand, [China](#) was now accusing the [United States](#) and the European Union of shirking their own responsibilities by setting weak targets for greenhouse gas emissions cuts. Senior Chinese negotiator, Su Wei, characterized the goals of the world's second largest greenhouse gas emitter -- the [United States](#) -- as "not notable," and the European Union's target as "not enough." Su Wei also took issue with [Japan](#) for setting implausible preconditions.

On Dec. 11, 2009, [China](#) demanded that developed and wealthy countries in Copenhagen should help deliver a real agreement on climate change by delivering on their promises to reduce carbon emissions and provide financial support for developing countries to adapt to global warming. In so doing, China's Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei said his country was hoping that a "balanced outcome" would emerge from the discussions at the summit. Echoing the position of the Australian government, He Yafei spoke of a draft agreement as follows: "The final document we're going to

adopt needs to be taking into account the needs and aspirations of all countries, particularly the most vulnerable ones."

China's Vice Foreign Minister emphasized the fact that climate change was "a matter of survival" for developing countries, and accordingly, such countries need wealthier and more developed countries to accentuate not only their pledges of emissions reduction targets, but also their financial commitments under the aforementioned United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. To that end, scientists and leaders of small island states in the Indian Ocean, the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea, have highlighted the existential threat posed by global warming and the concomitant rise in sea level.

China aside, attention was also on [India](#) -- another major player in the developing world and a country with an industrializing economy that was impacting the environment. At issue was the Indian government's decision to set a carbon intensity target, which would slow emissions growth by up to 25 percent by the 2020 deadline. This strong position was resisted by some elements in [India](#), who argued that their country should not be taking such a strong position when developed wealthy countries were yet to show accountability for their previous commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The matter grew so heated that the members of the opposition stormed out of the parliament in protest as Indian Environment Minister Jairam Ramesh defended the policy. But the political pressure at home in [India](#) was leaving the Indian delegation in Copenhagen in a state of chaos as well. In fact, India's top environmental negotiator refused to travel to Copenhagen in protest of the government's newly-announced stance.

China and [India](#) were joined by [Brazil](#) and [South Africa](#) in the crafting of a draft document calling for a new global climate treaty to be completed by June 2010. Of concern has been the realization that there was insufficient time to find concurrence on a full legal treaty, which would leave countries only with a politically-binding text by the time the summit at Copenhagen closed. But Guyana's leader, President Bharrat Jagdeo, warned that the summit in [Denmark](#) would be classified as a failure unless a binding document was agreed upon instead of just political consensus. He urged his cohorts to act with purpose saying, "Never before have science, economics, geo-strategic self-interest and politics intersected in such a way on an issue that impacts everyone on the planet."

Likewise, [Tuvalu](#) demanded that legally binding agreements emerge from Copenhagen. Its proposal was supported by many of the vulnerable countries, from small island states and sub-Saharan Africa, all of whom warned of the catastrophic impact of climate change on their citizens. [Tuvalu](#) also called for more aggressive action, such as an amendment to the 1992 agreement, which would focus on sharp greenhouse gas emissions and the accepted rise in temperatures, due to the impact the rise in seas. The delegation from [Kiribati](#) joined the call by drawing attention to the fact that one village had to be abandoned due to waist-high water, and more such effects were likely to follow. Kiribati's Foreign Secretary, Tessie Lambourne, warned that the people of [Kiribati](#) could well be faced with no homeland in the future saying, "Nobody in

this room would want to leave their homeland." But despite such impassioned pleas and irrespective of warnings from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change that the rise in sea level from melting polar ice caps would deleteriously affect low-lying atolls such as such as [Tuvalu](#) and [Kiribati](#) in the Pacific, and the [Maldives](#) in the Indian Ocean, the oil-giant [Saudi Arabia](#) was able to block this move.

Meanwhile, within the developed countries, yet another power struggle was brewing. The European Union warned it would only agree to raise its target of 20 percent greenhouse gas emissions reductions to 30 percent if the [United States](#) demonstrated that it would do more to reduce its own emissions. It was unknown if such pressure would yield results. [United States](#) President Barack Obama offered a "provisional" 2020 target of 17 percent reductions, noting that he could not offer greater concessions at Copenhagen due to resistance within the [United States](#) Congress, which was already trying to pass a highly controversial "cap and trade" emissions legislation. However, should that emissions trading bill fail in the Senate, the [United States](#) Environment Protection Agency's declaration that greenhouse gases pose a danger to human health and the environment was expected to facilitate further regulations and limits on power plants and factories at the national level. These moves could potentially strengthen the Obama administration's offering at Copenhagen. As well, President Obama also signaled that he would be willing to consider the inclusion of international forestry credits.

Such moves indicated willingness by the Obama administration to play a more constructive role on the international environmental scene than its predecessor, the Bush administration. Indeed, ahead of his arrival at the Copenhagen summit, President Barack Obama's top environmental advisors promised to work on a substantial climate change agreement. To that end, [United States](#) Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Lisa Jackson said at a press conference, "We are seeking robust engagement with all of our partners around the world." But would this pro-engagement assertion yield actual results?

By Dec. 12, 2009, details related to a draft document prepared by Michael Zammit Cutajar, the head of the Ad-hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action, were released at the Copenhagen climate conference. Included in the document were calls for countries to make major reductions in carbon emissions over the course of the next decade. According to the Washington Post, industrialized countries were called on to make cuts of between 25 percent and 40 percent below 1990 levels -- reductions that were far more draconian than the [United States](#) was likely to accept. As discussed above, President Obama had offered a provisional reduction target of 17 percent. The wide gap between the released draft and the United States' actual stated position suggested there was much more negotiating in the offing if a binding agreement could be forged, despite the Obama administration's claims that it was seeking greater engagement on this issue.

In other developments, the aforementioned call for financial support of developing countries to deal with the perils of climate change was partly answered by the European Union on Dec. 11, 2009.

The European bloc pledged an amount of 2.4 billion euros (US\$3.5 billion) annually from 2010 to 2012. Environment Minister Andreas Carlgren of [Sweden](#) -- the country that holds the rotating presidency of the European Union at the time of the summit -- put his weight behind the notion of a "legally binding deal." Meanwhile, Yvo de Boer, a top United Nations climate change official, focused less on the essence of the agreement and more on tangible action and effects saying, "Copenhagen will only be a success if it delivers significant and immediate action that begins the day the conference ends."

The division between developed and developing countries in Copenhagen reached new heights on Dec. 14, 2009, when some of the poor and less developed countries launched a boycott at the summit. The move, which was spurred by African countries but backed by [China](#) and [India](#), appeared to be geared toward redirecting attention and primary responsibility to the wealthier and more industrialized countries. The impasse was resolved after the wealthier and more industrialized countries offered assurances that they did not intend on shirking from their commitments to reducing greenhouse gases. As a result, the participating countries ceased the boycott.

Outside the actual summit, thousands of protestors had gathered to demand crucial global warming, leading to clashes between police and demonstrators elsewhere in the Danish capital city. There were reports of scattered violence across Copenhagen and more than 1,000 people were arrested.

Nevertheless, by the second week of the climate change summit, hopes of forging a strong deal were eroding as developed and developing nations remained deadlocked on sharing cuts in greenhouse gases, and particularly on the matters of financing and temperature goals. In a bid to shore up support for a new climate change, [United States](#) President Barack Obama joined other world leaders in Copenhagen. On Dec. 14, 2009, there was a standoff brewing between the [United States](#) and [China](#). At issue was China's refusal to accept international monitoring of its expressed targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The [United States](#) argued that China's opposition to verification could be a deal-breaker.

By the close of the summit, the difficult process eventually resulted in some consensus being cultivated. A draft text called for \$100 billion a year by 2020 to assist poor nations cope with climate change, while aiming to limit global warming to two degrees Celsius compared with pre-industrial levels. The deal also included specific targets for developed countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and called for reductions by developing countries as a share of their economies. Also included in the agreement was a mechanism to verify compliance. The details of the agreement were supported by President Barack Obama, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva.

This draft would stand as an interim agreement, with a legally-binding international pact unlikely to materialize until 2010. In this way, the summit in Copenhagen failed to achieve its central

objective, which was to negotiate a successor to the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gas emissions.

Editor's Note

In the background of these developments was the growing global consciousness related to global warming and climate change. Indeed, as the Copenhagen summit was ongoing, it was clear there was enormous concurrence on the significance of the stakes with an editorial on the matter of climate change being published in 56 newspapers in 45 countries. That editorial warned that without global action, climate change would "ravage our planet." Meanwhile, a global survey taken by Globescan showed that concern over global warming had exponentially increased from 1998 -- when only 20 percent of respondents believed it to be a serious problem -- to 64 percent in 2009. Such survey data, however, was generated ahead of the accusations by climate change skeptics that some climate scientists may have overstated the case for global warming, based on emails derived in an illicit manner from a British University.

Special Entry: Climate change talks in Doha in [Qatar](#) extend life of Kyoto Protocol (2012)

December 2012 saw climate talks ensue in the Qatari city of Doha as representatives from countries across the world gathered to discuss the fate of the Kyoto Protocol, which seeks to minimize greenhouse gas emissions. The summit yielded results with decisions made (1) to extend the Kyoto Protocol until 2020, and (2) for wealthier countries to compensate poorer countries for the losses and damage incurred as a result of climate change.

In regards to the second matter, Malia Talakai of [Nauru](#), a leading negotiator for the Alliance of Small Island States, explained the necessity of the compensation package as follows: "We are trying to say that if you pollute you must help us."

This measure was being dubbed the "Loss and Damage" mechanism, and was being linked with [United States](#) President Barack Obama's request for \$60 billion from Congress to deal with the devastation caused by Hurricane Sandy months before. The sight of a hurricane bearing down on the northern Atlantic seaboard, along with the reality of the scope of reconstruction, appeared to have illustrated the economic costs of climate change -- not so much as a distant environmental issue -- but as a danger to the quotidian lives of people. Still, there was blame to be placed on the [United States](#) and European countries -- some of world's largest emitters -- for failing to do more to reduce emissions.

To that latter end, there was in fact little progress made on the central issue of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Had those emissions been reduced, there would have been less of a need to financially deal with the devastation caused by climate change. One interpretation was that the global community was accepting the fact that industrialization was contributing to global warming,

which had deleterious effects on the polar ice caps and concomitantly on the rise of sea level, with devastating effects for small island nations. Thus, wealthier countries were willing to pay around \$10 billion a year through 2020, effectively in "damages," to the poor countries that could be viewed as the "collateral damage" of industrial progress. But damages today could potentially be destruction tomorrow, leaving in place the existential challenges and burdens to be born by some of the world's smallest and least wealthy island countries.

Perhaps not surprisingly, the representative for the small island nation states at the Doha summit responded with ire, characterizing the lack of progress on reducing emissions as follows: "We see the package before us as deeply deficient in mitigation (carbon cuts) and finance. It's likely to lock us on the trajectory to a 3,4,5C rise in global temperatures, even though we agreed to keep the global average temperature rise of 1.5C to ensure survival of all islands. There is no new finance (for adapting to climate change and getting clean energy) -- only promises that something might materialize in the future. Those who are obstructive need to talk not about how their people will live, but whether our people will live."

Indeed, in most small island countries not just in the Pacific, but also the Caribbean and Indian Ocean, ecological concerns and the climate crisis have been dominant themes with dire life and death consequences looming in the background for their people. Small island nations in these region are already at risk from the rise of sea-level, tropical cyclones, floods. But their very livelihoods of fishing and subsistence farming were also at risk as a result of ecological and environmental changes. Increasingly high storm surges can wipe out entire villages and contaminate water supplies. Accordingly, the very existence of island nations, such as [Kiribati](#) and [Tuvalu](#), are at severe risk of being obliterated from the map. Yet even with the existential threat of being wiped off the map in the offing, the international community has been either slow or restrictive in its efforts to deal with global warming, climate change, economic and ecological damage, as well as the emerging global challenge of environmental refugees.

A 2012 report from the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the Pacific Regional Environment Program underlined the concerns of small island nations and their people as it concluded that the livelihoods of approximately 10 million people in Pacific island communities were increasingly vulnerable to climate change. In fact, low-lying islands in that region would likely confront losses of up to 18 percent of gross domestic product due to climate change, according to the report. The report covers 21 countries and territories, including [Fiji](#), [Kiribati](#), [Samoa](#) and [Tonga](#), and recommended environmental legislation intended to deal with the climate crisis facing the small island countries particularly. As noted by David Sheppard, the director general of the Pacific Regional Environment Program that co-sponsored this study: "The findings... emphasize the need more than ever to raise the bar through collective actions that address the region's environmental needs at all levels."

Regardless of the failures of the summit in [Qatar](#) (discussed above), the meeting did facilitate a

process starting in 2015, which would bind both wealthy and poor countries together in the mission of forging a new binding treaty that would replace the Kyoto Protocol and tackle the central causes of climate change.

For more information on the threats faced in small island nations by climate change and the measures being undertaken to lobby for international action, please see the Alliance for Small Island States available online at the URL: <http://aosis.org/>

Special Report

COP 21 summit in Paris ends with historic agreement to tackle climate change; rare international consensus formed on environmental crisis facing the planet (2015) --

In mid-December 2015, the highly-anticipated United Nations climate conference of parties (COP) in Paris, [France](#), ended with a historic agreement. In fact, it would very likely be understood as the most significant international agreement signed by all the recognized countries of the world since the Cold War. Accordingly, the Paris Agreement was being distinguished as the first multilateral pact that would compel all countries across the world to cut its carbon emissions -- one of the major causes of increasing greenhouse gas emissions, which contribute to global warming, and its deleterious effects ranging from the dangerous rise in sea level to catastrophic climate change.

The accord, which was dubbed to be the "Paris Agreement," was the work of rigorous diplomacy and fervent environmental advocacy, and it aimed to address the climate change crisis facing the planet. As many as 195 countries were represented in the negotiations that led to the landmark climate deal. Indeed, it was only after weeks of passionate debate that international concurrence was reached in addressing the environmental challenges confronting the world, with particular attention to moving beyond fossil fuels and reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

The success of the COP 21 summit in Paris and the emergence of the landmark Paris Agreement was, to some extent, attributed to the efforts of France's Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius who presided over the negotiations. The French foreign minister's experience and credentials as a seasoned diplomat and respected statesman paid dividends. He skillfully guided the delegates from almost 200 countries and interest groups along the negotiations process, with ostensibly productive results and a reasonably robust deal to show for it.

On Dec. 12, 2015, French Foreign Minister Fabius officially adopted the agreement, declaring: "I now invite the COP to adopt the decision entitled Paris Agreement outlined in the document. Looking out to the room I see that the reaction is positive, I see no objections. The Paris agreement is adopted." Once Foreign Minister Fabius' gavel was struck, symbolically inaugurating

the Paris Agreement into force, the COP delegate rushed to their feet with loud and bouyant cheers as well as thunderous applause.

In general, the Paris Agreement was being hailed as a victory for enviromental activists and a triumph for international diplomats, while at the same time being understood as simply an initial -- and imperfect -- move in the direction of a sustainable future. China's chief negotiator, Xie Zhenhua, issued this message, saying that while the accord was not ideal, it should "not prevent us from marching historical steps forward."

United States President Barack Obama lauded the deal as both "ambitious" and "historic," and the work of strenuous multilateral negotiations as he declared, "Together, we've shown what's possible when the world stands as one." The [United States](#) leader acknowledged that the accord was not "perfect," but he reminded the critics that it was "the best chance to save the one planet we have. "

Former [United States](#) Vice President Al Gore, one of the world's most well known environmental advocates, issued a lengthy statement on the accomplishments ensconced in the Paris Agreement. He highlighted the fact that the Paris Agreement was a first step towards a future with a reduced carbon footprint on Planet Earth as he said, "The components of this agreement -- including a strong review mechanism to enhance existing commitments and a long-term goal to eliminate global-warming pollution this century -- are essential to unlocking the necessary investments in our future. No agreement is perfect, and this one must be strengthened over time, but groups across every sector of society will now begin to reduce dangerous carbon pollution through the framework of this agreement."

The central provisions of the Paris Agreement included the following items:

- Greenhouse gas emissions should peak as quickly as possible, with a move towards balancing energy sources, and ultimately the decrease of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century
- Global temperature increase would be limited to 1.5 degrees Centigrade above pre-industrial levels and would be held "well below" the two degrees Centigrade threshold
- Progress on these goals would be reviewed every five years beginning in 2020 with new greenhouse gas reduction targets issued every five years
- \$100 billion would be expended each year in climate finance for developing countries to move forward with green technologies, with further climate financing to be advanced in the years beyond

It should be noted that there both legally binding and voluntary elements contained within the Paris Agreement. Specifically, the submission of an emissions reduction target and the regular review of that goal would be legally mandatory for all countries. Stated differently, there would be a system in place by which experts would be able to track the carbon-cutting progress of each country. At the same time, the specific targets to be set by countries would be determined at the discretion of the countries, and would not be binding. While there was some criticism over this

non-binding element, the fact of the matter was that the imposition of emissions targets was believed to be a major factor in the failure of climate change talks in Copenhagen, [Denmark](#), in 2009.

In 2015, the talks faced challenges as several countries, such as [China](#) and [India](#), objected to conditions that would stymie economic and development. In order to avoid that kind of landmine, a system Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) was developed and formed the basis of the accord. As such, the Paris Agreement would, in fact, facilitate economic growth and development, as well as technological progress, but with the goal of long-term ecological sustainability based on low carbon sources. In fact, the agreement heralded as "the beginning of the end of the fossil fuel era." As noted by Nick Mabey, the head of the climate diplomacy organization E3G, said, "Paris means governments will go further and faster to tackle climate change than ever before. The transition to a low carbon economy is now unstoppable, ensuring the end of the fossil fuel age."

A particular sticking point in the agreement was the \$100 billion earmarked for climate financing for developing countries to transition from traditional fossil fuels to green energy technologies and a low carbon future. In 2014, a report by the International Energy Agency indicated that the cost of that transition would actually be around \$44 trillion by the mid-century -- an amount that would render the \$100 billion being promised to be a drop in the proverbial bucket. However, the general expectation was that the Republican-controlled Senate in the [United States](#), which would have to ratify the deal in that country, was not interested in contributing significant funds for the cause of climate change.

A key strength of the Paris Agreement was the ubiquitous application of measures to all countries. Of note was the frequently utilized concept of "flexibility" with regard to the Paris Agreement. Specifically, the varying capacities of the various countries in meeting their obligations would be anticipated and accorded flexibility. This aspect presented something of a departure from the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which drew a sharp distinction between developed and developing countries, and mandated a different set of obligations for those categories of countries. Thus, under Kyoto, [China](#) and [India](#) were not held to the same standards as the [United States](#) and European countries. In the Paris Agreement, there would be commitments from all countries across the globe.

Another notable strength of the Paris Agreement was the fact that the countries of the world were finally able to reach consensus on the vital necessity to limit global temperature increases to 1.5 degrees Centigrade. Ahead of the global consensus on the deal, and as controversy continued to surface over the targeted global temperature limits, the leaders of island countries were sounding the alarm about the melting of the Polar ice caps and the associated rise in sea level. Prime Minister Enele Sopoaga of [Tuvalu](#) issued this dismal reminder: "Tuvalu's future ... is already bleak and any further temperature increase will spell the total demise of [Tuvalu](#). No leader in this

room carries such a level of worry and responsibility. Just imagine you are in my shoes, what would you do?" It was thus something of a victory for environmental advocates that the countries of the world could find consensus on the lower number -- 1.5 degrees rather than 2 degrees.

A significant weak point with regard to the Paris deal was a "loss and damage" provision, which anticipates that even with all the new undertakings intended to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and move to a low carbon future, there would nonetheless be unavoidable climate change consequences. Those consequences ranged from the loss of arable land for farmers as well as soil erosion and contamination of potable water by sea water, to the decimation of territory in coastal zones and on small islands, due to the rise in sea level, with entire small island countries being rendered entirely uninhabitable. The reality was that peoples' homes across the world would be destroyed along with their way of life.

With that latter catastrophic effect being a clear and present danger for small island countries, the Association of Small Island States (AOSIS) demanded that the developed world acknowledge its responsibility for this irreversible damage.. Despite the fact that greenhouse gas emissions and the ensuing plague of global warming was, indeed, the consequence of development in the West (the [United States](#) and Europe) and the large power house countries, such as [Russia](#), [China](#) and [India](#), there was no appetite by those countries to sign on to unlimited liability. Under the Paris Agreement, there was a call for research on insurance mechanisms that would address loss and damage issues, with recommendations to come in the future.

The call for research was being regarded as an evasion of sorts and constituted the weakest aspect of the Paris Agreement. Not surprisingly, a coalition of small island nations demanded a "Marshall Plan" for the Pacific. Borrowing the term "Marshall Plan" from the post-World War II reconstruction effort, the coalition of Pacific island nation, which included [Kiribati](#), [Tuvalu](#), [Fiji](#), and the [Marshall Islands](#), called for an initiative that would include investment in renewable energy and shoreline protection, cultural preservation, economic assistance for economies in transition, and a plan for migration and resettlement for these countries as they confront the catastrophic effects of the melting of the Polar ice caps and the concomitant rise in sea level. The precise contours of the initiative remained unknown, unspecified, and a mere exercise in theory at the time of writing. Yet such an initiative would, at some point, have to be addressed, given the realities of climate change and the slow motion calamity unfolding each day for low-lying island nations across the world.

As noted by Vice President Greg Stone of Conservation International, who also functions as an adviser to the government of [Kiribati](#), "Imagine living in a place where you know it's going to go away someday, but you don't know what day that wave's going to come over and wash your home away." He added, "It's a disaster we know is going to happen." Meanwhile, the intervening years promised to be filled with hardship for small island nations, such as [Kiribati](#). Stone explained, "For every inch of sea-level rise, these islands lose 10 feet of their freshwater

table to saltwater intrusion,” Stone explained. “So it’s not just about the day the water finally goes over the island; it’s also about the day that there’s just not enough water left and everyone has to move off the island.” Presaging the future for island nations that could face submersion, Stone said, “If you look ahead 50 years, a country like [Kiribati](#) could become the first aqueous nation. possibility of migration. That is, they own this big patch of ocean, and they administer it from elsewhere.”

Foreign Minister Minister Tony Debrum of the [Marshall Islands](#) emerged as the champion advocating on behalf of small island nation states and a loose coalition of concerned countries from the Pacific to the Caribbean, but with support from the [United States](#). He addressed the comprehensive concerns of small island nations regarding the weaknesses of the deal, while simultaneously making clear that the Paris Agreement signified hope for the countries most at risk. In a formal statement, Debrum declared: “We have made history today. Emissions targets are still way off track, but this agreement has the tools to ramp up ambition, and brings a spirit of hope that we can rise to this challenge. I can go back home to my people and say we now have a pathway to survival.” Debrum highlighted the imperatives of Pacific island nations, saying, “Our High Ambition Coalition was the lightning rod we needed to lift our sights and expectations for a strong agreement here in Paris. We were joined by countries representing more than half the world. We said loud and clear that a bare-bones, minimalist agreement would not fly. We instead demanded an agreement to mark a turning point in history, and the beginning of our journey to the post-carbon era.”

Debrum of the [Marshall Islands](#) espoused the quintessential synopsis of the accord and its effects for those most likely to be affected by climate change as he noted, “Climate change won’t stop overnight, and my country is not out of the firing line just yet, but today we all feel a little safer.”

Editor's Entry on [Environmental Policy](#):

The low-lying Pacific island nations of the world, including [Kiribati](#), [Tuvalu](#), the [Marshall Islands](#), [Fiji](#), among others, are vulnerable to the threats posed by global warming and climate change, derived from carbon emissions, and resulting in the rise in sea level. Other island nations in the Caribbean, as well as poor countries with coastal zones, were also at particular risk of suffering the deleterious effects of climate change.

Political policy in these countries are often connected to ecological issues, which have over time morphed into an existential crisis of sorts. Indeed, ecological concerns and the climate crisis have also been dominant themes with life and death consequences for the people of island nations in the Pacific. Indeed, the very livelihoods of fishing and subsistence farming remain at risk as a result of ecological and environmental changes. Yet even so, these countries are threatened by increasingly high storm surges, which could wipe out entire villages and contaminate water supplies. Moreover, because these are low lying island nations, the sustained rise in sea level can potentially lead to the

terrain of these countries being uninhabitable at best, and submerged at worst. Stated in plain terms, these countries are at severe risk of being obliterated from the map and their plight illuminates the emerging global challenge of environmental refugees. In these manifold senses, climate change is the existential crisis of the contemporary era.

Since the time of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, there have been efforts aimed at extending the life of that agreement, with an eye on minimizing greenhouse gas emissions, and thus minimizing the effects of climate change. Those endeavors have largely ended in failure, as exemplified by the unsuccessful Copenhagen talks in 2009 and the fruitless Doha talks in 2012 respectively. The success of the COP 21 talks in [France](#), with the adoption of the landmark Paris Agreement in 2015, was regarded as the first glimmer of hope. Not only did the Paris Agreement signify the triumph of international diplomacy and global consensus, but it also marked the start of the end of the fossil fuel era, with the path forward toward a low carbon future reliant on greener technologies. Most crucially, the Paris Agreement stood as the first significant response in recent times to the central challenge of climate change and its quotidian effects on the lives of real human beings across the world.

1. Major International Environmental Accords:

General Environmental Concerns

Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Espoo, 1991.

Accords Regarding Atmosphere

Annex 16, vol. II (Environmental Protection: Aircraft Engine Emissions) to the 1044 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Montreal, 1981

Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP), Geneva, 1979

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), New York, 1992

Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Vienna, 1985 including the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Depleted the Ozone Layer, Montreal, 1987

Accords Regarding Hazardous Substances

Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movements and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa, Bamako, 1991

Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Caused during Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels (CRTD), Geneva, 1989

Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (Basel Convention), Basel, 1989

Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, Helsinki, 1992

Convention to Ban the Importation into Forum Island Countries of Hazardous and Radioactive Wastes and to Control the Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within the South Pacific Region (Waigani Convention), Waigani, 1995

European Agreement Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR), Geneva 1957

FAO International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides, Rome, 1985

2. Major International Marine Accords:

Global Conventions

Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (London Convention 1972), London, 1972

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by Protocol of 1978 relation thereto (MARPOL 73/78), London, 1973 and 1978

International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1969 (1969 CLC), Brussels, 1969, 1976, and 1984

International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage 1971 (1971 Fund Convention), Brussels, 1971

Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea (HNS), London 1996

International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response, and Co-operation (OPRC),

London, 1990

International Convention Relation to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties (Intervention Convention), Brussels, 1969

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Montego Bay, 1982

Regional Conventions

Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft (Oslo Convention), Oslo, 1972

Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-based Sources (Paris Convention), Paris, 1974

Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention), Paris, 1992

Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (1974 Helsinki Convention), Helsinki 1974

Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (1992 Helsinki Convention), Helsinki 1992

Conventions within the UNEP Regional Seas Programme

Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea against Pollution, Bucharest, 1992

Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region, Cartagena de Indias, 1983

Convention for the Protection, Management, and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Eastern African Region, Nairobi, 1985

Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution, [Kuwait](#), 1978

Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment and Coastal Region of the Mediterranean Sea (Barcelona Convention), Barcelona, 1976

Regional Convention for the Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Environment, Jeddah, 1982

Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region, Noumea, 1986

Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and Coastal Area of the South-East Pacific, Lima, 1981

Convention for Co-operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the West and Central African Region, Abidjan, 1981

3. Major Conventions Regarding Living Resources:

Marine Living Resources

Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), Canberra, 1980

International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), Rio de Janeiro, 1966

International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW), Washington, 1946

Nature Conservation and Terrestrial Living Resources

Antarctic Treaty, Washington, D.C., 1959

Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (World Heritage Convention), Paris, 1972

Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), Nairobi, 1992

Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS), Bonn, 1979

Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), Washington, D.C., 1973

Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar Convention), Ramsar, 1971

Convention to Combat Desertification (CCD), Paris 1994

FAO International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, Rome, 1983

International Tropical Timber Agreement, 1994 (ITTA, 1994), Geneva, 1994

Freshwater Resources

Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Helsinki, 1992

4. Major Conventions Regarding Nuclear Safety:

Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (Assistance Convention), Vienna, 1986

Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (Notification Convention), Vienna, 1986

Convention on Nuclear Safety, Vienna, 1994

Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, Vienna, 1963

5. Major Intergovernmental Organizations

Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD)

European Union (EU): Environment

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)

Global Environment Facility (GEF)

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES)

International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)

International Labour Organization (ILO)

International Maritime Organization (IMO)

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds (IOPC Funds)

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Environment Policy Committee (EPOC)

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)

United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)

United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)

United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)

World Bank

World Food Programme (WFP)

World Health Organization (WHO)

World Meteorological Organization (WMO)

World Trade Organization (WTO)

6. Major Non-Governmental Organizations

Atmosphere Action Network East Asia (AANE)

Climate Action Network (CAN)

Consumers International (CI)

Earth Council

Earthwatch Institute

Environmental Liaison Centre International (ELCI)

European Environmental Bureau (EEB)

Forest Stewardship Council (FSC)

Friends of the Earth International (FoEI)

Greenpeace International

International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)

International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)

International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF)

International Solar Energy Society (ISES)

IUCN-The World Conservation Union

Pesticide Action Network (PAN)

Sierra Club

Society for International Development (SID)

Third World Network (TWN)

Water Environment Federation (WEF)

Women's Environment and Development Organization (WEDO)

World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD)

World Federalist Movement (WFM)

World Resources Institute (WRI)

World Wide Fund For Nature (WWF)

7. Other Networking Instruments

Arab Network for Environment and Development (RAED)

Global Legislators for a Balanced Environment (GLOBE)

Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe (REC)

United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison Service (UN-NGLS)

Appendices

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[United States](http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html) Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook. Washington, D.C.: Printing and Photography Group. URL: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>

World Bank. URL: <http://www.worldbank.org/>

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Methodology Note for Demographic Data:

The demographic numbers for cities and national populations listed in CountryWatch content are derived from the Geoba.se website, which analyzes data from the World Bank. The current demographic numbers displayed on the Countrywatch website are reflective of the latest available estimates.

The demographic information for language, ethnicity and religion listed in CountryWatch content is

derived from a mix of sources including the Altapedia, Central Intelligence Agency Factbook, Infoplease, and State Department Background Notes.

Sources: Political Overview

Agence [France](http://www.afp.com/en/) Presse. URL: <http://www.afp.com/en/>

BBC International News. URL: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/> (Various editions and dates as cited in particular reviews)

Britannica Book of the Year. 1998-present. David Calhoun, ed. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc.

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Patterns of Global Terrorism. n.d. [United States](#) Department of State. Washington D.C.: [United States](#) Department of State Publications.

Political Handbook of the World. n.d. Arthur S. Banks, Thomas C. Muller, ed. Binghamton, New York: CSA Publications.

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Reuters News. URL: <http://www.reuters.com/>

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The Guardian Online. URL: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/> (Various editions and dates as cited in particular reviews)

The Statesman's Year-Book 2006. Barry Turner, ed. London: St. Martin's Press.

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[United States](#) Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook. Washington, D.C.: Printing and Photography Group. URL: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>

[United States](#) Department of State, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT) URL : http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/bureau_ac/reports_ac.html

United States Department of State, Country Reports on [Human Rights](#) Practices. URL: <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18245.htm>

[United States](#) Department of State, Background Notes. URL : http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/index.html

Virtual Library: International Relations Resources. URL: <http://www.etown.edu/vl/countgen.html>

World Bank: Governance Indicators. URL: <http://info.worldbank.org/governance>

-- See also list of News Wires services below, which are also used for research purposes. --

Note on Edition Dates:

The earlier edition dates are noted above because they were used to formulate the original Country Reviews and serve as the baseline for some of the information covered. Later editions have been used in some cases, and are cited as such, while other more recent online resources (cited above) contain recent and ever-updated data sets used for research.

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BP Statistical Review of World Energy. URL: <http://www.bp.com/genericsection.do?categoryId=92&contentId=7005893>

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United Nations, Comtrade Data Base, <http://comtrade.un.org/>

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URL:<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/contents.html>

United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics Database

United States Geological Service, Mineral Information

United States Department of State, Country Commercial Guides. Washington, D.C. [United States](http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/business/com_guides/index.html)
of America. URL:http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/business/com_guides/index.html

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Yearbook of Tourism Statistics, World Tourism Organization. 1998 to present. Madrid: The World Tourism Organization.

Note on Edition Dates:

The earlier edition dates are noted above because they were used to formulate the original country reviews and serve as the baseline for some of the information covered. Later editions have been used in some cases, and are cited as such, while other more recent online resources (cited above) contain recent and ever-updated data sets used for research.

Methodology Notes for Economic Data:

Estimates by CountryWatch.com of GDP in dollars in most countries are made by converting local currency GDP data from the International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook to US dollars by market exchange rates estimated from the International Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics and projected out by the CountryWatch Macroeconomic Forecast. Real GDP was estimated by deflating current dollar values by the US GDP Implicit Price Deflator.

Exceptions to this method were used for:

- Bosnia-Herzegovina
- Nauru
- Cuba
- Palau
- Holy See
- San Marino
- Korea, North
- [Serbia](#) & Montenegro
- Liberia
- Somalia
- Liechtenstein
- Tonga
- Monaco
- Tuvalu

In these cases, other data and/or estimates by CountryWatch.com were utilized.

Investment Overview

C o r r u p t i o n a n d T r a n s p a r e n c y I n d e x . U R L :
<http://www.transparency.org/documents/cpi/2001/cpi2001.html#cpi>
<<http://www.transparency.org/documents/>

Deloitte Tax Guides. URL: <http://www.deloittetaxguides.com>

Trade Policy Reviews by the World Trade Organization . URL: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp_rep_e.htm#bycountry

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Lonely Planet. URL: <http://www.lonelyplanet.com/worldguide/>

Steve Kropla's Online Help For World Travelers. URL: <http://www.kropla.com/>

United Kingdom Ministry of Foreign and Commonwealth Office. URL: <http://www.fco.gov.uk/>

United Nations Human Development Report. URL: <http://www.undp.org/hdro>

UNICEF Statistical Database Online. URL: <http://www.unicef.org/statis/atoz.html>

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United States Department of State, Background Notes. URL: http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/index.html

United States Department of State, Commercial and Business Affairs: Travel Tips. URL: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/business/cba_travel.html

United States Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs. URL: <http://travel.state.gov/>

World Health Organization. URL: <http://www.who.int/home-page/>

World News Connection, National Technical Information Service. Springfield, Virginia, USA.

Internet News Service, Xinhua News Agency (U.S.) Inc. Woodside, New York. URL: <http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/>

Note on Edition Dates:

The earlier edition dates are noted above because they were used to formulate the original country reviews and serve as the baseline for some of the information covered. Later editions have been used in some cases, and are cited as such, while other more recent online resources (cited above) contain recent and ever-updated data sets used for research.

Methodology Notes for the HDI:

Since 1990, the United Nations Development Programme, in concert with organizations across the globe, has produced the [Human Development Index](#) (or HDI). According to the UNDP, the index measures average achievement in basic human development in one simple composite index, and produces from this index a ranking of countries. The HDI is a composite of three basic components of human development: longevity, knowledge and standard of living. Longevity is measured by life expectancy. Knowledge is measured by combination of adult literacy and mean

years of schooling. Standard of living is measured by purchasing power, based on real GDP per capita (in constant US\$) adjusted for differences in international living costs (or, purchasing power parity, PPP). While the index uses these social indicators to measure national performance with regard to human welfare and development, not all countries provide the same level of information for each component needed to compute the index; therefore, as in any composite indicator, the final index is predicated on projections, predictions and weighting schemes. The index is a static measure, and thus, an incomplete measure of human welfare. In fact, the UNDP says itself the concept of human development focuses on the ends rather than the means of development and progress, examining in this manner, the average condition of all people in a given country.

Specifically, the index is calculated by determining the maximum and minimum for each of the three components (as listed above) and then measuring where each country stands in relation to these scales-expressed as a value between 0 and 1. For example, the minimum adult literary rate is zero percent, the maximum is 100 percent, and the reading skills component of knowledge in the HDI for a country where the literacy rate is 75 percent would be 0.75. The scores of all indicators are then averaged into the overall index.

For a more extensive examination of human development, as well as the ranking tables for each participating country, please visit: <http://www.undp.org>

Note on [History](#) sections

In some CountryWatch Country Reviews, open source content from the State Department Background Notes and Country Guides have been used.

Environmental Overview

Environmental Profiles: A Global Guide to Projects and People. 1993. Linda Sobel Katz, Sarah Orrick, and Robert Honig. New York: Garland Publishing.

The Environment Encyclopedia and Directory, 2nd Edition. 1998. London: Europa.

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Introduction to Global [Environmental Issues](#), 2nd Edition. 1997. Kevin Pickering and Lewis Owen.

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United Nations Environmental Program. URL: http://www.unep.org/GEO/GEO_Products/Assessment_Reports/

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1998/1999 Yearbook of International Cooperation on Environment and Development. 1998. London: Earthscan Publications.

Note on Edition Dates:

The earlier edition dates are noted above because they were used to formulate the original country reviews and serve as the baseline for some of the information covered. Later editions have been used in some cases, and are cited as such, while other more recent online resources (cited above) contain recent and ever-updated data sets used for research.

Other Sources:

General information has also been used in the compilation of this review, with the courtesy of governmental agencies from this country.

News Services:

CANA Daily Bulletin. Caribbean Media Agency Ltd., St. Michael, [Barbados](#).

Central and Eastern Africa Report, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa.

Daily News, Panafrican News Agency. Dakar, [Senegal](#).

PACNEWS, Pacific Islands Broadcasting Association. Suva, [Fiji](#).

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Washington D.C. USA.

Reuters News. Thomson Reuters. New York, New York. USA.

Southern Africa Report, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Integrated Regional Information Network for Southern Africa.

Voice of America, English Service. Washington D.C.

West Africa Report, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Integrated Regional Information Network for West Africa. 1998-1999

Note: Some or all these news services have been used to research various sections of this Country Review.

USING COUNTRYWATCH.COM AS AN ELECTRONIC SOURCE:

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Basic form, using an Internet protocol:

Author/editor. *Title of Print Version of Work*. Edition statement (if given). Publication information (Place of publication: publisher, date), if given. *Title of Electronic Work*. Medium. Available Protocol (if applicable):Site/Path/File. Access date.

Examples:

Youngblood-Coleman, Denise. *Country Review: France*. 2003. Houston, Texas: CountryWatch Publications, 2003. *Country Review:France*. Online. Available URL : http://www.countrywatch.com/cw_country.asp?vCOUNTRY=61 October, 12, 2003.

Note:

This is the citation format used when the print version is not used in the reference.

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Author/editor. "Part title." *Title of Print Version of Work*. Edition statement (if given). Publication information (Place of publication: publisher, date), if given. *Title of Electronic Work*. Medium. AvailableProtocol (if applicable): Site/Path/File. Access date.

Examples:

Youngblood-Coleman, Denise. "People." *CountryWatch.com: France*. 2003. Houston, Texas: CountryWatch Publications, 2003. *CountryWatch.com: France*. Online. Available URL : http://www.countrywatch.com/cw_topic.asp?vCOUNTRY=61&SECTION=SOCIAL&TOPIC=CLPEO&TYPE=TEXT. October 12, 2003.

Note:

This is the citation format used when the print version is not used in the reference.

For further source citation information, please email: editor@countrywatch.com or education@countrywatch.com.

CountryWatch

CountryWatch is an information provider for public and private sector organizations that operate globally. The management of CountryWatch has extensive international experience and has utilized this experience to provide a concise and useful set of political, economic, and business information for its clients in the form of Country Reviews, the Country Wire, CountryWatch Data, Elections Central, CountryWatch Videos and CountryWatch Forecast.

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