

Brazil

2016 Country Review

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Chapter 1

Country Overview

Country Overview

BRAZIL

Following more than three centuries under Portuguese rule, Brazil peacefully gained its independence in 1822 and adopted a constitutional monarchy as its form of government. It became a federal republic following a military takeover in 1889. A coup in 1964 put Brazil under military rule for 21 years until 1985 when the military regime peacefully ceded power to civilian rulers. With a population of around 194 million, Brazil is the largest and most populous country in South America. Endowed with rich natural resources, Brazil's economy outweighs that of all other South American countries with large and well-developed agricultural, mining, manufacturing and services sectors.

Key Data

Key Data	
Region:	South America
Population:	212346064
Climate:	Mostly tropical, but temperate in south
Languages:	Portuguese (official), over 195 indigenous languages, German, Italian, Japanese, Korean, and Baltic languages also spoken
Currency:	1 real (R\$) = 100 centavos
Holiday:	Independence Day is 7 September (1822), Tiradentes Day is 21 April, Republic Day is 15 November
Area Total:	8511965
Area Land:	8456510
Coast Line:	7491

Brazil

Country Map



South America

Regional Map



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Chapter 2

Political Overview

History

It is estimated that the indigenous population of the territory that comprises modern Brazil numbered between 2.4 and five million prior to the arrival of the Portuguese. There were hundreds of tribes, diverse in terms of both language and culture. The four main language groups were the Ge, Tupi, Carib and Arawak, but many tribes spoke other, unrelated languages.

Portuguese explorers arrived in South America in the late 15th century, and Pedro Alvares Cabral claimed Brazil for Portugal in 1500. The indigenous groups that had initial contact with Portuguese explorers displayed curiosity and a willingness to exchange goods, but they were also extremely adept at defending their communities. Tens of thousands of Native Americans, including whole tribes and peoples, were quickly killed by European diseases to which they had no immunity. The Portuguese viewed the indigenous people as slave labor from the outset, and they took advantage of the cultural differences amongst them to involve them in colonial battles.

Brazil was ruled from Lisbon as a colony until 1808. Its economy was based on slave labor and the exportation of a dominant product - brazil wood from 1500 to 1550, sugar from 1530 to 1650, and gold and diamond mining from the 1690s into the 1750s.

In addition to the slavery of indigenous peoples, the Portuguese engaged in the African slave trade for over three centuries. A lucrative endeavor for the Portuguese, approximately four million people were transported from Africa to Brazil and sold into slavery from 1550 through the 19th century. The two main groups of Africans that arrived in Brazil were the Bantos of Congo, Angola, and Moçambique, and the Sudanese of Nigeria, Daomé and the Marfim Coast. Given that the number of Africans exceeded the number of Portuguese by the 17th century, much of their culture and religion was preserved despite European domination.

In 1808, the royal family, having fled from Napoleon's army, established the seat of Portuguese government in Rio de Janeiro. Brazil then became a kingdom under Dom Joao VI. Dom Joao VI returned to Portugal in 1821. His son declared Brazil's independence on Sept. 7, 1822, and adopted constitutional monarchy as the form of government. He became emperor with the title of Dom Pedro I. His son, Dom Pedro II, ruled from 1831 to 1889. Brazil maintained its slave-based, plantation economy during this period, with coffee as the major export product. Political participation was very limited.

Military demands and pressure to emancipate slaves eventually brought the era of stable monarchy to an end. In 1888, while Dom Pedro II was in Europe, Regent Princess Isabel abolished slavery. In 1889, Army Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca staged a coup d'etat, and a federal republic was established.

Note on History: In certain entries, open source content from the State Department Background Notes and Country Guides have been used. A full listing of sources is available in the Bibliography.

Political Conditions

Introduction

From 1889 to 1930, the government was a constitutional democracy, with the presidency alternating between the dominant states of Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais. In reality, the political system was based on the economic power of large landowners in rural areas. This period, known as the Old Republic, ended following post-World War I rural-urban migration and agricultural-industrial transformation, as well as the 1929 stock market crash.

In the closing years of the 19th century, the newly freed black population, lacking in industrial skills, literacy, savings, and property, had flocked in great numbers to the cities in search of labor in the ports, domestic employment, street vending, and other odd jobs. They received no reparation from the Brazilian government. In general, the political system lacked the capacity to handle the growing demands of the urban middle and working classes, and in 1930, a military coup placed civilian Getulio Vargas in the presidency.

Violent conflict erupted in disputes between labor and capital in the 1930s. In 1937, Getulio Vargas closed Congress and ruled as dictator until 1945. During his presidency and dictatorship, Vargas worked closely with the military. He moved to promote industrialization and to reduce state command of the military, instead centralizing military control by building up the Brazilian Armed Forces.

The development of political parties was stunted in Brazil during the Old Republic and the Vargas regime, as political leaders often intervened to prevent their establishment and growth. The political parties that did exist were elite groups whose messages were aimed at other elite members of society.

From 1945 to 1961

In 1945, Vargas was deposed by a coup, and presidential elections were held. Six million citizens voted in the elections, five times more than ever before recorded. The illiterate were still barred from voting, but the 1945 presidential elections marked a fundamental change in Brazil, namely the beginning of mass politics in which the elite were not the only actors. From 1945 to 1964, for the first time in Brazilian history, the major means of access to power was through multiparty democratic politics, and parties had to appeal to popular interests in order to win votes.

In the period between 1945 and 1961, Eurico Dutra, Getulio Vargas, Juscelino Kubitschek, and Janio Quadros were elected presidents. Although the political system of this era was, overall, a democracy, the Communist party was banned and the military sometimes intervened in politics, on those occasions undermining the authority of electoral results and constitutional norms.

The 1960 and 1970s

In 1961, President Quadros resigned and was succeeded by Vice President Joao Goulart. Goulart's years in office were marked by high inflation, economic stagnation, and the increasing influence of radical political elements. The major political parties lost power and labor unions gained influence over the Goulart administration. The armed forces, alarmed by these developments, staged a coup on March 31, 1964. The coup leaders chose as president Humberto Castello Branco, followed by Arthur da Costa e Silva (1967-69), Emilio Garrastazu Medici (1968-74), and Ernesto Geisel (1974-79) all of whom were senior army officers.

During the 21 years of military rule, Congress remained open, but its power was greatly diminished. Regular elections were held for Congress, state assemblies, and local offices, but presidential, gubernatorial, and some mayoral elections became indirect. The political parties of the former, democratic era were fragile and weakly rooted in society, and did not hold up when the multiparty political system was forcibly replaced by a two-party system in 1965. The two parties were the pro-government National Renovating Alliance (Arena) party and the opposing Democratic Brazilian Movement, or MDB. The military regime enjoyed a period of economic prosperity from 1967 to 1974. It employed massive oppression from 1969 to 1974.

In 1974, Brazil entered a period of economic stagnation and inflation. By that time, the population was 70 percent urban, its economy was industrialized, and 55 percent of Brazilian citizens were registered to vote. In terms of the bi-party system, the MDB began to be identified as the anti-government party of the poor, and Arena the pro-government party of the rich. The MDB began receiving more and more votes.

Ernesto Geisel, dictator from 1974 to 1979, began a liberalization that was carried further by his successor, General Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo (1979-85). Figueiredo not only permitted the return of politicians exiled or banned from political activity during the 1960s and 1970s, but also allowed them to run for state and federal offices in 1982. Wanting to remain in power while still carrying out the liberalization process, the military dissolved both the MDB and Arena parties in 1979 and imposed legislation that kept Arena intact with the new name PDS, but divided the opposition into five parties. Two of the parties later fused, and in the following decades, several other parties formed.

The 1980s through 1994

In the early 1980s, an electoral college consisting of all members of Congress and six delegates, chosen from each state, continued to choose the president. In January 1985, the electoral college voted Tancredo Neves from the opposition Brazilian Democratic Movement Party into office as president. Neves, however, became ill in March and died a month later. His vice president, former Senator Jose Sarney, became President upon Neves' death. Sarney moved to employ a system of clientelism and economic nationalism similar to that of the pre-1964 period.

Brazil completed its transition to a popularly elected government in 1989, when Fernando Collor de Mello won 53 percent of the vote in the first direct presidential election in 29 years. Collor advocated political liberalism and economic modernization. In 1992, a major corruption scandal led to the impeachment and ultimate resignation of President Collor.

A major achievement of the Collor administration was its initiative in the formation of the South American Common Market, also known as MERCOSUR in 1991. Consisting of members Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, MERCOSUR was, in the 1990s, the fastest growing trade block in the world.

The vice president, Itamar Franco, took his place and governed for the remainder of Collor's term. Franco's governance was erratic, but he gained great popularity in 1994 by introducing an economic stabilization program called the Real Plan. The plan was developed by then-Minister of Finance Fernando Henrique Cardoso.

The 1990s: Brazil Under President Cardoso

When presidential elections were held on Oct. 3, 1994, Cardoso was elected president with 54 percent of the vote. He took office on Jan. 1, 1995, with great popular support, in addition to the support of the majority of newly elected state governors and potentially strong support blocs in

Congress.

President Fernando Henrique Cardoso was elected with the support of a heterodox alliance of his own, center-left Social Democratic Party and two center-right parties, the Liberal Front Party (PFL) and the Brazilian Labor Party. The centrist Brazilian Democratic Movement, Brazil's largest party, joined Cardoso's governing coalition after the election, as did the center-right Brazilian Progressive Party in 1996 after its formation from three conservative parties the previous year.

At the time of Cardoso's election, inflation rates and unemployment were low, and popular expectation was high. President Cardoso declared his aims to be the establishment of the basis for long-term stability and growth and the reduction of Brazil's extreme socioeconomic imbalances. He made proposals to Congress for constitutional amendments that promoted the opening of the Brazilian economy to greater foreign participation, the reduction of the state's role in the economy, cutbacks on excessive public sector spending, the reformation of the federal bureaucracy and the social security system, the reworking of federalist relationships, the reorganization of the complicated tax system, and the reformation of the electoral and party systems to strengthen the representation of political parties.

Brazilian parties have historically been fragile, only weakly rooted in society, and short-lived. In general, politicians enjoy a great deal of autonomy in respect to their parties. As such, federal deputies and senators who belong to the parties comprising the government coalition do not always vote with the government. President Cardoso had great difficulty, at times, gaining sufficient support for some of his legislative priorities, despite the fact that his coalition parties held an overwhelming majority of congressional seats. Nevertheless, the 1994-1998 Cardoso administration accomplished many of its legislative and reform objectives.

Presidential elections took place on Oct. 4, 1998. Fernando Henrique Cardoso was re-elected with 53.1 percent of the vote, while his closest challenger, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (PT), received 31.7 percent. Eighteen political parties were represented in the National Congress. (As it is common for politicians to switch parties, the proportion of congressional seats held by particular parties changes regularly.)

In January 1999, the Brazilian real was overvalued by around 40 percent, and foreign reserves were pouring out of the country. Itamar Franco, governor of the prominent state of Minas Gerais, defaulted on the state's debt to the government, causing the rapid withdrawal of many more investors. Soon afterward, the Brazilian government was driven to devalue the real, and Brazil fell into an economic crisis. Economists predicted an enormous recession.

In March 1999, the International Monetary Fund approved a revision of its economic plan for Brazil, granting the country a package of international financial support totaling about 41.5 billion dollars. Also in March, President Cardoso made Arminio Fraga the new Central Bank president, a significant political move because Fraga was well respected by the international community of

foreign investors.

The January 1999 real devaluation caused conflict within the MERCOSUR. With the real worth less, Brazilian products became cheaper in the international market, and other member countries began losing much of their business. With both of MERCOSUR's main countries, Brazil and Argentina, in economic recession, trade between the two countries declined dramatically, and trade disputes resulted. The future of MERCOSUR became endangered. Institutional problems of the Common Market came to light during the crisis, namely the fact that it was in need of internal commissions designated to deal with such disputes in order to increase efficiency, decrease conflict, and disassociate the affairs of MERCOSUR from the political strategies of its member countries' presidents.

Throughout the legislative reform process, primary concern was placed on the extremely inefficient social security system, which drains a great deal of money from the government and allows some civil servants to retire early and reap great monetary benefits from the state. In the midst of the economic crisis, the Brazilian Congress made the bold move of finally approving two pension reforms which President Cardoso had unsuccessfully put before them four times before. These reforms were part of Cardoso's agenda of the restructuring of taxes, the political system, pensions, and the public administration, in order to channel public spending more into anti-poverty measures.

In the following couple of months, there was a shift of attention from Cardoso's aims for reform, as his congressional allies began focusing instead on investigations of alleged malpractice in the judiciary and of the financial system. Then, in August 1999, with the government trying to get a much-needed simplification of the tax system approved by Congress, Senate president and Cardoso ally Antonio Carlos Magalhaes made the surprising move of proposing a new layer of taxes for anti-poverty projects. On Sept. 30, 1999, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that the two pension laws passed in January were unconstitutional, a major blow to the progress of Cardoso's reform agenda.

In the period between 1997 and 1999, unemployment rose sharply in Brazil. Popular discontent over this issue put great pressure on the government, especially given that the economic changes that the country was undergoing in order to recover from the *real* devaluation meant an increase in job cuts. Union leaders pressed the government to implement plans to create more jobs. The "social crisis" created by the rise of unemployment highlighted a long-running argument within the Cardoso administration. The conflict was between supporters of "development" (expansionary economic policies) and those of "stability" (fiscal austerity). Those who support "stability" look to long-term economic development as the eventual solution to the employment problem, while the "developmentalists" believe that the needs of the unemployed are too urgent to delay some redirection of public spending on their behalf.

Despite predictions of massive recession due to the devaluation of the real, the economy grew by a

modest, but still significant, 0.9 percent in 1999. In early 2000, President Cardoso endorsed the Brasil Enterprising Plan, designed to provide incentive to small and medium-sized businesses. On Jan. 18, 2000, he announced that the government would implement the program in areas of agricultural production, in hopes of generating up to four million jobs in rural areas.

Another issue on the Brazilian political front was that of land reform. For over 150 years, there has been much discussion of land reform, but little action. The social problem has led to frequent, often violent conflict between landowners, the landless, and the police. In 1999, Brazil was estimated to be home to 2.5 million landless peasants.

Since early 1995, the federal government has been making large, compulsory purchases of land that it deemed underused, and between then and 2000, roughly 370,000 families (about two million people) settled on those lands. The system was organized so that families gained formal ownership of the land when judged ready to support themselves. The 1999 economic crisis led to cuts and slowdowns for such programs, but President Cardoso promised that initiative would continue to be taken in land reform.

At the end of the first year of his second term, President Cardoso was deeply unpopular, with two-thirds of the electorate dissatisfied with his performance. The drastic decline in the president's popularity was attributed mainly to the devaluation of the real in January 1999, but also to the general feeling that he could have done more on all fronts in his five years in office.

With public dissatisfaction with the Cardoso administration so great, the coalition that brought the president to power seemed to be on the brink of breaking up. In the aftermath of the economic crisis of January 1999, Cardoso had fostered ties with traditionally conservative figures, and those left-of-center subsequently distanced themselves from him. Feuding between the coalition's parties was constant. Thinking ahead to the municipal elections planned for October 2000, Cardoso's allies in the conservative PFL and centrist PMDB parties began to distance themselves from the alliance, and even some leaders of Cardoso's own PSDB party disassociated themselves. Despite Cardoso's urging for their cooperation, leaders of the PFL and PMDB stated in December 1999 that the coalition would be defunct by the next elections.

Developments in 2000

Statistics released in February 2000 indicated that the Brazilian economy was recovering and could be expected to grow by four percent in 2000, thanks mainly to exports, which had risen from the real devaluation. The currency seemed to have reached a point of stability. Potential GDP growth depended on the government cutting inflation and reducing interest rates, as well as sticking to tough fiscal targets set with the IMF in March 1999 so as to curb the rise in public debt. In order to achieve the needed fiscal efficiency, Cardoso needed to continue pushing reform through Congress.

In the area of agrarian reform, the Peasants Without Land Movement, or MST, expressed dissatisfaction with the government by carrying out a series of riots, invasions of public offices, and acts of vandalism against public property. In addition to demanding more resources for land reform, the radical MST was upset with the government for carrying out negotiations with the National Confederation of Agricultural Workers, and not with them. The government refused to meet with MST leaders. On May 15, 2000, a newspaper reported that the MST receives three percent of each official outlay for land distribution. The government suspended all resources allotted to agrarian reform for 10 days in order to carry out an audit of the organization. Surveys showed that the majority of Brazilian citizens disapproved of the MST's actions.

In May 2000, a new fiscal-responsibility law was implemented. Aimed at enforcing fiscal prudence at the federal, state, and municipal levels, the law banned the federal government from bailing out state and city debts, limited borrowing and payroll costs at all levels, and banned government officials from leaving unpaid bills to their successors. Offenders could be removed from office or even incarcerated. The law seemed to be taking effect with a fair amount of success in the months following its implementation. State and municipal officials made moves to cut government salaries and eliminate "ghost" workers, and they began charging local taxes, instead of simply borrowing or surviving on monetary transfers from the federal and state governments. With this, in addition to more efficient tax collection and higher revenues due to economic growth, states and municipalities were enjoying balanced budgets in late 2000 and 2001. It appeared that Brazil's tradition of the over-spending state was phasing out, although continued change would depend on the politicians elected in the future.

Municipal elections scheduled for October caused a slowdown of the reform process in the legislative agenda. The legislature focused instead on micro-economic legislation and other, less controversial measures during most of 2000. The elections were held on Oct. 1, 2000, with a run-off held on October 29, and the left-wing Workers' Party achieved a record number of victories. The number of Workers' Party mayors increased from 113 to 187, including the mayoral seats of Sao Paulo and five other state capitals. Although this was a setback for President Cardoso, his center-right coalition maintained control of most of the 5,656 municipalities that constitute Brazil. The municipal elections are viewed by many as a foreshadowing of the political landscape in Brazil for the forthcoming presidential elections. Potential candidates for the presidency were already jockeying for position.

In 2000, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights condemned Brazil's justice system, citing its "failure to investigate, bring to trial, and punish seriously and effectively those responsible." While defendants who could not afford lawyers often spent years in overcrowded cells awaiting trial, those who hired good lawyers were able to take advantage of unclear laws and outdated court procedures, frequently succeeding in having their trials delayed and verdicts reconsidered. Reforms of the courts and penal code have been discussed for years, but little effort has been put into drafting and passing them. One proposed civil-law reform has been stuck in

Congress for 25 years.

Developments in 2001

The problem of overcrowded cells led to violent riots and breakouts in March 2001, and the government responded by sending a proposal to Congress for a reformed penal code. The suggested reforms included time limits on police investigations and reductions in the number of separate hearings required, both measures aimed at cutting the average length of a criminal proceeding. While the reforms would help in theory, they could come up against another major problem that plagues the justice system. Brazil has an excess of laws - an estimated 27,471, according to a team of government lawyers - many of which give lawyers the opportunity to draw out proceedings or have charges dropped, if they so desire.

With Brazil's economy enjoying growth and a decrease in unemployment in early 2001, the country's banks were expanding fast. The banks, which had been accustomed to investing in government bonds as their main source of profits, were changing their focus as a result of the fallen interest rates and reduced government borrowing brought on by the 1994 *real* plan. In addition to selling more financial products to wealthier citizens, the banks were advertising heavily, opening new branches, and seeking new customers, namely the 80 percent of Brazilians with no bank account.

The government coalition's constant feuding reached a point of crisis in January and February 2001 as a result of elections for the presidency of the Senate and that of the Brazilian National Congress (parliament). Outgoing congressional president and PFL leader Antonio Carlos Magalhaes aggressively backed Jose Sarney for the position, while President Cardoso supported Jader Barbalho, the leader of the PMDB and Magalhaes' rival. Sarney, a PMDB member who was Brazil's president from 1985 to 1989 and Senate president from 1995 to 1997, was an ally of Magalhaes' faction of the PFL. The elections were held in February, and Barbalho came out the winner. Magalhaes was outraged, and upon being forced to hand the congressional presidencies over to Barbalho, he made public accusations of corruption in the Cardoso government, with specific focus on Barbalho's PMDB party and President Cardoso himself. Soon thereafter, while attempting to arrange some mud-slinging against Barbalho, Senator Magalhaes let slip information about some of his own actions that implicated him with corruption.

In the following weeks, President Cardoso announced the termination of his seven-year political alliance with Senator Magalhaes, who had been his strongest collaborator in maintaining the unity of the congressional coalition. Cardoso subsequently fired and replaced cabinet members and senior officials who had been appointed upon Magalhaes' recommendation. The reshuffling of the cabinet due to the Cardoso-Magalhaes split meant the beginning of a new phase in the Cardoso administration, and the PFL found itself in the position of having to decide whether or not to stay

in the coalition government. While Magalhaes' closest allies said the PFL would no longer support the government, other party leaders said that they were willing to remove Magalhaes from the party leadership in order to remain in the government.

Magalhaes' corruption accusations resulted in a call for the organization of a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry, or CPI, into corruption in the political establishment. Numerous members of both the PFL and the PMDB, including Senate President Barbalho, backed the investigations. The outcome of a CPI would undoubtedly be damaging to both parties, but to oppose them would look like a public admission of corrupt behavior. The congressional votes needed to establish a CPI had yet to be obtained as of April 2001, but the threat of the CPIs looked progressively less daunting. For one thing, such a commission would take a long time to set up, and for another, the parties' mutual self-preservation would be sure to create a dead-lock in the commission if it was approved. On May 9, the opposition had gathered enough signatures to force its corruption inquiry and was due to present the motion in Congress. In desperation, Senate President Jader Barbalho, who happened to be one of the opposition's main targets, simply cancelled the day's proceedings.

On May 30, 2001, after the Senate ethics committee recommended his expulsion, Senator Magalhaes resigned in disgrace, marking the end of a political career that spanned five decades. Magalhaes was a long-time politician from the state of Bahia whose supporters held a near-monopoly of public positions in that state. He had worked his way up to being Brazil's most powerful political leader with the exception perhaps of President Cardoso only, and his swift downfall marked a significant shift toward the possible end of an era of all-powerful political bosses.

Although proceedings had been temporarily put on hold, the opposition was sure to attempt to motion for the corruption inquiry once again. President Cardoso argued that a congressional inquiry would divert Congress from passing vital economic reforms, and urged the opposition to leave the accusations for the police and judiciary to handle.

In the midst of this political crisis, Brazil was hit with a severe energy crisis in early and mid-2001. With the southeastern and northeastern regions of the country undergoing the worst drought in three decades, hydro-electric dams were depleted at a time when economic growth and demand for electricity were up. In May, the government announced emergency measures aimed at cutting electricity consumption by 20 percent, including electricity quotas and heavy fines or temporary disconnection for consumers who exceeded them. The government said that it was attempting to avoid regular blackouts.

Brazil's electricity industry has been in dire need of the expansion of its transmission grid, so that electricity can be exported from the south of the country where rainfall is plentiful to the industrial areas experiencing shortages. This process has been severely delayed by the slow rate of privatization of the industry. Since most of Brazil's electricity plants are still owned by federal or

state governments, government spending constraints have hindered expansion of the grid. What is more, the partial privatization that has already occurred has led to a tariff problem in which regulators have not allowed electricity firms to pass rising costs of gas to consumers.

Meanwhile, the 20 percent cut in electricity consumption as announced by the government meant that in addition to the Brazilian people having to go without comforts like air conditioners and freezers, many industries had to cut output. Forecasts for expected economic growth, which had been high at 4.1 percent, decreased to 3.1 percent or lower. A slowdown in industrial output meant a decrease in exports and a blow to the trade balance, all of which caused the further weakening of the real and the possibility of inflation. The Central Bank was forced to raise interest rates three times in the period between January and May 2001. At the very least, Brazilians appeared to be cooperating with the conservation of energy. If they did not, blackouts and further economic problems would result.

In May 2001, the threat of a weakening economy was great due to political squabbling, an unstable currency, falling surpluses, rising debt, energy shortages, and a failing economy in neighboring Argentina. In this context, the aforementioned corruption scandal caused turbulence in the ruling four-party coalition and tempered Cardoso's popularity.

2001-2002: The Path to Elections

While the uproar of corruption allegations were fading, such events did seem to be an indication of the increasing importance of politics as the October 2002 elections approached. As the presidential race picked up, social and ethical issues like poverty and income disparity were likely to come to the forefront, with reforms taking the backburner. Although a bill to grant operational independence to the central bank did appear to be in the making in April 2001, only modest headway was expected in the way of fiscal policy, structural reforms, and tax reforms for the remainder of Cardoso's presidency.

Prior to the launching of the official 2002 presidential campaign, none of Cardoso's coalition candidates seemed to be garnering enough support to stand out as a probable winner. Meanwhile, Lula da Silva of the leftist Labor Party, or PT, who ran and lost in the previous three elections, seemed to be gathering more support than before. In June 2001, the PT published a document of its economic policies that uncovered changes in some of its most radical policies. Major changes included the PT's acceptance of inflation targets and its withdrawal of previous proposals to renationalize former state industries and to impose import restrictions. Also, instead of simply blocking tax reforms as its members did previously, the PT was cooperating with the government in mid-2001 to pass some tax reforms before the next election. While these measures were notably moderate for the PT, the left-wing party continued to support radical policies such as capping the share of tax receipts on the servicing of the public debt, increasing public spending and borrowing,

cutting the interest paid on the public debt, and prohibiting the privatization of the oil industry and federal banks.

While the apparent popularity enjoyed by the PT in pre-campaign months was promising for the party, there were many political parties in Brazil and those that were part of a coalition were believed to hold an advantage in the election campaign, especially because free election broadcasts were to be allotted in proportion to the 1998 election results. Many of the economic reforms implemented during Cardoso's terms in office, such as the privatization of public utilities, are irreversible and would not be affected no matter which party came to power in succession. However, in the face of looming electricity shortages, a weak currency, rising interest rates, and the prospect of lower growth and higher inflation, many Brazilians were likely to support sustainable development - further cuts in the budget deficit, contained, efficient public spending, and more deregulations and privatizations - in order to avoid a return to hyper-inflation.

On May 23, 2002, Brazil's Senate approved a constitutional amendment opening up the country's media market to foreign investors. The law, which will be incorporated into the constitution once the Senate formally meets to sanction it, opens a market that has been closed to foreigners by a series of laws from the military dictatorship era of 1964-1985. For the first time in the country's history, the new law also allows media companies to be held under corporate ownership. With a population of some 170 million, Brazil is South America's largest country, and is seen as a media market ripe for the picking. The new law is expected to attract big overseas investments.

In April 2002, Brazil's Supreme Court upheld a law mandating that political parties must maintain the same alliances at the state and federal level. The decision augured well for presidential candidate Jose Serra - Cardoso's hand-picked successor - because it would guarantee that the rival Liberal Front Party could not align itself immediately with a viable challenger. The PFL, who had hoped the law would be overturned so it could use its substantial influence in Brazil's lower house and Senate to challenge the PDSB in the first round of the election, was disappointed in the ruling. It was widely believed that the Supremo Tribunal Federal decision could play a major role in who gets the upper hand in the presidential race, scheduled for Oct. 6, 2002.

By late May 2002, many of the predictions by experts were upset when Workers Party (PT) candidate Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, was favored to win the presidential race, according to one opinion poll.

It was also announced in late May that Brazil's ruling coalition partner, the Democratic Movement Party, chose a woman politician as its vice-presidential nominee to run with presidential candidate Jose Serra of the Social Democratic Party. Rita Camata represented the first woman to seek that office. Some analysts suggested that Serra's choice of a female running mate was a possible attempt to refresh his image in light of his lagging numbers. Another poll had Serra tied for second in the race with Socialist Party Candidate Anthony Garotinho, the former governor of Rio de

Janeiro. Garotinho, 42, was the first socialist presidential candidate since military rule ended in the country in 1985.

Serra pledged both continuity of Cardoso's policies and change. He would maintain fiscal austerity and a floating currency while aiming to lower inflation and interest rates. If elected, "we are going to see Serra revitalize the role of the state," said Edson Nunes, a political scientist at Candido Mendes University in Rio de Janeiro. Serra described his style as "government activism" and is a fierce supporter of national industry. He stated that he would use the government machine to bolster exports and substitute imports for local goods.

Meanwhile, observers noted that as Serra shuffled leftward, his main rival Lula, of the left-wing Worker's Party, was flirting with the center to raise his standing in his fourth attempt at Brazil's presidency. Previous attempts had not been successful (as noted below).

In October 2002, early results from Brazil's election suggested that the country's left-wing candidate, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva ("Lula"), garnered almost double the number of votes as his closest rival, Jose Serra, but not quite an absolute majority. These results meant that a second round of voting would be necessitated in order for a winner to be declared. A runoff election was scheduled to determine if "Lula," a former metal worker and union activist, would, indeed, become the country's new president. His opponent, Jose Serra, was backed by President Cardoso and the ruling centrist coalition, as noted above. Despite his successful showing in the first round of elections, experts noted that "Lula" made it to the second round before and then failed to win the presidency. Having said that, his margin of victory in the first round had never before been as impressive.

Prior to the runoff election, "Lula" was expected to become Brazil's new president. The 61 percent victory sealed that fate and his foray into power was likely to have an effect not only on Brazil, but upon the entire South American region.

2003: Lula Comes to Power

On Jan. 2, 2003, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva was inaugurated as Brazil's first leftist president in forty years and promised to transform Brazil. A champion of the working poor and the indigenous people of Brazil's Amazon interior, Lula promised poverty alleviation, but without miraculous or immediate results. In his inauguration address, he said, "I am not the result of one election, I am the result of a history... I am realising the dreams of generations and generations before me who tried and failed."

Present at his inauguration ceremony were two other leftists Latin American leaders -- Cuban President Fidel Castro and Venezuela President Hugo Chavez, as well as the famed Brazilian musician, Gilberto Gil, who was to become the country's Culture Minister. Meanwhile, in the

streets of Brazil, people celebrated with Brazilian-style enthusiasm and fervor, flying the leftist Workers Party's flag alongside the Brazilian national flag, while singing, "Ole, ole, ole, ola Lula."

Several months later, it appeared that Argentina and Brazil were considering the introduction of a common currency. Because the Argentinean peso and the Brazilian real are both valued about the same, and because the two countries are major players in the Latin American trading bloc, MERCOSUR, the measure has been viewed as one which would improve the functions of the trading bloc by reducing currency fluctuations. Further developments in this regard had been suspended until the next round of presidential elections ensued in Argentina and a new president took office.

In late January 2003, nearly 120,000 people from all over the world descended on Porto Alegre to attend the World Social Forum -- which had doubled in size from the previous year. Top issues on the agenda included the environment, the continuing Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the pending war in Iraq.

In March 2003, Lula faced trouble from former allies when leaders of the Landless Movement, or MST, ended a truce with the government by organizing a new wave of land invasions. The MST announced it had adopted a policy of "zero tolerance" toward what it characterized as feudalism and warned that if its demands were not met it would launch in April a series of takeovers of what they considered to be unproductive lands around the country.

Brazilian Agrarian Development Minister Miguel Rossetto, a former labor leader from the PT's most leftist wing who has ties to the MST, criticized the protesters and said that the government was working towards a peaceful process of land re-distribution. It was the first time Rossetto had censured an MST action since he took office. He had been criticized by several rural landowners for failing to condemn other "revolutionary" events staged by the organization.

By April 2003, the government was trying to live up to another campaign promise by offering workers a 20 percent increase in minimum wage; Lula and his Worker's Party (PT) had promised to double the minimum wage within four years.

Meanwhile, a report from the country's Pastoral Land Commission (CPT) revealed that rural violence in Brazil had increased since Lula had taken office in January. According to the group, 13 people died in conflicts over land during the first three months of 2003, compared to nine in the same period of 2002. The report blamed the new government for failing to crack down on landowner militias and dragging its heels on land reform. However, Brazilian authorities called the commission's figures "subjective," and claimed they had recorded only six deaths.

The saga continued in July 2003 when police arrested a leader of the country's Landless Movement. Jose Rainha Junior was detained for organizing the 2000 occupation of a ranch in

which several landless farmers stole cattle and destroyed crops.

Further discontent with the government made headlines when, in August 2003, a group of protesters taking part in a protest against pension reform in Brazil attacked the National Congress building. The protestors, consisting of about 40,000 civil servants, smashed windows with stones and were forced back by police.

The lower house of the Brazilian Congress had given its initial approval to the reform bill earlier that day. If the bill passed the entire parliamentary procedure, it would raise the retirement age, place ceilings on civil servants' pensions and allow the pensions to be taxed - changes the government said were crucial to prevent the whole pension system from collapsing. The protestors reacted by calling Lula "a traitor" to his working class background.

Meanwhile, in regards to international relations, Lula went to Washington, D.C., in June 2003 for the biggest Brazil-United States summit since World War II. Ultimately, Lula and United States President George W. Bush agreed to seek closer ties. Relations between the two countries have been strained since Brazil criticized the United States-led war against Iraq. For more information on this topic, see the "Foreign Relations" section of this review.

On the economic front, by mid-2003, Brazil was effectively in a recession. The news was worse than analysts had expected and were linked with high interest rates, which were in place to control inflation. Amidst this negative news, Lula had been under pressure to create much-needed employment within the Brazilian economy. On this issue, there were some encouraging developments including a drop in unemployment from 13 percent to 12.8 percent in July 2003.

Also in mid-2003, government inspectors from Brazil's Ministry of Labor freed 849 workers on a coffee farm in the state of Bahia. The workers had been held under conditions of slavery. In 2003 alone, over 2,000 workers were freed from forced labor in Brazil, however, the operation at the Bahia coffee farm was unprecedented because of the number of workers involved. Most forced labor has been recorded in the Amazon region where forests are cleared for the creation of cattle ranches.

Two Tragedies in 2003

On August 19, 2003, a truck bomb exploded at the United Nations headquarters at the Canal Hotel in Iraq. The explosion killed at least 23 people, including the United Nations Envoy to Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello -- a native Brazilian. The attack was the most devastating in the 58-year history of the international body. The United States accused loyalists of the ousted regime of Saddam Hussein for the attack as well as others. Transnational terrorist groups, such as al-Qaida, as well as Ansar al-Islam, were also discussed as possible groups responsible for the attack. Nevertheless, the news agency *Reuters*, as well as an Arabic television station *Al Arabiya*, both reported that a

previously unknown group called the "Armed Vanguard of the Second Mohammed Army" took responsibility for the bombing. (For more details on this incident, please see the "Foreign Relations" section of this review.)

Tragedy hit the country again in October 2003 when the body of Brazilian Congressman Jose Carlos Martinez, along with two friends and a pilot, were found in the forest following the disappearance of the single-engine plane upon which they were traveling. The plane disappeared from radar screens shortly after taking off from Curitiba, the capital of state of Parana, south-west of Sao Paulo. In addition to his position in Congress, Martinez was the leader of Brazil's Labour Party, which is a member of Lula's center-left coalition government.

2004-2005: Corruption Scandal

Almost a year later in September 2004, federal prosecutors identified 137 politicians and more than 400 government officials whom they alleged to be involved in a corruption scandal. Many were believed to be members of Congress and officials from the Central Bank. The scandal involved the illegal movement of \$30 billion and \$60 billion from Brazil to overseas locations. Most of the money allegedly came from questionable sources, such as drug smuggling. Details aside, the corruption scandal was played up in Brazil as a "time-bomb" of sorts for the entire political landscape.

Because Brazil's president had only been in office for two years at the time when the story broke, it was believed that the scandal would cause greater havoc on the opposition compared to the government of Lula or his Worker's Party.

By mid-2005, however, the issue of corruption remained at the forefront of Brazilian politics. President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva vowed in late June 2005 to continue in office despite corruption allegations cited against his party. The Brazilian leader welcomed an investigation at a time when his Workers Party had been accused of paying bribes to allies in Brazil's Congress. Lula's statements came a week after his chief of staff, Jose Dirceu, resigned over the accusations.

In early July 2005, another key official in Brazil's governing Workers' Party (PT) resigned because of alleged involvement in a "bribes for votes" scandal. Silvio Pereira, Secretary General of the party, was also asked to step down as a parliamentary inquiry into the scandal was carried out.

The announcement of Pereira's resignation in early July 2005 came a day prior to an emergency meeting within the party to discuss the scandal, which was growing due to the publication of documents in the Brazilian weekly, *Veja*. In that publication, there were suggestions of possible contact between the party and a financier believed to be at the heart of the "bribes for votes" scheme.

A week later, Jose Genoino, the chairman of the Workers Party also resigned. Genoino denied being involved in any illegal activities and, indeed, his resignation appeared to be related to a strange incident involving his brother rather than any actual evidence about him. In that incident, an adviser to his brother (his brother is a state representative to the Workers party) was held at an airport, after \$200,000 in cash was found in his underpants and luggage. The unsavory nature of the incident conveyed unwelcome attention to Genoino, who felt he had no choice but to resign in order to remove even the smallest specter of impropriety from his party, which was under fire.

In late July 2005, Delubio Soares, the former treasurer of Brazil's governing Workers' Party admitted publicly that campaign funds totaling \$17 million had not been declared to the electoral authorities. Failure to report such funds constitutes a violation of Brazilian law. Soares' admission came during a parliamentary hearing into alleged corruption. During his testimony, he insisted that he had acted alone and that neither the president nor the party's leadership knew of his actions. Still at issue were allegations that Soares organized political votes in exchange for bribes. Soares, along with the Workers Party, has denied those claims.

The Brazilian political landscape has been replete with cases of corruption. Indeed, as noted by Soares himself in his testimony, clandestine funding has been commonplace in Brazilian politics -- a point of concurrence among most political observers. As such, it makes the accusations against the Workers Party seem rather unremarkable in comparison to other similar cases. But because of the party's incorruptible image, even if the charges are unfounded, the allegations alone may well tainted its image. Indeed, the association of scandal with the Workers Party -- long viewed as a model of integrity within a rather corrupt political system -- could have damaging consequences.

Nevertheless, despite these realities, Lula retained a high degree of popularity. An opinion poll by Instituto Sensus suggested that almost 60 percent of Brazilians approved of the president's personal performance. The poll also showed that Lula would be easily re-elected if elections were held now. (Note: The next election was scheduled for October of 2006.) The three main reasons identified for Lula's enduring popularity were: (1) his stewardship of the economy, characterized by a reduction in unemployment, the establishment of social programs, and the rise of the minimum wage; (2) a successful political operation that effectively unhinged the president from association with the scandal; (3) public perceptions that the president was simply not involved in the scandal in any way.

Developments in Late 2005

In other developments, a referendum in Brazil on a proposed ban on gun sales went down to defeat in October 2005. The referendum results showed that about 64 percent of the voters rejected the call for the firearms sales to the public to be banned. The proposal was backed by

both the government and the United Nations, however, those advocating a "no" vote had argued that people should not be defenseless against criminals. There were 36,000 gun-related deaths in Brazil in 2004, making it the country with the world's highest death toll from firearms.

Prisoners siezed control of a jail in the Amazonian state of Rondonia in Brazil on December 25, 2005. More than 200 people were taken hostage. One of the demands of prisoners was the return of one of the leaders of the inmates, Ednildo de Souza, who had been recently transferred to another prison but who was believed to be responsible for organizing a riot earlier in the year. The inmates have also demanded better living conditions.

Recent Developments: Scandal

In April 2006, Antonio Palocci, Brazil's former Finance Minister under President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, was charged with illegally accessing the bank account of a man who testified against him a month earlier. In that testimony, Francenildo Santos Costa, who worked as a caretaker, stated that he had seen Palocci at a house believed to be the place where politicians allegedly disbursed bribery funds. For his part, Palocci, who resigned from office due to the corruption charges he was facing, told federal authorities that although he received Costa's bank records on March 16, 2006, he destroyed them a day later.

In a related development, a parliamentary inquiry implicated the ruling Workers' Party in an ongoing bribery scandal. The parliamentary inquiry reported that it had found evidence that the party made illegal payments to politicians from other parties who joined its governing coalition. The parliamentary inquiry, however, cleared President Lula of any criminal wrong-doing. That finding was expected to boost President Lula's chances in the upcoming presidential elections set for October 2006. Most analysts agreed that such a finding might serve to inoculate Lula from some of the damaging effects of the bribery scandal that had terribly infected the Workers Party's otherwise well-regarded record of governance.

Recent Developments: Nuclear Politics

In May 2006, Brazil officially joined a small group of countries with the ability to enrich uranium for energy generating purposes. Brazil, which is home to large reserves of uranium, announced that it had opened a centrifuge facility at the Resende nuclear plant and noted. The government noted that the facility was home to some of the most advanced nuclear technology in the world. It also predicted that Brazil would be able to meet all of its nuclear energy needs within 10 years. Until the opening of the new facility, Brazilian uranium ore had been sent elsewhere for enrichment into nuclear fuel.

This development ensued following extensive discussions with the United Nations nuclear watchdog agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The process was not an easy one and even led to disagreement about the scientific technology Brazil has been using. Part of the problem involved Brazil's reticence to share its proprietary knowledge, which resulted in obstacles for the IAEA inspectors trying to access nuclear facilities. The timing of the development of Brazilian nuclear program along with Iran's nuclear ambitions also led to complex political challenges. These were resolved after Brazil and the IAEA were able to reach an agreement ensuring that the new facilities would not be used for weapons production.

Recent Developments: Violence Plagues Sao Paulo

Also in May 2006, violence in the state of Sao Paulo in Brazil left over 100 people dead. The chaos occurred when criminal gangs carried out attacks against police stations and spurred riots in prisons. Revolts at about 70 prisons across the states even led to 250 people -- mostly inmates' families who were in the facilities for visits -- being taken hostage. Meanwhile, police officers at work -- but also at home or at leisure activities -- were targeted by attackers lobbing grenades and shooting at them with machine guns. There was even a report of one police station being the site of an explosion.

The level of violence and chaos became so intense that roads had to be closed in the event of drive-by shootings, while small street shops and booths had to shut down for fear of random violence. Police stations also had to increase security and public transportation was curtailed.

In the face of these measures, the state's governor, Claudio Limbo, declined assistance from the federal government, saying that he had the situation under control. It was a claim not shared by the residents of the state, some of whom reported to feeling as if they were under seige in something akin to a civil war. Indeed, experts on the ground in Sao Paulo acknowledged that it was the most significant case of organized violence in the state's history.

Officials accused the First Command of the Capital (PCC) criminal faction of being responsible. The PCC was founded in 1993 and since then has been linked with narcotics and weapons trafficking, kidnappings, bank robberies, as well as prison breaks and uprisings.

As the wave of violence waned for a few days, speculation arose that the state government had struck what some described as an unsavory deal with the criminal gangs. The state government denied this to be the case. Indeed, by the second half of May 2006, violence was ongoing. In a twist, however, the number of attacks against the police by the PCC was decreasing, just as shootings by police officers were on the increase. In one incident, 100 suspects were fatally shot by police. Human rights groups accused the police of over-reaction and said that innocent civilians had also been killed in the incident. Complicating the dire situation even further was the

revelation by members of the state medical council that some victims' bodies showed signs of being killed execution-style.

By mid-2006, Brazil was impacted by further unrest when landless farm workers stormed a parliament building in Brasilia. Those participating in the protest action were thought to be members of a splinter wing of Brazil's Landless Rural Workers' Movement (MST). With farm tools and other makeshift weapons in hand, they thrashed at windows and doors. There were also reports of clashes with police, which led to injuries of scores of people. Some of the protesting farm workers were arrested as a result. At issue was their demand for rapid agricultural reform.

For his part, President Lula condemned the group's violent actions but also promised assistance in acquiring land for the workers. The MST has normally backed President Lula due to shared aspirations regarding land reform. Indeed, one leader in the landless movement, Bruno Maranhao, has also functioned as an executive with Lula's governing Workers Party. However, despite these linkages, the protestors complained that the pace of action in this realm has been slow. Indeed, the MST has said that the government has not realized its promise to find home and land for hundreds of thousands of families.

In July 2006, a wave of violence again hit the Brazilian state of Sao Paulo. A number of police stations, banks, shops and buses were attacked in what appeared to be another clash between the official security forces and the aforementioned criminal gang -- the PCC. President Lula offered federal assistance to the state as it tried to deal with the latest bout of instability.

In mid-August 2006, a Brazilian journalist, Guilherme Portanova, was kidnapped by the PCC. Portanova, who has reported stories related to crime, was apparently abducted at gunpoint. On the Globo television station, a broadcast by a representative of PCC was aired. The broadcast showed an individual in hooded garb reading a statement as follows: "We want a prison system with humane conditions, not a bankrupt, inhumane system in which we are subjected to innumerable humiliations and beatings. The Brazilian penal system is, in reality, a true human dump, where human beings are thrown as if they are animals."

Note: The wave of violence that raged in Sao Paulo for several months in 2006 has been attributed to the PCC, and has evoked questions about the state government's competence in dealing with criminal gang activity.

Election 2006

In late June 2006, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva ("President Lula") announced that he would stand for re-election. Presidential elections in Brazil were scheduled to take place in October 2006.

President Lula's announcement came at the national convention of his Workers' Party. Addressing the thousands of delegates at the convention, he said, "I'm here to tell you once more that I've accepted, from the bottom of my heart, the call ...to continue the struggle for a more just and independent Brazil, where each Brazilian can eat three times a day, can have a job, education and good health."

President Lula's popularity plummeted in 2005 as a result of the scandal over campaign funding and alleged bribery (discussed above). As aforementioned, the situation resulted in the resignations of the party leader and several other high-level officials. The scandal clearly tarnished the reputation of the Workers' Party, which had been viewed as outside the realm of dirty politics. It also had an effect on the public's approval for the president. Still, with time, Brazilians appeared to gradually conclude that President Lula was largely outside the fray of corruption and that he had been betrayed by associates within his own party. Indeed, his popularity increased once again, perhaps in large part due to his engaging personality, the prevailing shared values with the working class, as well as his successful stewardship of the Brazilian economy.

In September 2006, however, President Lula's strong position was somewhat compromised when two men with links to his party were arrested. The men were allegedly carrying \$800,000 dollars, believed to have been intended as payment for a dossier of corruption allegations against the president's opponents. The incident resulted in President Lula's decision to fire campaign manager. The unsavory nature of the situation was expected to impact voters' perceptions and inclinations on election day.

On October 1, 2006, voters went to the polls to vote in the presidential elections. With the votes counted, it was clear that President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva had won a plurality of votes -- 49 percent -- but just one percent short of an outright majority. As such, he was slated to face a run-off election against the second-place candidate, former Sao Paulo governor and corporatist, Geraldo Alckmin, who garnered 41.4 percent of the vote share. Heloisa Helena picked up seven percent of the votes cast and a third place finish.

The aforementioned dossier incident appeared to have contributed to a tightening of the election race in the days ahead of the vote. Indeed, it was this very shift in those last days that resulted in a denial of outright victory for Lula on election day. Nevertheless, an aide to Lula said that the president was ready for the second round. For his part, Alckmin expressed his thanks to his supporters in Sao Paulo saying, "I'm heading to the second round with a great chance of winning the election."

The competition between President Lula and Alckmin largely focused on the issues of welfare and privatization. The president accused his rival of seeking to deconstruct the country's welfare benefits for the poor and to privatize state enterprises. While Alckmin refuted these claims, in a

country where privatization has been viewed warily, and where the cause of impoverished Brazilians resonates among the citizenry, attention to these matters was expected to benefit Lula.

On October 29, 2006, Brazilian voters returned to the polls. With most of the votes counted, it was apparent that President Lula had won a decisive victory over Alckmin in the second round, garnering more than 60 percent of the vote share.

In his victory speech, Lula said he intended to be a leader of all Brazilians and would continue with his poverty alleviation agenda in his second term. To this end, he said, "We will give attention to the most needy. The poor will have preference in our government." In a speech to his supporters -- many of whom were jubilantly waving the flags of the Workers' Party -- President Lula also said that he would work to increase economic development and to reduce socio-economic inequality.

Note: The presidential race aside, Brazilian voters were also selecting members of congress, senators and governors.

The new year [2007] commenced in Brazil with the inauguration of President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva into office for a second term. In his inaugural speech, Lula pledged "to uphold, defend and honour the constitution, observe the laws, promote the general well-being of the Brazilian people, and preserve the union, the integrity and independence of Brazil." With a nod to his leftist and union roots, Lula said that social change would remain the core of his policies, and that he continued to be focused on poverty alleviation, in conjunction with control over public spending. Other priority areas mentioned included the improvement of education and the reduction of urban violence that had plagued the country particularly in 2006.

Recent Developments

In the summer of 2007, the Brazilian government officially acknowledged that human rights abuses had taken place under the aegis of the military dictatorship that ruled the country from 1964 to 1985. The formal recognition of this dark chapter in Brazilian history, in which more than 500 people either died or disappeared, was of historic proportions since never before had the government made such an admission.

At the close of the year [2007], the ongoing corruption scandal that was plaguing the political sphere took center stage when the Speaker of the Brazilian Senate, Renan Calheiros, resigned from that office in order to avoid impeachment. Calheiros was regarded as an ally of President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva.

May 2008 saw further internal dissonance within the government when Environment Minister

Marina Silva resigned from office. At issue was Silva's disagreement with the government's policy over development in her native Amazon, which she found to be objectionable. In particular, Silva opposed a number of government infrastructure projects in the Amazon, including the construction of two hydro-electric dams on the River Madeira. Her environmental views also contributed to her rejection of the government's sanction of genetically modified grains as well as the building of a new nuclear power plant. Moreover, Silva has sharply expressed alarm over the deforestation of the Amazon rain forest, which she has blamed on cattle ranchers and farmers. After her resignation and growing isolation from the president's Workers Party, Silva ultimately switched her party membership to the Green Party.

Social issues took center stage in mid-2008 when the issue of legalizing abortion emerged. The matter promised to be a contentious one in this predominantly Catholic country. Ultimately, a congressional commission rejected the measure aimed at the legalization of abortion.

Also in mid-2008, with an eye on social stability and security, the government began a program aimed at getting hundreds of thousands of illegal weapons off the streets in a country plagued by a high murder rate. To this end, the Brazilian government launched a program in which people were encouraged to give up their illegal weapons in return for cash payments and immunity from prosecution. Four years earlier, a similar program successfully resulted in up to 500,000 weapons being relinquished.

In September 2008, President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva ordered that the suspension of the leadership of the country's intelligence agency, known as Abin. The suspension was to remain in place pending an investigation into a wiretapping scandal. At issue were allegations that telephones of politicians, judges and other officials had been wiretapped. The scandal broke via a story that was published in the *Veja* magazine. That report alleged that several senior officials, including the president's own chief of staff and the head of the Senate, had been wiretapped by Abin. An intelligence agent, who provided a transcript of a telephone conversation between the head of the country's Supreme Court and an opposition politician, said that such incidences of illegal wiretapping were not abnormal at Abin. This particular situation, however, raised the ire of the president. According to the law, wiretapping -- while common in Brazil -- nonetheless requires the authorization from a judge. These revelations appeared to indicate that the proper procedures may not have been in place, resulting in an assault on the rule of law and basic civil liberties.

In the autumn of 2008, Brazil received a formal invitation from Iran to join the international oil cartel known as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Brazilian Energy Minister Edson Lobao said in a news conference in Brasilia that his country had declined the invitation. Lobao explained that he had informed the Iranian envoy, Moshen Shaterzadeh, that Brazil "does not envisage that possibility" in the immediate future.

International affairs dominated the headlines in 2009. Of particular note was the fact that Brazil

and Paraguay reached an agreement to end their long-standing dispute over the cost of energy from the Itaipu hydro-electric plant, which has been located on their mutual border. At the core of the agreement was Brazil's promise to pay Paraguay triple the existing rate for excess energy supplies derived from the Itaipu hydro-electric plant.

Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva was the first Latin American leader to meet in person with newly-inaugurated United States President Barack Obama in early 2009. President Lula said that President Obama had an opportunity to transform relations with Latin America. President Lula, who called on developed countries to assist in thawing the frozen credit markets, which have been particularly hard on developing economies, said that President Obama was in a "unique and exceptional position to improve relationships with Latin America." After his meeting with President Obama, President Lula said, "I think in Latin America we need to construct a new relationship, a relationship of trust not interference." President Obama appeared to echo President Lula's call for an improved and more cooperative relationship with Latin America when he said, "We have a very strong friendship between the two countries, but we can always make it stronger."

By September 2009, Brazil and Honduras were embroiled in a conflict over the presence of ousted Honduran President Manuel Zelaya at the Brazilian embassy in Honduras. According to reports from the ground in Tegucigalpa, the interim Honduran authorities, led by Roberto Micheletti, were demanding that Brazil "immediately take measures to ensure that Zelaya stops using the protection offered by the diplomatic mission to instigate violence in Honduras." The interim government also warned that it would take unspecified "additional measures" if Zelaya's status remained undefined within 10 days.

For its part, Brazil decided to reject the ultimatum by Honduras' interim authorities on the basis that its embassy was protected under international law. Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva personally entered the fray when he asserted, "Brazil will not comply with an ultimatum from a government of coup mongers."

The situation took a disturbing turn when it was reported that hundreds of Honduran soldiers and riot police had surrounded the Brazilian embassy. While Micheletti said that he had no plans to storm the embassy and arrest Zelaya, there were intimations that the Brazilian diplomatic mission was, indeed, under siege. Zelaya himself accused the interim authorities of pumping toxic gas into the building, however, Red Cross personnel on the ground could not confirm the allegation. Still, the United Nations Security Council appeared to acknowledge the "siege" effect when it demanded that the interim authorities of Honduras "cease harassing" the Brazilian embassy.

Brazil entered the new year of 2010 with a political crisis looming over an anticipated investigation into human rights abuses committed under the old military regime. At issue is the National Commission on the Truth, or "truth commission," that would probe the details of alleged human

rights abuses committed by the military leadership of Brazil from 1964 to 1985 -- a period before Brazil returned to the path of democratization. The military has been highly opposed to the notion of the truth commission, which it has viewed as a potential attack on its reputation. According to Brazilian newspapers, O Globo and O Estado de Sao Paulo, the matter has also reached into the government of Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. President Lula's own Defense Minister Nelson Jobim and commanders of the military presented their resignations after draft legislation authorizing the "truth commission" was advanced. While the president rejected their resignations, the political crisis found no resolution.

President Lula said he would review the draft text of the legislation, however, political analysts have said that a reversal of his support for the formation of the truth commission would likely to incur political damage for him. Indeed, the National Commission on the Truth has been a centerpiece of President Lula's Human Rights National Program, and has been a vital part of his promise to investigate those responsible for the killing of hundreds of political activists and the torture of about 20,000 people during the two decades of military dictatorship. Advocates of the bill, such as its main writer, Human Rights Minister Paulo Vannuchi, explained that the truth commission was intended "to rescue information of all that happened during the long period of dictatorial repression in recent Brazilian history." But opponents, such as Defense Minister Jobim, have argued that it is an exercise in revenge. They also argued that left-wing groups active during the rule by the military have not been held to the same kind of scrutiny.

Elections of 2010

Special Report: Brazil's Elections of 2010

Rousseff becomes Brazil's first female president and extends Lula legacy

Introduction

On Oct. 3, 2010, Brazilian voters went to the polls to vote in parliamentary elections and the first round of the presidential contest; a second round of the presidential election was scheduled to be held, if needed, on Oct. 31, 2010.

Summary

Brazilian voters went to the polls to vote in presidential and parliamentary elections on October 3, 2010. The elections would be a test of outgoing President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva -- to see if his Workers Party would be re-elected to power even without the popular President Lula on the ballot himself.

The presidential contest was also a test of sorts and would likely illustrate whether or not voters wanted to continue the legacy of President Lula. The first round of the presidential election was also held on October 3, 2010, resulting in no candidate achieving an outright majority, and thus, setting the stage for another day of voting between the two candidates garnering the most support in the first round. The second or "run-off" round of the Brazilian presidential election was held on October 31, 2010 between the Dilma Rousseff, the representative of the Ruling Workers' Party and a stalwart of outgoing President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, and Jose Serra of the Social Democracy Party. Rousseff and Serra were the candidates garnering the most votes respectively in the first round of the election, which was held on October 3, 2010, in which neither crossed the necessary 50 percent threshold to win outright victory.

Dilma Rousseff -- a trained economist who had never been elected to office -- served in government as President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva's Minister of Energy from 2003 to 2005, and then was his chief of staff. Her main opponent, Jose Serra, has held a centrist political orientation and belonged to the Brazilian Social Democracy Party. Unlike Rousseff, he was a seasoned politician who was experienced at contesting elections having served as a former congressman and governor of Sao Paulo state. Rousseff was campaigning on a promise of continuing President Lula's popular mix of market-friendly policies and social programs. Serra was highlighting his political credentials as a former congressman and governor of Sao Paulo state.

On October 31, 2010, exit poll predictions appeared to have been accurate; Rousseff had over 55 percent of the vote share while Serra had 44 percent. In this way, it was Rousseff who was victorious, making history as Brazil's first female president and head of state, and also extending the Lula legacy.

Meanwhile, on the original date of the parliamentary elections -- October 3, 2010 -- the results showed that parties allied with President Lula secured a majority in the Congress. Indeed, the ruling coalition expanded its presence in the Federal Senate, the upper house of the Congress, and was the big winner in the lower house, known as the Chamber of Deputies. The result was a validation of President Lula's legacy.

In detail:

The first round of the presidential election in Brazil was scheduled for October 3, 2010. At issue was the successor to President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva who had served two consecutive four-year terms, the maximum allowed under Brazil's constitution. The main presidential contenders to succeed President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva were Dilma Rousseff of the Workers' Party and Jose Serra of the Social Democracy Party. Other notable contenders were the Green Party's candidate, Marina Silva, and Plinio Soares de Arruda Sampaio of the Socialism and Freedom Party. Ahead of that election in early August 2010, the presidential contenders participated in the first televised debate. Analysts said that there was no clear winner following the debate that addressed

economics, health care, public transport, and infrastructure.

Polling data showed Rousseff and Serra to be the two top contenders. Rousseff -- a stalwart of the president -- was trailing behind Serra -- Sao Paulo's former governor -- by about 10 percentage points. However, if no candidate garnered more than 50 percent of the vote share, a second round would be held a month later. If polling trends held steady, Serra would win the first round and face Rousseff in the runoff four weeks later; in that second round, Serra could not count on a guaranteed victory since Rousseff could benefit from a consolidated left-wing vote.

By August 26, 2010, polling data showed a shift in the dynamics of the election race with Rousseff pulling ahead. According to a Datafolha poll, Rousseff was now commanding 49 percent of support -- a seismic shift in modern political terms against Serra who had 29 percent support and Green Party candidate Marina Silva with nine percent. The shift in fortune for Rousseff seemed at least partially attributable to a well-managed public relations and advertising campaign.

In September 2010, despite being embroiled in two well-publicized scandals, and in the face of vituperative attacks by her rivals, Brazil's ruling Workers Party presidential candidate, Dilma Rousseff, was showing no sign of decreased popularity. Indeed, Rousseff had a 51-26 percent lead over the main opposition candidate, Jose Serra, according to the Sensus polling institute.

It was apparent that the overwhelming popularity of incumbent President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva was having a crossover effect on Rousseff, who had been mentored by Lula. Indeed, neither the revelation that members of the Workers Party may have wrongfully accessed the tax records of Serra's daughter, nor the allegation that a former aide to Rousseff was involved in a kickback scheme, appeared to have garnered much traction with the Brazilian citizenry. Perhaps Rousseff was helped, to some degree, by the rapid response of the government, which ensured that tax records would be subject to heavy security and that the corruption allegation would be investigated.

In the days ahead of the election, a Datafolha poll showed that Rousseff had 47 percent of support -- less than the weeks before, but still ahead of Serra with 28 percent and Silva with garnering 14 percent. Several other candidates were showing support levels in the single digits. When only valid votes were considered, Rousseff's polling number rose to 52 percent, Serra had 31 percent and Silva had close to 20 percent.

Whatever the reason for Rousseff's strength in the pre-election polls, should those polls hold steady, then she was positioned to become Brazil's first female president. Yet to be seen was whether or not she could achieve this end in only one round of voting, or, if she would be subject to a run-off election at a later date.

Early results appeared to indicate Rousseff was in the lead in Brazil's presidential election. With the ballots counted, Rousseff had 47 percent of the vote share while her main rival, Serra, had 33 percent, according to Brazil's Supreme Electoral Tribunal.

Rousseff, therefore, would not avoid a runoff and would have to contest the runoff election against the next top performer from the first round -- Serra -- on October 31, 2010. Rousseff appeared to have lost some last-minute support to Green candidate, Silva, who attracted increased support from disaffected left-wing voters. It was expected that Silva's voters would turn to Rousseff rather than Serra in the second round, thereby assuring Lula's legacy would continue in the next presidency under the stewardship of his stalwart, Rousseff.

Meanwhile, the results in the parliamentary election showed that parties allied with President Lula secured a majority in the Congress. Indeed, the ruling coalition expanded its presence in the Federal Senate, the upper house of the Congress, securing 57 out of 81 seats at stake. In the lower house, known as the Chamber of Deputies, the ruling coalition garnered 72 percent of the 513 seats. In specific terms, President Lula's Workers Party was the big winner, increasing its share to 88 seats, while Brazilian Democratic Movement Party garnered 80 seats (ten less than the last election), and the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB) acquired 36 seats. Among the opposition ranks, the PSDB won 53 seats (a decrease from the last election), while the Democrats (DEM) also saw a decrease from 54 to 43. Meanwhile, the Green Party held steady with 14 seats.

With the second round of the presidential contest looming, outgoing President Lula said, "The election has two rounds. I have never won an election in the first round. It will be 30 more days of fighting... and let's go to this fight." He also noted that his former chief of staff was well-positioned for victory.

The opposition was not willing to lose easily. Instead, Serra of the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) met with allied political leaders on October 6, 2010, with an eye on consolidating support ahead of the second round. Leaders of the parties present at the meeting, such as the Democrats (DEM) and the Socialist People's Party (PPS), insisted that Serra could win the second round. Meanwhile, Serra -- in renewed campaign mode -- impugned President Lula's involvement in Rousseff's campaign saying, "Brazil has changed for the worse in that aspect. One of the first things we have to do as president, along with Congress, is to make a law that defines the head of state involvement in campaigns." Serra was also attempting to curry favor with Green Party candidate, Silva, who placed third in the first round. Clearly, he wanted to attract her voters to his fold.

That being said, Silva made clear that she would endorse the candidate who was willing to prioritize environmental proposals. It should be noted that Silva was invited to the post of environmental minister when President Lula first took office in 2002; she resigned five years later due to her perception that there was insufficient support for ecological policy and programs. Now, she poised to play a decisive role in who would ultimately become president. To that end, Silva was intent on revitalizing the environmental agenda and ultimately decided to endorse neither Rousseff nor Serra, although she acknowledged that the Lula-Rousseff environmental agenda was more compatible with her vision for the future of Brazil.

Leading up to the second round of the presidential election, Serra saw some degree of a boost and was looking highly competitive against Rousseff. However, in the week ahead of election day, a number of polls started to register Rousseff's movement away from Serra. Notably, Rousseff extended her lead over Serra by 10 percentage points in a new survey released by polling firm Datafolha, which showed her at the crucial 50 percent mark. Serra had 40 percent, according to this poll. By October 27, 2010, a poll by the Sensus Institute showed Rousseff with a commanding lead of 17 percentage points over Serra -- 58.6 percent for Rousseff to 41.4 percent for Serra. It was the most significant gap between the two presidential contenders measured by survey data. A day later, a poll released by Ibope indicated a similar chasm between the two candidates -- this time of 14 percentage points; Rousseff had 57 percent while Serra had 43 percent. On October 29, 2010, just two days ahead of election day in Brazil, Rousseff was again shown to have a decisive lead of 56 percent against Serra with 44 percent, according to Datafolha. Despite this collection of the three latest public survey results, Serra's cadre of campaign advisors insisted that their own internal polling showed the race to be a statistical tie.

For her part, Rousseff's fortune appeared to be boosted partially by Green candidate Silva's non-endorsement decision (noted above). She was also helped by steadfast messaging in which she highlighted her intent to continue President Lula's combination of market-friendly policies and social programs. Despite being the clear front runner, Rousseff appeared to be cautiously optimistic, spending her time instead outlining her policy agenda. To that end, she noted that her priorities would be strengthening democracy, facilitating employment and advocating on behalf of workers' rights, protecting the environment, increasing sustainable development, alleviating poverty, as well as improving public education and health care. It was yet to be seen if Rousseff would prevail on election day, effectively advancing the Lula legacy in the Brazilian political sphere.

On October 31, 2010, exit poll data indicated that Rousseff was on track to win the presidential election with 57 percent of valid votes, while Serra was carrying about 43 percent of the vote share. With most of the ballots counted, exit poll predictions appeared to have been accurate; Rousseff had over 55 percent of the vote share while Serra had 44 percent. In this way, Rousseff made history becoming Brazil's first female president and head of state.

Rousseff Sworn Into Office:

On January 1, 2011, Dilma Rousseff -- a stalwart of outgoing President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva - - was inaugurated into office as Brazil's new president. A trained economist, Rousseff served in government as President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva's Minister of Energy from 2003 to 2005, and then served as his chief of staff. Known as the "Iron Lady," Rousseff was arrested in 1970, imprisoned for three years and tortured, for her participation in an armed guerrilla group that opposed the military dictatorship that ruled Brazil from 1964 to 1985. Rousseff made history by becoming the country's first female head of state. Acknowledging the historical importance of her

achievement in winning the presidency, President Rousseff said during her inauguration, "I know the historical significance of this decision. Today, all Brazilian women should feel proud and happy."

After taking the oath of office, President Rousseff vowed to work on behalf of those most vulnerable saying, "Poverty still exists and this is a shame on our country." She continued, "The most determined struggle will be to eradicate extreme poverty." She went on to make the following promise: "I will not rest while there are Brazilians without food on their table, homeless in the streets, and poor children abandoned to their luck." President Rousseff also made it clear that she intended to continue the policy agenda of President Lula, whom she lauded for changing government in Brazil. To that end, a strong state role would continue in the energy and banking sectors, but with an eye on economic growth and development. Also included in her policy agenda were the following items: environmental protection, regional development and tax reform.

Update

In June 2011, Brazil's chief minister, Antonio Palocci, resigned amidst corruption allegations. Palocci -- the Brazilian president's chief of staff -- said he did not want to weaken the government of recently-inaugurated President Dilma Rousseff. That said, Palocci denied any wrongdoing. At issue was a report in the the Folha de Sao Paulo newspaper, which alleged that during the previous four years, Palocci had increased his personal wealth 20-fold. No stranger to corruption allegations, Palocci resigned as finance minister in 2006 amidst corruption rumors at that time, although he was later cleared of charges. Now in 2011, Palocci was pointing out that the country's attorney general had concluded -- as before -- that his conduct met the standards of "legality and rectitude." Still, Palocci said that the ceaseless "thrashing" of the government in the media as a result of his earnings could harm his professional effectiveness. Also, as already noted here, Palocco did not want the matter to negatively taint President Rousseff. Gleisi Hoffmann, a senator with the ruling Workers Party, was being tapped to replace Palocci.

In August 2011, Brazilian police arrested more than 30 tourism officials and business leaders across the country in an official corruption investigation. Included in the list of people served with arrest warrants was Deputy Tourism Minister Frederico Silva da Costa. All individuals who were arrested were accused of conspiring to divert public money for private purposes. According to Brazilian prosecutors, the suspects awarded highly lucrative contracts to unqualified -- but complicit -- companies. Soon thereafter, Agriculture Minister Wagner Rossi resigned from office amidst a corruption scandal, which centered on allegations that he accepted bribes and air travel from agricultural companies. In a letter cited by Agencia Brasil, Rossi stated, "Over the last 30 days, I have faced a daily barrage of false accusations without any proof." These developments came at a time when government ministries of agriculture and transportation were also under scrutiny for corruption. In fact, only a month prior, 20 officials including Transport Minister

Alfredo Nascimento resigned in conjunction with allegations of kickbacks from federal infrastructure contracts.

Note:

In March 2012, the South American powerhouse of Brazil announced that its economy had expanded so much that it was now the sixth largest in the world. Brazilian Finance Minister Guido Mantega noted that the national economy grew 2.7 percent in 2011 -- more than the United Kingdom's 0.8 percent of growth. Mantega suggested that despite this milestone, his country was focused on dynamism and sustainability in the economic sphere. He said, "It is not important to be the world's sixth-biggest economy, but to be among the most dynamic economies, and with sustainable growth."

Special Report: Is Brazil's unrest a "Tropical Spring" ?

Is Brazil's unrest a "Tropical Spring" ?

Mid-2013 saw an eruption of unrest in South America's powerhouse of Brazil. Tens of thousands of protesters took to the streets in Brazil over the course of weeks to register their outrage.

The eruption of unrest was sparked by the decision to increase transport fares in Sao Paulo but soon spread across the country to other cities, such as Rio de Janeiro. The list of grievances against Brazilian authorities also expanded from frustration over transport fare hikes to outrage over corruption. Even the government's expenditures on facilities for the upcoming World Cup (set to be hosted by Brazil in 2014) constituted a source of outrage for people hit by marked inflation and economic stress. Of particular concern was the fact that the government was willing to spend money on the spectacle of the World Cup, while social welfare programs, such as the national health system, required improvement. Indeed, demonstrators were soon raging broadly against inefficient public services and heavy public spending on major international sport events.

In keeping with the expanding list of grievances, the size of the protests concomitantly increased, with demonstrations at times attracting as many as one million participants. In short order, the unrest had morphed from protests and rallies over specific causes to a national anti-government movement.

For her part, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff has said that she is "proud" of the fact that Brazilians were empowered to take to the streets to express their views. She was on the record asserting that "the protests show the strength of democracy and the youngsters' wish to make Brazil advance." She tried to strike an affirmative and supportive tone, saying, "If we take advantage of the impulse of this new political energy, we can do, better and faster, many things we

have been unable to do so far because of political and economic limitations."

However, violent clashes leading to injuries and a handful of deaths likely contributed to the president's decision to address the needs of the people. Those clashes were heated at times with protesters hurling rocks at police, and those police responding with tear gas. There were also attacks on city hall buildings in the capital city of Brasilia.

With an eye on quelling the mass movement, President Rousseff announced that the proposed increase in transportation costs would be reversed. When that move did not end the unrest, President Rousseff offered a national address in which she acknowledged and validated the grievances of the protesters, saying, "We can do many things a lot better in Brazil. People have a right to criticize." President Rousseff also unveiled a series of reforms, including a new plan for public transportation, a program that would transfer oil revenue royalties to the education system, and recruitment of doctors from overseas, with the goal of ameliorating the country's health service by providing medical care in remote parts of the country. It should be noted that this aspect of Rousseff's plan was not new and has been criticized by physicians associations who argue that the government should instead invest in local doctors and improve infrastructure in small towns. On the issue of corruption, President Rousseff said: "I want institutions that are more transparent, more resistant to wrongdoing." But the president also defended the World Cup infrastructure expenditures, arguing that funding for the facilities would not come from taxpayers' contributions but, rather, from private companies that would use sporting arenas. She said, "I would never allow this money to come out of the taxpayers' money, harming essential areas such as health and education."

Note that at the close of June 2013, despite President Rousseff's proposals, unrest continued to rock Brazil. The Confederations Cup final between Brazil and Spain was held in Rio de Janeiro. Despite Brazil's clear defeat of Spain in the football match, the scene was marred by an outbreak of violent clashes. The situation grew so fractious that police had to use tear gas to subdue the crowds close to the Maracana football stadium. President Rousseff soon proposed a national referendum, the outcome of which would either reject or ratify her reform proposal package discussed above. By the start of July 2013, Brazil's Supreme Electoral Court set a 70-day deadline for congress to orchestrate a referendum on political reforms proposed by the president.

July 2013 saw no relief in the climate of unrest in Brazil. Outrage of the use of public funds and lack of basic services boiled over into protests on July 11, 2013 with demonstrations bringing Brazil's main highways to a virtual standstill on that day. Protest organizers were calling the mass action, which affected major thoroughfares in at least seven Brazilian states, a "national struggle day." The clogging of major transport arteries caused anxiety among Brazil's business class, with exporters worrying that their products would not be shipped on time, and with schools and hospitals facing disruptions.

It was to be seen if passions would simmer as a result of the president's proposals and the referendum schedule. In the meanwhile, speculation was rising about whether this national anti-government movement in Brazil could be compared to the so-called "Arab Spring" in 2011. Presented differently, was this unrest in Brazil something of a "Tropical Spring?"

In truth, while many of the incidences of socio-economic unrest across the world in recent years have attracted disillusioned and disengaged youth, the demographic breakdown of Brazilian protesters suggest participants were better educated and wealthier than pro-democracy activists in North Africa or anti-austerity activists in Europe. In fact, Brazil does not suffer from abysmal rates of youth unemployment to be found in North Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. It was also noteworthy that while Arab Spring protests sought to depose autocratic leaders, and while European anti-austerity protests sought to protect social welfare programs, and more recently, while Turkish protests highlighted the socio-political tensions between Islamists and secularists, the Brazilian case seemed less targeted in nature. Indeed, as the unrest began, the Brazilian case was regarded as more an amorphous expression of discontent.

However, as the protests continued and began to attract the working middle class to the fold (to be distinguished from the wealthier and educated upper middle class), the aims of the burgeoning Brazilian protest movement became more apparent. The very fact that unrest in this country was sparked by the proposed hike in public transport fares was instructive. Not only was the price issue a burden in Brazil, which was already dealing with inflation, but Brazilians were also frustrated by the poor state of the transportation infrastructure. The complaint about poor infrastructure also extended to outrage over hospitals and schools.

At issue was the fact that although the Brazilian state does spend significant funds on the people via entitlement programs, including pensions and social welfare benefits, it has not concentrated on properly funding public services or improving the infrastructure that affects the daily lives of people in the form of transportation, education, and health facilities. As noted by Samuel Pessoa, an economist at the Fundacao Getulio Vargas research institute in an interview with Reuters News, "We adopted a model that transfers a lot of public wealth to individuals and leaves very little for public investment."

At the concrete level, the tax burden of Brazilians (at the level of several European countries) has not resulted in better roads, an enhanced transport system in a geographically vast country, higher-quality schools, or improved access to hospitals and health care. At the broader level, there was a sense of discontent among Brazilians as they realized that despite all the claims of progress in the country, progress on the path towards the developed world was actually limited, and the construction of prestige projects, such as new soccer stadiums, was unlikely to assuage that growing realization.

For President Rousseff, the political consequences of this scenario were quite clear. Once a

popular world leader, Rousseff was suffering from crumbling approval ratings matched by the shocking spectacle of Brazilians clamoring for the return of Rousseff's predecessor -- former President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva -- to lead the country. At public events, she was met with heckling and protests. Rousseff's challenges were only expected to increase since Brazil's balance of trade was headed toward deficit territory for the first time since 2000 and the slowest rate of growth in more than two decades.

Special Report: Pope Francis concludes Brazil visit with massive vigil at Copacabana in Rio de Janeiro

On July 27, 2013, Pope Francis concluded his week-long visit to Brazil to celebrate World Youth Day with a massive vigil at the famed Copacabana Beach in Rio de Janeiro. Approximately two million people packed Copacabana Beach to participate in the night-long vigil and were on hand to hear the pope urge young people to be agents of change in society.

Speaking of the mass protests that have rocked Brazil in 2013 as Brazilians rallied for less sports stadiums and better infrastructure, Pope Francis said: "Keep overcoming apathy and offering a Christian response to the social and political concerns taking place in different parts of the world." Earlier the pope had a message for both the Brazilian authorities and the protesters on the street on the same subject when he urged them to use dialogue rather than "selfish indifference" to the problems facing the country. He said: "Between selfish indifference and violent protest, there is always another possible option: that of dialogue." The pope continued, "A country grows when constructive dialogue occurs between its many rich cultural components: popular culture, university culture, youth culture, artistic and technological culture, economic culture, family culture and media culture."

Pope Francis also called on members of the clergy to leave the confines of their churches and enter the wider community, with the aim of helping the most marginalized segments of society. Separately in an address to bishops and priests in a Cathedral, Pope Francis urged the clergy to visit Brazil's slums, known as "favelas." He said, "We cannot keep ourselves shut up in parishes, in our communities, when so many people are waiting for the Gospel." It was a now-familiar call from a pontiff uncomfortable with the regal symbols of the Vatican hierarchy, and more at home moving among the people and with a clear social justice agenda for the Roman Catholic Church.

Brazilian Socialist Party exits President Rousseff's coalition government

On Sept. 18, 2013, Brazil's Socialist Party announced that it was exiting President Dilma Rousseff's coalition government. That coalition government was led by Rousseff and her Workers Party but included the Socialists as a junior partner. The move -- as reported by Brazil's

Globovision news agency -- was being made ahead of the next elections in Brazil, set for 2014. The president of the Socialist Party, Eduardo Campos, said, "We are leaving the government and handing over the posts we occupied, so we can freely debate the future of Brazil." The Socialists wanted to end their association with Rousseff -- now suffering from low popularity -- as they intended to field strong candidates in the next elections, including at the presidential level. For that top post, Campos was expected to challenge Rousseff for the presidency.

Primer on 2014 presidential and parliamentary elections in Brazil

A presidential election was to be held in October 2014 over the course of two rounds -- Oct. 5, 2014 and Oct. 26, 2014. In Brazil, the president is both the chief of state and head of government; the president is elected by popular vote for a single four-year term. Incumbent President Dilma Rousseff, who was first elected to power in 2010, was looking to re-election victory in 2014.

Parliamentary elections would also be held in October 2014. At stake would be the composition of the bicameral "Congresso Nacional" (National Congress), which consists of the "Senado Federal" (Federal Senate) and the "Câmara dos Deputados" (Chamber of Deputies). In the "Senado Federal" (Federal Senate), there are 81 seats; three members from each state or federal district are elected according to the principle of majority to serve eight-year terms; one-third are elected after a four-year period, two-thirds are elected after the next four-year period. In the "Camara dos Deputados" (Chamber of Deputies), there are 513 seats; members are elected by proportional representation to serve four-year terms.

Some of the main political parties contesting the election included the president's Workers Party (PT), the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party, the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB), Social Democracy Party (PSD), Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), the Democrats (Dem), Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), Democratic Labor Party (PDT), National Labor Party (PTN), Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB), Brazilian Republican Party (PRB), Green Party (PV), National Ecologic Party (PEN) Social Christian Party (PSC), Social Liberal Party (PSL), United Socialist Workers' Party (PSTU), among others.

Polling data in the spring of 2014 gave Rousseff, of the ruling leftist Workers Party (PT), the clear (but dwindling) lead over her rivals. Those rivals included Aécio Neves, the Minas Gerais senator from the centrist Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB).

In mid-2014, with the election only months away, and with Brazil plagued by a stagnating economy, Neves was chipping away at Rousseff's lead. Given the country's economic woes, Neves' campaign message of pro-market and business-friendly policies held resonance with the

voters. Polling data from Sensus showed Rousseff dropping from 34 percent support in the spring of 2014 to 32 percent in June 2014, while Neves moved from 20 percent to 21.5 percent in that same period.

By the first part of July 2014, Rousseff was still holding onto a lead, with 38 percent of voters' support, while Neves had 20 percent. These numbers suggested a boost for Rousseff that many attributed to positive national feelings amidst the World Cup football tournament being hosted by Brazil. But that boost may have been ephemeral as polling data in mid-July 2014 showed Rousseff's lead slipping to 36 percent. While Neves remained behind at 20 percent in a first round of voting, the data by the Datafolha poll indicated that the two candidates would be in a statistical dead heat in the second round with Rousseff only sporting a four percent lead ahead of Neves in a likely runoff.

It was possible that Rousseff's prospects for re-election were being impacted by the economy, with some experts projecting that Brazil might be on the verge of a recession. Indeed, the Brazilian economy had been showing signs of stagnation for the previous 12 months, as it slowed to only two percent. Meanwhile, industrial output was falling. Also bad for GDP growth were the rising interest rates by the Central Bank, which were intended to subdue inflation but which were also yielding negative consequences for economic activity.

These factors provided fuel for Rousseff's rivals, such as Neves, to criticize her handling of the economy. To that end, Neves was using the opportunity to focus on the economy, and to tout his pro-business agenda that included tax cuts and the restoration of investor confidence. Neves was also calling for reforms to the state-run oil company, Petroleo Brasileiro SA, which was negatively affected by the prevailing government policy of selling oil at below-market prices. It was to be seen if this economic message would resonate among the voters as Brazil's once booming economy flirted with recession.

Note that while the Brazilian presidential contest has focused on the battle between Rousseff and Neves, there were other presidential contenders. That wider field entered the international purview in mid-August 2014 when one presidential candidate, Eduardo Campos of the Brazilian Socialist Party, along with his entourage, were killed in a private jet crash. The aircraft reportedly went down just as it was preparing to land in the city of Santos in bad weather. A business-friendly leftist, Campos was consistently holding a third-place finish in the polls with about 10 percent of the vote share. Clearly, he was not viewed as the likely winner of the presidency in 2014; however, he was regarded as a relatively young and fresh "star" on the Brazilian political scene, who was predicted to perhaps one day win the presidency.

It was soon announced that Campos' running mate, environmentalist Marina Silva, would take his place at the top of the ticket in the presidential election in October 2014. The entrance of Silva into the presidential race in August 2014 appeared to have changed the dynamics to some extent.

To this point, Rousseff was regarded as the favorite, with Neves standing as her most significant rival. With well-known Silva entering the race, the contest was suddenly far more competitive. At issue was Silva's ability to attract left-leaning voters looking for an experienced leader -- indeed one who contested the previous 2010 presidential election as the Green Party candidate. Those left-leaning voters may have gone to Rousseff rather than fresh-faced Campos (prior to his tragic death), but were now willing to consider Silva as their candidate instead. She was also an appealing option for disenchanted and disillusioned Brazilian voters who may not have intended to vote but were now going to the polls to cast a ballot for an environmentalist at the top of a ticket. Stated differently, Rousseff would now have to contend with a far more divided left-wing electorate.

For her part, Silva appeared to have taken the lessons from her previous presidential bid in 2010 and was now presenting herself as a pro-economic development candidate and as an advocate of prosperity. At the same time, she wasted few opportunities to criticize President Rousseff's stewardship of the economy that was now beset by sluggish growth and high inflation. At a news conference, Silva advanced her economic message, saying, "We know that our country needs investments and they will come when there is a new government that has credibility among investors." Silva's prospects would be aided by her reputation as an unwavering environmentalist committed to saving the Amazon rainforest, along with her background as a Christian evangelist. These two traits helped to brand Silva as the most principled politician in a country often rocked by corruption scandals. It was to be seen if it would be enough to facilitate her ascent to the presidency.

A poll by Datafolha in mid-August 2014 showed that Rousseff commanded 36 percent of support, while Silva was now attracting 21 percent of support -- just ahead of Neves who held 20 percent support. Should Silva manage to consolidate this strong start to her late campaign, she could win the second most votes in the first round of voting. That performance would position her for participation in a second round of voting against Rousseff, while sidelining the conservative option, Neves. The new polling data showed that Silva could also pose a credible threat to Rousseff in the runoff -- posting 47 percent support against Rousseff with 43 percent in that second round of voting.

By the end of August 2014, momentum was with Silva and the environmentalist had widened her lead over incumbent President Rousseff. A new poll by Datafolha showed that Rousseff and Silva were now tied in the first round with 34 percent, positioning the two women to contest the second round. In that run-off election, Silva would unseat Rousseff with 50 percent of the vote share -- a full 10 percent more than the 40 percent Rousseff was forecast to garner.

In early September 2014, the race appeared to be in a "plateau phase" according to the polling data. The polling firm, Sensus, showed Rousseff and Silva tied at around 30 percent of the vote

share in the first round. In a second round, as suggested by the voting intentions of persons interviewed by Sensus, Silva would likely be victorious, since 47.6 percent of respondents said they would vote for her over Rousseff, who just had 32.8 percent of support from those interviewed. Other polls showed a similar "leveling off" of support for Silva, while Rousseff's support had stabilized. For example, a poll by MDA showed Rousseff winning the first round with 38 percent over Silva with 33.5 percent; but Silva would have a narrow second round advantage of three percentage points over Rousseff -- 45.5 percent to 42.7 percent.

Now in the thick of the race, Silva was being subject to greater criticism of the type that has been dogging Rousseff. Of note were shifting stances in Silva's campaign platform on contentious issues, such as support for gay marriage. Facing criticism from evangelical pastors over her commitment to back gay marriage, Silva reversed her position. While that move may have shored up her support base among religious voters, it simultaneously repelled urban middle class voters.

Those middle class voters would likely decide the election. The slowing of the Brazilian economy has particularly plagued Brazil's new middle class. The crowning achievement of former President Lula, Brazil's new middle class was now suffering from an economy in stagnation; they were additionally annoyed by the poor quality of public services, which stood in sharp and unwelcome contrast to government expenditures on stadiums for the World Cup. Angry with Rousseff over this mismanagement of the country's coffers, they were persuadable voters who could be attracted to Silva, were it not for her conservative social views. Thus the election would likely be a highly competitive event.

By the last week of September 2014, with the first round of the election less than two weeks away, Rousseff had managed to narrow the gap between herself and Silva and moved back into an advantageous position. Rousseff was making the economic argument that Silva, despite her environmental credentials, was too willing to cozy up to business and would not be good for the country's poorest echelon. It was an argument likely to find resonance with voters generally loyal to Rousseff's Workers Party (PT), who had been considering Silva as an alternative. Rousseff was also arguing that Silva was an untested leader and ill-equipped to govern Brazil.

The new Datafolha poll in the last week of September 2014 showed Rousseff ahead with 37 percent of the votes compared to 30 percent for Silva. In the second round, Silva was forecast to have a slim lead of only two percentage points -- 46 percent to Rousseff with 44 percent. Another poll in the same period -- this time by MDA -- showed a similar trend. In the first round, Rousseff was forecast to take 36 percent against Silva with 27.4 percent; in the second round Silva was expected to be in a dead heat with Rousseff with the former now trailing the incumbent president 41 percent to 42 percent.

If Silva was ultimately able to narrowly unseat Rousseff, it would augur a political earthquake on Brazil's political landscape. Indeed, Silva could become Brazil's first Afro-Brazilian president in

the nation's history. However, such a fate was not to become reality. Instead, the first round of the presidential contest recalibrated the race, essentially returning it to the original dynamics before the ascent of Silva.

On Oct. 5, 2014, Brazilians went to the polls to cast their ballots. To recapitulate -- the main presidential candidates on the ballot were incumbent President Dilma Rousseff of the leftist Workers' Party (PT), Minas Gerais Senator Aécio Neves from the centrist Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB), and Marina Silva from the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB).

After the votes in the first round had been tallied, the presidential contest had been inexorably altered. As expected, Rousseff had won this initial stage, carrying 41.6 percent of the vote share. But instead of Silva, it was Neves who had quietly crept up in voters' preferences to secure the second place finish and, thus, the right to contest that second and final election round. Neves won 33.5 percent of the vote share with Silva slipping to third place with 21.3 percent. The run-off election on Oct. 26, 2014, would be a contest between incumbent President Rousseff and the pro-business opposition candidate, Neves.

Polling data compiled right after the first round of voting indicated that the two candidates contesting the second round were in a competitive race. Two surveys by the Datafolha and Ibope respectively showed Neves with 46 percent support against Rousseff with 44 percent. As such, the fight to transfer support from Silva's constituency to either Rousseff or Neves would be a fierce and possibly decisive one.

For its part, Silva's Brazilian Socialist Party soon indicated that it might be prepared to back Neves; however, Silva was herself not quick to offer a personal endorsement to Neves. Instead, allies of Silva said she wanted to see Neves commit to some of her "progressive" causes such as sustainable development with a pro-environmental orientation, the defense of the rights of indigenous Brazilians, and a program of land reform for landless peasants. Apparently, Silva was able to garner those commitments because in the second week of October 2014, she officially endorsed Neves for the presidency. At a campaign event in Sao Paulo, Silva said, "In view of Aécio Neves' commitments, I declare that I will vote for and support his candidacy."

Assuming Silva's support base took her lead and transferred their backing to Neves, it was highly likely that Rousseff would be unseated and the domination of the Workers Party in the executive branch of government in Brazil would come to a close.

For her part, Rousseff was on the proverbial cliff and precipitously close to a political fall. As such, the incumbent president reminded voters that pro-business types, such as Neves, followed an economic philosophy that failed Brazil in the past, while her leftist Workers Party had done the opposite. Speaking of Neves, Rousseff warned, "He represents a model that bankrupted the country three times, cowered Brazil before the International Monetary Fund, privatized state

companies for peanuts, caused widespread unemployment, wage reductions and recession." But Rousseff would not be helped by an unfolding corruption scandal involving her party and the state-run energy company, Petrobras.

In the second week of October 2014, with the runoff about two weeks away, polling data showed Rousseff and Neves to be in a competitive race, running neck and neck with one another. A survey by Datafolha showed Neves with 45 percent and Rousseff with 43 percent in voters' preferences.

By the third week of October 2014, with the run-off election about one week away, polling data by Sensus gave the advantage to Neves, who was at 56 percent in voters' preferences, significantly ahead of Rousseff with 44 percent. It should be noted that Sensus was not as well-renowned a pollster as Datafolha; nevertheless, the wide margin between the two candidates, according to Sensus, certainly suggested that undecided voters along with Silva voters might be breaking in favor of Neves.

But an MDA survey in the last week of October 2014 -- just days ahead of the election -- showed a close race with Rousseff holding 45.5 percent of voter support against Neves with 44.5 percent. Another poll by the well-known pollster, Datafolha, around the same time gave the slight advantage to Rousseff with 47 percent of voter support and Neves with 43 percent. It seemed the second round of the Brazilian presidential election would be a competitive contest all the way to election day on Oct. 26, 2014.

On Oct. 26, 2014, voters cast their ballots in the runoff election of the presidential contest. Neves' pro-business stance meant that he racked up votes in wealthier southern states of Brazil; meanwhile, Rousseff's warnings about the ills of the supply side economic path held resonance with voters in the poorer northern states of Brazil.

Ultimately, the election results gave re-election victory to Rousseff with 51 percent of the vote share over Neves with just over 48 percent in what clearly turned into a close and heavily contested presidential race. Acknowledging that her performance in her first term was less than optimal, even with this re-election victory, Rousseff vowed to be "a much better president than I have been until now." Moving forward, Rousseff urged all Brazilians "to unite in favor of Brazil's future" and said political reform would be "a top priority" of her second term in office. For his part, Neves conceded defeat and wished Rousseff success in the administration of her next government.

Note that at the parliamentary level, the broad pro-government coalition, including Rousseff's Workers Party, secured 55 percent of the vote share and was on track to carry around 304 seats in parliament. The opposition "change" coalition aligned with Neves, and including his Social Democratic Party, took about 26 percent of the vote share and would likely control approximately

128 seats in parliament. The opposition bloc aligned with Silva, including her Brazilian Socialist Party, garnered 11 percent of the vote share and about 55 seats in parliament.

President Rousseff faced with impeachment proceedings over corruption scandal

For some time, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff has been confronted with serious political challenges. Going back to December 2015, President Dilma Rousseff was faced with impeachment as the speaker of Brazil's lower house of Congress opened proceedings against her. The move was based on allegations that her government manipulated its accounts in 2014 to obfuscate the country's fiscal deficit at a time when she was campaigning for re-election.

Earlier in 2015, a corruption scandal had unfolded involving President Rousseff's party and the state-run energy company, Petrobras. At issue were claims that many politicians from her ruling coalition were being accused of taking bribes in an elaborate kickback scheme. Of particular concern was the fact that much of the alleged bribery occurred when Rousseff was at the helm of Petrobras. The opposition in Brazil quickly exploited this fact, noting that it was delusional to assume Rousseff was unaware of the scheme given her position in Petrobras.

With the Brazilian citizenry already angry and frustrated over the downturn in the economy, their anti-government anger was sparked with more than a million people participating in demonstrations across the country, including major cities such as Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro, and Sao Paulo. The first major burst of demonstrations occurred in March 2015 quickly turned to a protest movement of sorts with participants demanding the impeachment of the president.

Of course, it should be noted that Brazil's largest opposition party, the centrist Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB), at the time made clear that it was not interested in advancing impeachment proceedings against Rousseff. The PSDB leader and former president, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, said in an interview with Reuters News that impeaching Rousseff only months after she was re-elected to power would be contrary to democracy. Admonishing protesters, he said, "Nobody should want impeachment, it's a very complex thing." He continued, "You'd need to have a crime, and a political consensus in Congress as well as in the street. I don't think that's the situation here."

For her part, Rousseff seemed undeterred, refusing even to consider a cabinet shuffle in the face of growing public resentment. Instead, she pointed to the fact that an investigation by the attorney general absolved her of any involvement.

This defiant stance was doing Rousseff no favors. Another burst of protests broke out on April 12, 2015, as Brazilians took to the streets in more than 100 cities, with demonstrators chanting "Out with Dilma" and others holding "Impeachment Now" banners.

It was apparent that the Brazilian president, who was re-elected to power only months before in the latter part of 2014, was under pressure. Survey data by Datafolha showed that a full 62 percent of respondents rating Rousseff's government as either "bad" or "terrible." Less than a quarter of respondents -- 24 percent -- rated her government as "okay," while only 13 percent rated it as "good." Another poll, this time by CNT/MDA, showed similarly grim news, with 65 percent of respondents rating Rousseff's government negatively and only 11 percent giving it positive marks. Perhaps most disturbingly for Rousseff was another bout of polling data by Datafolha showing that a full two-thirds of Brazilians favored her impeachment.

Irrespective of the populist call for Rousseff's impeachment in the Petrobras scandal, there was a new controversy brewing in April 2015. This time, the issue centered on the charges that government delayed the transfer of funds to state banks, presumably to finesse the health of the country's fiscal accounts during an election year. The Federal Audit Court ruled that in postponing the funds for this alleged purpose, the government had violated the fiscal responsibility law. Opposition parties seized on the court ruling as grounds for impeachment of President Rousseff.

Justice Minister Jose Eduardo Cardozo made clear there was actually no substantial basis for taking impeachment action against the president in this case, given the premise for the ruling by the Federal Audit Court. According to Cardozo, the government thus had a sound basis for a successful court appeal.

By August 2015, the protest movement was resurfacing and calls for Rousseff's impeachment were reaching new heights. Now, the complaints centered on charges of corruption tied to the scandals discussed above, as well as a significant economic slow-down, which was deemed the worst reversal in 25 years. Hundreds of thousands of Brazilians were taking to the streets in Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, and Brasilia singing the national anthem and carrying banners and posters emblazoned with the words, "Dilma Out!" While some political voices have argued that the impeachment of Rousseff would damage Brazil, her approval ratings were so low -- now measuring in single digits -- it was difficult to see how she would survive politically. One factor in her favor was the fact that while Brazil business community did not share President Rousseff's leftist ideology, it was not keen to see the country destabilized politically. For business leaders, an impeachment would plunge the country into a state of political uncertainty that was hardly conducive for economic growth at a time when Brazil was already suffering a downturn.

Brazil's downturn reached new lows on Sept. 10, 2015, when the credit ratings agency, Standard & Poor's, downgraded the country from an investment-grade rating to "junk status." Indeed, as Brazil was plunged into a recession, Standard & Poor's moved Brazil's rating from BBB-minus to BB-plus, in order to show substantial credit risk; Standard & Poor's also classified Brazil's outlook as negative, auguring a further downgrade in the future.

In October 2015, the Brazilian president's political fate took a dim turn when the Federal Accounts Court ruled that Rousseff's government manipulated its accounts in 2014 to obfuscate the country's fiscal deficit at a time when she was campaigning for re-election. While the ruling was not legally binding, it could nonetheless be used by political opponents to impeach Rousseff. Indeed, several opposition politicians were cheering the court ruling and asserting that it was now time to move forward with impeachment proceedings against the president. For her part, President Rousseff has said that there were no legal grounds for such a move, and the government has accused the audit court has been unfair in assessing its effort to pay for vital social programs that benefit Brazil's most impoverished people. It was to be seen if Rousseff would be able to survive the political crisis.

As October 2015 was drawing to a close, the pressure was mounting to move forward with impeachment proceedings against President Rousseff. Of note was the rising call from opposition activists, who had handcuffed themselves to a pillar in Brazil's Congress, and demanded that House Speaker Eduardo Cunha move forward with an impeachment request issued by the opposition. That move would have popular support since polling data showed that more than 65 percent of Brazilians backed the impeachment of Rousseff. However, Cunha was himself implicated in the corruption scandal rocking the country due to revelations about secret bank accounts, and likely needed the support of Rousseff's ruling Workers Party to avoid being removed from office himself. As such, with his own political self-preservation at stake, Cunha was not eager to see impeachment proceedings against the Workers Party's leader go into motion.

By December 2015, Rousseff's political prospects turned dim as the speaker of Brazil's lower house of Congress opened impeachment proceedings against the president. Those impeachment proceedings were based on allegations that President Rousseff acted illegally in manipulating the 2014 budget -- borrowing funds from state banks to cover budget shortfalls -- with an eye on bolstering her economic credentials at a time she was seeking re-election. Also included in the impeachment document were references to the Petrobras scandal.

As discussed just above, House Speaker Cunha had not been keen to move in this direction, given his own legal woes and his reliance on the ruling party for support in parliament. But with an ethics committee deciding whether to oust Cunha from his post as speaker, he was now moving in a politically expedient direction. He explained his rationale as follows: "It was a difficult decision. I did not become speaker of the Chamber of Deputies aiming to approve impeachment proceedings against the president."

For her part, President Rousseff condemned the move and dismissed the accusations, declaring in a national address, "I was outraged by the decision. I haven't committed any wrongful act." In interviews with the media, she also called on the legislative branch of government to cancel its January recess and turn its attention to the impeachment proceedings against her. To this end, Rousseff said, "In this situation of political and economic crisis that the country is living, I think it

is important to call back Congress." With the economy set to suffer more setbacks in 2016, Rousseff may have been making the calculation that it would be better to settle her fate sooner rather than later, given the economic woe yet to unfold.

It was to be seen if the impeachment proceedings would actually move forward as the process must be approved by a two-thirds majority in the lower house where the pro-Rousseff governing coalition has a majority of seats. Still, the development has fueled anti-Rousseff sentiment with one of her defeated rivals in the 2014 presidential contest, Senator Aécio Neves, expressing support for her impeachment. Via the social media outlet, Twitter, he wrote, "Everyone in the country must obey the law, especially the president."

In the second week of December 2015, the Supreme Court suspended impeachment proceedings against the president until it could rule on the validity of a secret ballot vote that was undertaken to select the members of the house committee directing the impeachment of Rousseff. Nevertheless, the Brazilian people continued to make their voices be heard, with thousands taking to the streets of cities across Brazil to demand that Rousseff be removed as president. In truth, the groundswell of support for the ousting of Rousseff was not based in the charges at stake in the impeachment case so much as they were based on outrage over corruption at Petrobras and upset about the downturn in the Brazilian economy.

By mid-December 2015, Rousseff's prospects of political survival improved when the Supreme Court ruled that the Senate could review the grounds for impeachment even if the lower chamber opted to impeach the president. As December 2015 came to a close, Rousseff seemed emboldened by the assistance from the Supreme Court as she declared that her opponents could not resort to impeachment simply because they were at odds with her, and noted that those rivals had no legal basis to impeach her in the first place. She also asserted that Brazil should not be sidetracked, and that the country should focus on economic stewardship.

The year 2016 brought a shift in fortune for President Rousseff. A new burst of mass protests in March 2016 was motivating unsure members of parliament from the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) -- the governing coalition's biggest partner -- to shift their sentiment. Now, they favored voting against Rousseff in ongoing impeachment proceedings in Congress. Indeed, members of parliament from the PMDB were suggesting that impeachment was "inevitable," although the Rio de Janeiro wing of the party was not keen on the idea due to its dependence on federal funds for various projects. Should an impeachment vote go forward with members of parliament voting to sanction Rousseff, presidential power would shift to the vice president, Michel Temer, who was the head of the PMDB. Meanwhile, a member of their own party -- the aforementioned Cunha -- was himself under investigation regarding the prevailing scandal. By sacrificing Rousseff via impeachment, the PMDB would ease the pressure of scrutiny on their side.

By the middle of March 2016, anti-government protesters were rocking Brazil, with security forces using war cannons to disperse the angry demonstrations. This latest bout of mass action had erupted over President Rousseff's decision to appoint her predecessor, former President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (known in Brazil as "Lula") as a cabinet minister. She made the move hoping to assuage her critics and build support among the party faithful where Lula remained highly popular. But critics have accused her of making the appointment for more insidious reasons -- specifically to help Lula evade prosecutors who have charged him with money laundering and fraud. Of note that the very appointment of Lula to a cabinet was subject to legal consequences with a federal judge issuing an injunction to suspend his appointment. Meanwhile, on the streets, a loud and outraged demand for Rousseff to be removed from office was going on in cities across the country.

In the third week of March 2016, the process of impeaching President Rousseff was under way, with the lower house of the Congress convening a session on the matter. It should be noted that a significant majority of Brazilians favored either the impeachment of President Rousseff or her resignation, according to survey data. That finding suggested that most Brazilians wanted to see Rousseff gone from office in some form another. That being said, survey data also showed that Brazilians were not keen on her likely successor, Vice President Michel Temer.

As March 2016 was coming to a close, the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) decided to officially split with President Dilma Rousseff's coalition, essentially isolating the president. Such an end would facilitate the impeachment of the president, as discussed above, her suspension from office by Congress, and her replacement by Temer.

Rousseff's political prospects worsened on March 29, 2016, when the Brazilian Bar Association filed a measure to impeach her for obstructing justice, fiscal accounting machinations, and the questionable decision to grant tax-exempt status to the international soccer body FIFA during the 2014 World Cup. This move was separate from the existing corruption charges discussed above, but the new charges could end the same way.

By the start of April 2016, the Brazilian attorney general, Jose Eduardo Cardozo, indicted that he would ask a congressional committee to dismiss the impeachment charges* against Rousseff, suggesting that there was no legal basis for the move. He added that House Speaker Cunha's decision to accept the impeachment request was politically motivated.

For the impeachment to go forward, Rousseff's opponents would have to garner the votes of two-thirds of 513 deputies in the lower chamber. If that threshold is passed, then the matter would be taken up by the Senate. Should the lower chamber of Brazil's parliament ultimately impeach Rousseff, she would be suspended from her post as president for six months while the Senate conducted her trial. During that period, as indicated here, Vice President Temer would function as the country's acting president.

That likely scenario became more murky on April 5, 2016, when a Supreme Court Justice Marco Aurelio Mello ordered the lower chamber of the parliament to commence impeachment proceedings against Vice President Temer. Mello said that a congressional committee should consider placing Temer on trial on the basis of the fact that he was part of the very Rousseff government, which was accused of manipulating the budget accounting discussed here.

With Temer's political fate on the line, members of congress of all invested parties were likely to rethink the consequences of voting to impeach Rousseff with Temer's fate now likely tied to hers. The political calculations and strategies were effectively changing as a result of Justice Mello's decision.

Of significance was the news evolving on April 6, 2016, that Temer would step down as head of the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) with leadership switching to his deputy Senator Romero Juca.

By the second week of April 2016, a Congressional committee in the Brazilian parliament voted to move forward with impeachment proceedings against Rousseff. The vote opened the door for a full impeachment vote in the lower house of the parliament, set to begin on April 17, 2016. While the decision by the Congressional committee was to be viewed as a symbolic gesture, it nonetheless indicated that there was support in the parliament for the impeachment of the president.

It should be noted that during this period, thousands of supporters of President Rousseff participated in anti-impeachment rallies in Rio de Janeiro. Meanwhile, stalwarts of the president railed against the impeachment moves, casting them as something of a coup against a popularly elected government, while Rousseff herself accused Temer as treachery. She said, "If there were any doubts about my denunciation that a coup is underway there can't be now. The coup plotters have a leader and a deputy leader."

On April 17, 2016, member of Brazil's lower house voted to impeach President Rousseff, while the ruling Workers Party conceded defeat. The ruling party said that it would redirect its efforts to the Senate, where they hoped they would be able to block the effort to remove Rousseff from office. As well, Jacques Wagner, President Rousseff's chief of staff, expressed confidence that the Senate would bring an end to the process. For her part, President Rousseff promised to fight the impeachment. In a national address, she said, "While I am very saddened by this, I have the force, the spirit and the courage to fight this whole process to the end." She added, "This is just the beginning of the battle, which will be long and drawn out."

With two-thirds support needed and secured in a lower house vote (specifically 342 votes out of 513 since the Speaker would not vote), the matter would then be sent to the Senate.

In the latter part of April 2016, at the United Nations for the signing of the Paris climate change agreement, President Dilma Rousseff told the international community that Brazil was being mired by the impeachment crisis. She said, "I cannot conclude my remarks without mentioning the grave moment Brazil is currently undergoing." She added, "I have no doubt our people will be capable of preventing any setbacks."

For his part, Vice President Temer, who would likely succeed Rousseff, should she be impeached, denied the president's accusations that he was carrying out a "coup" against her. Temer defended himself in interviews with the media, telling the Wall Street Journal that he was worried about the damage Rousseff was doing to Brazil's image. In an interview with the New York Times, he said: "I'm very worried about the president's intention to say Brazil is some minor republic where coups are carried out."

In the second week of May 2016, there was an attempt by the interim speaker of the lower house to annul the impeachment process and prevent it from going to the Senate. But the leader of the Senate, Renan Calheiros, said that the process would move forward in the upper chamber. To that end, a vote would be taken on whether or not to try Rousseff.

In the Senate, debate began on May 11, 2016, to decide whether or not to suspend Rousseff from her presidential duties while her trial was ongoing. In the early hours of May 12, 2016, following more than 20 hours of debate, lawmakers in the Brazilian Senate voted 55 to 22 to suspend Rousseff and move forward with her trial for corruption. Later on May 12, 2016, as she exited her post, Rousseff blasted her suspension, calling it a "farce" and "sabotage." She also denied the allegations against her and vowed to battle the "injustice."

As discussed here, Vice President Temer assumed the presidency, albeit on a temporary basis. In a national address, having become Brazil's interim head of state, Temer said, "It is urgent to restore peace and unite Brazil. We must form a government that will save the nation." He added, "We must rescue Brazil's credibility internally and externally." Striking a tone of national resolve, Temer declared, "Trust in me; trust in the values of our people and in our ability to recover the economy."

It should be noted that Temer formed a pro-business cabinet that included the former head of the central bank, Henrique Meirelles, who now would hold the finance portfolio.

As June 2016 commenced, Brazil was mired by no shortage of political scandals involving the new interim government. In fact, leaked recordings indicated that two cabinet ministers tried to block an anti-graft investigation at the state oil company, Petrobras. This revelation prompted the resignations of the two cabinet ministers before they could even make a dent in their respective portfolios. These developments had the effect of helping Rousseff politically, with some members

of the Senate now telegraphing that they would not necessarily vote in favor of her impeachment.

Going forward, the Senate would have an 180-day period to carry out that trial, and with two-thirds support in the upper chamber (specifically 54 votes of 81), then Rousseff would be impeached and stripped of the presidency. She would be prevented from running for political office for eight years while Temer would assume the presidency for the rest of Rousseff's term, which was set to end in 2018.

*To recapitulate: The impeachment process against the Brazilian leader was related to allegations that Rousseff deliberately and illegally manipulated the 2014 budget -- borrowing funds from state banks to cover budget shortfalls -- in order to bolster her economic credentials as she was seeking re-election.

-- June 2016

Written by Dr. Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief, CountryWatch.com . Research sources listed in Bibliography.

Political Risk Index

Political Risk Index

The **Political Risk Index** is a proprietary index measuring the level of risk posed to governments, corporations, and investors, based on a myriad of political and economic factors. The [Political Risk Index](#) is calculated using an established methodology by CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is based on varied criteria* including the following consideration: political stability, political representation, democratic accountability, freedom of expression, security and crime, risk of conflict, human development, jurisprudence and regulatory transparency, economic risk, foreign investment considerations, possibility of sovereign default, and corruption. Scores are assigned from 0-10 using the aforementioned criteria. A score of 0 marks the highest political risk, while a score of 10 marks the lowest political risk. Stated differently, countries with the lowest scores pose the greatest political risk. A score of 0 marks the most dire level of political risk and an ultimate nadir, while a score of 10 marks the lowest possible level of political risk, according to this

proprietary index. Rarely will there be scores of 0 or 10 due to the reality that countries contain complex landscapes; as such, the index offers a range of possibilities ranging from lesser to greater risk.

Country	Assessment
Afghanistan	2
Albania	4
Algeria	6
Andorra	9
Angola	4
Antigua	8
Argentina	4
Armenia	4-5
Australia	9.5
Austria	9.5
Azerbaijan	4
Bahamas	8.5
Bahrain	6

Bangladesh	3.5
Barbados	8.5-9
Belarus	3
Belgium	9
Belize	8
Benin	5
Bhutan	5
Bolivia	5
Bosnia-Herzegovina	4
Botswana	7
Brazil	7
Brunei	7
Bulgaria	6
Burkina Faso	4
Burma (Myanmar)	4.5
Burundi	3
Cambodia	4
Cameroon	5

Canada	9.5
Cape Verde	6
Central African Republic	3
Chad	4
Chile	9
China	7
China: Hong Kong	8
China: Taiwan	8
Colombia	7
Comoros	5
Congo DRC	3
Congo RC	4
Costa Rica	8
Cote d'Ivoire	4.5
Croatia	7
Cuba	4-4.5
Cyprus	5
Czech Republic	8

Denmark	9.5
Djibouti	4.5
Dominica	7
Dominican Republic	6
East Timor	5
Ecuador	6
Egypt	5
El Salvador	7
Equatorial Guinea	4
Eritrea	3
Estonia	8
Ethiopia	4
Fiji	5
Finland	9
Fr. Yugoslav Rep. Macedonia	5
France	9
Gabon	5
Gambia	4

Georgia	5
Germany	9.5
Ghana	6
Greece	4.5-5
Grenada	8
Guatemala	6
Guinea	3.5
Guinea-Bissau	3.5
Guyana	4.5
Haiti	3.5
Holy See (Vatican)	9
Honduras	4.5-5
Hungary	7
Iceland	8.5-9
India	7.5-8
Indonesia	6
Iran	3.5-4
Iraq	2.5-3

Ireland	8-8.5
Israel	8
Italy	7.5
Jamaica	6.5-7
Japan	9
Jordan	6.5
Kazakhstan	6
Kenya	5
Kiribati	7
Korea, North	1
Korea, South	8
Kosovo	4
Kuwait	7
Kyrgyzstan	4.5
Laos	4.5
Latvia	7
Lebanon	5.5
Lesotho	6

Liberia	3.5
Libya	2
Liechtenstein	9
Lithuania	7.5
Luxembourg	9
Madagascar	4
Malawi	4
Malaysia	8
Maldives	4.5
Mali	4
Malta	8
Marshall Islands	6
Mauritania	4.5-5
Mauritius	7
Mexico	6.5
Micronesia	7
Moldova	5
Monaco	9

Mongolia	5
Montenegro	6
Morocco	6.5
Mozambique	4.5-5
Namibia	6.5-7
Nauru	6
Nepal	4
Netherlands	9.5
New Zealand	9.5
Nicaragua	5
Niger	4
Nigeria	4.5
Norway	9.5
Oman	7
Pakistan	3.5
Palau	7
Panama	7.5
Papua New Guinea	5

Paraguay	6.5-7
Peru	7
Philippines	6
Poland	8
Portugal	7.5
Qatar	7.5
Romania	5.5
Russia	5.5
Rwanda	5
Saint Kitts and Nevis	8
Saint Lucia	8
Saint Vincent and Grenadines	8
Samoa	7
San Marino	9
Sao Tome and Principe	5.5
Saudi Arabia	6
Senegal	6
Serbia	5

Seychelles	7
Sierra Leone	4.5
Singapore	9
Slovak Republic (Slovakia)	8
Slovenia	8
Solomon Islands	6
Somalia	2
South Africa	7
Spain	7.5
Sri Lanka	5
Sudan	3.5
Suriname	5
Swaziland	5
Sweden	9.5
Switzerland	9.5
Syria	2
Tajikistan	4.5
Tanzania	6

Thailand	6.5
Togo	4.5
Tonga	7
Trinidad and Tobago	8
Tunisia	6
Turkey	7
Turkmenistan	4.5
Tuvalu	7
Uganda	6
Ukraine	3.5-4
United Arab Emirates	7
United Kingdom	9
United States	9.5
Uruguay	8
Uzbekistan	4
Vanuatu	7
Venezuela	4
Vietnam	5

Yemen	3
Zambia	4.5
Zimbabwe	3

*Methodology

The [Political Risk Index](#) is calculated by CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is based on the combined scoring of varied criteria as follows --

1. political stability (record of peaceful transitions of power, ability of government to stay in office and carry out policies as a result of productive executive-legislative relationship, perhaps with popular support vis a vis risk of government collapse)
2. political representation (right of suffrage, free and fair elections, multi-party participation, and influence of foreign powers)
3. democratic accountability (record of respect for political rights, human rights, and civil liberties, backed by constitutional protections)
4. freedom of expression (media freedom and freedom of expression, right to dissent or express political opposition, backed by constitutional protections)
5. security and crime (the degree to which a country has security mechanisms that ensures safety of citizens and ensures law and order, without resorting to extra-judicial measures)
6. risk of conflict (the presence of conflict; record of coups or civil disturbances; threat of war; threats posed by internal or external tensions; threat or record of terrorism or insurgencies)
7. human development (quality of life; access to education; socio-economic conditions; systemic concern for the status of women and children)
8. jurisprudence and regulatory transparency (the impartiality of the legal system, the degree of transparency within the regulatory system of a country and the durability of that structure)
9. economic conditions (economic stability, investment climate, degree of nationalization of industries, property rights, labor force development)
10. corruption (the degree of corruption in a country and/or efforts by the government to address

graft and other irregularities)

Editor's Note:

As of 2015, the current climate of upheaval internationally -- both politically and economically -- has affected the ratings for several countries across the world.

North Korea, [Afghanistan](#), [Somalia](#), and [Zimbabwe](#) -- retain their low rankings.

Several Middle Eastern and North African countries, such as [Tunisia](#), [Egypt](#), [Libya](#), [Syria](#), [Iraq](#) and [Yemen](#) were downgraded in recent years due to political instability occurring in the "season of unrest" sweeping the region since 2011 and continuing today. The worst downgrades affected [Syria](#) where civil war is at play, along with the rampage of terror being carried out by Islamist terrorists who have also seized control over part of Syrian territory. [Iraq](#) has been further downgraded due to the rampage of Islamist terrorists and their takeover of wide swaths of Iraqi territory. [Libya](#) has also been downgraded further due to its slippage into failed state status; at issue in [Libya](#) have been an ongoing power struggle between rival militias. [Yemen](#) continues to hold steady with a poor ranking due to continued unrest at the hands of Houthi rebels, secessionists, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, and Islamic State. Its landscape has been further complicated by the fact that it is now the site of a proxy war between [Iran](#) and [Saudi Arabia](#). Conversely, [Tunisia](#) and [Egypt](#) have seen slight upgrades as these countries stabilize.

In Africa, [Zimbabwe](#) continues to be one of the bleak spots of the world with the Mugabe regime effectively destroying the country's once vibrant economy, and miring [Zimbabwe](#) with an exceedingly high rate of inflation, debilitating unemployment, devolving public services, and critical food shortages; rampant crime and political oppression round out the landscape. [Somalia](#) also sports a poor ranking due to the continuing influence of the terror group, al-Shabab, which was not operating across the border in [Kenya](#). On the upside, [Nigeria](#), which was ineffectively dealing with the threat posed by the terror group, Boko Haram, was making some strides on the national security front with its new president at the helm. [Mali](#) was slightly upgraded due to its efforts to return to constitutional order following the 2012 coup and to neutralize the threat of separatists and Islamists. But the [Central African Republic](#) was downgraded due to the takeover of the government by Muslim Seleka rebels and a continued state of lawlessness in that country. South [Sudan](#) -- the world's newest nation state -- has not been officially included in this assessment; however, it can be unofficially assessed to be in the vicinity of "3" due to its manifold political and economic challenges. [Burkina Faso](#), [Burundi](#) and [Guinea](#) have been downgraded due to political unrest, with [Guinea](#) also having to deal with the burgeoning Ebola crisis.

In Europe, [Ukraine](#) was downgraded due to the unrest facing that country following its Maidan revolution that triggered a pro-Russian uprising in the eastern part of the country. [Russia](#) was also implicated in the Ukrainian crisis due to its intervention on behalf of pro-Russian separatists, as well as its annexation of the Ukrainian territory of Crimea. Strains on the infrastructure of southern and eastern European countries, such as [Serbia](#), [Croatia](#), and [Hungary](#), due to an influx of refugees was expected to pose social and economic challenges, and slight downgrades were made accordingly. So too, a corruption crisis for the Romanian prime minister has affected the ranking of that country. Meanwhile, the rankings for [Spain](#), [Portugal](#), [Ireland](#), and [Italy](#) were maintained due to debt woes and the concomitant effect on the euro zone. [Greece](#), another euro zone nation, was earlier downgraded due to its sovereign debt crisis; however, no further downgrade was added since the country was able to successfully forge a bailout rescue deal with creditor institutions. Cyprus' exposure to Greek banks yielded a downgrade in its case.

In Asia, [Nepal](#) was downgraded in response to continuous political instability and a constitutional crisis that prevails well after landmark elections were held. Both [India](#) and [China](#) retain their rankings; [India](#) holds a slightly higher ranking than [China](#) due to its record of democratic representation and accountability. Increasing violence and political instability in [Pakistan](#) resulted in a downgrade for this country's already low rating. Meanwhile, [Singapore](#) retained its strong rankings due to its continued effective stewardship of the economy and political stability.

In the Americas, ongoing political and economic woes, as well as crime and corruption have affected the rankings for [Mexico](#), [Guatemala](#), and [Brazil](#). [Argentina](#) was downgraded due to its default on debt following the failure of talks with bond holders. [Venezuela](#) was downgraded due to its mix of market unfriendly policies and political oppression. For the moment, the [United States](#) maintains a strong ranking along with [Canada](#), and most of the English-speaking countries of the Caribbean; however, a renewed debt ceiling crisis could cause the [United States](#) to be downgraded in a future edition. Finally, a small but significant upgrade was attributed to [Cuba](#) due to its recent pro-business reforms and its normalization of ties with the United States.

Source:

Dr. Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief, CountryWatch Inc. www.countrywatch.com

Updated:

2015

Political Stability

Political Stability

The **Political Stability Index** is a proprietary index measuring a country's level of stability, standard of good governance, record of constitutional order, respect for human rights, and overall strength of democracy. The [Political Stability Index](#) is calculated using an established methodology* by CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is based on a given country's record of peaceful transitions of power, ability of a government to stay in office and carry out its policies vis a vis risk credible risks of government collapse. Threats include coups, domestic violence and instability, terrorism, etc. This index measures the dynamic between the quality of a country's government and the threats that can compromise and undermine stability. Scores are assigned from 0-10 using the aforementioned criteria. A score of 0 marks the lowest level of political stability and an ultimate nadir, while a score of 10 marks the highest level of political stability possible, according to this proprietary index. Rarely will there be scores of 0 or 10 due to the reality that countries contain complex landscapes; as such, the index offers a range of possibilities ranging from lesser to greater stability.

Country	Assessment
Afghanistan	2
Albania	4.5-5
Algeria	5
Andorra	9.5
Angola	4.5-5
Antigua	8.5-9
Argentina	7

Armenia	5.5
Australia	9.5
Austria	9.5
Azerbaijan	5
Bahamas	9
Bahrain	6
Bangladesh	4.5
Barbados	9
Belarus	4
Belgium	9
Belize	8
Benin	5
Bhutan	5
Bolivia	6
Bosnia-Herzegovina	5
Botswana	8.5
Brazil	7
Brunei	8

Bulgaria	7.5
Burkina Faso	4
Burma (Myanmar)	4.5
Burundi	4
Cambodia	4.5-5
Cameroon	6
Canada	9.5
Cape Verde	6
Central African Republic	3
Chad	4.5
Chile	9
China	7
China: Hong Kong	8
China: Taiwan	8
Colombia	7.5
Comoros	5
Congo DRC	3
Congo RC	5

Costa Rica	9.5
Cote d'Ivoire	3.5
Croatia	7.5
Cuba	4.5
Cyprus	8
Czech Republic	8.5
Denmark	9.5
Djibouti	5
Dominica	8.5
Dominican Republic	7
East Timor	5
Ecuador	7
Egypt	4.5-5
El Salvador	7.5-8
Equatorial Guinea	4.5
Eritrea	4
Estonia	9
Ethiopia	4.5

Fiji	5
Finland	9
Fr.YugoslavRep.Macedonia	6.5
France	9
Gabon	5
Gambia	4.5
Georgia	5
Germany	9.5
Ghana	7
Greece	6
Grenada	8.5
Guatemala	7
Guinea	3.5-4
Guinea-Bissau	4
Guyana	6
Haiti	3.5-4
Holy See (Vatican)	9.5
Honduras	6

Hungary	7.5
Iceland	9
India	8
Indonesia	7
Iran	3.5
Iraq	2.5
Ireland	9.5
Israel	8
Italy	8.5-9
Jamaica	8
Japan	9
Jordan	6
Kazakhstan	6
Kenya	5
Kiribati	8
Korea, North	2
Korea, South	8.5
Kosovo	5.5

Kuwait	7
Kyrgyzstan	5
Laos	5
Latvia	8.5
Lebanon	5.5
Lesotho	5
Liberia	3.5-4
Libya	2
Liechtenstein	9
Lithuania	9
Luxembourg	9.5
Madagascar	4
Malawi	5
Malaysia	8
Maldives	4.5-5
Mali	4.5-5
Malta	9
Marshall Islands	8

Mauritania	6
Mauritius	8
Mexico	6.5-7
Micronesia	8
Moldova	5.5
Monaco	9.5
Mongolia	6.5-7
Montenegro	8
Morocco	7
Mozambique	5
Namibia	8.5
Nauru	8
Nepal	4.5
Netherlands	9.5
New Zealand	9.5
Nicaragua	6
Niger	4.5
Nigeria	4.5

Norway	9.5
Oman	7
Pakistan	3
Palau	8
Panama	8.5
Papua New Guinea	6
Paraguay	8
Peru	7.5
Philippines	6
Poland	9
Portugal	9
Qatar	7
Romania	7
Russia	6
Rwanda	5
Saint Kitts and Nevis	9
Saint Lucia	9
Saint Vincent and Grenadines	9

Samoa	8
San Marino	9.5
Sao Tome and Principe	7
Saudi Arabia	6
Senegal	7.5
Serbia	6.5
Seychelles	8
Sierra Leone	4.5
Singapore	9.5
Slovak Republic (Slovakia)	8.5
Slovenia	9
Solomon Islands	6.5-7
Somalia	2
South Africa	7.5
Spain	9
Sri Lanka	5
Sudan	3
Suriname	5

Swaziland	5
Sweden	9.5
Switzerland	9.5
Syria	2
Tajikistan	4.5
Tanzania	6
Thailand	6
Togo	5
Tonga	7
Trinidad and Tobago	8
Tunisia	5
Turkey	7.5
Turkmenistan	5
Tuvalu	8.5
Uganda	6
Ukraine	3.5-4
United Arab Emirates	7
United Kingdom	9

United States	9
Uruguay	8.5
Uzbekistan	4
Vanuatu	8.5
Venezuela	4.5-5
Vietnam	4.5
Yemen	2.5
Zambia	5
Zimbabwe	3

*Methodology

The Political Stability Index is calculated by CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is based on the combined scoring of varied criteria as follows --

1. record of peaceful transitions of power (free and fair elections; adherence to political accords)
2. record of democratic representation, presence of instruments of democracy; systemic accountability
3. respect for human rights; respect for civil rights
4. strength of the system of jurisprudence, adherence to constitutional order, and good governance
5. ability of a government to stay in office and carry out its policies vis a vis risk credible risks of government collapse (i.e. government stability versus a country being deemed "ungovernable")
6. threat of coups, insurgencies, and insurrection

7. level of unchecked crime and corruption
8. risk of terrorism and other threats to national security
9. relationship with regional powers and international community; record of bilateral or multilateral cooperation
10. degree of economic strife (i.e. economic and financial challenges)

Editor's Note:

As of 2015, the current climate of upheaval internationally -- both politically and economically -- has affected the ratings for several countries across the world. The usual suspects -- North Korea, [Afghanistan](#), and [Somalia](#) -- retain their low rankings. The reclusive and ultra-dictatorial North Korean regime, which has terrified the world with its nuclear threats, has exhibited internal instability. Of note was a cut-throat purge of hundreds of high ranking officials deemed to be a threat to Kim Jung-un. Despite their attempts to recover from years of lawlessness, war, and warlordism, both [Afghanistan](#) and [Somalia](#) continue to be beset by terrorism and turmoil. In [Afghanistan](#), while international forces have seen success in the effort against the terror group, al-Qaida, the other Islamist extremist group, the Taliban, continues to carry out a vicious insurgency using terrorism. In [Somalia](#), while the government attempts to do the nation's business, the terror group, al-Shabab continues to make its presence known not only in [Somalia](#), but across the border into [Kenya](#) with devastating results/ Also in this category is [Iraq](#), which continues to be rocked by horrific violence and terrorism at the hands of Islamic State, which has taken over wide swaths of Iraqi territory.

Syria, [Libya](#), and [Yemen](#) have been added to this unfortunate echelon of the world's most politically unstable countries. [Syria](#) has been mired by the twin hazards of 1. a civil war as rebels oppose the Assad regime; and 2. the rampage of terror being carried out by Islamic State, which also seized control over vast portions of Syrian territory. Meanwhile, the post-Qaddhafi landscape of [Libya](#) has devolved into chaos as rival militias battle for control -- the elected government of the country notwithstanding. Rounding out this grim triad is [Yemen](#), which was dealing with a Houthi rebellion, secessionists in the south, as well as the threat of terrorism from al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula as well as Islamic State, while also being the site of a proxy war between Shi'a [Iran](#) and Sunni [Saudi Arabia](#).

Meanwhile, several Middle Eastern and North African countries, such as [Tunisia](#), [Egypt](#), and [Bahrain](#) were downgraded in recent years due to political instability occurring in the "season of unrest" sweeping the region since 2011 and continuing today. All three of these countries have stabilized in recent years and have been upgraded accordingly. In [Bahrain](#), the landscape had

calmed. In [Egypt](#), the secular military-backed government has generated criticism for its crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood; however, the country had ratified the presidency via democratic elections and were on track to hold parliamentary elections as the country moved along the path of democratization. Perhaps the most impressive story was coming out of [Tunisia](#) -- the country whose Jasmine Revolution sparked the entire Arab Spring -- and where after a few years of strife, a new progressive constitution was passed into law and a secular government had been elected to power. [Tunisia](#), [Egypt](#), and [Bahrain](#) have seen slight upgrades as these countries stabilize.

In Africa, the [Central African Republic](#) was downgraded the previous year due to the takeover of the government by Muslim Seleka rebels. Although the country has been trying to emerge from this crisis, the fact of the matter was that it was difficult to halt the precipitous decline into lawlessness in that country. [Zimbabwe](#) has maintained its consistently poor ranking due to the dictatorial regime of Mugabe, who continues to hold a tight grip on power, intimidates the opposition, squashes dissent, and oppresses the white farmer population of the country. Moving in a slightly improved direction is [Nigeria](#), which has sported abysmal ratings due to the government's fecklessness in dealing with the threat posed by the Islamist terror group, Boko Haram. Under its newly-elected government, there appears to be more of a concerted effort to make national security a priority action item. [Mali](#) was also slightly upgraded due to its efforts to return to constitutional order following the 2012 coup and to neutralize the threat of separatists and Islamists. Political instability has visited [Burkina Faso](#) and [Burundi](#) as the leaders of those countries attempted to side-step constitutional limits to hold onto power. In [Burundi](#), an attempted coup ensued but quelled, and the president won a (questionable) new term in office; unrest has since punctuated the landscape. In [Burkina Faso](#), the political climate has turned stormy as a result of a successful coup that ended the rule of the president, and then a putsch against the transitional government. These two African countries have been downgraded as a result.

It should be noted that the African country of South [Sudan](#) -- the world's newest nation state -- has not been officially included in this assessment; however, it can be unofficially assessed to be in the vicinity of "3" due to its manifold political and economic challenges. [Guinea](#) has endured poor rankings throughout, but was slightly downgraded further over fears of social unrest and the Ebola health crisis.

In Europe, [Ukraine](#) was downgraded due to the unrest facing that country following its Maidan revolution that triggered a pro-Russian uprising in the eastern part of the country. [Russia](#) was also implicated in the Ukrainian crisis due to its intervention on behalf of pro-Russian separatists, as well as its annexation of the Ukrainian territory of Crimea. [Serbia](#) and [Albania](#) were slightly downgraded due to eruptions of unrest, while [Romania](#) was slightly downgraded on the basis of corruption charges against the prime minister. [Spain](#), [Portugal](#), [Ireland](#), and [Italy](#) were downgraded due to debt woes and the concomitant effect on the euro zone. [Greece](#), another euro zone nation, was downgraded the previous year due to its sovereign debt crisis; however, the country

successfully forged a rescue deal with international creditors and stayed within the Euro zone. Greek voters rewarded the hitherto unknown upstart party at the polls for these efforts. As a result, [Greece](#) was actually upgraded slightly as it proved to the world that it could endure the political and economic storms. Meanwhile, [Germany](#), [France](#), [Switzerland](#), the [United Kingdom](#), the [Netherlands](#), and the Scandinavian countries continue to post impressive ranking consistent with these countries' strong records of democracy, freedom, and peaceful transfers of power.

In Asia, [Nepal](#) was downgraded in response to continuous political instability well after landmark elections that prevails today. [Cambodia](#) was very slightly downgraded due to post-election instability that has resulted in occasional flares of violence. Despite the "trifecta of tragedy" in [Japan](#) in 2011 -- the earthquake, the ensuing tsunami, and the resulting nuclear crisis -- and the appreciable destabilization of the economic and political terrain therein, this country has only slightly been downgraded. Japan's challenges have been assessed to be transient, the government remains accountable, and there is little risk of default. Both [India](#) and China retain their rankings; [India](#) holds a slightly higher ranking than [China](#) due to its record of democratic representation and accountability. Increasing violence and political instability in [Pakistan](#) resulted in a downgrade for this country's already low rating.

In the Americas, [Haiti](#) retained its downgraded status due to ongoing political and economic woes. [Mexico](#) was downgraded due to its alarming rate of crime. [Guatemala](#) was downgraded due to charges of corruption, the arrest of the president, and uncertainty over the outcome of elections. [Brazil](#) was downgraded due to the corruption charges erupting on the political landscape, the stalling of the economy, and the increasingly loud calls for the impeachment of President Rousseff. [Argentina](#) was downgraded due to its default on debt following the failure of talks with bond holders. [Venezuela](#) was downgraded due to the fact that the country's post-Chavez government is every bit as autocratic and nationalistic, but even more inclined to oppress its political opponents. [Colombia](#) was upgraded slightly due to efforts aimed at securing a peace deal with the FARC insurgents. A small but significant upgrade was attributed to [Cuba](#) due to its recent pro-business reforms and its normalization of ties with the United States. Meanwhile, the [United States](#), [Canada](#), [Costa Rica](#), [Panama](#), and most of the English-speaking countries of the Caribbean retain their strong rankings due to their records of stability and peaceful transfers of power.

In the Pacific, [Fiji](#) was upgraded due to its return to constitutional order and democracy with the holding of the first elections in eight years.

In Oceania, [Maldives](#) has been slightly downgraded due to the government's continued and rather relentless persecution of the country's former pro-democracy leader - former President Nasheed.

Source:

Dr. Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief, CountryWatch Inc. www.countrywatch.com

Updated:

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Freedom Rankings

Freedom Rankings

Freedom in the World

Editor's Note: This ranking by Freedom House quantifies political freedom and civil liberties into a single combined index on each sovereign country's level of freedom and liberty. The initials "PR" and "CL" stand for Political Rights and Civil Liberties, respectively. The number 1 represents the most free countries and the number 7 represents the least free. Several countries fall in the continuum in between. The freedom ratings reflect an overall judgment based on survey results.

Country	PR	CL	Freedom Status	Trend Arrow
Afghanistan	6 ?	6	Not Free	
Albania*	3	3	Partly Free	
Algeria	6	5	Not Free	
Andorra*	1	1	Free	

Angola	6	5	Not Free
Antigua and Barbuda*	3 ?	2	Free
Argentina*	2	2	Free
Armenia	6	4	Partly Free
Australia*	1	1	Free
Austria*	1	1	Free
Azerbaijan	6	5	Not Free
Bahamas*	1	1	Free
Bahrain	6 ?	5	Not Free ?
Bangladesh*	3 ?	4	Partly Free
Barbados*	1	1	Free
Belarus	7	6	Not Free
Belgium*	1	1	Free
Belize*	1	2	Free
Benin*	2	2	Free
Bhutan	4	5	Partly Free
Bolivia*	3	3	Partly Free
Bosnia-Herzegovina*	4	3	Partly Free

Botswana*	3 ?	2	Free	
Brazil*	2	2	Free	
Brunei	6	5	Not Free	
Bulgaria*	2	2	Free	
Burkina Faso	5	3	Partly Free	
Burma	7	7	Not Free	
Burundi*	4	5	Partly Free	↑
Cambodia	6	5	Not Free	↓
Cameroon	6	6	Not Free	
Canada*	1	1	Free	
Cape Verde*	1	1	Free	
Central African Republic	5	5	Partly Free	
Chad	7	6	Not Free	
Chile*	1	1	Free	
China	7	6	Not Free	
Colombia*	3	4	Partly Free	
Comoros*	3	4	Partly Free	
Congo (Brazzaville)	6	5	Not Free	↓

Congo (Kinshasa)	6	6	Not Free	↓
Costa Rica*	1	1	Free	
Cote d'Ivoire	6	5	Not Free	
Croatia*	1 ?	2	Free	
Cuba	7	6	Not Free	
Cyprus*	1	1	Free	
Czech Republic*	1	1	Free	
Denmark*	1	1	Free	
Djibouti	5	5	Partly Free	
Dominica*	1	1	Free	
Dominican Republic*	2	2	Free	↓
East Timor*	3	4	Partly Free	
Ecuador*	3	3	Partly Free	
Egypt	6	5	Not Free	
El Salvador*	2	3	Free	
Equatorial Guinea	7	7	Not Free	
Eritrea	7	7 ?	Not Free	
Estonia*	1	1	Free	

Ethiopia	5	5	Partly Free	↓
Fiji	6	4	Partly Free	
Finland*	1	1	Free	
France*	1	1	Free	
Gabon	6	5 ?	Not Free ?	
The Gambia	5	5 ?	Partly Free	
Georgia	4	4	Partly Free	
Germany*	1	1	Free	
Ghana*	1	2	Free	
Greece*	1	2	Free	
Grenada*	1	2	Free	
Guatemala*	4 ?	4	Partly Free	
Guinea	7	6 ?	Not Free	
Guinea-Bissau*	4	4	Partly Free	
Guyana*	2	3	Free	
Haiti*	4	5	Partly Free	
Honduras	4 ?	4 ?	Partly Free	
Hungary*	1	1	Free	

Iceland*	1	1	Free	
India*	2	3	Free	
Indonesia*	2	3	Free	
Iran	6	6	Not Free	↓
Iraq	5 ?	6	Not Free	
Ireland*	1	1	Free	
Israel*	1	2	Free	
Italy*	1	2	Free	
Jamaica*	2	3	Free	
Japan*	1	2	Free	
Jordan	6 ?	5	Not Free ?	
Kazakhstan	6	5	Not Free	↓
Kenya	4	4 ?	Partly Free	
Kiribati*	1	1	Free	
Kosovo	5 ?	4 ?	Partly Free ?	
Kuwait	4	4	Partly Free	
Kyrgyzstan	6 ?	5 ?	Not Free ?	
Laos	7	6	Not Free	

Latvia*	2	1	Free	
Lebanon	5	3 ?	Partly Free	
Lesotho*	3 ?	3	Partly Free ?	
Liberia*	3	4	Partly Free	
Libya	7	7	Not Free	
Liechtenstein*	1	1	Free	
Lithuania*	1	1	Free	
Luxembourg*	1	1	Free	
Macedonia*	3	3	Partly Free	↑
Madagascar	6 ?	4 ?	Partly Free	
Malawi*	3 ?	4	Partly Free	
Malaysia	4	4	Partly Free	
Maldives*	3 ?	4	Partly Free	
Mali*	2	3	Free	
Malta*	1	1	Free	↓
Marshall Islands*	1	1	Free	
Mauritania	6	5	Not Free	
Mauritius*	1	2	Free	

Mexico*	2	3	Free	
Micronesia*	1	1	Free	
Moldova*	3 ?	4	Partly Free	
Monaco*	2	1	Free	
Mongolia*	2	2	Free	↑
Montenegro*	3	2 ?	Free ?	
Morocco	5	4	Partly Free	↓
Mozambique	4 ?	3	Partly Free	
Namibia*	2	2	Free	
Nauru*	1	1	Free	
Nepal	4	4	Partly Free	
Netherlands*	1	1	Free	
New Zealand*	1	1	Free	
Nicaragua*	4	4 ?	Partly Free	
Niger	5 ?	4	Partly Free	
Nigeria	5	4	Partly Free	↓
North Korea	7	7	Not Free	↓
Norway*	1	1	Free	

Oman	6	5	Not Free	
Pakistan	4	5	Partly Free	
Palau*	1	1	Free	
Panama*	1	2	Free	
Papua New Guinea*	4	3	Partly Free	
Paraguay*	3	3	Partly Free	
Peru*	2	3	Free	
Philippines	4	3	Partly Free	↓
Poland*	1	1	Free	
Portugal*	1	1	Free	
Qatar	6	5	Not Free	
Romania*	2	2	Free	
Russia	6	5	Not Free	↓
Rwanda	6	5	Not Free	
Saint Kitts and Nevis*	1	1	Free	
Saint Lucia*	1	1	Free	
Saint Vincent and Grenadines*	2	1	Free	
Samoa*	2	2	Free	

San Marino*	1	1	Free	
Sao Tome and Principe*	2	2	Free	
Saudi Arabia	7	6	Not Free	
Senegal*	3	3	Partly Free	
Serbia*	2 ?	2	Free	
Seychelles*	3	3	Partly Free	
Sierra Leone*	3	3	Partly Free	
Singapore	5	4	Partly Free	
Slovakia*	1	1	Free	↓
Slovenia*	1	1	Free	
Solomon Islands	4	3	Partly Free	
Somalia	7	7	Not Free	
South Africa*	2	2	Free	
South Korea*	1	2	Free	
Spain*	1	1	Free	
Sri Lanka*	4	4	Partly Free	
Sudan	7	7	Not Free	
Suriname*	2	2	Free	

Swaziland	7	5	Not Free	
Sweden*	1	1	Free	
Switzerland*	1	1	Free	↓
Syria	7	6	Not Free	
Taiwan*	1 ?	2 ?	Free	
Tajikistan	6	5	Not Free	
Tanzania	4	3	Partly Free	
Thailand	5	4	Partly Free	
Togo	5	4 ?	Partly Free	
Tonga	5	3	Partly Free	
Trinidad and Tobago*	2	2	Free	
Tunisia	7	5	Not Free	
Turkey*	3	3	Partly Free	↓
Turkmenistan	7	7	Not Free	
Tuvalu*	1	1	Free	
Uganda	5	4	Partly Free	
Ukraine*	3	2	Free	
United Arab Emirates	6	5	Not Free	

United Kingdom*	1	1	Free	
United States*	1	1	Free	
Uruguay*	1	1	Free	
Uzbekistan	7	7	Not Free	
Vanuatu*	2	2	Free	
Venezuela	5 ?	4	Partly Free	
Vietnam	7	5	Not Free	↓
Yemen	6 ?	5	Not Free ?	
Zambia*	3	4 ?	Partly Free	
Zimbabwe	6 ?	6	Not Free	

Methodology:

PR and CL stand for political rights and civil liberties, respectively; 1 represents the most free and 7 the least free rating. The ratings reflect an overall judgment based on survey results.

? ? up or down indicates a change in political rights, civil liberties, or status since the last survey.

↑ ↓ up or down indicates a trend of positive or negative changes that took place but that were not sufficient to result in a change in political rights or civil liberties ratings of 1-7.

* indicates a country's status as an electoral democracy.

Source:

This data is derived from the latest edition of Freedom House's Freedom in the World 2010 edition.

Available at URL: <http://www.freedomhouse.org>

Updated:

Reviewed in 2015

Human Rights

Overview of Human Rights in Brazil

Brazil is a constitutional federal republic. The government is working to maintain debt repayment to its foreign debtors at the expense of its social spending. This policy is creating domestic issues and subsequent human rights issues. Higher levels of hunger, poverty, as well as widespread child labor, are all results of domestic spending cuts.

At the governmental level there are numerous serious abuses worth noting. The police, notably at the state level, is believed to be involved in killings for hire and death squad executions of suspects. Excessive force, coerced confessions, and torture are all common practices as well. Once convicted of a crime and sent to prison, one faces harsh and inhumane conditions, overcrowding and the threat of violence at the hands of other inmates or prison guards.

The judiciary is not known to be fully independent of the government and, therefore, there is no way to ensure a free, fair or speedy trial. Investigations into human rights abuses are seldom subject to independent review. This has allowed for impunity for many military and civilian police officials who have committed crimes against humanity.

Society frequently discriminates against and perpetrates violent acts upon homosexuals and those of Afro-Brazilian descent without fear of reprisal from the authorities.

Efforts to improve the human rights situation in Brazil are often undermined by the failure to punish those who continue to commit the abuses on a daily bases or even those known guilty of past offenses.

Human Development Index (HDI) Rank:

See full listing of the Human Development Index located in the Social Overview of this report for this country's current rank.

Human Poverty Index Rank:

20th out of 103

Gini Index:

60.7

Life Expectancy at Birth (years):

70.5 years

Unemployment Rate:

9.8%

Population living on \$1 a day (%):

8.2%

Population living on \$2 a day (%):

22.4%

Population living beneath the Poverty Line (%):

17.4%

Internally Displaced People:

N/A

Note- 3,000 refugees

Total Crime Rate (%):

44%

Health Expenditure (% of GDP):

Public: 3.6%

% of GDP Spent on Education:

4.2%

Human Rights Conventions Party to:

- International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
- International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
- International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
- Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
- Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
- Conventions on the Rights of the Child
- Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
- Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

*Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index that measures the level of well-being in 177 nations in the world. It uses factors such as poverty, literacy, life-expectancy, education, gross domestic product, and purchasing power parity to assess the average achievements in each nation. It has been used in the United Nation’s Human Development Report since 1993.

*Human Poverty Index Ranking is based on certain indicators used to calculate the Human Poverty Index. Probability at birth of not surviving to age 40, adult literacy rate, population without sustainable access to an improved water source, and population below income poverty line are the indicators assessed in this measure.

*The Gini Index measures inequality based on the distribution of family income or consumption. A value of 0 represents perfect equality (income being distributed equally), and a value of 100 perfect inequality (income all going to one individual).

*The calculation of the total crime rate is the % of the total population which has been effected by property crime, robbery, sexual assault, assault, or bribery (corruption) related occurrences.

Government Functions

Background

Brazil is a federal republic with 26 states and a federal district. The 1988 constitution grants broad powers to the federal government, comprised of executive, legislative, and judicial branches.

Executive Authority

At the executive level, there is a president, who functions as head of state and head of government. The president holds office for four years, with the right to re-election for an additional four-year term, and appoints his own cabinet.

Legislative Authority

Legislative authority is vested in the bicameral "Congresso Nacional" (National Congress), comprised of a "Senado Federal" (Senate) and a "Câmara dos Deputados" (Chamber of Deputies). There are 81 senators, three from each state and the federal district, and 513 deputies.

Senators' terms are eight years, with elections staggered so that two-thirds of the upper house is up for election at one time, and one-third stands for election four years later. Deputies' terms are four years, with elections based on a complex system of proportional representation by state. Each state is eligible for a minimum of eight seats; the largest state delegation (Sao Paulo's) is capped at 70 seats. The result is a system weighted in favor of geographically large but sparsely populated states.

Judicial Authority

The judiciary is made up of the Supreme Federal Tribunal, the Higher Tribunal of Justice, Regional Tribunals, and other lesser tribunals. The Supreme Federal Tribunal possesses jurisdiction over the entirety of Brazil and is the highest level of judicial authority. The legal system is based on Roman codes.

Regional Governance

States are organized like the federal government, with three government branches. Because of the mandatory revenue allocation to states and municipalities provided for in the 1988 Constitution, Brazilian governors and mayors have exercised considerable power since 1989.

Government Structure

Names:

conventional long form:

Federative Republic of Brazil

conventional short form:

Brazil

local long form:

Republica Federativa do Brasil

local short form:

Brasil

Type:

Federal republic; democratic system

Executive Branch:

Chief of state and head of government:

President Dilma Rousseff (elected in 2010; inaugurated at the start of 2011; re-elected in 2014).

See "Primer" below for details.

Note on presidency:

The president is both the chief of state and head of government; the president is elected on the same ticket by popular vote for a single four-year term

Cabinet:

Appointed by the president

Elections:

Last held in 2014; see "Primer" below. Note: Rousseff re-elected to power.

Legislative Branch:

Bicameral "Congresso Nacional" (National Congress):

Consists of the "Senado Federal" (Federal Senate) and the "Câmara dos Deputados" (Chamber of

Deputies)

"Senado Federal" (Federal Senate):

81 seats; three members from each state or federal district elected according to the principle of majority to serve eight-year terms; one-third elected after a four-year period, two-thirds elected after the next four-year period

"Camara dos Deputados" (Chamber of Deputies):

513 seats; members are elected by proportional representation to serve four-year terms

Elections:

Last held in 2014; see "Primer" below.

Primer on 2014 presidential and parliamentary elections in Brazil:

A presidential election was to be held in October 2014 over the course of two rounds -- Oct. 5, 2014 and Oct. 26, 2014. In Brazil, the president is both the chief of state and head of government; the president is elected by popular vote for a single four-year term. Incumbent President Dilma Rousseff, who was first elected to power in 2010, was looking to re-election victory in 2014.

Parliamentary elections would also be held in October 2014. At stake would be the composition of the bicameral "Congresso Nacional" (National Congress), which consists of the "Senado Federal" (Federal Senate) and the "Câmara dos Deputados" (Chamber of Deputies). In the "Senado Federal" (Federal Senate), there are 81 seats; three members from each state or federal district are elected according to the principle of majority to serve eight-year terms; one-third are elected after a four-year period, two-thirds are elected after the next four-year period. In the "Camara dos Deputados" (Chamber of Deputies), there are 513 seats; members are elected by proportional representation to serve four-year terms.

Some of the main political parties contesting the election included the president's Workers Party (PT), the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party, the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB), Social Democracy Party (PSD), Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), the Democrats (Dem), Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), Democratic Labor Party (PDT), National Labor Party (PTN), Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB), Brazilian Republican Party (PRB), Green Party (PV), National Ecologic Party (PEN) Social Christian Party (PSC), Social Liberal Party (PSL), United Socialist Workers' Party (PSTU), among others.

Polling data in the spring of 2014 gave Rousseff, of the ruling leftist Workers Party (PT), the clear (but dwindling) lead over her rivals. Those rivals included Aécio Neves, the Minas Gerais senator from the centrist Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB).

In mid-2014, with the election only months away, and with Brazil plagued by a stagnating economy, Neves was chipping away at Rousseff's lead. Given the country's economic woes, Neves' campaign message of pro-market and business-friendly policies held resonance with the voters. Polling data from Sensus showed Rousseff dropping from 34 percent support in the spring of 2014 to 32 percent in June 2014, while Neves moved from 20 percent to 21.5 percent in that same period.

By the first part of July 2014, Rousseff was still holding onto a lead, with 38 percent of voters' support, while Neves had 20 percent. These numbers suggested a boost for Rousseff that many attributed to positive national feelings amidst the World Cup football tournament being hosted by Brazil. But that boost may have been ephemeral as polling data in mid-July 2014 showed Rousseff's lead slipping to 36 percent. While Neves remained behind at 20 percent in a first round of voting, the data by the Datafolha poll indicated that the two candidates would be in a statistical dead heat in the second round with Rousseff only sporting a four percent lead ahead of Neves in a likely runoff.

It was possible that Rousseff's prospects for re-election were being impacted by the economy, with some experts projecting that Brazil might be on the verge of a recession. Indeed, the Brazilian economy had been showing signs of stagnation for the previous 12 months, as it slowed to only two percent. Meanwhile, industrial output was falling. Also bad for GDP growth were the rising interest rates by the Central Bank, which were intended to subdue inflation but which were also yielding negative consequences for economic activity.

These factors provided fuel for Rousseff's rivals, such as Neves, to criticize her handling of the economy. To that end, Neves was using the opportunity to focus on the economy, and to tout his pro-business agenda that included tax cuts and the restoration of investor confidence. Neves was also calling for reforms to the state-run oil company, Petroleo Brasileiro SA, which was negatively affected by the prevailing government policy of selling oil at below-market prices. It was to be seen if this economic message would resonate among the voters as Brazil's once booming economy flirted with recession.

Note that while the Brazilian presidential contest has focused on the battle between Rousseff and Neves, there were other presidential contenders. That wider field entered the international purview in mid-August 2014 when one presidential candidate, Eduardo Campos of the Brazilian Socialist Party, along with his entourage, were killed in a private jet crash. The aircraft reportedly went down just as it was preparing to land in the city of Santos in bad weather. A business-friendly leftist, Campos was consistently holding a third-place finish in the polls with about 10 percent of the vote share. Clearly, he was not viewed as the likely winner of the presidency in 2014; however, he was regarded as a relatively young and fresh "star" on the Brazilian political scene, who was predicted to perhaps one day win the presidency.

It was soon announced that Campos' running mate, environmentalist Marina Silva, would take his place at the top of the ticket in the presidential election in October 2014. The entrance of Silva into the presidential race in August 2014 appeared to have changed the dynamics to some extent.

To this point, Rousseff was regarded as the favorite, with Neves standing as her most significant rival. With well-known Silva entering the race, the contest was suddenly far more competitive. At issue was Silva's ability to attract left-leaning voters looking for an experienced leader -- indeed one who contested the previous 2010 presidential election as the Green Party candidate. Those left-leaning voters may have gone to Rousseff rather than fresh-faced Campos (prior to his tragic death), but were now willing to consider Silva as their candidate instead. She was also an appealing option for disenchanted and disillusioned Brazilian voters who may not have intended to vote but were now going to the polls to cast a ballot for an environmentalist at the top of a ticket. Stated differently, Rousseff would now have to contend with a far more divided left-wing electorate.

For her part, Silva appeared to have taken the lessons from her previous presidential bid in 2010 and was now presenting herself as a pro-economic development candidate and as an advocate of prosperity. At the same time, she wasted few opportunities to criticize President Rousseff's stewardship of the economy that was now beset by sluggish growth and high inflation. At a news conference, Silva advanced her economic message, saying, "We know that our country needs investments and they will come when there is a new government that has credibility among investors." Silva's prospects would be aided by her reputation as an unwavering environmentalist committed to saving the Amazon rainforest, along with her background as a Christian evangelist. These two traits helped to brand Silva as the most principled politician in a country often rocked by corruption scandals. It was to be seen if it would be enough to facilitate her ascent to the presidency.

A poll by Datafolha in mid-August 2014 showed that Rousseff commanded 36 percent of support, while Silva was now attracting 21 percent of support -- just ahead of Neves who held 20 percent support. Should Silva manage to consolidate this strong start to her late campaign, she could win the second most votes in the first round of voting. That performance would position her for participation in a second round of voting against Rousseff, while sidelining the conservative option, Neves. The new polling data showed that Silva could also pose a credible threat to Rousseff in the runoff -- posting 47 percent support against Rousseff with 43 percent in that second round of voting.

By the end of August 2014, momentum was with Silva and the environmentalist had widened her lead over incumbent President Rousseff. A new poll by Datafolha showed that Rousseff and Silva were now tied in the first round with 34 percent, positioning the two women to contest the second round. In that run-off election, Silva would unseat Rousseff with 50 percent of the vote share -- a

full 10 percent more than the 40 percent Rousseff was forecast to garner.

In early September 2014, the race appeared to be in a "plateau phase" according to the polling data. The polling firm, Sensus, showed Rousseff and Silva tied at around 30 percent of the vote share in the first round. In a second round, as suggested by the voting intentions of persons interviewed by Sensus, Silva would likely be victorious, since 47.6 percent of respondents said they would vote for her over Rousseff, who just had 32.8 percent of support from those interviewed. Other polls showed a similar "leveling off" of support for Silva, while Rousseff's support had stabilized. For example, a poll by MDA showed Rousseff winning the first round with 38 percent over Silva with 33.5 percent; but Silva would have a narrow second round advantage of three percentage points over Rousseff -- 45.5 percent to 42.7 percent.

Now in the thick of the race, Silva was being subject to greater criticism of the type that has been dogging Rousseff. Of note were shifting stances in Silva's campaign platform on contentious issues, such as support for gay marriage. Facing criticism from evangelical pastors over her commitment to back gay marriage, Silva reversed her position. While that move may have shored up her support base among religious voters, it simultaneously repelled urban middle class voters.

Those middle class voters would likely decide the election. The slowing of the Brazilian economy has particularly plagued Brazil's new middle class. The crowning achievement of former President Lula, Brazil's new middle class was now suffering from an economy in stagnation; they were additionally annoyed by the poor quality of public services, which stood in sharp and unwelcome contrast to government expenditures on stadiums for the World Cup. Angry with Rousseff over this mismanagement of the country's coffers, they were persuadable voters who could be attracted to Silva, were it not for her conservative social views. Thus the election would likely be a highly competitive event.

By the last week of September 2014, with the first round of the election less than two weeks away, Rousseff had managed to narrow the gap between herself and Silva and moved back into an advantageous position. Rousseff was making the economic argument that Silva, despite her environmental credentials, was too willing to cozy up to business and would not be good for the country's poorest echelon. It was an argument likely to find resonance with voters generally loyal to Rousseff's Workers Party (PT), who had been considering Silva as an alternative. Rousseff was also arguing that Silva was an untested leader and ill-equipped to govern Brazil.

The new Datafolha poll in the last week of September 2014 showed Rousseff ahead with 37 percent of the votes compared to 30 percent for Silva. In the second round, Silva was forecast to have a slim lead of only two percentage points -- 46 percent to Rousseff with 44 percent. Another poll in the same period -- this time by MDA -- showed a similar trend. In the first round, Rousseff was forecast to take 36 percent against Silva with 27.4 percent; in the second round Silva was expected to be in a dead heat with Rousseff with the former now trailing the incumbent president

41 percent to 42 percent.

If Silva was ultimately able to narrowly unseat Rousseff, it would augur a political earthquake on Brazil's political landscape. Indeed, Silva could become Brazil's first Afro-Brazilian president in the nation's history. However, such a fate was not to become reality. Instead, the first round of the presidential contest recalibrated the race, essentially returning it to the original dynamics before the ascent of Silva.

On Oct. 5, 2014, Brazilians went to the polls to cast their ballots. To recapitulate -- the main presidential candidates on the ballot were incumbent President Dilma Rousseff of the leftist Workers' Party (PT), Minas Gerais Senator Aécio Neves from the centrist Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB), and Marina Silva from the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB).

After the votes in the first round had been tallied, the presidential contest had been inexorably altered. As expected, Rousseff had won this initial stage, carrying 41.6 percent of the vote share. But instead of Silva, it was Neves who had quietly crept up in voters' preferences to secure the second place finish and, thus, the right to contest that second and final election round. Neves won 33.5 percent of the vote share with Silva slipping to third place with 21.3 percent. The run-off election on Oct. 26, 2014, would be a contest between incumbent President Rousseff and the pro-business opposition candidate, Neves.

Polling data compiled right after the first round of voting indicated that the two candidates contesting the second round were in a competitive race. Two surveys by the Datafolha and Ibope respectively showed Neves with 46 percent support against Rousseff with 44 percent. As such, the fight to transfer support from Silva's constituency to either Rousseff or Neves would be a fierce and possibly decisive one.

For its part, Silva's Brazilian Socialist Party soon indicated that it might be prepared to back Neves; however, Silva was herself not quick to offer a personal endorsement to Neves. Instead, allies of Silva said she wanted to see Neves commit to some of her "progressive" causes such as sustainable development with a pro-environmental orientation, the defense of the rights of indigenous Brazilians, and a program of land reform for landless peasants. Apparently, Silva was able to garner those commitments because in the second week of October 2014, she officially endorsed Neves for the presidency. At a campaign event in Sao Paulo, Silva said, "In view of Aécio Neves' commitments, I declare that I will vote for and support his candidacy."

Assuming Silva's support base took her lead and transferred their backing to Neves, it was highly likely that Rousseff would be unseated and the domination of the Workers Party in the executive branch of government in Brazil would come to a close.

For her part, Rousseff was on the proverbial cliff and precipitously close to a political fall. As

such, the incumbent president reminded voters that pro-business types, such as Neves, followed an economic philosophy that failed Brazil in the past, while her leftist Workers Party had done the opposite. Speaking of Neves, Rousseff warned, "He represents a model that bankrupted the country three times, cowered Brazil before the International Monetary Fund, privatized state companies for peanuts, caused widespread unemployment, wage reductions and recession." But Rousseff would not be helped by an unfolding corruption scandal involving her party and the state-run energy company, Petrobras.

In the second week of October 2014, with the runoff about two weeks away, polling data showed Rousseff and Neves to be in a competitive race, running neck and neck with one another. A survey by Datafolha showed Neves with 45 percent and Rousseff with 43 percent in voters' preferences.

By the third week of October 2014, with the run-off election about one week away, polling data by Sensus gave the advantage to Neves, who was at 56 percent in voters' preferences, significantly ahead of Rousseff with 44 percent. It should be noted that Sensus was not as well-renowned a pollster as Datafolha; nevertheless, the wide margin between the two candidates, according to Sensus, certainly suggested that undecided voters along with Silva voters might be breaking in favor of Neves.

But an MDA survey in the last week of October 2014 -- just days ahead of the election -- showed a close race with Rousseff holding 45.5 percent of voter support against Neves with 44.5 percent. Another poll by the well-known pollster, Datafolha, around the same time gave the slight advantage to Rousseff with 47 percent of voter support and Neves with 43 percent. It seemed the second round of the Brazilian presidential election would be a competitive contest all the way to election day on Oct. 26, 2014.

On Oct. 26, 2014, voters cast their ballots in the runoff election of the presidential contest. Neves' pro-business stance meant that he racked up votes in wealthier southern states of Brazil; meanwhile, Rousseff's warnings about the ills of the supply side economic path held resonance with voters in the poorer northern states of Brazil.

Ultimately, the election results gave re-election victory to Rousseff with 51 percent of the vote share over Neves with just over 48 percent in what clearly turned into a close and heavily contested presidential race. Acknowledging that her performance in her first term was less than optimal, even with this re-election victory, Rousseff vowed to be "a much better president than I have been until now." Moving forward, Rousseff urged all Brazilians "to unite in favor of Brazil's future" and said political reform would be "a top priority" of her second term in office. For his part, Neves conceded defeat and wished Rousseff success in the administration of her next government.

Note that at the parliamentary level, final results were not available at the time of writing for the "Camara dos Deputados" (Chamber of Deputies). However, the broad pro-government coalition, including Rousseff's Workers Party, secured 55 percent of the vote share and was on track to carry around 304 seats in parliament. The opposition "change" coalition aligned with Neves, and including his Social Democratic Party, took about 26 percent of the vote share and would likely control approximately 128 seats in parliament. The opposition bloc aligned with Silva, including her Brazilian Socialist Party, garnered 11 percent of the vote share and about 55 seats in parliament.

Judicial Branch:

- Supreme Federal Tribunal; judges appointed for life by the Senate
- Higher Tribunal of Justice
- Regional Tribunals
- Lesser tribunals

Constitution:

Oct. 5, 1988

Legal System:

Based on Roman codes; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction

Political Parties and Leaders:

Brazilian Communist Party or PCB [Ivan Martins PINHEIRO]
Brazilian Democratic Movement Party or PMDB [Michel TEMER]
Brazilian Labor Party or PTB [Cristiane BRASIL]
Brazilian Renewal Labor Party or PRTB [Jose Levy FIDELIX da Cruz]
Brazilian Republican Party or PRB [Marcos Antonio PEREIRA]
Brazilian Social Democracy Party or PSDB [Aecio NEVES]
Brazilian Socialist Party or PSB [Carlos Roberto SIQUEIRA de Barros]
Christian Labor Party or PTC [Daniel TOURINHO]
Christian Social Democratic Party or PSDC [Jose Maria EYMAEL]
Communist Party of Brazil or PCdoB [Jose Renato RABELO]
Democratic Labor Party or PDT [Carlos Roberto LUPPI]
The Democrats or DEM [Jose AGRIPINO] (formerly Liberal Front Party or PFL)
Free Homeland Party or PPL [Sergio RUBENS]
Green Party or PV [Jose Luiz PENNA]
Humanist Party of Solidarity or PHS [Eduardo MACHADO]
Labor Party of Brazil or PTdoB [Luis Henrique de Oliveira RESENDE]

National Ecologic Party or PEN [Adilson Barroso OLIVEIRA]
National Labor Party or PTN [Jose Masci de ABREU]
National Mobilization Party or PMN [Telma RIBEIRO dos Santos]
Party of the Republic or PR [Alfredo NASCIMENTO]
Popular Socialist Party or PPS [Roberto Joao Pereira FREIRE]
Progressive Party or PP [Ciro NOGUEIRA]
Progressive Republican Party or PRP [Ovasco Roma Altimari RESENDE]
Republican Social Order Party or PROS [Euripedes JUNIOR]
Social Christian Party or PSC [Vitor Jorge Abdala NOSSEIS]
Social Democratic Party or PSD [Guilherme CAMPOS]
Social Liberal Party or PSL [Luciano Caldas BIVAR]
Socialism and Freedom Party or PSOL [Luiz ARAUJO]
Solidarity or SD [Paulo PEREIRA DA SILVA]
United Socialist Workers' Party or PSTU [Jose Maria DE ALMEIDA]
Workers' Cause Party or PCO [Rui Costa PIMENTA]
Workers' Party or PT [Rui FALCAO]

Suffrage:

Voluntary between 16 and 18 years of age and over 70; compulsory over 18 and under 70 years of age; military conscripts do not vote

Administrative Divisions:

26 states (estados, singular - estado) and 1 federal district* (distrito federal): Acre, Alagoas, Amapa, Amazonas, Bahia, Ceara, Distrito Federal*, Espirito Santo, Goias, Maranhao, Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, Minas Gerais, Para, Paraiba, Parana, Pernambuco, Piaui, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Norte, Rio Grande do Sul, Rondonia, Roraima, Santa Catarina, Sao Paulo, Sergipe, Tocantins

Principal Government Officials

Government of Brazil

Pres. Dilma Vana ROUSSEFF

Vice Pres. Michel Miguel Elias TEMER Lulia

Chief of the Civilian Household of the Presidency Aloizio MERCADANTE Oliva
Sec. Gen. of the Presidency Miguel ROSSETTO
Min. of Agrarian Development Patrus ANANIAS
Min. of Agriculture, Livestock, & Supply Katia Regina de ABREU
Min. of Cities Gilberto KASSAB
Min. of Communications Ricardo BERZOINI
Min. of Culture Juca FERREIRA
Min. of Defense Jaques WAGNER
Min. of Development, Industry, & Trade Armando MONTEIRO
Min. of Education Janine RIBEIRO
Min. of the Environment Izabella TEIXEIRA
Min. of Finance Joaquim LEVY
Min. of Fishing & Aquaculture Helder BARBALHO
Min. of Foreign Relations Mauro Luiz Iecker VIEIRA
Min. of Health Arthur CHIORO
Min. of Justice Jose Eduardo Martins CARDOZO
Min. of Labor & Employment Manoel DIAS
Min. of Mines & Energy Eduardo BRAGA
Min. of National Integration Gilberto Magalhaes OCCHI
Min. of Planning, Budget, & Management Nelson BARBOSA
Min. of Science, Technology, & Innovation Jose Aldo REBELO Figueiredo
Min. of Social Development & Hunger Alleviation Tereza CAMPELLO
Min. of Social Security Carlos GABAS
Min. of Sports George HILTON
Min. of Tourism Henrique Eduardo Lyra ALVES
Min. of Transportation Antonio Carlos RODRIGUES
Head, Office of the Inspectorate Gen. Valdir SIMAO
Head, Office of Institutional Security Jose ELITO Carvalho Siqueira
Head, Office of the Solicitor Gen. Luis Inacio Lucena ADAMS
Head, Secretariat of Civil Aviation Eliseu PADILHA
Head, Secretariat of Micro- and Small Enterprises Guilherme AFIF DOMINGOS
Head, Secretariat for Social Communication Edinho SILVA
Head, Secretariat of Strategic Affairs Mangabeira UNGER
Head, Special Secretariat for Human Rights Pepe VARGAS
Head, Special Secretariat of Ports Edinho ARAUJO
Head, Special Secretariat for Promotion of Racial Equality Nilma LINO GOMES
Head, Special Secretariat for Women's Rights Eleonora MENICUCCI de Oliveira
Pres., Central Bank Alexandre Antonio TOMBINI
Ambassador to the US Luiz Alberto FIGUEIREDO Machado
Permanent Representative to the UN, New York Antonio de Aguiar PATRIOTA

-- as of 2015

Leader Biography

Leader Biography

President of Brazil : *Dilma Rousseff*

Editor's Note --

On January 1, 2011, Dilma Rousseff -- a stalwart of outgoing President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva - - was inaugurated into office as Brazil's new president. A trained economist, Rousseff served in government as President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva's Minister of Energy from 2003 to 2005, and then served as his chief of staff. Known as the "Iron Lady," Rousseff was arrested in 1970, imprisoned for three years and tortured, for her participation in an armed guerrilla group that opposed the military dictatorship that ruled Brazil from 1964 to 1985. Rousseff made history by becoming the country's first female head of state. Acknowledging the historical importance of her achievement in winning the presidency, President Rousseff said during her inauguration, "I know the historical significance of this decision. Today, all Brazilian women should feel proud and happy."

After taking the oath of office, President Rousseff vowed to work on behalf of those most vulnerable saying, "Poverty still exists and this is a shame on our country." She continued, "The

most determined struggle will be to eradicate extreme poverty." She went on to make the following promise: "I will not rest while there are Brazilians without food on their table, homeless in the streets, and poor children abandoned to their luck." President Rousseff also made it clear that she intended to continue the policy agenda of President Lula, whom she lauded for changing government in Brazil. To that end, a strong state role would continue in the energy and banking sectors, but with an eye on economic growth and development. Also included in her policy agenda were the following items: environmental protection, regional development and tax reform.

A presidential election was to be held in October 2014 over the course of two rounds -- Oct. 5, 2014 and Oct. 26, 2014. In Brazil, the president is both the chief of state and head of government; the president is elected by popular vote for a single four-year term. Incumbent President Dilma Rousseff, who was first elected to power in 2010, was looking to re-election victory in 2014.

Parliamentary elections would also be held in October 2014. At stake would be the composition of the bicameral "Congresso Nacional" (National Congress), which consists of the "Senado Federal" (Federal Senate) and the "Câmara dos Deputados" (Chamber of Deputies). In the "Senado Federal" (Federal Senate), there are 81 seats; three members from each state or federal district are elected according to the principle of majority to serve eight-year terms; one-third are elected after a four-year period, two-thirds are elected after the next four-year period. In the "Camara dos Deputados" (Chamber of Deputies), there are 513 seats; members are elected by proportional representation to serve four-year terms.

Some of the main political parties contesting the election included the president's Workers Party (PT), the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party, the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB), Social Democracy Party (PSD), Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), the Democrats (Dem), Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), Democratic Labor Party (PDT), National Labor Party (PTN), Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB), Brazilian Republican Party (PRB), Green Party (PV), National Ecologic

Party (PEN) Social Christian Party (PSC), Social Liberal Party (PSL), United Socialist Workers' Party (PSTU), among others.

Polling data in the spring of 2014 gave Rousseff, of the ruling leftist Workers Party (PT), the clear (but dwindling) lead over her rivals. Those rivals included Aécio Neves, the Minas Gerais senator from the centrist Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB).

In mid-2014, with the election only months away, and with Brazil plagued by a stagnating economy, Neves was chipping away at Rousseff's lead. Given the country's economic woes, Neves' campaign message of pro-market and business-friendly policies held resonance with the voters. Polling data from Sensus showed Rousseff dropping from 34 percent support in the spring of 2014 to 32 percent in June 2014, while Neves moved from 20 percent to 21.5 percent in that same period.

By the first part of July 2014, Rousseff was still holding onto a lead, with 38 percent of voters' support, while Neves had 20 percent. These numbers suggested a boost for Rousseff that many attributed to positive national feelings amidst the World Cup football tournament being hosted by Brazil. But that boost may have been ephemeral as polling data in mid-July 2014 showed Rousseff's lead slipping to 36 percent. While Neves remained behind at 20 percent in a first round of voting, the data by the Datafolha poll indicated that the two candidates would be in a statistical dead heat in the second round with Rousseff only sporting a four percent lead ahead of Neves in a likely runoff.

It was possible that Rousseff's prospects for re-election were being impacted by the economy, with some experts projecting that Brazil might be on the verge of a recession. Indeed, the Brazilian economy had been showing signs of stagnation for the previous 12 months, as it slowed to only two percent. Meanwhile, industrial output was falling. Also bad for GDP growth were the rising interest rates by the Central Bank, which were intended to subdue inflation but which were also yielding negative consequences for economic activity.

These factors provided fuel for Rousseff's rivals, such as Neves, to criticize her handling of the economy. To that end, Neves was using the opportunity to focus on the economy, and to tout his pro-business agenda that included tax cuts and the restoration of investor confidence. Neves was also calling for reforms to the state-run oil company, Petroleo Brasileiro SA, which was negatively affected by the prevailing government policy of selling oil at below-market prices. It was to be seen if this economic message would resonate among the voters as Brazil's once booming economy flirted with recession.

Note that while the Brazilian presidential contest has focused on the battle between Rousseff and Neves, there were other presidential contenders. That wider field entered the international purview in mid-August 2014 when one presidential candidate, Eduardo Campos of the Brazilian Socialist Party, along with his entourage, were killed in a private jet crash. The aircraft reportedly went down just as it was preparing to land in the city of Santos in bad weather. A business-friendly leftist, Campos was consistently holding a third-place finish in the polls with about 10 percent of the vote share. Clearly, he was not viewed as the likely winner of the presidency in 2014; however, he was regarded as a relatively young and fresh "star" on the Brazilian political scene, who was predicted to perhaps one day win the presidency.

It was soon announced that Campos' running mate, environmentalist Marina Silva, would take his place at the top of the ticket in the presidential election in October 2014. The entrance of Silva into the presidential race in August 2014 appeared to have changed the dynamics to some extent.

To this point, Rousseff was regarded as the favorite, with Neves standing as her most significant rival. With well-known Silva entering the race, the contest was suddenly far more competitive. At issue was Silva's ability to attract left-leaning voters looking for an experienced leader -- indeed one who contested the previous 2010 presidential election as the Green Party candidate. Those left-leaning voters may have gone to Rousseff rather than fresh-faced Campos (prior to his tragic death), but were now willing to consider Silva as their candidate instead. She was also an appealing option for disenchanted and disillusioned Brazilian voters who may not have intended to vote but were now going to the polls to cast a ballot for an environmentalist at the top of a ticket.

Stated differently, Rousseff would now have to contend with a far more divided left-wing electorate.

For her part, Silva appeared to have taken the lessons from her previous presidential bid in 2010 and was now presenting herself as a pro-economic development candidate and as an advocate of prosperity. At the same time, she wasted few opportunities to criticize President Rousseff's stewardship of the economy that was now beset by sluggish growth and high inflation. At a news conference, Silva advanced her economic message, saying, "We know that our country needs investments and they will come when there is a new government that has credibility among investors." Silva's prospects would be aided by her reputation as an unwavering environmentalist committed to saving the Amazon rainforest, along with her background as a Christian evangelist. These two traits helped to brand Silva as the most principled politician in a country often rocked by corruption scandals. It was to be seen if it would be enough to facilitate her ascent to the presidency.

A poll by Datafolha in mid-August 2014 showed that Rousseff commanded 36 percent of support, while Silva was now attracting 21 percent of support -- just ahead of Neves who held 20 percent support. Should Silva manage to consolidate this strong start to her late campaign, she could win the second most votes in the first round of voting. That performance would position her for participation in a second round of voting against Rousseff, while sidelining the conservative option, Neves. The new polling data showed that Silva could also pose a credible threat to Rousseff in the runoff -- posting 47 percent support against Rousseff with 43 percent in that second round of voting.

By the end of August 2014, momentum was with Silva and the environmentalist had widened her lead over incumbent President Rousseff. A new poll by Datafolha showed that Rousseff and Silva were now tied in the first round with 34 percent, positioning the two women to contest the second round. In that run-off election, Silva would unseat Rousseff with 50 percent of the vote share -- a full 10 percent more than the 40 percent Rousseff was forecast to garner.

In early September 2014, the race appeared to be in a "plateau phase" according to the polling data. The polling firm, Sensus, showed Rousseff and Silva tied at around 30 percent of the vote share in the first round. In a second round, as suggested by the voting intentions of persons interviewed by Sensus, Silva would likely be victorious, since 47.6 percent of respondents said they would vote for her over Rousseff, who just had 32.8 percent of support from those interviewed. Other polls showed a similar "leveling off" of support for Silva, while Rousseff's support had stabilized. For example, a poll by MDA showed Rousseff winning the first round with 38 percent over Silva with 33.5 percent; but Silva would have a narrow second round advantage of three percentage points over Rousseff -- 45.5 percent to 42.7 percent.

Now in the thick of the race, Silva was being subject to greater criticism of the type that has been dogging Rousseff. Of note were shifting stances in Silva's campaign platform on contentious issues, such as support for gay marriage. Facing criticism from evangelical pastors over her commitment to back gay marriage, Silva reversed her position. While that move may have shored up her support base among religious voters, it simultaneously repelled urban middle class voters.

Those middle class voters would likely decide the election. The slowing of the Brazilian economy has particularly plagued Brazil's new middle class. The crowning achievement of former President Lula, Brazil's new middle class was now suffering from an economy in stagnation; they were additionally annoyed by the poor quality of public services, which stood in sharp and unwelcome contrast to government expenditures on stadiums for the World Cup. Angry with Rousseff over this mismanagement of the country's coffers, they were persuadable voters who could be attracted to Silva, were it not for her conservative social views. Thus the election would likely be a highly competitive event.

By the last week of September 2014, with the first round of the election less than two weeks away, Rousseff had managed to narrow the gap between herself and Silva and moved back into an advantageous position. Rousseff was making the economic argument that Silva, despite her environmental credentials, was too willing to cozy up to business and would not be good for the country's poorest echelon. It was an argument likely to find resonance with voters generally loyal

to Rousseff's Workers Party (PT), who had been considering Silva as an alternative. Rousseff was also arguing that Silva was an untested leader and ill-equipped to govern Brazil.

The new Datafolha poll in the last week of September 2014 showed Rousseff ahead with 37 percent of the votes compared to 30 percent for Silva. In the second round, Silva was forecast to have a slim lead of only two percentage points -- 46 percent to Rousseff with 44 percent. Another poll in the same period -- this time by MDA -- showed a similar trend. In the first round, Rousseff was forecast to take 36 percent against Silva with 27.4 percent; in the second round Silva was expected to be in a dead heat with Rousseff with the former now trailing the incumbent president 41 percent to 42 percent.

If Silva was ultimately able to narrowly unseat Rousseff, it would augur a political earthquake on Brazil's political landscape. Indeed, Silva could become Brazil's first Afro-Brazilian president in the nation's history. However, such a fate was not to become reality. Instead, the first round of the presidential contest recalibrated the race, essentially returning it to the original dynamics before the ascent of Silva.

On Oct. 5, 2014, Brazilians went to the polls to cast their ballots. To recapitulate -- the main presidential candidates on the ballot were incumbent President Dilma Rousseff of the leftist Workers' Party (PT), Minas Gerais Senator Aécio Neves from the centrist Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB), and Marina Silva from the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB).

After the votes in the first round had been tallied, the presidential contest had been inexorably altered. As expected, Rousseff had won this initial stage, carrying 41.6 percent of the vote share. But instead of Silva, it was Neves who had quietly crept up in voters' preferences to secure the second place finish and, thus, the right to contest that second and final election round. Neves won 33.5 percent of the vote share with Silva slipping to third place with 21.3 percent. The run-off election on Oct. 26, 2014, would be a contest between incumbent President Rousseff and the pro-business opposition candidate, Neves.

Polling data compiled right after the first round of voting indicated that the two candidates contesting the second round were in a competitive race. Two surveys by the Datafolha and Ibope respectively showed Neves with 46 percent support against Rousseff with 44 percent. As such, the fight to transfer support from Silva's constituency to either Rousseff or Neves would be a fierce and possibly decisive one.

For its part, Silva's Brazilian Socialist Party soon indicated that it might be prepared to back Neves; however, Silva was herself not quick to offer a personal endorsement to Neves. Instead, allies of Silva said she wanted to see Neves commit to some of her "progressive" causes such as sustainable development with a pro-environmental orientation, the defense of the rights of indigenous Brazilians, and a program of land reform for landless peasants. Apparently, Silva was able to garner those commitments because in the second week of October 2014, she officially endorsed Neves for the presidency. At a campaign event in Sao Paulo, Silva said, "In view of Aecio Neves' commitments, I declare that I will vote for and support his candidacy."

Assuming Silva's support base took her lead and transferred their backing to Neves, it was highly likely that Rousseff would be unseated and the domination of the Workers Party in the executive branch of government in Brazil would come to a close.

For her part, Rousseff was on the proverbial cliff and precipitously close to a political fall. As such, the incumbent president reminded voters that pro-business types, such as Neves, followed an economic philosophy that failed Brazil in the past, while her leftist Workers Party had done the opposite. Speaking of Neves, Rousseff warned, "He represents a model that bankrupted the country three times, cowered Brazil before the International Monetary Fund, privatized state companies for peanuts, caused widespread unemployment, wage reductions and recession." But Rousseff would not be helped by an unfolding corruption scandal involving her party and the state-run energy company, Petrobras.

In the second week of October 2014, with the runoff about two weeks away, polling data showed Rousseff and Neves to be in a competitive race, running neck and neck with one another. A

survey by Datafolha showed Neves with 45 percent and Rousseff with 43 percent in voters' preferences.

By the third week of October 2014, with the run-off election about one week away, polling data by Sensus gave the advantage to Neves, who was at 56 percent in voters' preferences, significantly ahead of Rousseff with 44 percent. It should be noted that Sensus was not as well-renowned a pollster as Datafolha; nevertheless, the wide margin between the two candidates, according to Sensus, certainly suggested that undecided voters along with Silva voters might be breaking in favor of Neves.

But an MDA survey in the last week of October 2014 -- just days ahead of the election -- showed a close race with Rousseff holding 45.5 percent of voter support against Neves with 44.5 percent. Another poll by the well-known pollster, Datafolha, around the same time gave the slight advantage to Rousseff with 47 percent of voter support and Neves with 43 percent. It seemed the second round of the Brazilian presidential election would be a competitive contest all the way to election day on Oct. 26, 2014.

On Oct. 26, 2014, voters cast their ballots in the runoff election of the presidential contest. Neves' pro-business stance meant that he racked up votes in wealthier southern states of Brazil; meanwhile, Rousseff's warnings about the ills of the supply side economic path held resonance with voters in the poorer northern states of Brazil.

Ultimately, the election results gave re-election victory to Rousseff with 51 percent of the vote share over Neves with just over 48 percent in what clearly turned into a close and heavily contested presidential race. Acknowledging that her performance in her first term was less than optimal, even with this re-election victory, Rousseff vowed to be "a much better president than I have been until now." Moving forward, Rousseff urged all Brazilians "to unite in favor of Brazil's future" and said political reform would be "a top priority" of her second term in office. For his part, Neves conceded defeat and wished Rousseff success in the administration of her next government.

Note that at the parliamentary level, final results were not available at the time of writing for the "Camara dos Deputados" (Chamber of Deputies). However, the broad pro-government coalition, including Rousseff's Workers Party, secured 55 percent of the vote share and was on track to carry around 304 seats in parliament. The opposition "change" coalition aligned with Neves, and including his Social Democratic Party, took about 26 percent of the vote share and would likely control approximately 128 seats in parliament. The opposition bloc aligned with Silva, including her Brazilian Socialist Party, garnered 11 percent of the vote share and about 55 seats in parliament.

Written by Dr. Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief, www.countrywatch.com; research sources for this section listed in Bibliography.

Foreign Relations

General Relations

Brazil is a charter member of the United Nations (U.N.) and participates in many of its specialized agencies. It has contributed troops to U.N. peacekeeping efforts in the Middle East, the former Belgian Congo, Cyprus, Mozambique, and most significantly, Angola. Brazil began serving a two-year term as a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council on Jan. 1, 1998.

As Brazil's domestic economy has grown and diversified, the country has become increasingly involved in international politics and economics. The United States, Western Europe, and Japan are primary markets for Brazilian exports and sources of foreign lending and investment. As an indication of Brazil's broader international role, trade with other developing countries increased from nine percent of the total in the 1970s to nearly 30 percent in 1993.

Regional Relations

Traditionally, Brazil has been a leader in the inter-American community and has played an important role in collective security efforts as well as in economic cooperation in the Western Hemisphere. Brazil aligned with the allies in both World Wars. During World War II, its expeditionary force in Italy played a key role in the allied victory at Monte Castello.

It is a member of the Organization of American States and the Rio Group. Recently, Brazil has given high priority to expanding relations with its South American neighbors and is a founding member of the Amazon Pact and MERCOSUR. Along with Argentina, Chile, and the United States, Brazil is one of the guarantors of the Peru-Ecuador peace process.

The Organization of American States was established on April 30, 1948 to promote regional peace and security as well as economic and social development. The OAS has 35 members and 31 observers.

The Rio Group, formerly known as "el Grupo de los Ocho," was established in December 1986 to consult on regional Latin American issues. The Rio Group includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

The Southern Cone Common Market, also known as "Mercado Comun del Cono Sur," or MERCOSUR, was established on March 26, 1991, to increase regional economic cooperation among its members, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and its associate member, Chile. In the 1990s, MERCOSUR was the fastest growing trade block in the world.

As discussed in the Political Conditions section, trade disputes occurred within MERCOSUR following the January 1999 devaluation of the real, and the future of the trade block was in question. In May 2000, there were discussions of extending membership to Chile and Bolivia.

In addition to the OAS, the Rio Group, and MERCOSUR, Brazil is a member of several other regional organizations including: the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, the Group of 11, the Latin American Economic System, the Latin American Integration Association, and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean.

On June 11, 2002, Brazilian officials told reporters that after the country takes over Mercosur's rotating presidency in July, it plans to keep alive the "critically ill patient" that is the South American trading bloc. The Argentine crisis, the economic recession afflicting Paraguay and Uruguay, and a resulting reduction in trade among the four member countries are the biggest causes of the bloc's current weakness.

On Nov. 13, 2009, the Brazilian Senate postponed a vote on Venezuela's entry into the South American trade bloc known as MERCOSUR. The delay was due to Venezuelan President Hugo

Chavez' declaration that Venezuelans should prepare for war with Colombia. At issue for President Chavez was an agreement forged between Colombia and the United States that would allow the American military to use Colombian bases in its anti-narcotics trafficking efforts. President Chavez has argued that the agreement obfuscates the United States' deeper intent to grab a foothold in South America, including the possible invasion of Venezuela. Regardless, President Chavez' declaration was viewed by the Brazilian Senate as an exercise in hyperbole and fiery rhetoric, which tainted the support of some members of the body. Already, there has been strong criticisms in Brazil regarding President Chavez' suppression of independent media and somewhat autocratic tendencies in Venezuela. There was no new date set for a vote since the immediate effort was centered on calming the situation and dispelling doubts about Venezuela's entry into Mercosur.

Editor's Note: Jointly founded in 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay under the Treaty of Asuncion, MERCOSUR has defined itself as the trading bloc of South America. That said, MERCOSUR has not yet actualized the free movement of goods, capital, services and people among its member-states.

The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean was established on Feb. 25, 1948 as the Economic Commission for Latin America to promote economic development as a regional commission of the U.N.'s Economic and Social Council. ECLAC has 41 members and seven associate members.

The Group of 11, also known as the Cartagena Group, was established on June 22, 1984, in Cartagena, Colombia to provide a forum for the largest debtor nations in Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

The Latin American Economic System, also known as "Sistema Económico Latinoamericana", established on Oct. 17, 1975 to promote economic and social development through regional cooperation. Members include: Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

The Latin American Integration Association, also known as "Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración", was established on Aug. 12, 1980 to promote freer regional trade. Members include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

The Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, also known as "Organismo para la Proscripción de las Armas Nucleares en la América Latina y el

Caribe", was established on Feb. 14, 1967, to encourage the peaceful uses of atomic energy and prohibit nuclear weapons. Members include Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

A two-day summit was held in Brasilia on Sept. 1-2, 2000, at which President Cardoso hosted the presidents of Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, and Ecuador. The leaders signed a document called the "Brasilia Communique," whose major pledge was to create free trade in the entire region by January 2002, thus uniting the Mercosur and Andean trade blocs. The document, signed one day after the U.S. released \$1.3 billion in military aid to Colombia for the anti-narcotics program, included a clause that obliged the countries to "strictly respect" democracy. Since its recovery from the January 1999 economic crisis, Brazil appeared to be emerging as a regional leader. The proposed trade bloc will unite 340 million people with a combined economic output of \$1.3 trillion.

Brazil also played host of the 4th Summit of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP) on July 31-Aug. 1, 2002. The event, which officially marked the entry of East Timor into the organization, included eight members: Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, Sao Tome and Principe and East Timor. Brazil presided over the CPLP for the following two years.

Other Significant Relationships

Canada

In February 2003, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) gave Brazil permission to impose US\$247.8 million (£155 million) in sanctions against Canada over government subsidies to its aircraft industry. Brazil had asked for US\$3.36 billion in punitive tariffs.

The WTO found that the Canadian government made loans below market rates to US airlines to help regional aircraft maker Bombardier win contracts; Bombardier and Brazil's Embraer are rivals in the short-haul jet market.

Brazil had asked for a ruling on countermeasures after Canada ignored a WTO recommendation to withdraw the subsidies by May 2002.

The United States

The United States (U.S.) was the first country to recognize Brazil's independence in 1822. The two countries have traditionally enjoyed friendly, active relations encompassing a broad political and economic agenda.

With the inauguration of Brazil's internationally oriented, reformist President Fernando Henrique Cardoso on Jan. 1, 1995, Brazil-U.S. engagement and cooperation have intensified. This is reflected in the unprecedented number of high-level contacts between the two governments. Examples include: President Cardoso's state visit to Washington in April 1995, visits to Brazil by Former U.S. President and First Lady Bill and Hillary Clinton, Secretaries of State Madeleine Albright and Warren Christopher, the late Secretary of Commerce Ronald Brown, and Secretary of Commerce William Daley. In addition, there have been many other exchanges between Brazilian cabinet and sub-cabinet officials and U.S. officials.

Important topics of discussion have included: trade and finance, hemispheric economic integration, United Nations reform and peacekeeping efforts, nonproliferation and arms control, follow-up to the 1994 Miami Summit of the Americas, common efforts to help resolve the Peru-Ecuador border conflict, support for democratic development, human rights issues, counter-narcotics, and environmental concerns.

During former U.S. President Clinton's October 1997 visit to Brazil, several agreements were signed. The Education Partnership Agreement is designed to enhance and expand cooperative initiatives in such areas as standards-based education reform, use of technology, and professional development of teachers. Other agreements include the Mutual Legal Assistance treaty, and agreements on cooperation in energy, the international space station, national parks, and government reform.

There have been other recent agreements with Brazil: a new agreement for cooperation in counter-narcotics signed in March 1995; an agreement signed in March 1998 to end Brazil's automotive investment incentive program earlier than scheduled; and a national drug control plan drafted. During a visit of former Under Secretary of State Timothy Wirth to Brazil in October 1995, the two countries signed a Common Agenda on the Environment, laying the foundation for cooperative efforts in environmental protection. Scientific and technical relations are advancing as well. During his 1996 visit, former Secretary of State Christopher signed a Space Cooperation agreement and initialed an agreement on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.

Former U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor and Brazilian Foreign Minister Lampraia submitted a joint report to Presidents Clinton and Cardoso on the Brazil-U.S. Bilateral Trade Review, completed Oct. 25, 1995. The Bilateral Trade Review laid the groundwork for closer cooperation in resolving bilateral trade issues as well as for joint efforts to advance progress toward a Free Trade Area of the Americas, or FTAA, and to develop closer ties between NAFTA and MERCOSUR. Brazil is a key player in hemispheric efforts to negotiate an FTAA by 2005, and

hosted the May 1997 FTAA Trade Ministerial meeting in Belo Horizonte.

In early June 2002, Italy declared it planned to increase its investment in Brazil despite global uncertainty over the results of voter preference polls that indicate center-leftist presidential candidate Inacio Lula da Silva could win the October presidential elections.

In June 2003, Lula (who officially took office as President in January) traveled to Washington for the biggest Brazil-U.S. summit since World War II. Lula was the first foreign leader who opposed the war in Iraq to visit the White House. Although Lula was an opponent of the U.S.-led war against Iraq, it was widely believed that Brazil holds the key to the United States' relationship with Latin America as a whole. Some observers said President Lula was serving as "a bridge" between other nations and the giant in the North. Also, his agreement was crucial for the United States if it wanted to proceed with ambitious plans to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas, linking economies from Alaska to Argentina in a single economic zone.

After the summit, President Bush described the relationship between the countries as "vital, important and growing." The two leaders announced a series of joint projects ranging from energy to business development in Brazil and fighting Aids in Africa.

However, by mid-July 2003, Lula was speaking out against any notion of the United States being the dominant force in the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and called for fairer negotiations. In an interview with the *BBC*, Lula said the FTAA "was not owned by the United States" and that all countries wanting to join should have an equal voice. He added that if this were not possible, then the matter would be taken to the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

Lula also reiterated calls for South American countries to join forces to create a stronger negotiating power in trade talks with the U.S. and Europe.

Recent changes to immigration policy by the United States, requiring the finger printing of visitors, resulted in the decision by Brazil to require the same of United States citizens traveling in Brazil. The scenario created some degree of bilateral tensions.

The situation has been further tested by Brazil's close ties with Venezuela, which has had a contentious with the United States. Brazil's decision to back Venezuela for a seat on the United Nations Security Council as a non-permanent member also went against the wishes of the United States (who was backing Guatemala) and promised to further strain bilateral ties.

Analysts suggested that the new Obama administration in the United States (with the inauguration of President Barack Obama in January 2009) was likely to forge improved bilateral ties with Brazil.

Special Entry: A Foreign Relations Tragedy

On Aug. 19, 2003, a truck bomb exploded at the United Nations headquarters at the Canal Hotel in Iraq. The explosion killed at least 23 people, including the United Nations Envoy to Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello -- a native Brazilian. The attack was the most devastating in the 58-year history of the international body. The United States accused loyalists of the ousted regime of Saddam Hussein for the attack as well as others. Transnational terrorist groups, such as al-Qaida, as well as Ansar al-Islam, were also discussed as possible groups responsible for the attack. Nevertheless, the news agency *Reuters*, as well as an Arabic television station *Al Arabiya*, both reported that a previously unknown group called the "Armed Vanguard of the Second Mohammed Army" took responsibility for the bombing.

Discussions about how to increase security began just as the United Nations humanitarian coordinator for Iraq, Ramiro Lopes da Silva, was appointed by United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, to succeed the Viera de Mello.

The body of slain envoy, Sergio Viera de Mello, was returned to his home country of Brazil to lay in state draped in the Brazilian and United Nations flags. At a private memorial service attended by the United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan and Brazilian President Luis Ignacio Lula da Silva, Viera de Mello was praised as global hero and a champion of peace. Several Brazilian senators called for Viera de Mello to receive the Nobel Peace Prize posthumously, while Iraq's Governing Council called for the establishment of a monument in his memory.

Special Entry: Summit of the Organisation of American States (OAS) in 2005

The leaders of 34 nations from across the Americas convened in the Argentine resort town of Mar del Plata on Nov. 3 and 4, 2005, to discuss consolidating free trade across the hemisphere. The talks, however, failed to reach any significant resolution on the matter of creating the United States-backed proposal for a regional free trade zone. The United States was faced with strong opposition from five Latin American countries -- Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Uruguay, Paraguay - who said that the free trade zone plan could damage their economies. They also cautioned that they wanted to see how various trade-related issues transpired at the upcoming World Trade Organization meeting in Hong Kong. The twenty-nine remaining countries said they would resume talks on a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) in 2006. For United States President George W. Bush, the summit was sometimes a rather discomfiting event due to the large and vocal protests on the ground in Argentina. After leaving Argentina, President Bush traveled to Brazil. There, he promised his Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula Da Silva that he would work on eliminating agricultural subsidies -- a key measure needed in the movement towards free trade around the world. He cautioned, however, that such an effort would also rest upon European willingness to do the same. While in Brazil, Bush took a retaliatory swipe at his nemesis, Chavez,

by accusing some nations of trying to roll back 20 years of democratic progress. In Brazil, Bush was met once again by protesters screaming insults and burning his effigy.

Special Entry: Nuclear Politics

In May 2006, Brazil officially joined a small group of countries with the ability to enrich uranium for energy generating purposes. Brazil, which is home to large reserves of uranium, announced that it had opened a centrifuge facility at the Resende nuclear plant and noted. The government noted that the facility was home to some of the most advanced nuclear technology in the world. It also predicted that Brazil would be able to meet all of its nuclear energy needs within 10 years. Until the opening of the new facility, Brazilian uranium ore had been sent elsewhere for enrichment into nuclear fuel.

This development ensued following extensive discussions with the United Nations nuclear watchdog agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The process was not an easy one and even led to disagreement about the scientific technology Brazil has been using. Part of the problem involved Brazil's reticence to share its proprietary knowledge, which resulted in obstacles for the IAEA inspectors trying to access nuclear facilities. The timing of the development of Brazilian nuclear program along with Iran's nuclear ambitions also led to complex political challenges. These were resolved after Brazil and the IAEA were able to reach an agreement ensuring that the new facilities would not be used for weapons production.

Special Entry: Obama and Lula

Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva was the first Latin American leader to meet in person with newly-inaugurated United States President Barack Obama in early 2009. President Lula said that President Obama had an opportunity to transform relations with Latin America. President Lula, who called on developed countries to assist in thawing the frozen credit markets, which have been particularly hard on developing economies, said that President Obama was in a "unique and exceptional position to improve relationships with Latin America." After his meeting with President Obama, President Lula said, "I think in Latin America we need to construct a new relationship, a relationship of trust not interference." President Obama appeared to echo President Lula's call for an improved and more cooperative relationship with Latin America when he said, "We have a very strong friendship between the two countries, but we can always make it stronger."

Other Recent Developments Related to Foreign Policy

In the autumn of 2008, Brazil received a formal invitation from Iran to join the international oil cartel known as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Brazilian Energy Minister Edson Lobao said in a news conference in Brasilia that his country had declined the invitation. Lobao explained that he had informed the Iranian envoy, Moshen Shaterzadeh, that Brazil "does not envisage that possibility" in the immediate future.

International affairs dominated the headlines in 2009. Of particular note was the fact that Brazil and Paraguay reached an agreement to end their long-standing dispute over the cost of energy from the Itaipu hydro-electric plant, which has been located on their mutual border. At the core of the agreement was Brazil's promise to pay Paraguay triple the existing rate for excess energy supplies derived from the Itaipu hydro-electric plant.

By September 2009, Brazil and Honduras were embroiled in a conflict over the presence of ousted Honduran President Manuel Zelaya at the Brazilian embassy in Honduras. According to reports from the ground in Tegucigalpa, the interim Honduran authorities, led by Roberto Micheletti, were demanding that Brazil "immediately take measures to ensure that Zelaya stops using the protection offered by the diplomatic mission to instigate violence in Honduras." The interim government also warned that it would take unspecified "additional measures" if Zelaya's status remained undefined within 10 days.

For its part, Brazil decided to reject the ultimatum by Honduras' interim authorities on the basis that its embassy was protected under international law. Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva personally entered the fray when he asserted, "Brazil will not comply with an ultimatum from a government of coup mongers."

The situation took a disturbing turn when it was reported that hundreds of Honduran soldiers and riot police had surrounded the Brazilian embassy. While Micheletti said that he had no plans to storm the embassy and arrest Zelaya, there were intimations that the Brazilian diplomatic mission was, indeed, under siege. Zelaya himself accused the interim authorities of pumping toxic gas into the building, however, Red Cross personnel on the ground could not confirm the allegation. Still, the United Nations Security Council appeared to acknowledge the "siege" effect when it demanded that the interim authorities of Honduras "cease harassing" the Brazilian embassy.

Special Entry: Rouseff and Obama:

Bilateral relations are complemented by people-to-people initiatives and trilateral and multilateral cooperation. The United States and Brazil's long history of exchange in education is one example; the bi-national Fulbright Commission was established in 1957, and thousands of scholars have traveled between the two countries. Education cooperation continues to thrive as President Obama's "100,000 Strong in the Americas" goal and Brazilian President Rouseff's "Science

without Borders” initiative create opportunities for new academic and research partnerships. EducationUSA centers around helping Brazil advise students on study in the United States and host events to assist U.S. higher education institutions recruit Brazilian students. The United States is also working closely with Brazilian counterparts to expand opportunities for English language learning and professional development for Brazilian teachers. These exchanges strengthen U.S. and Brazilian institutional partnerships, develop a workforce prepared for 21st century opportunities, and contribute to long-term economic growth for both countries.

The United States and Brazil also share a commitment to combat discrimination based on race, gender, ethnicity, or lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) status; to advance gender equality; to fight exploitative child and forced labor; and to promote human rights. The U.S.-Brazil Joint Action Plan to Eliminate Racial and Ethnic Discrimination and Promote Equality, the first bilateral instrument that targets racism, and the U.S.-Brazil Memorandum of Understanding on the Advancement of Women provide platforms for cooperation to combat racial discrimination and women’s empowerment broadly, and to share best practices in tackling discrimination in STEM education, law enforcement, labor, health, gender-based violence, economic empowerment, and many other areas. Multilateral cooperation and collaboration at the United Nations and Organization of American States has also proven effective in the promotion of LGBT human rights.

The United States and Brazil also partner on trilateral cooperation in third countries, particularly in support of biofuels and agricultural development, food security, health, and women’s rights. Successful programs include joint technical cooperation and training in support of trilateral development programs in Mozambique in agricultural research and technology and food security, with plans to extend this cooperation to additional countries in Africa, Central America, and the Caribbean. Multilaterally, the power of U.S.-Brazil collaboration is evidenced by the success of the Open Government Partnership, a multi-country initiative to foster transparency launched and co-chaired in its inaugural year by the United States and Brazil.

Special Report: Pope Francis concludes Brazil visit with massive vigil at Copacabana in Rio de Janeiro

On July 27, 2013, Pope Francis concluded his week-long visit to Brazil to celebrate World Youth Day with a massive vigil at the famed Copacabana Beach in Rio de Janeiro. Approximately two million people packed Copacabana Beach to participate in the night-long vigil and were on hand to hear the pope urge young people to be agents of change in society.

Speaking of the mass protests that have rocked Brazil in 2013 as Brazilians rallied for less sports stadiums and better infrastructure, Pope Francis said: "Keep overcoming apathy and offering a Christian response to the social and political concerns taking place in different parts of the world."

Earlier the pope had a message for both the Brazilian authorities and the protesters on the street on the same subject when he urged them to use dialogue rather than "selfish indifference" to the problems facing the country. He said: "Between selfish indifference and violent protest, there is always another possible option: that of dialogue." The pope continued, "A country grows when constructive dialogue occurs between its many rich cultural components: popular culture, university culture, youth culture, artistic and technological culture, economic culture, family culture and media culture."

Pope Francis also called on members of the clergy to leave the confines of their churches and enter the wider community, with the aim of helping the most marginalized segments of society. Separately in an address to bishops and priests in a Cathedral, Pope Francis urged the clergy to visit Brazil's slums, known as "favelas." He said, "We cannot keep ourselves shut up in parishes, in our communities, when so many people are waiting for the Gospel." It was a now-familiar call from a pontiff uncomfortable with the regal symbols of the Vatican hierarchy, and more at home moving among the people and with a clear social justice agenda for the Roman Catholic Church.

Special Note: U.S. spying on allies causes bilateral tensions

In late October 2013, the German publication, Der Spiegel, reported that according to leaked clandestine documents from the National Security Agency (NSA), the United States had been spying on Germany. Of primary interest was the suggestion that that United States had been spying on Angela Merkel -- the German head of government -- via her mobile phone. The report indicated that the United States' surveillance of Merkel dated back to 2002 -- before she became Chancellor of Germany.

The revelations have spurred outrage in Germany and even caused Chancellor Merkel to call United States President Obama to register her disapproval. There was also an announcement that German intelligence officials would be sent to the United States to seek answers on the news of spying. President Obama reportedly apologized to Chancellor Merkel for the phone monitoring but assured his German counterpart that he would have stopped the practice, had he known about it. Another German publication, Bild, disputed this claim by the United States president, citing intelligence sources who said President Obama had been briefed about the operation that included monitoring of Merkel. However, the National Security Agency in the United States issued a statement maintaining that the matter was never discussed with President Obama. Regardless, the issue has soured bilateral relations between the two countries.

Diplomatic relations between the United States and other countries have already been compromised as result of NSA revelations. Indeed, Spain was demanding answers about the news that millions of Spanish phone calls were intercepted by the NSA. As well, the Spanish government summoned the United States ambassador to Spain to answer questions about the

United States' espionage practices. Already, the governments of Brazil and Mexico had reacted in anger over news that the United States' espionage targets involved their countries.

Written by Dr. Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief at CountryWatch.com. Some sections taken from United States Department of State. See Bibliography for general research sources.

National Security

External Threats

Brazil does not face any major security threats of foreign origin. It is engaged in a minor territorial dispute with Uruguay over the Arroio Invernada (Arroyo de la Invernada) region of the Quarai (Cuareim) River and the islands at the convergence of the Quarai (Cuareim) and Uruguay rivers. Its border is subject to incursions from paramilitary organizations based in Colombia.

Crime

The presence of a significant criminal element within and on the fringe of Brazil's borders poses an ongoing threat to public safety there. Street crime is prevalent throughout Brazil's major urban centers. Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo have particularly high crime rates. The tri-border region between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay has long been a hotbed of criminal activity. The Brazilian city of Foz do Iguazu lies within the zone, as do Puerto Iguazu, Argentina and Ciudad del Este, Paraguay. The region has a total population of roughly 600,000 inhabitants. It has been used as a staging ground for the trafficking of arms, narcotics and contraband, document and currency fraud and money laundering, in addition to terrorism (see below). Brazil is subject to use by drug traffickers as a transshipment point for cocaine bound for Europe and the United States. Cannabis is cultivated there, as is coca on a small scale and largely for domestic consumption. The State Department reports that drug related violence and weapons smuggling are on the rise in Brazil as well.

Insurgencies

There are no organized insurgent movements operating in or outside of Brazil that seek the overthrow of its central government. Its border is subject to incursions by Colombian-based paramilitary organizations; none pose a direct threat to Brazil's central government, however. Strikes and demonstrations that occur sporadically in urban areas have the potential to turn violent.

Terrorism

In addition to a host of other illicit enterprises affiliated with the region, the zone between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay is closely linked to global terrorism. It has traditionally been a regional hub for Hezbollah and Hamas fundraising efforts. There were also uncorroborated reports of an al-Qaida presence there in 2002. However, there have been recent efforts on behalf of the government to crack down on terrorists and their outfits operating in Brazil. They have recently incorporated 10 out of the 14 conventions they signed against terrorism into their domestic laws. The security and law enforcement agencies have been cooperating with their counterparts at home and abroad to look terrorist suspects and to halt the financing of terrorist activities.

Defense Forces

Military Data

Military Branches:

Brazilian Army (Exercito Brasileiro, EB), Brazilian Navy (Marinha do Brasil (MB), includes Naval Air and Marine Corps (Corpo de Fuzileiros Navais)), Brazilian Air Force (Forca Aerea Brasileira, FAB)

Eligible age to enter service:

18-45 years of age for compulsory military service; 17-45 years of age for voluntary service

Mandatory Service Terms:

Conscript service obligation is 10-12 months

Manpower in general population-fit for military service:

males age 16-49: 38,993,989

females age 16-49: 44,841,661

Manpower reaching eligible age annually:

males: 1,733,168

females: 1,672,477

Military Expenditures - Percent of GDP:

1.47%

Chapter 3

Economic Overview

Economic Overview

Overview

Brazil is the largest and most populous country in South America. Endowed with rich natural resources, Brazil's economy outweighs that of all other South American countries with large and well-developed agricultural, mining, manufacturing and services sectors.

Agriculture accounts for about 5 percent of Brazil's GDP and 35 percent of its export earnings. The country is the world's largest producer of sugar cane, coffee and tropical fruits, and has the world's largest commercial cattle herd (170 million head). Other important agricultural products include soybeans, corn, cotton, cocoa, tobacco, and forest products. Industry accounts for one-third of GDP, with well-diversified sectors ranging from automobiles, machinery and equipment, steel, textiles, cement, petrochemicals and consumer durables. Contributing about 65 percent to GDP, Brazil's services sector is diverse and sophisticated, including telecommunications, banking, commerce and computing. Brazil also has the largest rainforest in the world -- located in the Amazon Basin-- and is one of the world's leading producers of hydroelectric power.

Over the past decade, Brazil has built a strong macroeconomic framework, including fiscal discipline, inflation targeting, and the flexible exchange rate regime. While implementing reforms and prudent macroeconomic policies, the government, led by President Lula, has also moved to narrow the gaps between the rich and poor. There have been reforms in the pension system, a modest increase in the minimum wage, and welfare programs that have targeted millions of poor families. These social policies have contributed to boosting domestic consumption. All these have helped reduce fiscal and external vulnerabilities and allowed the economy to adjust quickly to external shocks. As a result, Brazil's economy remained resilient against the global crisis, and it was one of the first emerging markets to begin a recovery. Following a sharp slowdown for two quarters, the economy began to improve in the second quarter of 2009, supported by private consumption and a healthy financial system.

Indeed, consumer and investor confidence revived and GDP growth returned to positive in 2010, helped by a recovery in exports. Foreign investors have been attracted to Brazil due to its strong growth and high interest rates. Large capital inflows have contributed as of late to the rapid appreciation of its currency and resulted in the government raising taxes on some foreign investments. Those inflows were estimated to have reached \$52.6 billion by the end of April 2011, almost twice as high as over the same period in 2010. Newly-elected President Dilma Rousseff has pledged to maintain the previous administration's commitment to inflation targeting by the Central

Bank, a floating exchange rate, and fiscal restraint. But the country's Central Bank faces a dilemma with inflation and growth pushing in different directions. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development warns that additional interest rate increases are necessary to prevent inflation expectations from becoming unanchored. Lending by private banks, which plunged during the crisis, has since rebounded very strongly. Meanwhile, public bank lending, which increased during the crisis to counter the decline in private lending, also continues to expand at a rapid pace. By early September 2011, Brazil had vowed to defend its domestic industry against unfair competition. The country slapped import tariffs on select Chinese steel products, just one of a series of measures to defend struggling domestic manufacturers and help shield Latin America's largest economy from the fallout of global financial turmoil.

By December 2011, Brazil's economy had expanded so much that it had become the sixth largest in the world – surpassing the United Kingdom. Brazilian Finance Minister Guido Mantega noted that the national economy grew 2.7 percent in 2011 -- more than the United Kingdom's 0.8 percent of growth. Mantega suggested that despite this milestone, his country was focused on dynamism and sustainability in the economic sphere. He said, "It is not important to be the world's sixth-biggest economy, but to be among the most dynamic economies, and with sustainable growth." Also by December 2011, urban unemployment was at the historic low of 4.7 percent and Brazil's traditionally high level of income equality had declined for each of the prior 12 years. In October 2012, surveyed economists predicted that growth would rebound from about 1.5 percent for the year to about 4 percent in 2013. Data released in October showed that Brazil's economy expanded in August at its fastest pace since March 2011.

Rising inflation led the authorities to take measures to cool the economy; these actions and the deteriorating international economic situation slowed growth in 2012. Still, unemployment was at historic lows and Brazil's traditionally high level of income inequality had declined for each of the prior 14 years. President Dilma Rousseff retained the previous administration's commitment to inflation targeting by the central bank, a floating exchange rate, and fiscal restraint. In an effort to boost growth, in 2012 the administration implemented a somewhat more expansionary monetary policy that has thus far failed to stimulate much growth.

By 2013, Brazil's economic situation was a bit shaky. In June 2013, Standard & Poor's lowered its credit outlook on Brazil, meaning it could potentially cut its rating over the next two years, and revised its outlook on long-term ratings to negative from stable. The ratings agency said that low GDP growth and continued expansionary fiscal policy (including off-budget measures) risked weakening Brazil's financial profile and could, without corrective measures, result in weaker fiscal performance and an increase in the government's debt burden.

"The credit ratings on Brazil reflect its well-established political institutions, diversified economy, manageable levels of net external debt, and political commitment to policies that maintain economic stability," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Sebastian Briozzo. "The ratings also incorporate its relatively large government debt and refinancing needs."

He went on to say the ratings reflected the country's substantial demand for investment to improve its physical infrastructure, as well as structural impediments that contribute to low overall investment as a share of GDP (just above 18% in 2012) and constrain GDP growth potential.

S&P predicted Brazil would suffer its third year of modest economic growth in 2013. By November 2013, investors were calling on President Dilma Rousseff to make sharp budget cuts. However, it appeared that she had no plans to do so despite a lower currency and concerns about future inflation. There were concerns that the country's deteriorating finances could lead credit ratings agencies to downgrade Brazil and turn off investors, which would in turn jeopardize the country's fragile recovery and prolong an era of mediocre economic growth.

By late August 2014 - one month before the general election - BBC reported that Brazil had fallen into recession.

GDP slid by 0.6 percent from April to June 2014, a worse performance than analysts were expecting. Amended figures for the first quarter of the year also showed a fall of 0.2 percent. The news was expected to dampen President Dilma Rousseff's chances for re-election. The World Cup, which took place in Brazil in June and July 2014, ended up not being particularly good for business in the country. Traditional tourists were deterred by the crowds and many employees took time off of work. In particular, civil construction, manufacturing and investment suffered during the second quarter.

Local economists were saying that deep reforms would be necessary by whoever won the next election considering there would likely be no growth in the Brazilian economy in 2014. Investor and consumer confidence were on the decline, and industrial output and retail sales were limping along.

After winning re-election in October 2014 by a historically narrow margin, President Dilma Rousseff appointed a new economic team led by Finance Minister Joaquim Levy, who introduced a fiscal austerity package intended to restore the primary account surplus to 1.2 percent of GDP and preserve the country's investment-grade sovereign credit rating. However, by late 2015, things were not going well.

After reaching historic lows of 4.5 percent in early 2014, the unemployment rate in Brazil remained low, but was slowly rising. In September 2015, Brazil's economy shed a net 95,602 payroll jobs, according to the labor ministry as the country headed toward a prolonged recession. Brazilian companies were expected to have fired a net 65,000 workers in September 2015, according to the median forecast of 12 economists. Brazil lost 86,543 jobs in August. According to a Reuters poll in October 2015, economists expect the Brazilian economy to shrink by 1 percent in 2016, following a sharp contraction of nearly 3 percent forecast for 2015. Brazil's economy had slipped into its worst recession in 25 years - hit by high inflation, rising interest rates and a string of tax hikes and

spending cuts by President Rousseff.

In early November 2015, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) said the Brazilian government needed structural reforms that raised the retirement age and pegged pensions to consumer prices to secure sustainable economic growth ahead. While President Rousseff had unveiled an ambitious fiscal austerity package to plug a widening fiscal deficit, tensions with her allies in Congress had delayed her efforts and soured the mood of investors.

Economic Performance

The Brazilian economy came under considerable stress in 2002 and 2003. The volatile external environment and concerns about the continuity of macroeconomic policies following the change in government led to a sharp decline in external capital flows and a depreciation of the real. In 2003, real GDP growth declined sharply to 1.1 percent, and inflation rose to 14.8 percent as a result of continued depreciation of the real.

In the context of a favorable external environment, macroeconomic stability was restored in 2004 through strong macroeconomic policies and the pursuit of ambitious structural reforms including tax and pension reforms and bankruptcy legislation. Consumer confidence increased and the business climate improved. As a consequence, real GDP growth increased to an annual average rate of nearly 5 percent between 2004 and 2008, while cautious monetary policy kept inflation low at single digits. Affected by the global economic crisis through declining commodity prices and external demand, real GDP growth fell sharply in the two quarters to March 2009, but has since improved, supported by the government's countercyclical measures. As a result, GDP growth, though declining, remained positive in 2009 before recovering strongly in 2010. Growth slowed a bit in 2011 and further in 2012.

According to CountryWatch estimated calculations for 2014:

Real GDP growth rate was: 2.4 percent

Inflation was measured at: 8.4 percent

The fiscal deficit/surplus as percent of GDP (%) was: -1.9 percent

Updated in 2015

**Please note that the figures in our Economic Performance section are estimates or forecasts based on IMF-based data that are formulated using CountryWatch models of analysis.*

Supplementary Sources: Roubini Global Economics, Standard & Poor's, BBC News, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, International Monetary Fund and Reuters

Nominal GDP and Components

Nominal GDP and Components					
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)	4,374.76	4,713.10	5,157.57	5,521.26	5,845.82
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)	12.553	7.734	9.431	7.052	5.879
Consumption (LCU billions)	2,637.01	2,908.41	3,200.74	3,449.81	3,679.17
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)	817.368	909.613	1,010.35	1,114.90	1,189.03
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)	954.060	958.804	1,066.99	1,108.76	1,054.12
Exports of Goods & Services (LCU billions)	501.802	563.573	619.919	635.910	750.633
Imports of Goods & Services (LCU billions)	535.473	627.304	740.431	788.127	827.130

Population and GDP Per Capita

Population and GDP Per Capita					
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Population, total (million)	197.397	199.242	201.033	202.769	204.451
Population growth (%)	0.9714	0.9347	0.8989	0.8635	0.8295
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)	22,162.27	23,655.13	25,655.34	27,229.29	28,592.79

Real GDP and Inflation

Real GDP and Inflation					
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005 base)	1,192.35	1,213.36	1,246.65	1,248.46	1,210.69
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)	3.916	1.762	2.744	0.1447	-3.0254
GDP Deflator (2005=100.0)	366.903	388.432	413.713	442.246	482.852
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)	8.311	5.868	6.508	6.897	9.182

Government Spending and Taxation

Government Spending and Taxation					
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Government Fiscal Budget (billions)	1,644.42	1,790.33	1,992.89	2,221.01	2,406.38
Fiscal Budget Growth Rate (percentage)	9.076	8.873	11.314	11.447	8.346
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)	35.121	35.412	35.585	33.998	33.496
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU billions)	1,536.46	1,669.01	1,835.34	1,877.10	1,958.10
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)	-107.9630	-121.3150	-157.5430	-343.9160	-448.2820
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)	-2.4679	-2.5740	-3.0546	-6.2289	-7.6684

Money Supply, Interest Rates and Unemployment

Money Supply, Interest Rates and Unemployment					
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)	3,067.86	3,555.73	3,872.68	4,396.71	4,655.17
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)	18.510	15.903	8.914	13.531	5.879
Lending Interest Rate (%)	43.883	36.637	27.392	32.008	9.463
Unemployment Rate (%)	5.967	5.483	5.392	4.842	6.598

Foreign Trade and the Exchange Rate

Foreign Trade and the Exchange Rate					
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/\$US)	1.674	1.954	2.157	2.353	3.248
Trade Balance NIPA (\$US billions)	-20.1118	-32.6157	-55.8689	-64.6936	-23.5491
Trade Balance % of GDP	-0.7697	-1.3522	-2.3366	-2.7569	-1.3086
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves (\$US billions)	352.010	373.161	358.816	363.570	276.393

Data in US Dollars

Data in US Dollars					
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Nominal GDP (\$US billions)	2,613.06	2,412.02	2,391.03	2,346.58	1,799.61
Exports (\$US billions)	299.728	288.420	287.392	270.267	231.079
Imports (\$US billions)	319.840	321.036	343.261	334.961	254.628

Energy Consumption and Production Standard Units

Energy Consumption and Production Standard Units					
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Petroleum Consumption (TBPD)	2,715.92	2,880.33	2,953.24	2,704.58	2,685.28
Petroleum Production (TBPD)	2,699.35	2,650.63	2,701.91	2,900.10	3,010.53
Petroleum Net Exports (TBPD)	-16.5722	-229.7033	-251.3231	195.524	325.249
Natural Gas Consumption (bcf)	884.994	1,071.25	1,356.10	1,357.02	1,395.11
Natural Gas Production (bcf)	515.395	600.184	745.970	697.981	763.568
Natural Gas Net Exports (bcf)	-369.5990	-471.0608	-610.1263	-659.0406	-631.5417
Coal Consumption (1000s st)	27,659.20	27,305.35	29,431.90	26,751.45	26,940.66
Coal Production	5,952.35	6,545.44	8,583.61	9,023.72	9,035.75

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
(1000s st)					
Coal Net Exports (1000s st)	-21706.8488	-20759.9146	-20848.2961	-17727.7299	-17904.913
Nuclear Production (bil kwh)	14.795	15.170	13.848	14.540	14.456
Hydroelectric Production (bil kwh)	424.050	411.189	387.082	365.792	348.210
Renewables Production (bil kwh)	35.000	40.287	47.332	61.619	67.781

Energy Consumption and Production QUADS

Energy Consumption and Production QUADS					
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Petroleum Consumption (Quads)	5.799	6.150	6.306	5.775	5.734
Petroleum Production (Quads)	5.763	5.698	5.788	6.334	5.138
Petroleum Net Exports (Quads)	-0.0360	-0.4520	-0.5180	0.5591	-0.5958
Natural Gas Consumption (Quads)	0.9027	1.093	1.383	1.384	1.423
Natural Gas Production (Quads)	0.5252	0.6102	0.7593	0.7221	0.6666
Natural Gas Net Exports (Quads)	-0.3775	-0.4825	-0.6239	-0.6620	-0.7564
Coal Consumption (Quads)	0.5532	0.5461	0.5886	0.5350	0.5388
Coal Production (Quads)	0.1214	0.1390	0.1805	0.1805	0.1629
Coal Net Exports (Quads)	-0.4318	-0.4071	-0.4082	-0.3546	-0.3759
Nuclear Production (Quads)	0.1480	0.1517	0.1385	0.1454	0.1446
Hydroelectric Production (Quads)	4.240	4.112	3.871	3.658	3.482
Renewables Production (Quads)	0.3500	0.4029	0.4733	0.6162	0.6778

World Energy Price Summary

World Energy Price Summary					
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Petroleum-WTI (\$/bbl)	95.054	94.159	97.943	93.112	48.709
Natural Gas-Henry Hub (\$/mmbtu)	3.999	2.752	3.729	4.369	2.614
Coal Thermal-Australian (\$/mt)	121.448	96.364	84.562	70.130	57.511

CO2 Emissions

CO2 Emissions					
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Petroleum Based (mm mt C)	129.559	137.402	140.880	129.018	128.098
Natural Gas Based (mm mt C)	14.358	17.380	22.001	22.016	22.634
Coal Based (mm mt C)	15.851	15.649	16.867	15.331	15.440
Total CO2 Emissions (mm mt C)	159.769	170.431	179.749	166.366	166.172

Agriculture Consumption and Production

Agriculture Consumption and Production					
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Corn Total Consumption (1000 metric tons)	46,829.66	52,101.31	54,559.67	45,069.83	38,560.4
Corn Production (1000 metric tons)	55,557.07	70,856.66	79,946.12	81,099.65	75,585.4
Corn Net Exports (1000 metric tons)	8,727.41	18,755.35	25,386.45	36,029.83	37,024.8
Soybeans Total Consumption (1000 metric tons)	41,870.87	33,647.29	39,211.18	38,360.63	32,052.2
Soybeans Production (1000 metric tons)	74,913.54	65,729.47	81,228.88	85,356.90	80,416.0
Soybeans Net Exports (1000 metric tons)	33,042.68	32,082.17	42,017.70	46,996.28	48,363.8

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Rice Total Consumption (1000 metric tons)	13,401.87	11,476.44	11,550.35	11,948.16	9,947.3
Rice Production (1000 metric tons)	13,486.08	11,549.69	11,777.38	12,170.82	11,469.8
Rice Net Exports (1000 metric tons)	84.216	73.250	227.036	222.653	1,522.5
Coffee Total Consumption (metric tons)	909,333.00	1,533,823.00	1,265,421.00	1,314,340.16	1,155,572
Coffee Production (metric tons)	2,613,033.65	2,936,495.22	2,903,075.90	2,954,391.28	2,806,943
Coffee Net Exports (metric tons)	1,703,700.65	1,402,672.22	1,637,654.90	1,640,051.11	1,651,371
Cocoa Beans Total Consumption (metric tons)	280,316.00	307,614.00	272,851.00	275,205.06	274,376.
Cocoa Beans Production (metric tons)	251,283.57	262,832.46	271,779.60	274,855.20	278,487.
Cocoa Beans Net Exports	-29032.4328	-44781.5420	-1071.3952	-349.8523	4,110.5

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
(metric tons)					
Wheat Total Consumption (1000 metric tons)	9,079.78	8,593.93	11,823.45	12,736.42	10,042.6
Wheat Production (1000 metric tons)	5,677.40	4,441.78	5,729.48	6,282.54	5,492.3
Wheat Net Exports (1000 metric tons)	-3402.3732	-4152.1486	-6093.9681	-6453.8734	-4550.28

World Agriculture Pricing Summary

World Agriculture Pricing Summary					
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Corn Pricing Summary (\$/metric ton)	291.684	298.417	259.389	192.881	169.750
Soybeans Pricing Summary (\$/metric ton)	540.667	591.417	538.417	491.771	390.417
Rice Pricing Summary (\$/metric ton)	458.558	525.071	473.989	425.148	386.033
Coffee Pricing Summary (\$/kilogram)	5.976	4.111	3.076	4.424	3.526
Cocoa Beans Pricing Summary (\$/kilogram)	2.980	2.392	2.439	3.062	3.135
Wheat Pricing Summary (\$/metric ton)	316.264	313.242	312.248	284.895	203.177

Metals Consumption and Production

Metals Consumption and Production					
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Copper Consumption (1000 mt)	415,675.30	456,371.68	421,840.19	414,644.88	337,9
Copper Production (1000 mt)	243,459.68	209,083.78	260,359.42	285,043.38	255,0
Copper Net Exports (1000 mt)	-172215.6155	-247287.8962	-161480.7663	-129601.5033	-82984
Zinc Consumption (1000 mt)	240,990.66	239,887.93	248,958.11	224,059.76	188,1
Zinc Production (1000 mt)	282,575.97	244,201.51	240,668.37	226,329.66	214,9
Zinc Exports (1000 mt)	41,585.31	4,313.58	-8289.7419	2,269.91	26,87
Lead Consumption (1000 mt)	222,343.65	239,835.49	248,476.88	257,475.34	202,6
Lead Production (1000 mt)	137,469.63	163,837.47	164,489.87	192,599.20	188,1

	2011	2012	2013	2014	20
Lead Exports (1000 mt)	-84874.0166	-75998.0166	-83987.0118	-64876.1327	-14454
Tin Consumption (1000 mt)	7,544.84	6,040.00	6,397.24	5,952.22	5,17
Tin Production (1000 mt)	9,557.79	12,089.92	12,431.22	14,393.05	14,40
Tin Exports (1000 mt)	2,012.95	6,049.92	6,033.98	8,440.82	9,22
Nickel Consumption (1000 mt)	14,351.38	38,440.61	57,595.39	87,664.56	66,17
Nickel Production (1000 mt)	36,983.84	52,281.35	72,615.57	99,945.55	96,65
Nickel Exports (1000 mt)	22,632.47	13,840.74	15,020.18	12,280.99	30,47
Gold Consumption (kg)	20,338.79	17,518.59	12,225.69	11,839.84	9,72
Gold Production (kg)	70,878.38	72,507.02	77,182.07	81,068.44	81,04
Gold Exports (kg)	50,539.59	54,988.43	64,956.38	69,228.60	71,32

	2011	2012	2013	2014	20
Silver Consumption (mt)	201,079.00	177,581.00	204,072.00	207,548.01	160,2
Silver Production (mt)	22,911.62	24,626.07	25,909.91	28,987.33	26,94
Silver Exports (mt)	-178167.3793	-152954.9290	-178162.0949	-178560.6788	-13333

World Metals Pricing Summary

World Metals Pricing Summary					
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Copper (\$/mt)	8,828.19	7,962.35	7,332.10	6,863.40	5,510.46
Zinc (\$/mt)	2,193.90	1,950.41	1,910.26	2,160.97	1,931.68
Tin (\$/mt)	26,053.68	21,125.99	22,282.80	21,898.87	16,066.63
Lead (\$/mt)	2,400.81	2,064.64	2,139.79	2,095.46	1,787.82
Nickel (\$/mt)	22,910.36	17,547.55	15,031.80	16,893.38	11,862.64
Gold (\$/oz)	1,569.21	1,669.52	1,411.46	1,265.58	1,160.66
Silver (\$/oz)	35.224	31.137	23.850	19.071	15.721

Economic Performance Index

Economic Performance Index

The Economic Performance rankings are calculated by CountryWatch's editorial team, and are based on criteria including sustained economic growth, monetary stability, current account deficits, budget surplus, unemployment and structural imbalances. Scores are assessed from 0 to 100 using this aforementioned criteria as well as CountryWatch's proprietary economic research data and models.

	Bank stability risk	Monetary/ Currency stability	Government Finances	Empl./ Unempl.	Econ.GNP growth or decline/ forecast
	0 - 100	0 - 100	0 - 100	0 - 100	%
North Americas					
Canada	92	69	35	38	3.14%
United States	94	76	4	29	3.01%
Western Europe					
Austria	90	27	30	63	1.33%
Belgium	88	27	19	23	1.15%
Cyprus	81	91	16	80	-0.69%
Denmark	97	70	45	78	1.20%
Finland	89	27	41	33	1.25%

France	87	27	18	27	1.52%
Germany	86	27	22	21	1.25%
Greece	79	27	5	24	-2.00%
Iceland	90	17	2	34	-3.04%
Italy	85	27	37	24	0.84%
Ireland	92	27	11	10	-1.55%
Luxembourg	99	27	28	66	2.08%
Malta	77	27	41	51	0.54%
Netherlands	91	27	26	74	1.30%
Norway	98	44	10	76	1.08%
Portugal	77	27	13	20	0.29%
Spain	83	27	9	3	-0.41%
Sweden	94	72	54	32	1.23%
Switzerland	97	86	55	77	1.53%
United Kingdom	85	12	9	37	1.34%
Central and Eastern Europe					
Albania	44	60	33	6	2.30%
Armenia	45	59	49	30	1.80%

Azerbaijan	56	4	84	99	2.68%
Belarus	59	21	83	98	2.41%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	34	68	69	N/A	0.50%
Bulgaria	58	75	88	49	0.20%
Croatia	69	68	94	9	0.18%
Czech Republic	80	89	29	70	1.67%
Estonia	72	90	66	92	0.80%
Georgia	36	60	53	56	2.00%
Hungary	70	66	26	54	-0.16%
Latvia	67	100	65	44	-3.97%
Lithuania	65	91	87	79	-1.65%
Macedonia (FYR)	53	69	56	2	2.03%
Moldova	23	36	81	67	2.50%
Poland	74	74	38	12	2.72%
Romania	62	56	70	62	0.75%
Russia	73	18	90	8	4.00%
Serbia	48	49	52	5	1.97%

Montenegro	39	27	73	1	-1.70%
Slovak Republic	80	62	30	14	4.06%
Slovenia	81	27	36	65	1.12%
Ukraine	41	11	57	N/A	3.68%
Africa					
Algeria	57	18	96	7	4.55%
Angola	49	1	97	N/A	7.05%
Benin	19	91	20	N/A	3.22%
Botswana	68	58	76	N/A	6.33%
Burkina Faso	16	91	13	N/A	4.41%
Burundi	2	91	6	N/A	3.85%
Cameroon	26	91	91	N/A	2.58%
Cape Verde	52	87	4	N/A	4.96%
Central African Republic	9	91	32	N/A	3.18%
Chad	22	91	89	N/A	4.42%
Congo	52	87	87	N/A	12.13%
Côte d'Ivoire	25	91	82	28	2.98%
Dem. Republic					

Congo	4	91	47	N/A	5.44%
Djibouti	31	76	50	N/A	4.47%
Egypt	37	20	24	69	5.01%
Equatorial Guinea	82	91	85	N/A	0.94%
Eritrea	1	3	1	18	1.81%
Ethiopia	6	45	8	N/A	6.96%
Gabon	64	91	96	N/A	5.36%
Gambia	8	48	86	N/A	4.82%
Ghana	9	11	69	N/A	4.50%
Guinea	10	7	91	N/A	3.03%
Guinea-Bissau	5	91	46	N/A	3.47%
Kenya	20	41	59	N/A	4.11%
Lesotho	13	40	12	N/A	2.98%
Liberia	12	73	74	N/A	5.92%
Libya	73	2	94	N/A	5.22%
Madagascar	4	22	24	N/A	-1.02%
Malawi	7	25	55	N/A	5.96%
Mali	20	91	82	N/A	5.12%

Mauritania	15	13	93	N/A	4.58%
Mauritius	65	52	56	55	4.10%
Morocco	37	72	48	26	3.23%
Mozambique	12	23	71	N/A	6.45%
Namibia	40	39	62	N/A	1.70%
Niger	10	91	21	N/A	4.41%
Nigeria	30	6	61	N/A	6.98%
Rwanda	21	40	68	N/A	5.39%
Sao Tome & Principe	1	61	100	N/A	3.40%
Senegal	24	91	63	N/A	3.44%
Seychelles	60	67	97	N/A	4.01%
Sierra Leone	5	10	39	N/A	4.77%
Somalia	2	38	59	N/A	3.19%
South Africa	61	37	70	N/A	2.59%
Sudan	16	5	73	N/A	5.52%
Swaziland	32	44	79	N/A	1.09%
Tanzania	15	45	32	N/A	6.17%
Togo	8	91	92	N/A	2.56%

Tunisia	50	61	44	39	4.00%
Uganda	11	17	54	N/A	5.59%
Zambia	29	20	49	N/A	5.84%
Zimbabwe	0	8	16	N/A	2.24%
South and Central America					
Argentina	66	3	80	36	3.50%
Belize	47	76	80	N/A	1.00%
Bolivia	32	51	61	81	3.99%
Brazil	71	47	78	11	5.50%
Chile	78	25	92	73	4.72%
Columbia	47	52	34	47	2.25%
Costa Rica	60	42	39	57	3.45%
Ecuador	43	76	75	64	2.51%
El Salvador	35	76	67	N/A	1.04%
Guatemala	46	59	58	N/A	2.52%
Honduras	27	47	58	N/A	2.00%
Mexico	69	42	52	61	4.07%
Nicaragua	23	49	42	N/A	1.75%

Panama	66	76	72	45	5.00%
Paraguay	35	46	66	16	5.27%
Peru	59	66	75	22	6.33%
Suriname	58	26	81	59	4.02%
Uruguay	70	26	27	N/A	5.71%
Venezuela	55	1	28	13	-2.63%
Caribbean					
Antigua & Barbuda	72	76	15	N/A	-2.01%
Bahamas	74	76	45	87	-0.50%
Barbados	67	76	33	15	-0.50%
Bermuda	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Cuba	45	76	18	95	0.25%
Dominica	53	76	65	N/A	1.40%
Dominican Republic	54	39	43	4	3.50%
Grenada	63	76	48	N/A	0.80%
Guyana	28	56	17	N/A	4.36%
Haiti	11	27	89	N/A	-8.50%
Jamaica	42	9	85	19	-0.28%

St Lucia	55	76	67	N/A	1.14%
St Vincent & Grenadines	49	76	95	N/A	0.50%
Trinidad & Tobago	82	37	77	72	2.13%
Middle East					
Bahrain	84	76	62	91	3.48%
Iran	51	19	40	58	3.01%
Iraq	48	9	8	N/A	7.27%
Israel	87	62	12	48	3.20%
Jordan	41	51	3	N/A	4.10%
Kuwait	96	4	99	N/A	3.10%
Lebanon	63	54	2	N/A	6.00%
Oman	76	16	88	N/A	4.71%
Qatar	99	16	83	N/A	18.54%
Saudi Arabia	76	8	98	N/A	3.70%
Syria	61	24	40	N/A	5.00%
Turkey	75	23	27	60	5.20%
United Arab Emirates	96	24	98	94	1.29%

Yemen	28	2	78	N/A	7.78%
Asia					
Afghanistan	17	70	74	N/A	8.64%
Bangladesh	13	43	25	N/A	5.38%
Bhutan	24	55	5	N/A	6.85%
Brunei	78	19	99	75	0.48%
Cambodia	18	67	42	N/A	4.77%
China	54	90	19	68	11.03%
Hong Kong	89	76	14	82	5.02%
India	31	38	34	35	8.78%
Indonesia	42	46	37	31	6.00%
Japan	88	89	6	71	1.90%
Kazakhstan	62	13	76	42	2.40%
Korea North	18	65	23	N/A	1.50%
Korea South	83	63	22	85	4.44%
Kyrgyz Republic	24	15	84	88	4.61%
Laos	17	54	7	N/A	7.22%
Macao	91	76	14	82	3.00%

Malaysia	68	65	44	90	4.72%
Maldives	44	55	17	N/A	3.45%
Mongolia	33	5	77	93	7.22%
Myanmar	3	41	72	N/A	5.26%
Nepal	3	14	25	N/A	2.97%
Pakistan	19	15	31	41	3.00%
Papua New Guinea	75	50	11	N/A	7.96%
Philippines	30	48	53	43	3.63%
Singapore	93	75	63	40	5.68%
Sri Lanka	38	22	10	N/A	5.50%
Taiwan	84	88	35	89	6.50%
Tajikistan	6	6	60	97	4.00%
Thailand	56	64	90	96	5.46%
Turkmenistan	51	53	68	N/A	12.00%
Uzbekistan	40	10	60	100	8.00%
Vietnam	25	12	20	N/A	6.04%
Pacific					
Australia	96	63	31	46	2.96%

Fiji	46	53	3	N/A	2.06%
Marshall Islands	27	76	46	N/A	1.08%
Micronesia (Fed. States)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
New Caledonia	96	73	51	52	2.00%
New Zealand	98	73	51	52	2.00%
Samoa	34	88	64	N/A	-2.77%
Solomon Islands	14	71	1	N/A	3.36%
Tonga	26	57	38	N/A	0.60%
Vanuatu	33	58	47	N/A	3.80%

Source:

CountryWatch Inc. www.countrywatch.com

Updated:

This material was produced in 2010; it is subject to updating in 2012.

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Chapter 4

Investment Overview

Foreign Investment Climate

Background

Characterized by large and well-developed agricultural, mining, manufacturing, and service sectors, Brazil's economy outweighs that of all other South American countries, and Brazil is expanding its presence in world markets. Since 2003, Brazil has steadily improved its macroeconomic stability, building up foreign reserves, and reducing its debt profile by shifting its debt burden toward real denominated and domestically held instruments. In 2008, Brazil became a net external creditor and two ratings agencies awarded investment grade status to its debt. After record growth in 2007 and 2008, the onset of the global financial crisis hit Brazil in September 2008. Brazil experienced two quarters of recession, as global demand for Brazil's commodity-based exports dwindled and external credit dried up. However, Brazil was one of the first emerging markets to begin a recovery. Consumer and investor confidence revived and GDP growth returned to positive in 2010, boosted by an export recovery. Brazil's strong growth and high interest rates make it an attractive destination for foreign investors. Large capital inflows over the past year have contributed to the rapid appreciation of its currency and led the government to raise taxes on some foreign investments. President Dilma ROUSSEFF has pledged to retain the previous administration's commitment to inflation targeting by the Central Bank, a floating exchange rate, and fiscal restraint.

Foreign Investment Assessment

Brazil's government generally encourages foreign investment. While politically stable, Brazil's economy has demonstrated a tendency toward instability in the past decade. The country currently has a relatively high level of debt.

Industries

Textiles, shoes, chemicals, cement, lumber, iron ore, tin, steel, aircraft, motor vehicles and parts, other machinery and equipment

Import Commodities

Machinery, electrical and transport equipment, chemical products, oil

Import Partners

US 20%, Argentina 9.8%, Germany 8.7%, Japan 5.2%, China 4.4%

Export Commodities

Transport equipment, iron ore, soybeans, footwear, coffee, autos

Export Partners

US 23%, Argentina 6.1%, China 6%, Netherlands 5.8%, Germany 4.2%

Ports and Harbors

Belem, Fortaleza, Ilheus, Imbituba, Manaus, Paranagua, Porto Alegre, Recife, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande, Salvador, Santos, Vitoria

Telephone System

Good working system; country code: 55

Internet Users

14.3 million in recent years and increasing

Judicial System

Brazil's legal system is based on Roman codes. It has a functioning commercial code which dictates dispute settlement in business.

Labor Force

82.59 million; agriculture 23%, industry 24%, services 53%

Corruption Perception Ranking

See full list, as reported by Transparency International, elsewhere in this Country Review.

Cultural Considerations

The rules of etiquette that apply in other South American countries generally apply in Brazil as well. Brazilians tend to be a bit less formal. Men are usually addressed as Senhor plus their surname (women as Senhora plus the surname), but Brazilians move rapidly to first names, often used with a title.

Country Website (s)

www.brasilemb.org

Foreign Investment Index

Foreign Investment Index

The Foreign Investment Index is a proprietary index measuring attractiveness to international investment flows. The Foreign Investment Index is calculated using an established methodology by CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is based on a given country's economic stability (sustained economic growth, monetary stability, current account deficits, budget surplus), economic risk (risk of non-servicing of payments for goods or services, loans and trade-related finance, risk of sovereign default), business and investment climate (property rights, labor force and laws, regulatory transparency, openness to foreign investment, market conditions, and stability of government). Scores are assigned from 0-10 using the aforementioned criteria. A score of 0 marks the lowest level of foreign investment viability, while a score of 10 marks the highest level of

foreign investment viability, according to this proprietary index.

Country	Assessment
Afghanistan	2
Albania	4.5
Algeria	6
Andorra	9
Angola	4.5-5
Antigua	8.5
Argentina	5
Armenia	5
Australia	9.5
Austria	9-9.5
Azerbaijan	5
Bahamas	9
Bahrain	7.5
Bangladesh	4.5

Barbados	9
Belarus	4
Belgium	9
Belize	7.5
Benin	5.5
Bhutan	4.5
Bolivia	4.5
Bosnia-Herzegovina	5
Botswana	7.5-8
Brazil	8
Brunei	7
Bulgaria	5.5
Burkina Faso	4
Burma (Myanmar)	4.5
Burundi	4
Cambodia	4.5
Cameroon	5
Canada	9.5

Cape Verde	6
Central African Republic	3
Chad	4
Chile	9
China	7.5
China: Hong Kong	8.5
China: Taiwan	8.5
Colombia	7
Comoros	4
Congo DRC	4
Congo RC	5
Costa Rica	8
Cote d'Ivoire	4.5
Croatia	7
Cuba	4.5
Cyprus	7
Czech Republic	8.5
Denmark	9.5

Djibouti	4.5
Dominica	6
Dominican Republic	6.5
East Timor	4.5
Ecuador	5.5
Egypt	4.5-5
El Salvador	6
Equatorial Guinea	4.5
Eritrea	3.5
Estonia	8
Ethiopia	4.5
Fiji	5
Finland	9
Former Yugoslav Rep. of Macedonia	5
France	9-9.5
Gabon	5.5
Gambia	5
Georgia	5

Germany	9-9.5
Ghana	5.5
Greece	5
Grenada	7.5
Guatemala	5.5
Guinea	3.5
Guinea-Bissau	3.5
Guyana	4.5
Haiti	4
Holy See (Vatican)	n/a
Hong Kong (China)	8.5
Honduras	5.5
Hungary	8
Iceland	8-8.5
India	8
Indonesia	5.5
Iran	4
Iraq	3

Ireland	8
Israel	8.5
Italy	8
Jamaica	5.5
Japan	9.5
Jordan	6
Kazakhstan	6
Kenya	5
Kiribati	5.5
Korea, North	1
Korea, South	9
Kosovo	4.5
Kuwait	8.5
Kyrgyzstan	4.5
Laos	4
Latvia	7
Lebanon	5
Lesotho	5.5

Liberia	3.5
Libya	3
Liechtenstein	9
Lithuania	7.5
Luxembourg	9-9.5
Madagascar	4.5
Malawi	4.5
Malaysia	8.5
Maldives	6.5
Mali	5
Malta	9
Marshall Islands	5
Mauritania	4.5
Mauritius	7.5-8
Mexico	6.5-7
Micronesia	5
Moldova	4.5-5
Monaco	9

Mongolia	5
Montenegro	5.5
Morocco	7.5
Mozambique	5
Namibia	7.5
Nauru	4.5
Nepal	4
Netherlands	9-9.5
New Zealand	9.5
Nicaragua	5
Niger	4.5
Nigeria	4.5
Norway	9-9.5
Oman	8
Pakistan	4
Palau	4.5-5
Panama	7
Papua New Guinea	5

Paraguay	6
Peru	6
Philippines	6
Poland	8
Portugal	7.5-8
Qatar	9
Romania	6-6.5
Russia	6
Rwanda	4
Saint Kitts and Nevis	8
Saint Lucia	8
Saint Vincent and Grenadines	7
Samoa	7
San Marino	8.5
Sao Tome and Principe	4.5-5
Saudi Arabia	7
Senegal	6
Serbia	6

Seychelles	5
Sierra Leone	4
Singapore	9.5
Slovak Republic (Slovakia)	8.5
Slovenia	8.5-9
Solomon Islands	5
Somalia	2
South Africa	8
Spain	7.5-8
Sri Lanka	5.5
Sudan	4
Suriname	5
Swaziland	4.5
Sweden	9.5
Switzerland	9.5
Syria	2.5
Tajikistan	4
Taiwan (China)	8.5

Tanzania	5
Thailand	7.5-8
Togo	4.5-5
Tonga	5.5-6
Trinidad and Tobago	8-8.5
Tunisia	6
Turkey	6.5-7
Turkmenistan	4
Tuvalu	7
Uganda	5
Ukraine	4.5-5
United Arab Emirates	8.5
United Kingdom	9
United States	9
Uruguay	6.5-7
Uzbekistan	4
Vanuatu	6
Venezuela	5

Vietnam	5.5
Yemen	3
Zambia	4.5-5
Zimbabwe	3.5

Editor's Note:

As of 2015, the global economic crisis (emerging in 2008) had affected many countries across the world, resulting in changes to their rankings. Among those countries affected were top tier economies, such as the [United Kingdom](#), [Iceland](#), [Switzerland](#) and [Austria](#). However, in all these cases, their rankings have moved back upward in the last couple of years as anxieties have eased. Other top tier countries, such as [Spain](#), [Portugal](#), [Ireland](#), and [Italy](#), suffered some effects due to debt woes and the concomitant effect on the euro zone. Greece, another euro zone nation, was also downgraded due to its sovereign debt crisis; however, Greece's position on the precipice of default incurred a sharper downgrade than the other four euro zone countries mentioned above. Cyprus' exposure to Greek bank yielded a downgrade in its case. Slovenia and [Latvia](#) have been slightly downgraded due to a mix of economic and political concerns but could easily be upgraded in a future assessment, should these concerns abate. Meanwhile, the crisis in eastern [Ukraine](#) fueled downgrades in that country and neighboring [Russia](#).

Despite the "trifecta of tragedy" in [Japan](#) in 2011 -- the earthquake, the ensuing tsunami, and the resulting nuclear crisis -- and the appreciable destabilization of the economic and political terrain therein, this country has only slightly been downgraded. Japan's challenges have been assessed to be transient, the government remains accountable, and there is little risk of default. Both [India](#) and China retain their rankings; [India](#) holds a slightly higher ranking than [China](#) due to its record of democratic representation and accountability.

There were shifts in opposite directions for [Mali](#) and [Nigeria](#) versus the [Central African Republic](#), [Burkina Faso](#), and [Burundi](#). [Mali](#) was slightly upgraded due to its efforts to return to constitutional order following the 2012 coup and to neutralize the threat of separatists and Islamists. Likewise, a new government in [Nigeria](#) generated a slight upgrade as the country attempts to confront corruption, crime, and terrorism. But the [Central African Republic](#) was downgraded due to the takeover of the government by Seleka rebels and the continued decline into lawlessness in that country. Likewise, the attempts by the leaders of [Burundi](#) and [Burkina Faso](#) to hold onto power by by-passing the constitution raised eyebrows and resulted in downgrades.

Political unrest in [Libya](#) and [Algeria](#) have contributed to a decision to marginally downgrade these countries as well. [Syria](#) incurred a sharper downgrade due to the devolution into de facto civil war and the dire security threat posed by Islamist terrorists. [Iraq](#) saw a similar downgrade as a result of the takeover of wide swaths of territory and the threat of genocide at the hands of Islamist terrorists. [Yemen](#), likewise, has been downgraded due to political instability at the hands of secessionists, terrorists, Houthi rebels, and the intervention of external parties. Conversely, [Egypt](#) and [Tunisia](#) saw slight upgrades as their political environments stabilize.

At the low end of the spectrum, devolving security conditions and/or economic crisis have resulted in countries like [Pakistan](#), [Afghanistan](#), [Somalia](#), and [Zimbabwe](#) maintaining their low ratings.

The [United States](#) continues to retain its previous slight downgrade due to the enduring threat of default surrounding the debt ceiling in that country, matched by a conflict-ridden political climate. In the case of [Mexico](#), there is limited concern about default, but increasing alarm over the security situation in that country and the government's ability to contain it. In [Argentina](#), a default to bond holders resulted in a downgrade to that country. Finally, a small but significant upgrade was attributed to [Cuba](#) due to its recent pro-business reforms and its normalization of ties with the United States.

Source:

CountryWatch Inc. www.countrywatch.com

Updated:

2015

Corruption Perceptions Index

Corruption Perceptions Index

Transparency International: [Corruption Perceptions Index](#)

Editor's Note:

Transparency International's [Corruption Perceptions Index](#) is a composite index which ranks countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials.

This index indicates the views of national and international business people and analysts about the levels of corruption in each country. The highest (and best) level of transparency is indicated by the number, 10. The lower (and worse) levels of transparency are indicated by lower numbers.

Rank	Country/Territory	CPI 2009 Score	Surveys Used	Confidence Range
1	New Zealand	9.4	6	9.1 - 9.5
2	Denmark	9.3	6	9.1 - 9.5
3	Singapore	9.2	9	9.0 - 9.4
3	Sweden	9.2	6	9.0 - 9.3
5	Switzerland	9.0	6	8.9 - 9.1
6	Finland	8.9	6	8.4 - 9.4
6	Netherlands	8.9	6	8.7 - 9.0
8	Australia	8.7	8	8.3 - 9.0
8	Canada	8.7	6	8.5 - 9.0
8	Iceland	8.7	4	7.5 - 9.4
11	Norway	8.6	6	8.2 - 9.1
12	Hong Kong	8.2	8	7.9 - 8.5
12	Luxembourg	8.2	6	7.6 - 8.8
14	Germany	8.0	6	7.7 - 8.3

14	Ireland	8.0	6	7.8 - 8.4
16	Austria	7.9	6	7.4 - 8.3
17	Japan	7.7	8	7.4 - 8.0
17	United Kingdom	7.7	6	7.3 - 8.2
19	United States	7.5	8	6.9 - 8.0
20	Barbados	7.4	4	6.6 - 8.2
21	Belgium	7.1	6	6.9 - 7.3
22	Qatar	7.0	6	5.8 - 8.1
22	Saint Lucia	7.0	3	6.7 - 7.5
24	France	6.9	6	6.5 - 7.3
25	Chile	6.7	7	6.5 - 6.9
25	Uruguay	6.7	5	6.4 - 7.1
27	Cyprus	6.6	4	6.1 - 7.1
27	Estonia	6.6	8	6.1 - 6.9
27	Slovenia	6.6	8	6.3 - 6.9
30	United Arab Emirates	6.5	5	5.5 - 7.5
31	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	6.4	3	4.9 - 7.5
32	Israel	6.1	6	5.4 - 6.7

32	Spain	6.1	6	5.5 - 6.6
34	Dominica	5.9	3	4.9 - 6.7
35	Portugal	5.8	6	5.5 - 6.2
35	Puerto Rico	5.8	4	5.2 - 6.3
37	Botswana	5.6	6	5.1 - 6.3
37	Taiwan	5.6	9	5.4 - 5.9
39	Brunei Darussalam	5.5	4	4.7 - 6.4
39	Oman	5.5	5	4.4 - 6.5
39	Korea (South)	5.5	9	5.3 - 5.7
42	Mauritius	5.4	6	5.0 - 5.9
43	Costa Rica	5.3	5	4.7 - 5.9
43	Macau	5.3	3	3.3 - 6.9
45	Malta	5.2	4	4.0 - 6.2
46	Bahrain	5.1	5	4.2 - 5.8
46	Cape Verde	5.1	3	3.3 - 7.0
46	Hungary	5.1	8	4.6 - 5.7
49	Bhutan	5.0	4	4.3 - 5.6
49	Jordan	5.0	7	3.9 - 6.1

49	Poland	5.0	8	4.5 - 5.5
52	Czech Republic	4.9	8	4.3 - 5.6
52	Lithuania	4.9	8	4.4 - 5.4
54	Seychelles	4.8	3	3.0 - 6.7
55	South Africa	4.7	8	4.3 - 4.9
56	Latvia	4.5	6	4.1 - 4.9
56	Malaysia	4.5	9	4.0 - 5.1
56	Namibia	4.5	6	3.9 - 5.1
56	Samoa	4.5	3	3.3 - 5.3
56	Slovakia	4.5	8	4.1 - 4.9
61	Cuba	4.4	3	3.5 - 5.1
61	Turkey	4.4	7	3.9 - 4.9
63	Italy	4.3	6	3.8 - 4.9
63	Saudi Arabia	4.3	5	3.1 - 5.3
65	Tunisia	4.2	6	3.0 - 5.5
66	Croatia	4.1	8	3.7 - 4.5
66	Georgia	4.1	7	3.4 - 4.7
66	Kuwait	4.1	5	3.2 - 5.1

69	Ghana	3.9	7	3.2 - 4.6
69	Montenegro	3.9	5	3.5 - 4.4
71	Bulgaria	3.8	8	3.2 - 4.5
71	FYR Macedonia	3.8	6	3.4 - 4.2
71	Greece	3.8	6	3.2 - 4.3
71	Romania	3.8	8	3.2 - 4.3
75	Brazil	3.7	7	3.3 - 4.3
75	Colombia	3.7	7	3.1 - 4.3
75	Peru	3.7	7	3.4 - 4.1
75	Suriname	3.7	3	3.0 - 4.7
79	Burkina Faso	3.6	7	2.8 - 4.4
79	China	3.6	9	3.0 - 4.2
79	Swaziland	3.6	3	3.0 - 4.7
79	Trinidad and Tobago	3.6	4	3.0 - 4.3
83	Serbia	3.5	6	3.3 - 3.9
84	El Salvador	3.4	5	3.0 - 3.8
84	Guatemala	3.4	5	3.0 - 3.9
84	India	3.4	10	3.2 - 3.6

84	Panama	3.4	5	3.1 - 3.7
84	Thailand	3.4	9	3.0 - 3.8
89	Lesotho	3.3	6	2.8 - 3.8
89	Malawi	3.3	7	2.7 - 3.9
89	Mexico	3.3	7	3.2 - 3.5
89	Moldova	3.3	6	2.7 - 4.0
89	Morocco	3.3	6	2.8 - 3.9
89	Rwanda	3.3	4	2.9 - 3.7
95	Albania	3.2	6	3.0 - 3.3
95	Vanuatu	3.2	3	2.3 - 4.7
97	Liberia	3.1	3	1.9 - 3.8
97	Sri Lanka	3.1	7	2.8 - 3.4
99	Bosnia and Herzegovina	3.0	7	2.6 - 3.4
99	Dominican Republic	3.0	5	2.9 - 3.2
99	Jamaica	3.0	5	2.8 - 3.3
99	Madagascar	3.0	7	2.8 - 3.2
99	Senegal	3.0	7	2.5 - 3.6
99	Tonga	3.0	3	2.6 - 3.3

99	Zambia	3.0	7	2.8 - 3.2
106	Argentina	2.9	7	2.6 - 3.1
106	Benin	2.9	6	2.3 - 3.4
106	Gabon	2.9	3	2.6 - 3.1
106	Gambia	2.9	5	1.6 - 4.0
106	Niger	2.9	5	2.7 - 3.0
111	Algeria	2.8	6	2.5 - 3.1
111	Djibouti	2.8	4	2.3 - 3.2
111	Egypt	2.8	6	2.6 - 3.1
111	Indonesia	2.8	9	2.4 - 3.2
111	Kiribati	2.8	3	2.3 - 3.3
111	Mali	2.8	6	2.4 - 3.2
111	Sao Tome and Principe	2.8	3	2.4 - 3.3
111	Solomon Islands	2.8	3	2.3 - 3.3
111	Togo	2.8	5	1.9 - 3.9
120	Armenia	2.7	7	2.6 - 2.8
120	Bolivia	2.7	6	2.4 - 3.1
120	Ethiopia	2.7	7	2.4 - 2.9

120	Kazakhstan	2.7	7	2.1 - 3.3
120	Mongolia	2.7	7	2.4 - 3.0
120	Vietnam	2.7	9	2.4 - 3.1
126	Eritrea	2.6	4	1.6 - 3.8
126	Guyana	2.6	4	2.5 - 2.7
126	Syria	2.6	5	2.2 - 2.9
126	Tanzania	2.6	7	2.4 - 2.9
130	Honduras	2.5	6	2.2 - 2.8
130	Lebanon	2.5	3	1.9 - 3.1
130	Libya	2.5	6	2.2 - 2.8
130	Maldives	2.5	4	1.8 - 3.2
130	Mauritania	2.5	7	2.0 - 3.3
130	Mozambique	2.5	7	2.3 - 2.8
130	Nicaragua	2.5	6	2.3 - 2.7
130	Nigeria	2.5	7	2.2 - 2.7
130	Uganda	2.5	7	2.1 - 2.8
139	Bangladesh	2.4	7	2.0 - 2.8
139	Belarus	2.4	4	2.0 - 2.8

139	Pakistan	2.4	7	2.1 - 2.7
139	Philippines	2.4	9	2.1 - 2.7
143	Azerbaijan	2.3	7	2.0 - 2.6
143	Comoros	2.3	3	1.6 - 3.3
143	Nepal	2.3	6	2.0 - 2.6
146	Cameroon	2.2	7	1.9 - 2.6
146	Ecuador	2.2	5	2.0 - 2.5
146	Kenya	2.2	7	1.9 - 2.5
146	Russia	2.2	8	1.9 - 2.4
146	Sierra Leone	2.2	5	1.9 - 2.4
146	Timor-Leste	2.2	5	1.8 - 2.6
146	Ukraine	2.2	8	2.0 - 2.6
146	Zimbabwe	2.2	7	1.7 - 2.8
154	Côte d'Ivoire	2.1	7	1.8 - 2.4
154	Papua New Guinea	2.1	5	1.7 - 2.5
154	Paraguay	2.1	5	1.7 - 2.5
154	Yemen	2.1	4	1.6 - 2.5
158	Cambodia	2.0	8	1.8 - 2.2

158	Central African Republic	2.0	4	1.9 - 2.2
158	Laos	2.0	4	1.6 - 2.6
158	Tajikistan	2.0	8	1.6 - 2.5
162	Angola	1.9	5	1.8 - 1.9
162	Congo Brazzaville	1.9	5	1.6 - 2.1
162	Democratic Republic of Congo	1.9	5	1.7 - 2.1
162	Guinea-Bissau	1.9	3	1.8 - 2.0
162	Kyrgyzstan	1.9	7	1.8 - 2.1
162	Venezuela	1.9	7	1.8 - 2.0
168	Burundi	1.8	6	1.6 - 2.0
168	Equatorial Guinea	1.8	3	1.6 - 1.9
168	Guinea	1.8	5	1.7 - 1.8
168	Haiti	1.8	3	1.4 - 2.3
168	Iran	1.8	3	1.7 - 1.9
168	Turkmenistan	1.8	4	1.7 - 1.9
174	Uzbekistan	1.7	6	1.5 - 1.8
175	Chad	1.6	6	1.5 - 1.7
176	Iraq	1.5	3	1.2 - 1.8

176	Sudan	1.5	5	1.4 - 1.7
178	Myanmar	1.4	3	0.9 - 1.8
179	Afghanistan	1.3	4	1.0 - 1.5
180	Somalia	1.1	3	0.9 - 1.4

Methodology:

As noted above, the highest (and best) level of transparency with the least perceived corruption is indicated by the number, 10. The lower (and worse) levels of transparency are indicated by lower numbers.

According to Transparency International, the [Corruption Perceptions Index](#) (CPI) table shows a country's ranking and score, the number of surveys used to determine the score, and the confidence range of the scoring.

The rank shows how one country compares to others included in the index. The CPI score indicates the perceived level of public-sector corruption in a country/territory.

The CPI is based on 13 independent surveys. However, not all surveys include all countries. The surveys used column indicates how many surveys were relied upon to determine the score for that country.

The confidence range indicates the reliability of the CPI scores and tells us that allowing for a margin of error, we can be 90% confident that the true score for this country lies within this range.

Note:

Kosovo, which separated from the Yugoslav successor state of [Serbia](#), is not listed above. No calculation is available for [Kosovo](#) at this time, however, a future corruption index by Transparency International may include the world's newest country in its tally. Taiwan has been listed above despite its contested status; while Taiwan claims sovereign status, [China](#) claims ultimate jurisdiction over Taiwan. Hong Kong, which is also under the rubric of Chinese sovereignty, is listed above. Note as well that Puerto Rico, which is a [United States](#) domain, is also included in the list above. These inclusions likely have to do with the size and fairly autonomous

status of their economies.

Source:

Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index; available at URL: <http://www.transparency.org>

Updated:

Uploaded in 2011 using most recent ranking available; reviewed in 2015.

Competitiveness Ranking

Competitiveness Ranking

Editor's Note:

The Global Competitiveness Report's competitiveness ranking is based on the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), which was developed for the World Economic Forum. The GCI is based on a number of competitiveness considerations, and provides a comprehensive picture of the competitiveness landscape in countries around the world. The competitiveness considerations are: institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, health and primary education, higher education and training, goods market efficiency, labour market efficiency, financial market development, technological readiness, market size, business sophistication, and innovation. The rankings are calculated from both publicly available data and the Executive Opinion Survey.

Country/Economy	GCI 2010 Rank	GCI 2010 Score	GCI 2009 Rank	Change 2009-2010
Switzerland	1	5.63	1	0
Sweden	2	5.56	4	2
Singapore	3	5.48	3	0

United States	4	5.43	2	-2
Germany	5	5.39	7	2
Japan	6	5.37	8	2
Finland	7	5.37	6	-1
Netherlands	8	5.33	10	2
Denmark	9	5.32	5	-4
Canada	10	5.30	9	-1
Hong Kong SAR	11	5.30	11	0
United Kingdom	12	5.25	13	1
Taiwan, China	13	5.21	12	-1
Norway	14	5.14	14	0
France	15	5.13	16	1
Australia	16	5.11	15	-1
Qatar	17	5.10	22	5
Austria	18	5.09	17	-1
Belgium	19	5.07	18	-1
Luxembourg	20	5.05	21	1
Saudi Arabia	21	4.95	28	7

Korea, Rep.	22	4.93	19	-3
New Zealand	23	4.92	20	-3
Israel	24	4.91	27	3
United Arab Emirates	25	4.89	23	-2
Malaysia	26	4.88	24	-2
China	27	4.84	29	2
Brunei Darussalam	28	4.75	32	4
Ireland	29	4.74	25	-4
Chile	30	4.69	30	0
Iceland	31	4.68	26	-5
Tunisia	32	4.65	40	8
Estonia	33	4.61	35	2
Oman	34	4.61	41	7
Kuwait	35	4.59	39	4
Czech Republic	36	4.57	31	-5
Bahrain	37	4.54	38	1
Thailand	38	4.51	36	-2
Poland	39	4.51	46	7

Cyprus	40	4.50	34	-6
Puerto Rico	41	4.49	42	1
Spain	42	4.49	33	-9
Barbados	43	4.45	44	1
Indonesia	44	4.43	54	10
Slovenia	45	4.42	37	-8
Portugal	46	4.38	43	-3
Lithuania	47	4.38	53	6
Italy	48	4.37	48	0
Montenegro	49	4.36	62	13
Malta	50	4.34	52	2
India	51	4.33	49	-2
Hungary	52	4.33	58	6
Panama	53	4.33	59	6
South Africa	54	4.32	45	-9
Mauritius	55	4.32	57	2
Costa Rica	56	4.31	55	-1
Azerbaijan	57	4.29	51	-6

Brazil	58	4.28	56	-2
Vietnam	59	4.27	75	16
Slovak Republic	60	4.25	47	-13
Turkey	61	4.25	61	0
Sri Lanka	62	4.25	79	17
Russian Federation	63	4.24	63	0
Uruguay	64	4.23	65	1
Jordan	65	4.21	50	-15
Mexico	66	4.19	60	-6
Romania	67	4.16	64	-3
Colombia	68	4.14	69	1
Iran	69	4.14	n/a	n/a
Latvia	70	4.14	68	-2
Bulgaria	71	4.13	76	5
Kazakhstan	72	4.12	67	-5
Peru	73	4.11	78	5
Namibia	74	4.09	74	0
Morocco	75	4.08	73	-2

Botswana	76	4.05	66	-10
Croatia	77	4.04	72	-5
Guatemala	78	4.04	80	2
Macedonia, FYR	79	4.02	84	5
Rwanda	80	4.00	n/a	n/a
Egypt	81	4.00	70	-11
El Salvador	82	3.99	77	-5
Greece	83	3.99	71	-12
Trinidad and Tobago	84	3.97	86	2
Philippines	85	3.96	87	2
Algeria	86	3.96	83	-3
Argentina	87	3.95	85	-2
Albania	88	3.94	96	8
Ukraine	89	3.90	82	-7
Gambia, The	90	3.90	81	-9
Honduras	91	3.89	89	-2
Lebanon	92	3.89	n/a	n/a
Georgia	93	3.86	90	-3

Moldova	94	3.86	n/a	n/a
Jamaica	95	3.85	91	-4
Serbia	96	3.84	93	-3
Syria	97	3.79	94	-3
Armenia	98	3.76	97	-1
Mongolia	99	3.75	117	18
Libya	100	3.74	88	-12
Dominican Republic	101	3.72	95	-6
Bosnia and Herzegovina	102	3.70	109	7
Benin	103	3.69	103	0
Senegal	104	3.67	92	-12
Ecuador	105	3.65	105	0
Kenya	106	3.65	98	-8
Bangladesh	107	3.64	106	-1
Bolivia	108	3.64	120	12
Cambodia	109	3.63	110	1
Guyana	110	3.62	104	-6
Cameroon	111	3.58	111	0

Nicaragua	112	3.57	115	3
Tanzania	113	3.56	100	-13
Ghana	114	3.56	114	0
Zambia	115	3.55	112	-3
Tajikistan	116	3.53	122	6
Cape Verde	117	3.51	n/a	n/a
Uganda	118	3.51	108	-10
Ethiopia	119	3.51	118	-1
Paraguay	120	3.49	124	4
Kyrgyz Republic	121	3.49	123	2
Venezuela	122	3.48	113	-9
Pakistan	123	3.48	101	-22
Madagascar	124	3.46	121	-3
Malawi	125	3.45	119	-6
Swaziland	126	3.40	n/a	n/a
Nigeria	127	3.38	99	-28
Lesotho	128	3.36	107	-21
Côte d'Ivoire	129	3.35	116	-13

Nepal	130	3.34	125	-5
Mozambique	131	3.32	129	-2
Mali	132	3.28	130	-2
Timor-Leste	133	3.23	126	-7
Burkina Faso	134	3.20	128	-6
Mauritania	135	3.14	127	-8
Zimbabwe	136	3.03	132	-4
Burundi	137	2.96	133	-4
Angola	138	2.93	n/a	n/a
Chad	139	2.73	131	-8

Methodology:

The competitiveness rankings are calculated from both publicly available data and the Executive Opinion Survey, a comprehensive annual survey conducted by the World Economic Forum together with its network of Partner Institutes (leading research institutes and business organizations) in the countries covered by the Report.

Highlights according to WEF --

- The [United States](#) falls two places to fourth position, overtaken by [Sweden](#) and [Singapore](#) in the rankings of the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011
- The People's Republic of [China](#) continues to move up the rankings, with marked improvements in several other Asian countries
- [Germany](#) moves up two places to fifth place, leading the Eurozone countries
- [Switzerland](#) tops the rankings

Source:

World Economic Forum; available at URL: <http://www.weforum.org>

Updated:

2011 using most recent ranking available; reviewed in 2015.

Taxation

Corporate tax

The standard rate of corporate income tax is 15 percent.

Individual tax

Individual tax rates are progressive rates and are as high as 27.5 percent.

Capital gains

Capital gains are typically taxed as income for companies. For individuals, gains are taxed at 15 percent.

Indirect tax

There is a value-added tax by the state (known by the acronym, ICMS), which is applied to certain goods and services at a standard rate of 18 percent.

Stock Market

Brazil has stock exchanges in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. At the end of the 1990s, Brazil's stock exchanges listed 478 companies.

Foreign investors can hold 49 percent of common stocks, and 100 percent of preferred stocks and must gain Central Bank certificates of registration. There is no ban on foreigners investing in convertible debentures.

For more information on the Rio de Janeiro Stock Exchange see URL: <http://www.bvrj.com.br/>.

For more information on the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange see URL: <http://www.bovespa.com.br/>.

Partner Links

Partner Links

Chapter 5

Social Overview

People

Cultural Demography

With approximately 200 million inhabitants, Brazil has the largest population in Latin America and the fifth largest in the world. The majority of its citizenry lives in the south-central area, which includes the industrial cities of Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Belo Horizonte. Rapid urban growth in Brazil has aided economic development but has also created serious social, environmental and political problems for major cities. In recent years, over 81 percent of the total population has been living in urban areas.

Ethnicity

Four major groups make up the Brazilian population. They are the Portuguese, who colonized in the 16th century; central and west Africans, who were brought to Brazil as slaves; indigenous people of the Tupi and Guarani language groups; and various other European, Middle Eastern, and Asian immigrant groups, who have settled in Brazil since the mid-19th century. From 1875 until 1960, about five million people immigrated to Brazil, settling mainly in the four southern states of Sao Paulo, Parana, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul. Immigrants came mainly from Italy, Germany, Spain, Poland, the Middle East, and Japan. (The largest Japanese community outside Japan is in Sao Paulo.) Inter-marriage between the Portuguese and indigenous people or African slaves as well as Brazil's many waves of immigration have contributed to a diverse ethnic and cultural heritage. Despite class distinctions, national identity is strong.

Indigenous full-blooded Indians, located mainly in the northern and western border regions and in the upper Amazon Basin, currently constitute less than one percent of the population. Their numbers are declining as contact with the outside world and commercial expansion into the interior increase. Brazilian government programs to establish reservations and to provide other forms of assistance have existed for years but are controversial and often ineffective.

Language

Brazil is the only Portuguese-speaking nation in the Americas. Approximately 80 percent of all Brazilians belong to the Roman Catholic Church, and most others are Protestant or follow practices derived from African religions, such as Candomble, or practices stemming from a combination of African, Indigenous and European religions, such as Umbanda.

Human Development

Brazil's infant mortality rate is 21.86 deaths per 1,000 live births, according to a recent estimate. The life expectancy at birth for the total population was estimated to be 72.26 years of age. The literacy rate of Brazil's total population was estimated to be 88.6 percent; 88.4 percent for males and 88.8 percent for females.

A notable measure of human development is the Human Development Index (HDI), which is formulated by the United Nations Development Program. The HDI is a composite of several indicators, which measure a country's achievements in three main arenas of human development: longevity, knowledge and education, as well as economic standard of living. The HDI placed Brazil in the high human development category, at 73rd place, in a recent ranking of 169 countries.

Although the concept of human development is complicated and cannot be properly captured by values and indices, the HDI, which is calculated and updated annually, offers a wide-ranging assessment of human development in certain countries, not based solely upon traditional economic and financial indicators.

Written by Dr. Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief at CountryWatch.com. See Bibliography for general research sources.

[Human Development Index](#)

Human Development Index

Human Development Index (Ranked Numerically)

The [Human Development Index](#) (HDI) is used to measure quality of life in countries across the world. The HDI has been compiled since 1990 by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) on a regular basis. The HDI is a composite of several indicators, which measure a country's achievements in three main arenas of human development: longevity, education, and economic standard of living. Although the concept of human development is complicated and

cannot be properly captured by values and indices, the HDI offers a wide-ranging assessment of human development in certain countries, not based solely upon traditional economic and financial indicators. For more information about the methodology used to calculate the HDI, please see the "Source Materials" in the appendices of this review.

Very High Human Development	High Human Development	Medium Human Development	Low Human Development
1. Norway	43. Bahamas	86. Fiji	128. Kenya
2. Australia	44. Lithuania	87. Turkmenistan	129. Bangladesh
3. New Zealand	45. Chile	88. Dominican Republic	130. Ghana
4. United States	46. Argentina	89. China	131. Cameroon
5. Ireland	47. Kuwait	90. El Salvador	132. Myanmar (Burma)
6. Liechtenstein	48. Latvia	91. Sri Lanka	133. Yemen
7. Netherlands	49. Montenegro	92. Thailand	134. Benin
8. Canada	50. Romania	93. Gabon	135. Madagascar
9. Sweden	51. Croatia	94. Suriname	136. Mauritania
10. Germany	52. Uruguay	95. Bolivia	137. Papua New Guinea
11. Japan	53. Libya	96. Paraguay	138. Nepal
12. South Korea	54. Panama	97. Philippines	139. Togo

13. Switzerland	55. Saudi Arabia	98. Botswana	140. Comoros
14. France	56. Mexico	99. Moldova	141. Lesotho
15. Israel	57. Malaysia	100. Mongolia	142. Nigeria
16. Finland	58. Bulgaria	101. Egypt	143. Uganda
17. Iceland	59. Trinidad and Tobago	102. Uzbekistan	144. Senegal
18. Belgium	60. Serbia	103. Micronesia	145. Haiti
19. Denmark	61. Belarus	104. Guyana	146. Angola
20. Spain	62. Costa Rica	105. Namibia	147. Djibouti
21. Hong King	63. Peru	106. Honduras	148. Tanzania
22. Greece	64. Albania	107. Maldives	149. Cote d'Ivoire
23. Italy	65. Russian Federation	108. Indonesia	150. Zambia
24. Luxembourg	66. Kazakhstan	109. Kyrgyzstan	151. Gambia
25. Austria	67. Azerbaijan	110. South Africa	152. Rwanda
26. United Kingdom	68. Bosnia and Herzegovina	111. Syria	153. Malawi
27. Singapore	69. Ukraine	112. Tajikistan	154. Sudan
28. Czech Republic	70. Iran	113. Vietnam	155. Afghanistan
29. Slovenia	71. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	114. Morocco	156. Guinea

30. Andorra	72. Mauritius	115. Nicaragua	157. Ethiopia
31. Slovakia	73. Brazil	116. Guatemala	158. Sierra Leone
32. United Arab Emirates	74. Georgia	117. Equatorial Guinea	159. Central African Republic
33. Malta	75. Venezuela	118. Cape Verde	160. Mali
34. Estonia	76. Armenia	119. India	161. Burkina Faso
35. Cyprus	77. Ecuador	120. East Timor	162. Liberia
36. Hungary	78. Belize	121. Swaziland	163. Chad
37. Brunei	79. Colombia	122. Laos	164. Guinea-Bissau
38. Qatar	80. Jamaica	123. Solomon Islands	165. Mozambique
39. Bahrain	81. Tunisia	124. Cambodia	166. Burundi
40. Portugal	82. Jordan	125. Pakistan	167. Niger
41. Poland	83. Turkey	126. Congo RC	168. Congo DRC
42. Barbados	84. Algeria	127. Sao Tome and Principe	169. Zimbabwe
	85. Tonga		

Methodology:

For more information about the methodology used to calculate the HDI, please see the "Source Materials" in the appendices of this Country Review.

Reference:

As published in United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Report 2010.

Source:

United Nations Development Programme's [Human Development Index](http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/) available at URL: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/>

Updated:

Uploaded in 2011 using ranking available; reviewed in 2015

Life Satisfaction Index

Life Satisfaction Index

Life Satisfaction Index

Created by Adrian G. White, an Analytic Social Psychologist at the University of Leicester, the "Satisfaction with Life Index" measures subjective life satisfaction across various countries. The data was taken from a metastudy (see below for source) and associates the notion of subjective happiness or life satisfaction with qualitative parameters such as health, wealth, and access to basic education. This assessment serves as an alternative to other measures of happiness that tend to rely on traditional and quantitative measures of policy on quality of life, such as GNP and GDP. The methodology involved the responses of 80,000 people across the globe.

Rank	Country	Score

1	Denmark	273.4
2	Switzerland	273.33
3	Austria	260
4	Iceland	260
5	The Bahamas	256.67
6	Finland	256.67
7	Sweden	256.67
8	Iran	253.33
9	Brunei	253.33
10	Canada	253.33
11	Ireland	253.33
12	Luxembourg	253.33
13	Costa Rica	250
14	Malta	250
15	Netherlands	250
16	Antiguaand Barbuda	246.67
17	Malaysia	246.67
18	New Zealand	246.67

19	Norway	246.67
20	Seychelles	246.67
21	Saint Kitts and Nevis	246.67
22	United Arab Emirates	246.67
23	United States	246.67
24	Vanuatu	246.67
25	Venezuela	246.67
26	Australia	243.33
27	Barbados	243.33
28	Belgium	243.33
29	Dominica	243.33
30	Oman	243.33
31	Saudi Arabia	243.33
32	Suriname	243.33
33	Bahrain	240
34	Colombia	240
35	Germany	240
36	Guyana	240

37	Honduras	240
38	Kuwait	240
39	Panama	240
40	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	240
41	United Kingdom	236.67
42	Dominican Republic	233.33
43	Guatemala	233.33
44	Jamaica	233.33
45	Qatar	233.33
46	Spain	233.33
47	Saint Lucia	233.33
48	Belize	230
49	Cyprus	230
50	Italy	230
51	Mexico	230
52	Samoa	230
53	Singapore	230
54	Solomon Islands	230

55	Trinidad and Tobago	230
56	Argentina	226.67
57	Fiji	223.33
58	Israel	223.33
59	Mongolia	223.33
60	São Tomé and Príncipe	223.33
61	El Salvador	220
62	France	220
63	Hong Kong	220
64	Indonesia	220
65	Kyrgyzstan	220
66	Maldives	220
67	Slovenia	220
68	Taiwan	220
69	East Timor	220
70	Tonga	220
71	Chile	216.67
72	Grenada	216.67

73	Mauritius	216.67
74	Namibia	216.67
75	Paraguay	216.67
76	Thailand	216.67
77	Czech Republic	213.33
78	Philippines	213.33
79	Tunisia	213.33
80	Uzbekistan	213.33
81	Brazil	210
82	China	210
83	Cuba	210
84	Greece	210
85	Nicaragua	210
86	Papua New Guinea	210
87	Uruguay	210
88	Gabon	206.67
89	Ghana	206.67
90	Japan	206.67

91	Yemen	206.67
92	Portugal	203.33
93	Sri Lanka	203.33
94	Tajikistan	203.33
95	Vietnam	203.33
96	Bhutan	200
97	Comoros	196.67
98	Croatia	196.67
99	Poland	196.67
100	Cape Verde	193.33
101	Kazakhstan	193.33
102	South Korea	193.33
103	Madagascar	193.33
104	Bangladesh	190
105	Republic of the Congo	190
106	The Gambia	190
107	Hungary	190
108	Libya	190

109	South Africa	190
110	Cambodia	186.67
111	Ecuador	186.67
112	Kenya	186.67
113	Lebanon	186.67
114	Morocco	186.67
115	Peru	186.67
116	Senegal	186.67
117	Bolivia	183.33
118	Haiti	183.33
119	Nepal	183.33
120	Nigeria	183.33
121	Tanzania	183.33
122	Benin	180
123	Botswana	180
124	Guinea-Bissau	180
125	India	180
126	Laos	180

127	Mozambique	180
128	Palestinian Authority	180
129	Slovakia	180
130	Myanmar	176.67
131	Mali	176.67
132	Mauritania	176.67
133	Turkey	176.67
134	Algeria	173.33
135	Equatorial Guinea	173.33
136	Romania	173.33
137	Bosnia and Herzegovina	170
138	Cameroon	170
139	Estonia	170
140	Guinea	170
141	Jordan	170
142	Syria	170
143	Sierra Leone	166.67
144	Azerbaijan	163.33

145	Central African Republic	163.33
146	Republic of Macedonia	163.33
147	Togo	163.33
148	Zambia	163.33
149	Angola	160
150	Djibouti	160
151	Egypt	160
152	Burkina Faso	156.67
153	Ethiopia	156.67
154	Latvia	156.67
155	Lithuania	156.67
156	Uganda	156.67
157	Albania	153.33
158	Malawi	153.33
159	Chad	150
160	Côte d'Ivoire	150
161	Niger	150
162	Eritrea	146.67

163	Rwanda	146.67
164	Bulgaria	143.33
165	Lesotho	143.33
166	Pakistan	143.33
167	Russia	143.33
168	Swaziland	140
169	Georgia	136.67
170	Belarus	133.33
171	Turkmenistan	133.33
172	Armenia	123.33
173	Sudan	120
174	Ukraine	120
175	Moldova	116.67
176	Democratic Republic of the Congo	110
177	Zimbabwe	110
178	Burundi	100

Commentary:

European countries, such as [Denmark](#), [Iceland](#), [Finland](#), [Sweden](#), [Switzerland](#), [Austria](#) resided at

the top of the ranking with highest levels of self-reported life satisfaction. Conversely, European countries such as [Latvia](#), [Lithuania](#), [Moldova](#), [Belarus](#) and [Ukraine](#) ranked low on the index. African countries such as Democratic Republic of Congo, [Zimbabwe](#) and [Burundi](#) found themselves at the very bottom of the ranking, and indeed, very few African countries could be found in the top 100. [Japan](#) was at the mid-way point in the ranking, however, other Asian countries such as [Brunei](#) and [Malaysia](#) were in the top tier, while [Pakistan](#) was close to the bottom with a low level of self-identified life satisfaction. As a region, the Middle East presented a mixed bag with Saudi Arabians reporting healthy levels of life satisfaction and Egyptians near the bottom of the ranking. As a region, Caribbean countries were ranked highly, consistently demonstrating high levels of life satisfaction. The findings showed that health was the most crucial determining factor in life satisfaction, followed by prosperity and education.

Source:

White, A. (2007). A Global Projection of Subjective Well-being: A Challenge To Positive Psychology? *Psychtalk* 56, 17-20. The data was extracted from a meta-analysis by Marks, Abdallah, Simms & Thompson (2006).

Uploaded:

Based on study noted above in "Source" ; reviewed in 2015

Happy Planet Index

Happy Planet Index

The Happy Planet Index (HPI) is used to measure human well-being in conjunction with environmental impact. The HPI has been compiled since 2006 by the New Economics Foundation. The index is a composite of several indicators including subjective life satisfaction, life expectancy at birth, and ecological footprint per capita.

As noted by NEFA, the HPI "reveals the ecological efficiency with which human well-being is delivered." Indeed, the index combines environmental impact with human well-being to measure the environmental efficiency with which, country by country, people live long and happy lives. The countries ranked highest by the HPI are not necessarily the ones with the happiest people overall, but the ones that allow their citizens to live long and fulfilling lives, without negatively

impacting this opportunity for either future generations or citizens of other countries. Accordingly, a country like the [United States](#) will rank low on this list due to its large per capital ecological footprint, which uses more than its fair share of resources, and will likely cause planetary damage.

It should be noted that the HPI was designed to be a counterpoint to other well-established indices of countries' development, such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which measures overall national wealth and economic development, but often obfuscates the realities of countries with stark variances between the rich and the poor. Moreover, the objective of most of the world's people is not to be wealthy but to be happy. The HPI also differs from the [Human Development Index](#) (HDI), which measures quality of life but not ecology, since it [HPI] also includes sustainability as a key indicator.

Rank	Country	HPI
1	Costa Rica	76.1
2	Dominican Republic	71.8
3	Jamaica	70.1
4	Guatemala	68.4
5	Vietnam	66.5
6	Colombia	66.1
7	Cuba	65.7
8	El Salvador	61.5
9	Brazil	61.0
10	Honduras	61.0
11	Nicaragua	60.5

12	Egypt	60.3
13	Saudi Arabia	59.7
14	Philippines	59.0
15	Argentina	59.0
16	Indonesia	58.9
17	Bhutan	58.5
18	Panama	57.4
19	Laos	57.3
20	China	57.1
21	Morocco	56.8
22	Sri Lanka	56.5
23	Mexico	55.6
24	Pakistan	55.6
25	Ecuador	55.5
26	Jordan	54.6
27	Belize	54.5
28	Peru	54.4
29	Tunisia	54.3

30	Trinidad and Tobago	54.2
31	Bangladesh	54.1
32	Moldova	54.1
33	Malaysia	54.0
34	Tajikistan	53.5
35	India	53.0
36	Venezuela	52.5
37	Nepal	51.9
38	Syria	51.3
39	Burma	51.2
40	Algeria	51.2
41	Thailand	50.9
42	Haiti	50.8
43	Netherlands	50.6
44	Malta	50.4
45	Uzbekistan	50.1
46	Chile	49.7
47	Bolivia	49.3

48	Armenia	48.3
49	Singapore	48.2
50	Yemen	48.1
51	Germany	48.1
52	Switzerland	48.1
53	Sweden	48.0
54	Albania	47.9
55	Paraguay	47.8
56	Palestinian Authority	47.7
57	Austria	47.7
58	Serbia	47.6
59	Finland	47.2
60	Croatia	47.2
61	Kyrgyzstan	47.1
62	Cyprus	46.2
63	Guyana	45.6
64	Belgium	45.4
65	Bosnia and Herzegovina	45.0

66	Slovenia	44.5
67	Israel	44.5
68	South Korea	44.4
69	Italy	44.0
70	Romania	43.9
71	France	43.9
72	Georgia	43.6
73	Slovakia	43.5
74	United Kingdom	43.3
75	Japan	43.3
76	Spain	43.2
77	Poland	42.8
78	Ireland	42.6
79	Iraq	42.6
80	Cambodia	42.3
81	Iran	42.1
82	Bulgaria	42.0
83	Turkey	41.7

84	Hong Kong	41.6
85	Azerbaijan	41.2
86	Lithuania	40.9
87	Djibouti	40.4
88	Norway	40.4
89	Canada	39.4
90	Hungary	38.9
91	Kazakhstan	38.5
92	Czech Republic	38.3
93	Mauritania	38.2
94	Iceland	38.1
95	Ukraine	38.1
96	Senegal	38.0
97	Greece	37.6
98	Portugal	37.5
99	Uruguay	37.2
100	Ghana	37.1
101	Latvia	36.7

102	Australia	36.6
103	New Zealand	36.2
104	Belarus	35.7
105	Denmark	35.5
106	Mongolia	35.0
107	Malawi	34.5
108	Russia	34.5
109	Chad	34.3
110	Lebanon	33.6
111	Macedonia	32.7
112	Republic of the Congo	32.4
113	Madagascar	31.5
114	United States	30.7
115	Nigeria	30.3
116	Guinea	30.3
117	Uganda	30.2
118	South Africa	29.7
119	Rwanda	29.6

120	Democratic Republic of the Congo	29.0
121	Sudan	28.5
122	Luxembourg	28.5
123	United Arab Emirates	28.2
124	Ethiopia	28.1
125	Kenya	27.8
126	Cameroon	27.2
127	Zambia	27.2
128	Kuwait	27.0
129	Niger	26.9
130	Angola	26.8
131	Estonia	26.4
132	Mali	25.8
133	Mozambique	24.6
134	Benin	24.6
135	Togo	23.3
136	Sierra Leone	23.1
137	Central African Republic	22.9

138	Burkina Faso	22.4
139	Burundi	21.8
140	Namibia	21.1
141	Botswana	20.9
142	Tanzania	17.8
143	Zimbabwe	16.6

Source: This material is derived from the Happy Planet Index issued by the New Economics Foundation (NEF).

Methodology: The methodology for the calculations can be found at URL: <http://www.happyplanetindex.org/>

Status of Women

Gender Related Development Index (GDI) Rank:

52nd out of 140

Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) Rank:

Not Ranked

Female Population:

92.9 million

Female Life Expectancy at birth:

76 years

Total Fertility Rate:

2.2

Maternal Mortality Ratio (2000):

260

Total Number of Women Living with HIV/AIDS:

110,000-390,000

Ever Married Women, Ages 15-19 (%):

17%

Mean Age at Time of Marriage:

23

Contraceptive Use Among Married Women, Any Method (%):

76%

Female Adult Literacy Rate:

88.8%

Combined Female Gross enrollment ratio for Primary, Secondary and Tertiary schools:

93%

Female-Headed Households (%):

25%

Economically Active Females (%):

43.7%

Female Contributing Family Workers (%):

N/A

Female Estimated Earned Income:

\$4,704

Seats in Parliament held by women (%):

Lower or Single House: 8.6%

Upper House or Senate: 12.3%

Year Women Received the Right to Vote:

1934

Year Women Received the Right to Stand for Election:

1934

*The Gender Development Index (GDI) is a composite index which measures the average achievement in a country. While very similar to the Human Development Index in its use of the same variables, the GDI adjusts the average achievement of each country in terms of life expectancy, enrollment in schools, income, and literacy in accordance to the disparities between males and females.

*The Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) is a composite index measuring gender inequality in three of the basic dimensions of empowerment; economic participation and decision-making, political participation and decision-making, and power over economic resources.

*Total Fertility Rate (TFR) is defined as the average number of babies born to women during their reproductive years. A TFR of 2.1 is considered the replacement rate; once a TFR of a population reaches 2.1 the population will remain stable assuming no immigration or emigration takes place. When the TFR is greater than 2.1 a population will increase and when it is less than 2.1 a population will eventually decrease, although due to the age structure of a population it will take years before a low TFR is translated into lower population.

*Maternal Mortality Rate is the number of deaths to women per 100,000 live births that resulted from conditions related to pregnancy and or delivery related complications.

*Economically Active Females are the share of the female population, ages 15 and above, whom supply, or are able to supply, labor for the production of goods and services.

*Female Contributing Family Workers are those females who work without pay in an economic enterprise operated by a relative living in the same household.

*Estimated Earned Income is measured according to Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) in US dollars.

Global Gender Gap Index

Global Gender Gap Index

Editor's Note:

The Global Gender Gap Index by the World Economic Forum ranks most of the world’s countries in terms of the division of resources and opportunities among males and females. Specifically, the ranking assesses the gender inequality gap in these four arenas:

1. Economic participation and opportunity (salaries and high skilled employment participation levels)
2. Educational attainment (access to basic and higher level education)
3. Political empowerment (representation in decision-making structures)
4. Health and survival (life expectancy and sex ratio)

	2010 rank	2010 score	2010 rank among 2009 countries	2009 rank	2009 score	2008 rank	2008 score	2007 rank
Country								

Iceland	1	0.8496	1	1	0.8276	4	0.7999	4
Norway	2	0.8404	2	3	0.8227	1	0.8239	2
Finland	3	0.8260	3	2	0.8252	2	0.8195	3
Sweden	4	0.8024	4	4	0.8139	3	0.8139	1
New Zealand	5	0.7808	5	5	0.7880	5	0.7859	5
Ireland	6	0.7773	6	8	0.7597	8	0.7518	9
Denmark	7	0.7719	7	7	0.7628	7	0.7538	8
Lesotho	8	0.7678	8	10	0.7495	16	0.7320	26
Philippines	9	0.7654	9	9	0.7579	6	0.7568	6
Switzerland	10	0.7562	10	13	0.7426	14	0.7360	40
Spain	11	0.7554	11	17	0.7345	17	0.7281	10
South Africa	12	0.7535	12	6	0.7709	22	0.7232	20
Germany	13	0.7530	13	12	0.7449	11	0.7394	7
Belgium	14	0.7509	14	33	0.7165	28	0.7163	19
United Kingdom	15	0.7460	15	15	0.7402	13	0.7366	11
Sri Lanka	16	0.7458	16	16	0.7402	12	0.7371	15
Netherlands	17	0.7444	17	11	0.7490	9	0.7399	12

Latvia	18	0.7429	18	14	0.7416	10	0.7397	13
United States	19	0.7411	19	31	0.7173	27	0.7179	31
Canada	20	0.7372	20	25	0.7196	31	0.7136	18
Trinidad and Tobago	21	0.7353	21	19	0.7298	19	0.7245	46
Mozambique	22	0.7329	22	26	0.7195	18	0.7266	43
Australia	23	0.7271	23	20	0.7282	21	0.7241	17
Cuba	24	0.7253	24	29	0.7176	25	0.7195	22
Namibia	25	0.7238	25	32	0.7167	30	0.7141	29
Luxembourg	26	0.7231	26	63	0.6889	66	0.6802	58
Mongolia	27	0.7194	27	22	0.7221	40	0.7049	62
Costa Rica	28	0.7194	28	27	0.7180	32	0.7111	28
Argentina	29	0.7187	29	24	0.7211	24	0.7209	33
Nicaragua	30	0.7176	30	49	0.7002	71	0.6747	90
Barbados	31	0.7176	31	21	0.7236	26	0.7188	n/a
Portugal	32	0.7171	32	46	0.7013	39	0.7051	37
Uganda	33	0.7169	33	40	0.7067	43	0.6981	50
Moldova	34	0.7160	34	36	0.7104	20	0.7244	21

Lithuania	35	0.7132	35	30	0.7175	23	0.7222	14
Bahamas	36	0.7128	36	28	0.7179	n/a	n/a	n/a
Austria	37	0.7091	37	42	0.7031	29	0.7153	27
Guyana	38	0.7090	38	35	0.7108	n/a	n/a	n/a
Panama	39	0.7072	39	43	0.7024	34	0.7095	38
Ecuador	40	0.7072	40	23	0.7220	35	0.7091	44
Kazakhstan	41	0.7055	41	47	0.7013	45	0.6976	32
Slovenia	42	0.7047	42	52	0.6982	51	0.6937	49
Poland	43	0.7037	43	50	0.6998	49	0.6951	60
Jamaica	44	0.7037	44	48	0.7013	44	0.6980	39
Russian Federation	45	0.7036	45	51	0.6987	42	0.6994	45
France	46	0.7025	46	18	0.7331	15	0.7341	51
Estonia	47	0.7018	47	37	0.7094	37	0.7076	30
Chile	48	0.7013	48	64	0.6884	65	0.6818	86
Macedonia, FYR	49	0.6996	49	53	0.6950	53	0.6914	35
Bulgaria	50	0.6983	50	38	0.7072	36	0.7077	25
Kyrgyz Republic	51	0.6973	51	41	0.7058	41	0.7045	70

Israel	52	0.6957	52	45	0.7019	56	0.6900	36
Croatia	53	0.6939	53	54	0.6944	46	0.6967	16
Honduras	54	0.6927	54	62	0.6893	47	0.6960	68
Colombia	55	0.6927	55	56	0.6939	50	0.6944	24
Singapore	56	0.6914	56	84	0.6664	84	0.6625	77
Thailand	57	0.6910	57	59	0.6907	52	0.6917	52
Greece	58	0.6908	58	85	0.6662	75	0.6727	72
Uruguay	59	0.6897	59	57	0.6936	54	0.6907	78
Peru	60	0.6895	60	44	0.7024	48	0.6959	75
China	61	0.6881	61	60	0.6907	57	0.6878	73
Botswana	62	0.6876	62	39	0.7071	63	0.6839	53
Ukraine	63	0.6869	63	61	0.6896	62	0.6856	57
Venezuela	64	0.6863	64	69	0.6839	59	0.6875	55
Czech Republic	65	0.6850	65	74	0.6789	69	0.6770	64
Tanzania	66	0.6829	66	73	0.6797	38	0.7068	34
Romania	67	0.6826	67	70	0.6805	70	0.6763	47
Malawi	68	0.6824	68	76	0.6738	81	0.6664	87
Paraguay	69	0.6804	69	66	0.6868	100	0.6379	69

Ghana	70	0.6782	70	80	0.6704	77	0.6679	63
Slovak Republic	71	0.6778	71	68	0.6845	64	0.6824	54
Vietnam	72	0.6776	72	71	0.6802	68	0.6778	42
Dominican Republic	73	0.6774	73	67	0.6859	72	0.6744	65
Italy	74	0.6765	74	72	0.6798	67	0.6788	84
Gambia, The	75	0.6762	75	75	0.6752	85	0.6622	95
Bolivia	76	0.6751	76	82	0.6693	80	0.6667	80
Brueni Darussalem	77	0.6748	77	94	0.6524	99	0.6392	n/a
Albania	78	0.6726	78	91	0.6601	87	0.6591	66
Hungary	79	0.6720	79	65	0.6879	60	0.6867	61
Madagascar	80	0.6713	80	77	0.6732	74	0.6736	89
Angola	81	0.6712	81	106	0.6353	114	0.6032	110
Bangladesh	82	0.6702	82	93	0.6526	90	0.6531	100
Malta	83	0.6695	83	88	0.6635	83	0.6634	76
Armenia	84	0.6669	84	90	0.6619	78	0.6677	71
Brazil	85	0.6655	85	81	0.6695	73	0.6737	74

Cyprus	86	0.6642	86	79	0.6706	76	0.6694	82
Indonesia	87	0.6615	87	92	0.6580	93	0.6473	81
Georgia	88	0.6598	88	83	0.6680	82	0.6654	67
Tajikistan	89	0.6598	89	86	0.6661	89	0.6541	79
El Salvador	90	0.6596	90	55	0.6939	58	0.6875	48
Mexico	91	0.6577	91	98	0.6503	97	0.6441	93
Zimbabwe	92	0.6574	92	95	0.6518	92	0.6485	88
Belize	93	0.6536	93	87	0.6636	86	0.6610	94
Japan	94	0.6524	94	101	0.6447	98	0.6434	91
Mauritius	95	0.6520	95	96	0.6513	95	0.6466	85
Kenya	96	0.6499	96	97	0.6512	88	0.6547	83
Cambodia	97	0.6482	97	104	0.6410	94	0.6469	98
Malaysia	98	0.6479	98	100	0.6467	96	0.6442	92
Maldives	99	0.6452	99	99	0.6482	91	0.6501	99
Azerbaijan	100	0.6446	100	89	0.6626	61	0.6856	59
Senegal	101	0.6414	101	102	0.6427	n/a	n/a	n/a
Suriname	102	0.6407	102	78	0.6726	79	0.6674	56
United Arab Emirates	103	0.6397	103	112	0.6198	105	0.6220	105

Korea, Rep.	104	0.6342	104	115	0.6146	108	0.6154	97
Kuwait	105	0.6318	105	105	0.6356	101	0.6358	96
Zambia	106	0.6293	106	107	0.6310	106	0.6205	101
Tunisia	107	0.6266	107	109	0.6233	103	0.6295	102
Fiji	108	0.6256	108	103	0.6414	n/a	n/a	n/a
Guatemala	109	0.6238	109	111	0.6209	112	0.6072	106
Bahrain	110	0.6217	110	116	0.6136	121	0.5927	115
Burkina Faso	111	0.6162	111	120	0.6081	115	0.6029	117
India	112	0.6155	112	114	0.6151	113	0.6060	114
Mauritania	113	0.6152	113	119	0.6103	110	0.6117	111
Cameroon	114	0.6110	114	118	0.6108	117	0.6017	116
Nepal	115	0.6084	115	110	0.6213	120	0.5942	125
Lebanon*	116	0.6084	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Qatar	117	0.6059	116	125	0.5907	119	0.5948	109
Nigeria	118	0.6055	117	108	0.6280	102	0.6339	107
Algeria	119	0.6052	118	117	0.6119	111	0.6111	108
Jordan	120	0.6048	119	113	0.6182	104	0.6275	104
Ethiopia	121	0.6019	120	122	0.5948	122	0.5867	113

Oman	122	0.5950	121	123	0.5938	118	0.5960	119
Iran	123	0.5933	122	128	0.5839	116	0.6021	118
Syria	124	0.5926	123	121	0.6072	107	0.6181	103
Egypt	125	0.5899	124	126	0.5862	124	0.5832	120
Turkey	126	0.5876	125	129	0.5828	123	0.5853	121
Morocco	127	0.5767	126	124	0.5926	125	0.5757	122
Benin	128	0.5719	127	131	0.5643	126	0.5582	123
Saudi Arabia	129	0.5713	128	130	0.5651	128	0.5537	124
Côte d'Ivoire*	130	0.5691	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Mali	131	0.5680	129	127	0.5860	109	0.6117	112
Pakistan	132	0.5465	130	132	0.5458	127	0.5549	126
Chad	133	0.5330	131	133	0.5417	129	0.5290	127
Yemen	134	0.4603	132	134	0.4609	130	0.4664	128
Belarus	n/a	n/a	n/a	34	0.7141	33	0.7099	23
Uzbekistan	n/a	n/a	n/a	58	0.6913	55	0.6906	41

*new country 2010

Commentary:

According to the report's index, Nordic countries, such as [Iceland](#), [Norway](#), [Finland](#), and [Sweden](#) have continued to dominate at the top of the ranking for gender equality. Meanwhile, [France](#) has seen a notable decline in the ranking, largely as a result of decreased number of women holding ministerial portfolios in that country. In the Americas, the [United States](#) has risen in the ranking to top the region, predominantly as a result of a decreasing wage gap, as well as higher number of women holding key positions in the current Obama administration. [Canada](#) has continued to remain as one of the top ranking countries of the Americas, followed by the small Caribbean island nation of Trinidad and Tobago, which has the distinction of being among the top three countries of the Americas in the realm of gender equality. [Lesotho](#) and South African ranked highly in the index, leading not only among African countries but also in global context. Despite [Lesotho](#) still lagging in the area of life expectancy, its high ranking was attributed to high levels of female participation in the labor force and female literacy. The [Philippines](#) and [Sri Lanka](#) were the top ranking countries for gender equality for Asia, ranking highly also in global context. The [Philippines](#) has continued to show strong performance in all strong performance on all four dimensions (detailed above) of the index. Finally, in the Arab world, the [United Arab Emirates](#) held the highest-rank within that region of the world; however, its placement near the bottom of the global list highlights the fact that Arab countries are generally poor performers when it comes to the matter of gender equality in global scope.

Source:

This data is derived from the latest edition of The Global Gender Gap Report by the World Economic Forum.

Available at URL:

<http://www.weforum.org/en/Communities/Women%20Leaders%20and%20Gender%20Parity/Gende>

Updated:

Based on latest available data as set forth in chart; reviewed in 2014

Culture and Arts

Etiquette

Cultural Dos and Taboos

1. Greetings in Brazil are fulsome. Lengthy handshakes in first meetings extend to embraces when friendships have developed. Handshakes should be extended to all people in a group at the start of an encounter and again at the end, upon leaving. Among women, kissing on alternating cheeks is the norm, although a third cheek kiss is added for single women as a sign of good luck in finding a spouse.
2. Conversations are generally lively, and heated debate, disagreements, interruptions and physical contact are the norm during conversation with Brazilians. Try not to be intimidated by it and simply enjoy the dynamic atmosphere. This kind of spirited conversation is simply an illustration of the typical outgoing and animated Brazilian culture. Culture and sports (soccer or *football* especially) are good topics of conversation while politics or controversial social issues should be avoided until you understand the culture well.
3. Brazilians are not as formal as other South American cultures. Men are usually addressed as *Senhor* plus their surname (women as *Senhora* plus the surname), but Brazilians move rapidly to first names, often used with a title.
4. Brazilians are status conscious and in business especially, adhering to standards of hierarchy is to be expected. Things do not function entirely along a top-down continuum either. The lateral dimension, exemplified by personal relationships, is also a vital aspect of Brazilian culture. Nothing is accomplished unless good rapport has been established and that quality of connection takes time. Another aspect of the lateral dimension is exemplified by the importance of contacts and introductions. Having a good local Brazilian sponsor, called a *despechante*, is vital. Visitors should learn how to cultivate an understanding for both the hierarchical and the lateral aspects of Brazilian culture and social structure.
5. As noted above, status is important in Brazil, as are symbols of status. If you stay at a hotel in Brazil, be sure to find a good hotel and if you take a colleague or associate out for a meal, you should choose one known for its excellence. Such choices denote your own importance and

worthiness of respect.

6. Brazil is still a male-centered society. Nevertheless, Brazilian women are increasingly becoming more involved and accepted in the workplace, and female visitors should expect few gender-oriented problems in the professional realm. Female visitors, however, should recognize that Brazilian men are socialized to behave in a persistent and ardent manner, and so audacious comments and overstated leering are to be expected.

7. Although many people refer to citizens of the US as Americans, people from other parts of the hemisphere often become irritated when the term "American" is not understood as denoting citizens from other American realms as well. Brazilians are particularly self-conscious about this issue and do not appreciate when phrases like "in America" are used to refer to the United States.

8. Brazil is a multiethnic country. Although Brazilians are proud of their Portuguese language and their national celebration, *Carnaval*, diverse ethnicities and cultures are also highly characteristic of this country. Visitors should be aware of how to strike a balance between national culture and aspects of cultural diversity in Brazil.

9. The sign for "O.K." in the United States (a circle of first finger and thumb) is a vulgar symbol in Brazil. Another exemplar of bad manners is eating while walking down the street.

10. To invoke good luck, place your thumb between your index and middle fingers while making a fist. This is also known as the "fig" and it is considered to be a national symbol.

11. When invited to a home, (a sign of deepening friendship), it is advisable that some sort of gift be brought. Suggested items include fine chocolate, champagne, or other upper tier liquor. Gifts for children of the host and hostess are also suggested. Black and purple are colors of mourning and should be avoided, along with knives, which symbolize severing of the relationship, or handkerchiefs, which denote grief.

12. Although Brazilian standards of attire is less formal than other Latin American countries, business suits should be worn in the professional world by both men and women. Of course, the range of business suits can vary from traditional and conservative dark suits to lighter Italian style options in various colors. Men should stick to long sleeved shirts despite the weather and executives may consider three piece suits. Women tend to be fashionable, and unlike parts of Europe or Canada where a more restrained look is the norm, vibrant color, makeup, accessories and jewelry are appreciated. Outside of business, men tend to wear dress trousers and shirts while women wear dresses, or in casual settings, they may wear shirts with skirts or pants. Ties are rarely worn for social occasions unless the event is more upscale; jackets, however, are frequently worn. Women generally have more latitude in their choices, and although local styles are often far more revealing than other parts of the world, female visitors should exercise some restraint in this

regard. Both men and women should confine their penchant for wearing shorts to the home and the beach.

Travel Information

Please Note: This is a generalized travel guide and it is intended to coalesce several resources that a traveler might find useful, regardless of a particular destination. As such, it does not include travel warnings for specific "hot spot" destinations.

For travel alerts and warnings, please see the United States Department of State's listings available at URL: <http://travel.state.gov/content/passports/english/alertswarnings.html>

Please note that travel to the following countries, based on these warnings, is ill-advised, or should be undertaken with the utmost precautions:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Honduras, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, Pakistan, Palestinian Territories of West Bank and Gaza, Philippines areas of Sulu Archipelago, Mindanao, and southern Sulu Sea, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Yemen.

International Travel Guide

Checklist for Travelers

1. Take out travel insurance to cover hospital treatment or medical evacuation. Overseas medical costs are expensive to most international travelers, where one's domestic, nationalized or even private health insurance plans will not provide coverage outside one's home country. Learn about "reciprocal insurance plans" that some international health care companies might offer.
2. Make sure that one's travel insurance is appropriate. If one intends to indulge in adventurous activities, such as parasailing, one should be sure that one is fully insured in such cases. Many traditional insurance policies do not provide coverage in cases of extreme circumstances.
3. Take time to learn about one's destination country and culture. Read and learn about the place one is traveling. Also check political, economic and socio-cultural developments at the destination by reading country-specific travel reports and fact sheets noted below.

- 4.** Get the necessary visas for the country (or countries) one intends to visit - but be aware that a visa does not guarantee entry. A number of useful sites regarding visa and other entry requirements are noted below.
- 5.** Keep in regular contact with friends and relatives back at home by phone or email, and be sure to leave a travel itinerary.
- 6.** Protect one's personal information by making copies of one's passport details, insurance policy, travelers checks and credit card numbers. Taking copies of such documents with you, while leaving another collection copies with someone at home is also good practice for travelers. Taking copies of one's passport photograph is also recommended.
- 7.** Stay healthy by taking all possible precautions against illness. Also, be sure to take extra supplies of prescription drugs along for the trip, while also taking time to pack general pharmaceutical supplies, such as aspirin and other such painkillers, bandages, stomach ailment medication, anti-inflammatory medication and anti-bacterial medication.
- 8.** Do not carry illicit drugs. Understand that the punishment for possession or use of illegal drugs in some countries may be capital punishment. Make sure your prescription drugs are legal in the countries you plan to visit.
- 9.** Know the laws of one's destination country and culture; be sure to understand the repercussions of breaking those laws and regulations. Often the transparency and freedoms of the juridical system at home is not consistent with that of one's destination country. Become aware of these complexities and subtleties before you travel.
- 10.** For longer stays in a country, or where the security situation is volatile, one should register one's self and traveling companions at the local embassy or consulate of one's country of citizenship.
- 11.** Women should take care to be prepared both culturally and practically for traveling in a different country and culture. One should be sure to take sufficient supplies of personal feminine products and prescription drugs. One should also learn about local cultural standards for women, including norms of dressing. Be aware that it is simply inappropriate and unsafe for women to travel alone in some countries, and take the necessary precautions to avoid risk-filled situations.
- 12.** If one is traveling with small children, one should pack extra supplies, make arrangements with the travel carrier for proper seating that would adequately accommodate children, infants or toddlers. Note also that whether one is male or female, traveling with children means that one's hands are thus not free to carry luggage and bags. Be especially aware that this makes one vulnerable to pickpockets, thieves and other sorts of crime.

13. Make proper arrangements for accommodations, well in advance of one's arrival at a destination. Some countries have limited accommodation, while others may have culturally distinctive facilities. Learning about these practicalities before one travels will greatly aid the enjoyment of one's trip.

14. Travel with different forms of currency and money (cash, traveler's checks and credit cards) in anticipation that venues may not accept one or another form of money. Also, ensuring that one's financial resources are not contained in one location, or by one person (if one is traveling with others) can be a useful measure, in the event that one loses a wallet or purse.

15. Find out about transportation in the destination country. In some places, it might be advisable to hire a local driver or taxi guide for safety reasons, while in other countries, enjoying one's travel experience may well be enhanced by renting a vehicle and seeing the local sights and culture independently. Costs may also be prohibitive for either of these choices, so again, prior planning is suggested.

Tips for Travelers

- Travel insurance. Don't leave home without comprehensive travel insurance. Ensure that you are fully covered for medical treatment, hospitalization and evacuation to your home country. Make sure your policy also covers unexpected losses and expenses (e.g. cancelled flights, lost luggage, stolen cash and credit cards, and stolen/lost passports).
- Check with your embassy, consulate, or appropriate government institution related to travel before traveling.
- Bring enough funds with you for your stay. Travelers' checks can be cashed in major hotels and banks. US Dollars (cash or travelers' checks) are more readily exchanged than other currencies. Credit cards are widely accepted in tourist areas and the major cities, but beware of fraud - ensure you always take your copy of the transaction receipt and the carbon paper.
- Carry a photocopy of your passport's data pages at all times. Lock the original in your hotel safe. Retain your Brazilian Immigration landing card, you will need it on departure. Note down the details of your passport, travelers' checks and credit/bank cards and keep them separate from the documents e.g. number, place and date of issue. Enter next of kin details into the back of your passport.
- Be conscious of your personal security at all times. Take sensible precautions such as using door chains and spy holes (if available), before admitting people to your room. Ensure your hotel room

door is locked at all times. Be aware of those around you.

- Take care of your valuables when out sightseeing. Only carry enough money for your immediate needs. Cameras, jewelry, watches, handbags, etc will mark you out as a potential target for a thief and are easily torn off. If you must carry a camera, try to conceal it. Ensure that you do not leave your bags/belongings unattended. Don't leave valuables visible in a car. Deposit any valuables/money that you are not using in your hotel safe, putting any credit cards in a sealed envelope before doing so.
- Don't resist muggers. Muggers often carry weapons, and are prepared to use them if you offer resistance. Muggers often operate in gangs.
- Don't get involved with drugs. The penalties for drug carrying/trafficking are severe. Don't accept or offer to carry packages/suitcases on behalf of someone else.
- Don't expect to find work in Brazil. It is illegal to work without a work permit.
- Consult your doctor before you travel. Brazil is a huge country. Different vaccinations/precautions may be needed according to which region you intend to visit.
- Retain enough cash to pay airport departure taxes. All passengers departing Brazilian airports must pay a departure tax at check-in before they can obtain their boarding card. Payment of these taxes is not normally included for tickets purchased outside of Brazil. The international departure tax is currently US\$36, and can only be paid in cash, either in US dollars or local currency equivalent. Domestic departure taxes vary and you should therefore check in advance their rates.
- Don't accept sweets, food or drink from strangers. It may be drugged. Ensure that any drinks you order, or that you are offered, especially in a nightclub/disco, are opened and poured in front of you.
- Use official metered taxis to get around town. Insist the driver switches on the meter when you get in, and check that they are displaying their obligatory photographic taxi permit. Avoid using buses or trams.
- Take extra care when driving in Brazil. The Brazilian style of driving and standards are very different from European countries. Be prepared to stop unexpectedly, and beware of potholes, slow moving vehicles and people/animals on the road. Avoid driving outside of town at night: vehicles without lights and other hazards can make it dangerous. Keep your car doors locked at all times and the windows shut, especially at traffic lights.
- Stick to the tourist areas in cities. Take local advice on where it safe to go, but don't wander off

into alleyways, cul de sacs, or where there are no other people (even during daylight). Don't enter slum areas or shantytowns: they often have extremely high violent crime rates. Avoid empty beaches. Don't go on to any beach after dark, muggers often target tourists who do so.

- Don't swim in the sea without taking advice. The open Atlantic currents can be extremely strong and dangerous. The sea can also be polluted, and in some areas sharks can also be a danger. Take local advice before swimming e.g. from your hotel.

Note: This information is directly quoted from the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Sources: *United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office*

Business Culture: Information for Business Travelers

Business visitors should become accustomed to several business conditions specific to Brazil. Compared to some Western countries, the pace of negotiation is slower and is based much more on personal contact. It is rare for important business deals to be concluded by telephone or letter. Many Brazilian executives do not react favorably to quick and infrequent visits by foreign sales representatives. They prefer a more continuous working relationship. The Brazilian buyer is also concerned with after-sales service provided by the exporter.

The slower pace of business negotiation does not mean that Brazilians are less knowledgeable in terms of industrial technology or modern business practices. In fact, one should be as prepared technically when making a call on a Sao Paulo firm as on a Chicago firm. In addition, a visiting businessperson is encouraged to learn as much about the Brazilian economic and commercial environment as possible before doing business.

While office hours in Brazil are generally 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., decision makers begin work later in the morning and stay later in the evening. The best times for calls on a Brazilian executive are between 10 a.m. and noon, and 3 to 5 p.m., although this is less the case for Sao Paulo where appointments are common throughout most of the day. Lunch is usually two hours. While many Brazilians may speak English, they may wish to conduct business in Portuguese. The non-Portuguese speaking foreign executive may need an interpreter on more than 50 percent of business calls. Correspondence and product literature should be in Portuguese, and English is preferred as a substitute over Spanish. Specifications and other technical data should be in the metric system.

Sources: *United States Department of State Commercial Guides*

Note: For general information on etiquette in Brazil see our Cultural Etiquette page.

Online Resources Regarding Entry Requirements and Visas

Foreign Entry Requirements for Americans from the United States Department of State

<http://travel.state.gov/foreignentryreqs.html>

Visa Services for Non-Americans from the United States Department of State

<http://www.unitedstatesvisas.gov/>

http://travel.state.gov/visa/visa_1750.html

Visa Bulletins from the United States Department of State

http://travel.state.gov/visa_bulletin.html

Visa Waivers from the United States Department of State

<http://travel.state.gov/jvw.html>

Passport and Visa Information from the Government of the United Kingdom

<http://www.fco.gov.uk/travel/dynpage.asp?Page=402>

Visa Information from the Government of Australia

<http://www.dfat.gov.au/visas/index.html>

Entry Requirements and Other Services for Travelers from the Government of Canada

http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1082.html

Online Visa Processing by Immigration Experts by VisaPro

<http://www.visapro.com>

Sources: *United States Department of State, United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Government of Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Government of Canada: Canada International*

Useful Online Resources for Travelers

Your trip abroad

http://travel.state.gov/travel/tips/brochures/brochures_1225.html

A safe trip abroad

http://travel.state.gov/travel/tips/safety/safety_1747.html

Tips for expatriates abroad

http://travel.state.gov/travel/living/residing/residing_1235.html

Tips for students

http://travel.state.gov/travel/living/studying/studying_1238.html <http://travel.state.gov/travel/tips/broc>

Medical information for travelers

http://travel.state.gov/travel/tips/health/health_1185.html

US Customs Travel information

<http://www.customs.gov/xp/cgov/travel/>

UK Travelers' Checklist

<http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1098377239217>

Canadian Government's resources on traveling, living or working abroad

http://www.voyage.gc.ca/Consular-e/living_menu-e.htm

Plan a trip to an exotic location

<http://www.geopassage.com>

Sources: *United States Department of State; United States Customs Department, United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Government of Canada: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade*

Other Practical Online Resources for Travelers

World Weather Forecasts

<http://www.intellicast.com/>

Worldwide Time Zones and World Clock

<http://www.timeanddate.com/>

International Currency Exchange Rates

<http://www.xe.com/ucc/>

Banking and Financial Institutions Across the World

<http://www.123world.com/banks/index.html>

International Credit Card or Automated Teller Machine (ATM) Locator

<http://international.visa.com/ps/services/atmnetwork.jsp>

<http://www.mastercard.com/cardholderservices/atm/>

Foreign Language Phrases for Travelers

<http://www.travlang.com/languages/>

International Dialing Codes

<http://www.kropla.com/dialcode.htm>

International Airport Codes

<http://www.ar-group.com/icaoiaata.htm>

International Internet Café Search Engine

<http://cybercaptive.com/>

World Electric Power Information

<http://www.kropla.com/electric.htm>

World Electric Power Guide

<http://www.kropla.com/electric2.htm>

World Television Standards and Codes

<http://www.kropla.com/tv.htm>

International Chambers of Commerce

<http://www.123world.com/chambers/index.html>

Diplomatic and Consular Information

United States Diplomatic Posts Abroad

<http://usembassy.state.gov/>

Resources for Finding Embassies and other Diplomatic Posts Across the World

<http://www.escapeartist.com/embassy1/embassy1.htm>

Travel and Tourism Information

World Tourism Websites

<http://123world.com/tourism/>

Safety and Security

United States Department of State Travel Warnings and Consular Information Sheets

http://travel.state.gov/travel_warnings.html

United States Department of State Current Warnings

http://travel.state.gov/warnings_list.html

United Kingdom Current Warnings and Travel Advice By Country

[http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?
pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029390590](http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029390590)

United Kingdom Travel Fact Sheets By Country

[http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?
pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029394365#T1](http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029394365#T1)

Government of Canada Travel Reports By Country

<http://www.voyage.gc.ca/dest/ctry/new-en.asp#ctr>

Government of Canada Travel Warnings

<http://www.voyage.gc.ca/dest/sos/warnings-en.asp>

Government of Australia Travel Advice Reports By Country

<http://www.dfat.gov.au/consular/advice/index.html>

Sources: *United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the United States Department of State, the Government of Canada: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Government of Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade*

Other Safety and Security Online Resources for Travelers

Information on Terrorism from Government of Canada

http://canada.gc.ca/wire/2001/09/110901-US_e.html

Information on Human Rights

<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/hr/>

Government of the United Kingdom Resource on the Risk of Terrorism

<http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1044011304926>

FAA Resource on Aviation Safety

<http://www.faa.gov/safety/>

In-Flight Safety Information for Air Travel (by British Airways crew trainer, Anna Warman)

<http://www.warman.demon.co.uk/anna/inflight.html>

Hot Spots: Travel Safety and Risk Information

<http://www.airsecurity.com/hotspots/HotSpots.asp>

Current Issues and Warnings by Government of United States

http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/pa/pa_1766.html

http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_1764.html

Sources: *The United States Department of State, the United States Customs Department, the Federal Aviation Authority, Anna Warman's In-flight Website, Hot Spots Travel and Risk Information, the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Government*

Diseases/Health Data

Please Note: Most of the entry below constitutes a generalized health advisory, which a traveler might find useful, regardless of a particular destination.

As a supplement, however, reader will also find below a list of countries flagged with current health notices and alerts issued by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

Please note that travel to the following countries, based on these 3 levels of warnings, is

ill-advised, or should be undertaken with the utmost precaution:

Level 3 (highest level of concern; avoid non-essential travel) --

Guinea - Ebola

Liberia - Ebola

Nepal - Earthquake zone

Sierra Leone - Ebola

Level 2 (intermediate level of concern; use utmost caution during travel) --

Cameroon - Polio

Somalia - Polio

Vanuatu - Tropical Cyclone zone

Throughout Middle East and Arabia Peninsula - MERS ((Middle East Respiratory Syndrome)

Level 1 (standard level of concern; use practical caution during travel) -

Australia - Ross River disease

Bosnia-Herzegovina - Measles

Brazil - Dengue Fever

Brazil - Malaria

Brazil - Zika

China - H7N9 Avian flu

Cuba - Cholera

Egypt - H5N1 Bird flu

Ethiopia - Measles

Germany - Measles

Japan - Hand, foot, and mouth disease (HFMD)

Kyrgyzstan - Measles

Malaysia -Dengue Fever

Mexico - Chikungunya

Mexico - Hepatitis A

Nigeria - Meningitis

Philippines - Measles

Scotland - Mumps

Singapore - Hand, foot, and mouth disease (HFMD)

South Korea - MERS ((Middle East Respiratory Syndrome)

Throughout Caribbean - Chikungunya

Throughout Central America - Chikungunya

Throughout South America - Chikungunya
Throughout Pacific Islands - Chikungunya

For specific information related to these health notices and alerts please see the CDC's listing available at URL:

<http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/notices>

Health Information for Travelers to Brazil

In recent years, there has been increased yellow fever activity in Brazil in the states of Minas Gerais, Rondonia, Goias, and Bahia. For more information and recommendations, see the following websites:

Yellow Fever Disease and Vaccine Information
(<http://www.cdc.gov/travel/yfever.htm>)

World Health Organization Disease Outbreak News
(<http://www.who.int/disease-outbreak-news/>)

Food and waterborne diseases are the number one cause of illness in travelers. Travelers' diarrhea can be caused by viruses, bacteria, or parasites, which are found universally throughout the region and can contaminate food or water.

Infections may cause diarrhea and vomiting (*E. coli*, *Salmonella*, cholera, and parasites), fever (typhoid fever and toxoplasmosis), or liver damage (hepatitis). Make sure your food and drinking water are safe (see below).

Malaria is a preventable infection that can be fatal if left untreated. Prevent infection by taking prescription antimalarial drugs and protecting yourself against mosquito bites (see below). Malaria risk in this region exists in some urban and many rural areas, depending on elevation. For specific locations, see Malaria Information for Travelers to Tropical South America (<http://www.cdc.gov/travel/regionalmalaria/tropsam.htm>).

A certificate of yellow fever vaccination may be required for entry into certain of these countries. For detailed information, see Comprehensive Yellow Fever Vaccination Requirements (<http://www.cdc.gov/travel/yelfever.htm>).

If you visit the Andes Mountains, ascend gradually to allow time for your body to adjust to the high altitude, which can cause insomnia, headaches, nausea, and altitude sickness. In addition, use

sunblock rated at least 15 SPF, because the risk of sunburn is greater at high altitudes.

Dengue, filariasis, leishmaniasis, onchocerciasis, and American trypanosomiasis (Chagas disease) are other diseases carried by insects that also occur in this region. Protecting yourself against insect bites (see below) will help to prevent these diseases.

Because motor vehicle crashes are a leading cause of injury among travelers, walk and drive defensively. Avoid nighttime travel if possible and always use seat belts.

CDC Recommends the Following Vaccines (as Appropriate for Age):

See your doctor at least 4-6 weeks before your trip to allow time for immunizations to take effect.

- Hepatitis A or immune globulin (IG).
- Hepatitis B, if you might be exposed to blood (for example, health-care workers), have sexual contact with the local population, stay >6 months in the region, or be exposed through medical treatment.
- Rabies, if you might be exposed to wild or domestic animals through your work or recreation.
- Typhoid, particularly if you are visiting developing countries in this region.
- Yellow fever vaccination, if you will be traveling outside urban areas.
- As needed, booster doses for tetanus-diphtheria and measles. Hepatitis B vaccine is now recommended for all infants and for children ages 11-12 years who did not complete the series as infants.

To Stay Healthy, Do:

- Wash hands frequently with soap and water.
- Drink only bottled or boiled water, or carbonated (bubbly) drinks in cans or bottles. Avoid tap water, fountain drinks, and ice cubes. If this is not possible, make water safer by BOTH filtering through an "absolute 1-micron or less" filter AND adding iodine tablets to the filtered water. "Absolute 1-micron filters" are found in camping/outdoor supply stores.
- Eat only thoroughly cooked food or fruits and vegetables you have peeled yourself. Remember: boil it, cook it, peel it, or forget it.
- If you will be visiting an area where there is risk for malaria, take your malaria prevention medication before, during, and after travel, as directed. (See your doctor for a prescription.)
- Protect yourself from insects by remaining in well-screened areas, using repellents (applied sparingly at 4-hour intervals) and permethrin-impregnated mosquito nets, and wearing long-sleeved shirts and long pants from dusk through dawn.
- To prevent fungal and parasitic infections, keep feet clean and dry, and do not go barefoot.
- Always use condoms to reduce the risk of HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases.

To Avoid Getting Sick:

- Don't eat food purchased from street vendors.
- Don't drink beverages with ice.
- Don't eat dairy products unless you know they have been pasteurized.
- Don't share needles with anyone.
- Don't handle animals (especially monkeys, dogs, and cats), to avoid bites and serious diseases (including rabies and plague). (For more information, please see the Animal-Associated Hazards on the Making Travel Safe page at URL <http://www.cdc.gov/travel/safety.htm>.)
- Don't swim in fresh water. Salt water is usually safer. (For more information, please see the Swimming Precautions on the Making Travel Safe page.)

What You Need To Bring with You:

- Long-sleeved shirt and long pants to wear while outside whenever possible, to prevent illnesses carried by insects (e.g., malaria, dengue, filariasis, leishmaniasis, and onchocerciasis).
- Insect repellent containing DEET (diethylmethyltoluamide), in 30%-35% strength for adults and 6%-10% for children, as well as a bed net impregnated with the insecticide permethrin. (Bed nets can be purchased in camping or military supply stores.) Bed nets may also protect against insect bites that transmit Chagas disease.
- Over-the-counter antidiarrheal medicine to take if you have diarrhea.
- Iodine tablets and water filters to purify water if bottled water is not available. See Do's above for more detailed information about water filters.
- Sunblock, sunglasses, hat.
- Prescription medications: make sure you have enough to last during your trip, as well as a copy of the prescription(s).

After You Return Home:

If you have visited an area where there is risk for malaria, continue taking your malaria medication weekly for 4 weeks after you leave the area. If you become ill with a fever-even as long as a year after your trip-tell your doctor that you traveled to a malaria-infected area.

For More Information:

Ask your doctor or check the CDC web for more information about how to protect yourself against diseases that occur in Tropical South America, such as:

For information about diseases-

Carried by Insects

Dengue, Malaria, Yellow Fever

Carried in Food or Water

Cholera, *Escherichia coli*, diarrhea, Hepatitis A, Schistosomiasis, Typhoid Fever

Person-to-Person Contact

Hepatitis B, HIV/AIDS

For more information about these and other diseases, please check the Diseases (<http://www.cdc.gov/travel/diseases.htm>) section and the Health Topics A - Z (<http://www.cdc.gov/health/diseases.htm>).

Note:

Brazil is located in the tropical South American health region.

Sources:

The Center for Disease Control Destinations Website:

<http://www.cdc.gov/travel/destinat.htm>

Chapter 6

Environmental Overview

Environmental Issues

General Overview:

Brazil is covered with the world's largest rainforest, and it is home to the most substantial recorded typologies of bio-diversity. Although this expansive and varied spectrum of plant and animal species accommodates a high degree of sustainability, any intrinsic shifts in the overall eco-system can potentially have damaging effects, not only on the Brazilian rainforest, but also on the global eco-system.

The threat of global warming presents an unusually grave prognosis in the discussion of Brazil 's environmental problems. Described in organic terms as the "lungs of the planet", the Brazilian rainforest can be damaged by climate change and that could upset the global ecological balance.

The loss of the Brazilian rainforest could destroy the natural habitat, and endanger the existence of a multitude of plant and animal species indigenous to the area. The threat to the rainforest is exacerbated by social and economic factors, such as human need, which directly impact the environment.

Current Issues:

- Deforestation in Amazon Basin, as a result of forest fires and flooding
- Loss of bio-diversity, from deforestation and other destructive human activities and practices
- Air and water pollution in Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, and several other large cities
- Soil nutrient degradation, as a result of direct exposure to rainfall and sunlight
- Negative effects on watersheds
- Land degradation, caused by improper mining activities
- Water pollution, caused by improper mining activities

Total Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Mtc):

229

Country Rank (GHG output):

8th

Natural Hazards:

- recurring droughts in northeast
- floods and occasional frost in south

Environmental Policy

Regulation and Jurisdiction:

The regulation and protection of the environment in Brazil is under the jurisdiction of the following:

- Ministry of the Environment
- Water Resources and Amazonia
- Ministry of Agriculture, Supplies and Land Reform

Major Non-Governmental Organizations:

- The Associação Brasileira de Caça e Conservação (Brazilian Hunting and Conservation Association)
- The Fundação Biodiversitas (Biodiversity Foundation)
- The Fundação Pró-Natureza (FUNATURA)/Pro-Nature Foundation
- Fundação SOS Mata Atlantica
- The Instituto Pró-Ecología (IPE)/Pro-Ecology Institute
- The Instituto Sul Mineiro de Estudo e Preservação (Sul Mineiro Institute of Studies and Nature Conservation)
- The Sociedade de Defesa do Pantanal (Society for the Defense of the Pantanal).

International Environmental Accords:

Party to:

- Antarctic-Environmental Protocol
- Antarctic-Marine Living Resources
- Antarctic Seals
- Antarctic Treaty
- Biodiversity
- Climate Change
- Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol
- Endangered Species
- Environmental Modification
- Hazardous Wastes
- Law of the Sea
- Marine Dumping
- Nuclear Test Ban
- Ozone Layer Protection
- Ship Pollution
- Tropical Timber 83
- Tropical Timber 94
- Wetlands
- Whaling

Signed but not ratified:

- None

Kyoto Protocol Status (year ratified):

2002

Greenhouse Gas Ranking

Greenhouse Gas Ranking

GHG Emissions Rankings

Country Rank	Country
1	United States
2	China
4	Russia
5	Japan
6	India
7	Germany
8	United Kingdom
9	Canada
10	Korea, South
11	Italy
12	Mexico
13	France

14	South Africa
15	Iran
16	Indonesia
17	Australia
18	Spain
19	Brazil
20	Saudi Arabia
21	Ukraine
22	Poland
23	Taiwan
24	Turkey
25	Thailand
26	Netherlands
27	Kazakhstan
28	Malaysia
29	Egypt
30	Venezuela
31	Argentina

32	Uzbekistan
33	Czech Republic
34	Belgium
35	Pakistan
36	Romania
37	Greece
38	United Arab Emirates
39	Algeria
40	Nigeria
41	Austria
42	Iraq
43	Finland
44	Philippines
45	Vietnam
46	Korea, North
47	Israel
48	Portugal
49	Colombia

50	Belarus
51	Kuwait
52	Hungary
53	Chile
54	Denmark
55	Serbia & Montenegro
56	Sweden
57	Syria
58	Libya
59	Bulgaria
60	Singapore
61	Switzerland
62	Ireland
63	Turkmenistan
64	Slovakia
65	Bangladesh
66	Morocco
67	New Zealand

68	Oman
69	Qatar
70	Azerbaijan
71	Norway
72	Peru
73	Cuba
74	Ecuador
75	Trinidad & Tobago
76	Croatia
77	Tunisia
78	Dominican Republic
79	Lebanon
80	Estonia
81	Yemen
82	Jordan
83	Slovenia
84	Bahrain
85	Angola

86	Bosnia & Herzegovina
87	Lithuania
88	Sri Lanka
89	Zimbabwe
90	Bolivia
91	Jamaica
92	Guatemala
93	Luxembourg
94	Myanmar
95	Sudan
96	Kenya
97	Macedonia
98	Mongolia
99	Ghana
100	Cyprus
101	Moldova
102	Latvia
103	El Salvador

104	Brunei
105	Honduras
106	Cameroon
107	Panama
108	Costa Rica
109	Cote d'Ivoire
110	Kyrgyzstan
111	Tajikistan
112	Ethiopia
113	Senegal
114	Uruguay
115	Gabon
116	Albania
117	Nicaragua
118	Botswana
119	Paraguay
120	Tanzania
121	Georgia

122	Armenia
123	Congo, RC
124	Mauritius
125	Nepal
126	Mauritius
127	Nepal
128	Mauritania
129	Malta
130	Papua New Guinea
131	Zambia
132	Suriname
133	Iceland
134	Togo
135	Benin
136	Uganda
137	Bahamas
138	Haiti
139	Congo, DRC

140	Guyana
141	Mozambique
142	Guinea
143	Equatorial Guinea
144	Laos
145	Barbados
146	Niger
147	Fiji
148	Burkina Faso
149	Malawi
150	Swaziland
151	Belize
152	Afghanistan
153	Sierra Leone
154	Eritrea
155	Rwanda
156	Mali
157	Seychelles

158	Cambodia
159	Liberia
160	Bhutan
161	Maldives
162	Antigua & Barbuda
163	Djibouti
164	Saint Lucia
165	Gambia
166	Guinea-Bissau
167	Central African Republic
168	Palau
169	Burundi
170	Grenada
171	Lesotho
172	Saint Vincent & the Grenadines
173	Solomon Islands
174	Samoa
175	Cape Verde

176	Nauru
177	Dominica
178	Saint Kitts & Nevis
179	Chad
180	Tonga
181	Sao Tome & Principe
182	Comoros
183	Vanuatu
185	Kiribati
Not Ranked	Andorra
Not Ranked	East Timor
Not Ranked	Holy See
Not Ranked	Hong Kong
Not Ranked	Liechtenstein
Not Ranked	Marshall Islands
Not Ranked	Micronesia
Not Ranked	Monaco
Not Ranked	San Marino

Not Ranked	Somalia
Not Ranked	Tuvalu

* European Union is ranked 3rd

Cook Islands are ranked 184th

Niue is ranked 186th

Global Environmental Snapshot

Introduction

The countries of the world face many environmental challenges in common. Nevertheless, the nature and intensity of problem vary from region to region, as do various countries' respective capacities, in terms of affluence and infrastructure, to remediate threats to environmental quality.

Consciousness of perils affecting the global environment came to the fore in the last third or so of the 20th century has continued to intensify well into the new millennium. According to the United Nations Environment Programme, considerable environmental progress has been made at the level of institutional developments, international cooperation accords, and public participation. Approximately two-dozen international environmental protection accords with global implications have been promulgated since the late 1970s under auspices of the United Nations and other international organizations, together with many additional regional agreements. Attempts to address and rectify environmental problems take the form of legal frameworks, economic instruments, environmentally sound technologies and cleaner production processes as well as conservation efforts. Environmental impact assessments have increasingly been applied across the globe.

Environmental degradation affects the quality, or aesthetics, of human life, but it also displays potential to undermine conditions necessary for the sustainability of human life. Attitudes toward the importance of environmental protection measures reflect ambivalence derived from this bifurcation. On one hand, steps such as cleaning up pollution, dedicating parkland, and suchlike, are seen as embellishments undertaken by wealthy societies already assured they can successfully perform those functions deemed, ostensibly, more essential-for instance, public health and education, employment and economic development. On the other hand, in poorer countries, activities causing environmental damage-for instance the land degradation effects of unregulated logging, slash-and-burn agriculture, overgrazing, and mining-can seem justified insofar as such

activities provide incomes and livelihoods.

Rapid rates of resource depletion are associated with poverty and high population growth, themselves correlated, whereas consumption per capita is much higher in the most developed countries, despite these nations' recent progress in energy efficiency and conservation. It is impossible to sequester the global environmental challenge from related economic, social and political challenges.

First-tier industrialized countries have recently achieved measurable decreases in environmental pollution and the rate of resource depletion, a success not matched in middle income and developing countries. It is believed that the discrepancy is due to the fact that industrialized countries have more developed infrastructures to accommodate changes in environmental policy, to apply environmental technologies, and to invest in public education. The advanced industrialized countries incur relatively lower costs in alleviating environmental problems, in comparison to developing countries, since in the former even extensive environmental programs represent a rather minuscule percentage of total expenditures. Conversely, budget constraints, lagged provision of basic services to the population, and other factors such as debt service and militarization may preclude institution of minimal environmental protection measures in the poorest countries.

A synopsis for the current situation facing each region of the world follows:

Regional Synopsis: Africa

The African continent, the world's second-largest landmass, encompasses many of the world's least developed countries. By global standards, urbanization is comparatively low but rising at a rapid rate. More heavily industrialized areas at the northern and southern ends of the continent experience the major share of industrial pollution. In other regions the most serious environmental problems typically stem from inefficient subsistence farming methods and other forms of land degradation, which have affected an increasingly extensive area under pressure of a widely impoverished, fast-growing population. Africa's distribution of natural resources is very uneven. It is the continent at greatest risk of desertification, especially in the Sahel region at the edge of the Sahara but also in other dry-range areas. Yet at the same time, Africa also harbors some of the earth's richest and most diverse biological zones.

Key Points:

Up to half a billion hectares of African land are moderately to severely degraded, an occurrence reflecting short-fallow shifting cultivation and overgrazing as well as a climatic pattern of recurrent droughts.

Soil degradation is severe along the expanse directly south of the Sahara, from the west to the east coasts. Parts of southern Africa, central-eastern Africa, and the neighboring island of Madagascar suffer from serious soil degradation as well.

Africa contains about 17 percent of the world's forest cover, concentrated in the tropical belt of the continent. Many of the forests, however, are severely depleted, with an estimated 70 percent showing some degree of degradation.

Population growth has resulted in continuing loss of arable land, as inefficient subsistence farming techniques affect increasingly extensive areas. Efforts to implement settled, sustainable agriculture have met with some recent success, but much further progress in this direction is needed. Especially in previously uninhabited forestlands, concern over deforestation is intensifying.

By contrast, the African savanna remains the richest grassland in the world, supporting a substantial concentration of animal and plant life. Wildlife parks are sub-Saharan Africa's greatest tourist attraction, and with proper management-giving local people a stake in conservation and controlling the pace of development-could greatly enhance African economies.

Significant numbers of mammal species in parts of northern, southern and eastern Africa are currently threatened, while the biological diversity in Mauritania and Madagascar is even further compromised with over 20 percent of the mammal species in these two countries currently under threat.

With marine catch trends increasing from 500,000 metric tons in the 1950s to over 3,000,000 metric tons by 2000, there was increasing concern about the reduction in fisheries and marine life, should this trend continue unabated.

Water resource vulnerability is a major concern in northeastern Africa, and a moderate concern across the rest of the continent. An exception is central Africa, which has plentiful water supplies.

Many Africans lack adequate access to resources, not just (if at all) because the resources are unevenly distributed geographically, but also through institutional failures such as faulty land tenure systems or political upheaval. The quality of Africa's natural resources, despite their spotty distribution, is in fact extraordinarily rich. The infrastructure needed to protect and benefit from this natural legacy, however, is largely lacking.

Regional Synopsis: Asia and the Pacific

Asia-earth's largest landmass-and the many large and nearly innumerable small islands lying off its Pacific shore display extraordinarily contrasting landscapes, levels of development, and degrees of

environmental stress. In the classification used here, the world's smallest continent, Australia, is also included in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Asia-Pacific region is home to 9 of the world's 14 largest urban areas, and as energy use for utilities, industry and transport increases in developing economies, urban centers are subject to worsening air quality. Intense population density in places such as Bangladesh or Hong Kong is the quintessential image many people have of Asia, yet vast desert areas such as the Gobi and the world's highest mountain range, the Himalayas, span the continent as well. Forested areas in Southeast Asia and the islands of Indonesia and the Philippines were historically prized for their tropical hardwood, but in many places this resource is now severely depleted. Low-lying small island states are extremely vulnerable to the effects of global warming, both rising sea levels and an anticipated increase in cyclones.

Key Points:

Asian timber reserves are forecast to be depleted in the next 40 years. Loss of natural forest is irreversible in some areas, but plantation programs to restore tree cover may ameliorate a portion of the resulting land degradation.

Increased usage of fossil fuels in China and other parts of southern Asia is projected to result in a marked increase in emissions, especially in regard to carbon dioxide. The increased usage of energy has led to a marked upsurge in air pollution across the region.

Acidification is an emerging problem regionally, with sulfur dioxide emissions expected to triple by 2010 if the current growth rate is sustained. China, Thailand, India, and Korea seem to be suffering from particularly high rates of acid deposition. By contrast, Asia's most highly developed economy, Japan, has effected substantial improvements in its environmental indicators.

Water pollution in the Pacific is an urgent concern since up to 70 percent of the water discharged into the region's waters receives no treatment. Additionally, the disposal of solid wastes, in like manner, poses a major threat in a region with many areas of high population density.

The Asia-Pacific region is the largest expanse of the world's land that is adversely affected by soil degradation.

The region around Australia reportedly suffers the largest degree of ozone depletion.

The microstates of the Pacific suffer land loss due to global warming, and the consequent rise in the levels of ocean waters. A high-emissions scenario and anthropogenic climate impact at the upper end of the currently predicted range would probably force complete evacuation of the lowest-elevation islands sometime in this century.

The species-rich reefs surrounding Southeast Asia are highly vulnerable to the deleterious effects of coastal development, land-based pollution, over-fishing and exploitative fishing methods, as well as marine pollution from oil spills and other activities.

With marine catch trends increasing from 5,000,000 metric tons in the 1950s to over 20,000,000 metric tons by 2000, there was increasing concern about the reduction in fisheries and marine life, should this trend continue unabated.

Significant numbers of mammal species in parts of China and south-east Asia are currently threatened, while the biological diversity in India, Japan, Australia, the Philippines, Indonesia and parts of Malaysia is even further compromised with over 20 percent of the mammal species in these countries currently under threat.

Water resource vulnerability is a serious concern in areas surrounding the Indian subcontinent.

Regional Synopsis: Central Asia

The Central Asian republics, formerly in the Soviet Union, experience a range of environmental problems as the result of poorly executed agricultural, industrial, and nuclear programs during the Soviet era. Relatively low population densities are the norm, especially since upon the breakup of the U.S.S.R. many ethnic Russians migrated back to European Russia. In this largely semi-arid region, drought, water shortages, and soil salinization pose major challenges.

Key Points:

The use of agricultural pesticides, such as DDT and other chemicals, has contributed to the contamination of soil and groundwater throughout the region.

Land and soil degradation, and in particular, increased salinization, is mostly attributable to faulty irrigation practices.

Significant desertification is also a problem in the region.

Air pollution is prevalent, mostly due to use of low octane automobile fuel.

Industrial pollution of the Caspian Sea and the Aral Sea, as a result of industrial effluents as well as mining and metal production, presents a challenge to the countries bordering these bodies of water.

One of the most severe environmental problems in the region is attributable to the several billion

tons of hazardous materials stored in landfills across Central Asia.

Uzbekistan's particular problem involves the contraction of the Aral Sea, which has decreased in size by a third, as a consequence of river diversions and poor irrigation practices. The effect has been the near-total biological destruction of that body of water.

Kazakhstan, as a consequence of being the heartland of the former Soviet Union's nuclear program, has incurred a high of cancerous malignancies, biogenetic abnormalities and radioactive contamination.

While part of the Soviet Union, the republics in the region experienced very high levels of greenhouse gas emissions, as a consequence of rapid industrialization using cheap but dirty energy sources, especially coal.

By contrast, however, there have recently been substantial reductions in the level of greenhouse gas emissions, especially those attributable to coal burning, with further decreases anticipated over the next decade. These changes are partially due to the use of cleaner energy technologies, such as natural gas, augmented by governmental commitment to improving environmental standards.

Regional Synopsis: Europe

Western Europe underwent dramatic transformation of its landscape, virtually eliminating large-scale natural areas, during an era of rapid industrialization, which intensified upon its recovery from World War II. In Eastern Europe and European Russia, intensive land development has been less prevalent, so that some native forests and other natural areas remain. Air and water pollution from use of dirty fuels and industrial effluents, however, are more serious environmental problems in Eastern than in Western Europe, though recent trends show improvement in many indicators. Acid rain has inflicted heavy environmental damage across much of Europe, particularly on forests. Europe and North America are the only regions in which water usage for industry exceeds that for agriculture, although in Mediterranean nations agriculture is the largest water consumer.

Key Points:

Europe contributes 36 percent of the world's chlorofluorocarbon emissions, 30 percent of carbon dioxide emissions, and 25 percent of sulfur dioxide emissions.

Sulfur and nitrogen oxide emissions are the cause of 30 to 50 percent of Central and Eastern Europe's deforestation.

Acid rain has been an environmental concern for decades and continues to be a challenge in parts

of Western Europe.

Overexploitation of up to 60 percent of Europe's groundwater presents a problem in industrial and urban areas.

With marine catch trends increasing from 5,000,000 metric tons in the 1950s to over 20,000,000 metric tons by 2000, there was increasing concern about the reduction in fisheries and marine life, should this trend continue unabated.

Significant numbers of mammal species in parts of western Europe, Eastern Europe and Russia are currently threatened, while the biological diversity on the Iberian Peninsula is even further compromised with over 40 percent of the mammal species in this region currently under threat. As a result, there has been a 10 percent increase in protected areas of Europe.

A major environmental issue for Europe involves the depletion of various already endangered or threatened species, and most significantly, the decline of fish stocks. Some estimates suggest that up to 50 percent of the continent's fish species may be considered endangered species. Coastal fisheries have been over-harvested, resulting in catch limits or moratoriums on many commercially important fish species.

Fortunately, in the last few years, these policies have started to yield measurable results with decreasing trends in marine fish catch.

Recently, most European countries have adopted cleaner production technologies, and alternative methods of waste disposal, including recycling.

The countries of Eastern Europe have made air quality a major environmental priority. This is exemplified by the Russian Federation's addition to the 1995 "Berlin Mandate" (transnational legislation based on resolutions of the Rio Earth Summit) compelling nations to promote "carbon sinks" to absorb greenhouse gases.

On a relative basis, when compared with the degree of industrial emissions emitted by many Eastern European countries until the late 1980s, there has been some marked increase in air quality in the region, as obsolete plants are closed and a transition to cleaner fuels and more efficient energy use takes place.

Regional Synopsis: The Middle and Near East

Quite possibly, the Middle East will exemplify the adage that, as the 20th century was a century

fixated on oil, the 21st century will be devoted to critical decisions about water. Many (though far from all) nations in the Middle East rank among those countries with the largest oil and gas reserves, but water resources are relatively scarce throughout this predominantly dry region. Effects of global warming may cause moderately high elevation areas that now typically receive winter "snowpack" to experience mainly rain instead, which would further constrain dry-season water availability. The antiquities and religious shrines of the region render it a great magnet for tourism, which entails considerable economic growth potential but also intensifies stresses on the environment.

Key Points:

Water resource vulnerability is a serious concern across the entire region. The increased usage of, and further demand for water, has exacerbated long-standing water scarcity in the region. For instance, river diversions and industrial salt works have caused the Dead Sea to shrink by one-third from its original surface area, with further declines expected.

The oil industry in the region contributes to water pollution in the Persian Gulf, as a result of oil spills, which have averaged 1.2 million barrels of oil spilt per year (some sources suggest that this figure is understated). The consequences are severe because even after oil spills have been cleaned up, environmental damage to the food webs and ecosystems of marine life will persist for a prolonged period.

The region's coastal zone is considered one of the most fragile and endangered ecosystems of the world. Land reclamation, shoreline construction, discharge of industrial effluents, and tourism (such as diving in the Red Sea) contribute to widespread coastal damage.

Significant numbers of mammal species in parts of the Middle East are currently threatened.

Since the 1980s, 11 percent of the region's natural forest has been depleted.

Regional Synopsis: Latin America and the Caribbean

The Latin American and Caribbean region is characterized by exceedingly diverse landforms that have generally seen high rates of population growth and economic development in recent decades. The percentage of inhabitants residing in urban areas is quite high at 73.4 percent; the region includes the megacities of Mexico City, Sao Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro. The region also includes the world's second-highest mountain range, the Andes; significant expanses of desert and grassland; the coral reefs of the Caribbean Sea; and the world's largest contiguous tropical forest in the Amazon basin. Threats to the latter from subsistence and commercial farming, mineral exploitation and timbering are well publicized. Nevertheless, of eight countries worldwide that still retain at least 70

percent of their original forest cover, six are in Latin America. The region accounts for nearly half (48.3 percent) of the world's greenhouse gas emissions derived from land clearing, but as yet a comparatively minuscule share (4.3 percent) of such gases from industrial sources.

Key Points:

Although Latin America is one of the most biologically diverse regions of the world, this biodiversity is highly threatened, as exemplified by the projected extinction of up to 100,000 species in the next few decades. Much of this loss will be concentrated in the Amazon area, although the western coastline of South America will also suffer significant depletion of biological diversity. The inventory of rainforest species with potentially useful commercial or medical applications is incomplete, but presumed to include significant numbers of such species that may become extinct before they are discovered and identified.

Up to 50 percent of the region's grazing land has lost its soil fertility as a result of soil erosion, salinization, alkalinization and overgrazing.

The Caribbean Sea, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Pacific Ocean have all been contaminated by agricultural wastes, which are discharged into streams that flow into these major waters. Water pollution derived from phosphorous, nitrates and pesticides adversely affects fish stocks, contributes to oxygen depletion and fosters overgrowth of aquatic vegetation. Marine life will continue to be severely compromised as a result of these conditions.

Due to industrial development in the region, many beaches of eastern Latin America and the Caribbean suffer from tar deposits.

Most cities in the region lack adequate sewage treatment facilities, and rapid migration of the rural poor into the cities is widening the gap between current infrastructure capacity and the much greater level needed to provide satisfactory basic services.

The rainforest region of the Amazon Basin suffers from dangerously high levels of deforestation, which may be a significant contributory factor to global warming or "the greenhouse effect." In the late 1990s and into the new millennium, the rate of deforestation was around 20 million acres of rainforest being destroyed annually.

Deforestation on the steep rainforest slopes of Caribbean islands contributes to soil erosion and landslides, both of which then result in heavy sedimentation of nearby river systems. When these sedimented rivers drain into the sea and coral reefs, they poison the coral tissues, which are vital to the maintenance of the reef ecosystem. The result is marine degradation and nutrient depletion. Jamaica's coral reefs have never quite recovered from the effects of marine degradation.

The Southern Cone of Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay) suffers the effects of greatly increased ultraviolet-B radiation, as a consequence of more intense ozone depletion in the southern hemisphere.

Water resource vulnerability is an increasingly major concern in the northwestern portion of South America.

Regional Synopsis: North America

North American nations, in particular the United States and Canada, rank among the world's most highly developed industrial economies—a fact which has generated significant pollution problems, but also financial resources and skills that have enabled many problems to be corrected. Although efforts to promote energy efficiency, recycling, and suchlike have helped ease strains on the environment in a part of the world where per capita consumption levels are high, sprawling land development patterns and recent preferences many households have demonstrated for larger vehicles have offset these advances.

Meanwhile, a large portion of North America's original forest cover has been lost, though in many cases replaced by productive second-growth woodland. In recent years, attitudes toward best use of the region's remaining natural or scenic areas seem to be shifting toward recreation and preservation and away from resource extraction. With increasing attention on the energy scarcity in the United States, however, there is speculation that this shift may be short-lived. Indeed, the energy shortage on the west coast of the United States and associated calls for energy exploration, indicate a possible retrenchment toward resource extraction. At the same time, however, it has also served to highlight the need for energy conservation as well as alternative energy sources.

Despite generally successful anti-pollution efforts, various parts of the region continue to suffer significant air, water and land degradation from industrial, vehicular, and agricultural emissions and runoff. Mexico, as a middle-income country, displays environmental problems characteristic of a developing economy, including forest depletion, pollution from inefficient industrial processes and dirty fuels, and lack of sufficient waste-treatment infrastructure.

Key Points:

Because of significantly greater motor vehicle usage in the United States (U.S.) than in the rest of the world, the U.S. contribution of urban air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions, especially carbon dioxide, is disproportionately high in relation to its population.

Acid rain is an enduring issue of contention in the northeastern part of the United States, on the border with Canada.

Mexico's urban areas suffer extreme air pollution from carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, and other toxic air pollutants. Emissions controls on vehicles are in their infancy, compared to analogous regulations in the U.S.

The cities of Mexico, including those on the U.S. border, also discharge large quantities of untreated or poorly treated sewage, though officials are currently planning infrastructure upgrades.

Deforestation is noteworthy in various regions of the U.S., especially along the northwest coastline. Old growth forests have been largely removed, but in the northeastern and upper midwestern sections of the United States, evidence suggests that the current extent of tree cover probably surpasses the figure for the beginning of the 20th century.

Extreme weather conditions in the last few years have resulted in a high level of soil erosion along the north coast of California; in addition, the coastline itself has shifted substantially due to soil erosion and concomitant landslides.

Agricultural pollution-including nitrate contamination of well water, nutrient runoff to waterways, and pesticide exposure-is significant in various areas. Noteworthy among affected places are California's Central Valley, extensive stretches of the Midwest, and land in the Chesapeake Bay watershed.

Inland waterways, especially around the Great Lakes, have substantially improved their water quality, due to concentrated efforts at reducing water pollution by governmental, commercial and community representatives. Strict curbs on industrial effluents and near-universal implementation of sewage treatment are the chief factors responsible for this improvement.

A major environmental issue for Canada and the United States involves the depletion of various already endangered or threatened species, and most significantly, the decline of fish stocks. Coastal fisheries have been over-harvested, resulting in catch limits or moratoriums on many commercially important fish species. In the last few years, these policies have started to yield measurable results with decreasing trends in marine fish catch.

Due to the decay of neighboring ecosystems in Central America and the Caribbean, the sea surrounding Florida has become increasingly sedimented, contributing to marine degradation, nutrient depletion of the ecosystem, depletion of fish stocks, and diseases to coral species in particular.

Polar Regions

Key Points:

The significant rise in sea level, amounting 10 to 25 centimeters in the last 100 years, is due to the melting of the Arctic ice sheets, and is attributed to global warming.

The Antarctic suffers from a significant ozone hole, first detected in 1976. By 1985, a British scientific team reported a 40 percent decrease in usual regeneration rates of the ozone. Because a sustained increase in the amount of ultraviolet-B radiation would have adverse consequences upon all planetary life, recent environmental measures have been put into effect, aimed at reversing ozone depletion. These measures are projected to garner significant results by 2050.

Due to air and ocean currents, the Arctic is a sink for toxic releases originally discharged thousands of miles away. Arctic wildlife and Canada's Inuit population have higher bodily levels of contaminants such as PCB and dioxin than those found in people and animals in much of the rest of the world.

Global Environmental Concepts

1. Global Warming and Greenhouse Gases

The Greenhouse Effect:

In the early 19th century, the French physicist, Jean Fourier, contended that the earth's atmosphere functions in much the same way as the glass of a greenhouse, thus describing what is now understood as the "greenhouse effect." Put simply, the "greenhouse effect" confines some of the sun's energy to the earth, preserving some of the planet's warmth, rather than allowing it to flow back into space. In so doing, all kinds of life forms can flourish on earth. Thus, the "greenhouse effect" is necessary to sustain and preserve life forms and ecosystems on earth.

In the late 19th century, a Swedish chemist, Svante Arrhenius, noticed that human activities, such as the burning of coal and other fossil fuels for heat, and the removal of forested lands for urban development, led to higher concentrations of greenhouse gases, like carbon dioxide and methane, in the atmosphere. This increase in the levels of greenhouse gases was believed to advance the "greenhouse effect" exponentially, and might be related to the trend in global warming.

In the wake of the Industrial Revolution, after industrial development took place on a large scale and the total human population burgeoned simultaneously with industrialization, the resulting increase in greenhouse gas emissions could, many scientists believe, be significant enough to have some bearing on climate. Indeed, many studies in recent years support the idea that there is a linkage between human activities and global warming, although there is less consensus on the extent to which this linkage may be relevant to environmental concerns.

That said, some scientists have argued that temperature fluctuations have existed throughout the evolution of the planet. Indeed, Dr. S. Fred Singer, the president of the Science and Environment Policy Project has noted that 3,000-year-old geological records of ocean sediment reveal changes in the surface temperature of the ocean. Hence, it is possible that climate variability is merely a normal fact of the planet's evolution. Yet even skeptics as to anthropogenic factors concur that any substantial changes in global temperatures would likely have an effect upon the earth's ecosystems, as well as the life forms that inhabit them.

The Relationship Between Global Warming and Greenhouse Gases:

A large number of climatologists believe that the increase in atmospheric concentrations of "greenhouse gas emissions," mostly a consequence of human activities such as the burning of fossil fuels, are contributing to global warming. The cause notwithstanding, the planet has reportedly warmed 0.3°C to 0.6°C over the last century. Indeed, each year during the 1990s was one of the very warmest in the 20th century, with the mean surface temperature for 1999 being the fifth warmest on record since 1880.

In early 2000, a panel of atmospheric scientists for the National Research Council concluded in a report that global warming was, indeed, a reality. While the panel, headed by Chairman John Wallace, a professor of atmospheric sciences at the University of Washington, stated that it remained unclear whether human activities have contributed to the earth's increasing temperatures, it was apparent that global warming exists.

In 2001, following a request for further study by the incoming Bush administration in the [United States](#), the National Academy of Sciences again confirmed that global warming had been in existence for the last 20 years. The study also projected an increase in temperature between 2.5 degrees and 10.4 degrees Fahrenheit by the year 2100. Furthermore, the study found the leading cause of global warming to be emissions of carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels, and it noted that greenhouse gas accumulations in the earth's atmosphere was a result of human activities.

Within the scientific community, the controversy regarding has centered on the difference between surface air and upper air temperatures. Information collected since 1979 suggests that while the earth's surface temperature has increased by about a degree in the past century, the atmospheric temperature five miles above the earth's surface has indicated very little increase. Nevertheless, the

panel stated that this discrepancy in temperature between surface and upper air does not invalidate the conclusion that global warming is taking place. Further, the panel noted that natural events, such as volcanic eruptions, can decrease the temperature in the upper atmosphere.

The major consequences of global warming potentially include the melting of the polar ice caps, which, in turn, contribute to the rise in sea levels. Many islands across the globe have already experienced a measurable loss of land as a result. Because global warming may increase the rate of evaporation, increased precipitation, in the form of stronger and more frequent storm systems, is another potential outcome. Other consequences of global warming may include the introduction and proliferation of new infectious diseases, loss of arable land (referred to as "desertification"), destructive changes to existing ecosystems, loss of biodiversity and the isolation of species, and concomitant adverse changes in the quality of human life.

International Policy Development in Regard to Global Warming:

Regardless of what the precise nature of the relationship between greenhouse gas emissions and global warming may be, it seems that there is some degree of a connection between the phenomena. Any substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and global warming trends will likely involve systematic changes in industrial operations, the use of advanced energy sources and technologies, as well as global cooperation in implementing and regulating these transformations.

In this regard, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) stipulated the following objectives:

1. To stabilize "greenhouse gas" concentrations within the atmosphere, in such a manner that would preclude hazardous anthropogenic intervention into the existing biosphere and ecosystems of the world. This stabilization process would facilitate the natural adaptation of ecosystems to changes in climate.
2. To ensure and enable sustainable development and food production on a global scale.

*** See section on "International Environmental Agreements and Associations" for information related to international policies related to limiting greenhouse gases and controlling climate change emanating from historic summits at Kyoto, Copenhagen, Doha, and Paris. ***

2. Air Pollution

Long before global warming reared its head as a significant issue, those concerned about the

environment and public health noted the deleterious effects of human-initiated combustion upon the atmosphere. Killer smogs from coal burning triggered acute health emergencies in London and other places. At a lower level of intensity motor vehicle, power plant, and industrial emissions impaired long-range visibility and probably had some chronic adverse consequences on the respiratory systems of persons breathing such air.

In time, scientists began associating the sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides released from coal burning with significant acid deposition in the atmosphere, eventually falling as "acid rain." This phenomenon has severely degraded forestlands, especially in Europe and a few parts of the [United States](#). It has also impaired some aquatic ecosystems and eaten away the surface of some human artifacts, such as marble monuments. Scrubber technology and conversion to cleaner fuels have enabled the level of industrial production to remain at least constant while significantly reducing acid deposition. Technologies aimed at cleaning the air and curtailing acid rain, soot, and smog may, nonetheless, boomerang as the perils of global warming become increasingly serious. In brief, these particulates act as sort of a sun shade -- comparable to the effect of volcanic eruptions on the upper atmosphere whereby periods of active volcanism correlate with temporarily cooler weather conditions. Thus, while the carbon dioxide releases that are an inevitable byproduct of combustion continue, by scrubbing the atmosphere of pollutants, an industrial society opens itself to greater insolation (penetration of the sun's rays and consequent heating), and consequently, it is likely to experience a correspondingly greater rise in ambient temperatures.

The health benefits of removing the sources of acid rain and smog are indisputable, and no one would recommend a return to previous conditions. Nevertheless, the problematic climatic effects of continually increasing emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases pose a major global environmental challenge, not as yet addressed adequately.

3. Ozone Depletion

The stratospheric ozone layer functions to prevent ultraviolet radiation from reaching the earth. Normally, stratospheric ozone is systematically disintegrated and regenerated through natural photochemical processes. The stratospheric ozone layer, however, has been depleted unnaturally as a result of anthropogenic (man-made) chemicals, most especially chlorine and bromide compounds such as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), halons, and various industrial chemicals in the form of solvents, refrigerants, foaming agents, aerosol propellants, fire retardants, and fumigants. Ozone depletion is of concern because it permits a greater degree of ultraviolet-B radiation to reach the earth, which then increases the incidences of cancerous malignancies, cataracts, and human immune deficiencies. In addition, even in small doses, ozone depletion affects the ecosystem by disturbing food chains, agriculture, fisheries and other forms of biological diversity.

Transnational policies enacted to respond to the dangers of ozone depletion include the 1985

Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. The Montreal Protocol was subsequently amended in London in 1990, Copenhagen in 1992 and Vienna in 1995. By 1996, 155 countries had ratified the Montreal Protocol, which sets out a time schedule for the reduction (and eventual elimination) of ozone depleting substances (OPS), and bans exports and imports of ODS from and to non-participant countries.

In general, the Protocol stipulates that developed countries must eliminate halon consumption by 1994 and CFC consumption by 1996, while developing countries must eliminate these substances by 2010. Consumption of methyl bromide, which is used as a fumigant, was to be frozen at the 1995 in developed countries, and fully eliminated in 2010, while developing countries are to freeze consumption by 2002, based on average 1995-1998 consumption levels. Methyl chloroform is to be phased out by 2005. Under the Montreal Protocol, most ODS will be completely eliminated from use by 2010.

4. Land Degradation

In recent decades, land degradation in more arid regions of the world has become a serious concern. The problem, manifest as both "desertification" and "devegetation," is caused primarily by climate variability and human activities, such as "deforestation," excessive cultivation, overgrazing, and other forms of land resource exploitation. It is also exacerbated by inadequate irrigation practices. Although the effects of droughts on drylands have been temporary in the past, today, the productivity and sustainability of these lands have been severely compromised for the long term. Indeed, in every region of the world, land degradation has become an acute issue.

Desertification and Devegetation:

"Desertification" is a process of land degradation causing the soil to deteriorate, thus losing its nutrients and fertility, and eventually resulting in the loss of vegetation, known as "devegetation." As aforementioned, "desertification" and "devegetation" are caused by human activities, yet human beings are also the greatest casualties. Because these forms of land degradation affect the ability of the soil to produce crops, they concomitantly contribute to poverty. As population increases and demographic concentrations shift, the extent of land subject to stresses by those seeking to wrest subsistence from it has inexorably risen.

In response, the United Nations has formed the Convention to Combat Desertification-aimed at implementing programs to address the underlying causes of desertification, as well as measures to prevent and minimize its effects. Of particular significance is the formulation of policies on transboundary resources, such as areas around lakes and rivers. At a broader level, the Convention

has established a Conference of Parties (COP), which includes all ratifying governments, for directing and advancing international action.

To ensure more efficacious use of funding, the Convention intends to reconfigure international aid to utilize a consultative and coordinated approach in the disbursement and expenditure of donor funds. In this way, local communities that are affected by desertification will be active participants in the solution-generation process. In-depth community education projects are envisioned as part of this new international aid program, and private donor financing is encouraged. Meanwhile, as new technologies are developed to deal with the problem of desertification, they need to be distributed for application across the world. Hence, the Convention calls for international cooperation in scientific research in this regard.

Desertification is a problem of sustainable development. It is directly connected to human challenges such as poverty, social and economic well-being and environmental protection as well. Broader environmental issues, such as climate change, biological diversity, and freshwater supplies, are indirectly related, so any effort to resolve this environmental challenge must entail coordinated research efforts and joint action.

Deforestation:

Deforestation is not a recent phenomenon. For centuries, human beings have cut down trees to clear space for land cultivation, or in order to use the wood for fuel. Over the last 200 years, and most especially after World War II, deforestation increased because the logging industry became a globally profitable endeavor, and so the clearing of forested areas was accelerated for the purposes of industrial development. In the long term, this intensified level of deforestation is considered problematic because the forest is unable to regenerate itself quickly. The deforestation that has occurred in tropical rainforests is seen as an especially serious concern, due to the perceived adverse effects of this process upon the entire global ecosystem.

The most immediate consequence of deforestation is soil degradation. Soil, which is necessary for the growth of vegetation, can be a fragile and vital property. Organically, an extensive evolution process must take place before soil can produce vegetation, yet at the same time, the effects of natural elements, such as wind and rain, can easily and quickly degrade this resource. This phenomenon is known as soil erosion. In addition, natural elements like wind and rain reduce the amount of fertile soil on the ground, making soil scarcity a genuine problem. When fertile topsoil that already exists is removed from the landscape in the process of deforestation, soil scarcity is further exacerbated. Equally significant is the fact that once land has been cleared so that the topsoil can be cultivated for crop production, not only are the nutrient reserves in the soil depleted, thus producing crops of inferior quality, but the soil structure itself becomes stressed and deteriorates further.

Another direct result of deforestation is flooding. When forests are cleared, removing the cover of vegetation, and rainfall occurs, the flow of water increases across the surface of land. When extensive water runoff takes place, the frequency and intensity of flooding increases. Other adverse effects of deforestation include the loss of wildlife and biodiversity within the ecosystem that supports such life forms.

At a broader level, tropical rainforests play a vital role in maintaining the global environmental system. Specifically, destruction of tropical rainforests affects the carbon dioxide cycle. When forests are destroyed by burning (or rotting), carbon dioxide is released into the air, thus contributing to an intensified "greenhouse effect." The increase in greenhouse gas emissions like carbon dioxide is a major contributor to global warming, according to many environmental scientists. Indeed, trees themselves absorb carbon dioxide in the process of photosynthesis, so their loss also reduces the absorption of greenhouse gases.

Tropical rainforest destruction also adversely affects the nitrogen cycle. Nitrogen is a key nutrient for both plants and animals. Plants derive nitrogen from soil, while animals obtain it via nitrogen-enriched vegetation. This element is essential for the formation of amino acids, and thereby for proteins and biochemicals that all living things need for metabolism and growth. In the nitrogen cycle, vegetation acquires these essential proteins and biochemicals, and then cyclically returns them to the atmosphere and global ecosystem. Accordingly, when tropical rainforest ecosystems are compromised, not only is vegetation removed; the atmosphere is also affected and climates are altered. At a more immediate level, the biodiversity within tropical rainforests, including wildlife and insect species and a wealth of plant varieties, is depleted. Loss of rare plants is of particular concern because certain species as yet unknown and unused could likely yield many practical benefits, for instance as medicines.

As a result of the many challenges associated with deforestation, many environmental groups and agencies have argued for government policies on the sustainable development of forests by governments across the globe. While many countries have instituted national policies and programs aimed at reducing deforestation, and substantial research has been advanced in regard to sustainable and regenerative forestry development, there has been very little progress on an international level. Generally speaking, most tropical rainforests are located in developing and less developed countries, where economic growth is often dependent upon the exploitation of tropical rainforests. Timber resources as well as wildlife hunting tend to be particularly lucrative arenas.

In places such as the Amazon, where deforestation takes place for the construction of energy plants aimed at industrialization and economic development, there is an exacerbated effect on the environment. After forests are cleared in order to construct such projects, massive flooding usually ensues. The remaining trees then rot and decay in the wake of the flooding. As the trees deteriorate, their biochemical makeup becomes more acidic, producing poisonous substances such

as hydrogen sulphide and methane gases. Acidified water subsequently corrodes the mechanical equipment and operations of the plants, which are already clogged by rotting wood after the floodwaters rise.

Deforestation generally arises from an economically plausible short-term motivation, but nonetheless poses a serious global concern because the effects go beyond national boundaries. The United Nations has established the World Commission on Forest and Sustainable Development. This body's task is to determine the optimal means of dealing with the issue of deforestation, without unduly affecting normal economic development, while emphasizing the global significance of protecting tropical forest ecosystems.

5. Water Resources

For all terrestrial fauna, including humans, water is the most immediate necessity to sustain life. As the population has increased and altered an ever-greater portion of the landscape from its natural condition, demand on water resources has intensified, especially with the development of industrialization and large-scale irrigation. The supply of freshwater is inherently limited, and moreover distributed unevenly across the earth's landmasses. Moreover, not just demand for freshwater but activities certain to degrade it are becoming more pervasive. By contrast, the oceans form a sort of "last wilderness," still little explored and in large part not seriously affected by human activity. However, coastal environments - the biologically richest part of the marine ecosystem-are experiencing major depletion due to human encroachment and over-exploitation.

Freshwater:

In various regions, for instance the Colorado River in the western [United States](#), current withdrawals of river water for irrigation, domestic, and industrial use consume the entire streamflow so that almost no water flows into the sea at the river's mouth. Yet development is ongoing in many such places, implying continually rising demand for water. In some areas reliant on groundwater, aquifers are being depleted at a markedly faster rate than they are being replenished. An example is the San Joaquin Valley in California, where decades of high water withdrawals for agriculture have caused land subsidence of ten meters or more in some spots. Naturally, the uncertainty of future water supplies is particularly acute in arid and semi-arid regions. Speculation that the phenomenon of global warming will alter geographic and seasonal rainfall patterns adds further uncertainty.

Water conservation measures have great potential to alleviate supply shortages. Some city water systems are so old and beset with leaking pipes that they lose as much water as they meter. Broad-scale irrigation could be replaced by drip-type irrigation, actually enhancing the sustainability of

agriculture. In many areas where heavy irrigation has been used for decades, the result is deposition of salts and other chemicals in the soil such that the land becomes unproductive for farming and must be abandoned.

Farming is a major source of water pollution. Whereas restrictions on industrial effluents and other "point sources" are relatively easy to implement, comparable measures to reform hydraulic practices at farms and other "nonpoint sources" pose a significantly knottier challenge. Farm-caused water pollution takes the following main forms:

- Nitrate pollution found in wells in intensive farming areas as a consequence of heavy fertilizer use is a threat to human health. The most serious danger is to infants, who by ingesting high-nitrate water can contract methemoglobinemia, sometimes called "blue baby syndrome," a potentially fatal condition.
- Fertilizer runoff into rivers and lakes imparts unwanted nutrients that cause algae growth and eventual loss of oxygen in the body of water, degrading its ability to support fish and other desirable aquatic life.
- Toxic agricultural chemicals - insecticides, herbicides, and fungicides - are detectable in some aquifers and waterways.

In general, it is much easier to get a pollutant into water than to retrieve it out. Gasoline additives, dry cleaning chemicals, other industrial toxins, and in a few areas radionuclides have all been found in water sources intended for human use. The complexity and long time scale of subterranean hydrological movements essentially assures that pollutants already deposited in aquifers will continue to turn up for decades to come. Sophisticated water treatment processes are available, albeit expensive, to reclaim degraded water and render it fit for human consumption. Yet source protection is unquestionably a more desirable alternative.

In much of the developing world, and even some low-income rural enclaves of the developed world, the population lacks ready access to safe water. Surface water and shallow groundwater supplies are susceptible to contamination from untreated wastewater and failing septic tanks, as well as chemical hazards. The occurrence of waterborne disease is almost certainly greatly underreported.

Marine Resources:

Coastal areas have always been desirable places for human habitation, and population pressure on them continues to increase. Many types of water degradation that affect lakes and rivers also affect coastal zones: industrial effluents, untreated or partially treated sewage, nutrient load from

agriculture figure prominently in both cases. Prospects for more extreme storms as a result of global warming, as well as the pervasiveness of poorly planned development in many coastal areas, forebode that catastrophic hurricanes and landslides may increase in frequency in the future. Ongoing rise in sea levels will force remedial measures and in some cases abandonment of currently valuable coastal property.

Fisheries over much of the globe have been overharvested, and immediate conservation measures are required to preserve stocks of many species. Many governments subsidized factory-scale fishing fleets in the 1970s and 1980s, and the resultant catch increase evidently surpassed a sustainable level. It is uncertain how much of the current decline in fish stocks stems from overharvesting and how much from environmental pollution. The deep ocean remains relatively unaffected by human activity, but continental shelves near coastlines are frequently seriously polluted, and these close-to-shore areas are the major biological nurseries for food fish and the smaller organisms they feed on.

6. Environmental Toxins

Toxic chemical pollution exploded on the public consciousness with disclosure of spectacularly polluted industrial areas such as Love Canal near Buffalo, New York. There is no question that pollutants such as organophosphates or radionucleides can be highly deleterious to health, but evidence to date suggests that seriously affected areas are a localized rather than universal problem.

While some explore the possibilities for a lifestyle that fully eschews use of modern industrial chemicals, the most prevalent remediative approach is to focus on more judicious use. The most efficient chemical plants are now able to contain nearly all toxic byproducts of their production processes within the premises, minimizing the release of such substances into the environment. Techniques such as Integrated Pest Management (IPM) dictate limited rather than broadcast use of pesticides: application only when needed using the safest available chemical, supplemented as much as possible with nontoxic controls.

While heightened public awareness and growing technical sophistication suggest a hopeful outlook on limiting the damage from manmade environmental toxins, one must grant that previous incidents of their misuse and mishandling have already caused environmental damage that will have to be dealt with for many years to come. In the case of the most hazardous radioactive substances, the time scale for successful remediation actually extends beyond that of the recorded history of civilization. Moreover, in this era of high population density and rapid economic growth, quotidian activities such as the transport of chemicals will occasionally, seemingly inevitably result in accidents with adverse environmental consequences.

7. "Islandization" and Biodiversity

With increased awareness regarding the adverse effects of unregulated hunting and habitat depletion upon wildlife species and other aspects of biodiversity, large-scale efforts across the globe have been initiated to reduce and even reverse this trend.

In every region of the world, many species of wildlife and areas of biodiversity have been saved from extinction. Nationally, many countries have adopted policies aimed at preservation and conservation of species, and one of the most tangible measures has been the proliferation of protected habitats. Such habitats exist in the form of wildlife reserves, marine life reserves, and other such areas where biodiversity can be protected from external encroachment and exploitation.

Despite these advances in wildlife and biodiversity protection, further and perhaps more intractable challenges linger. Designated reserves, while intended to prevent further species decline, exist as closed territories, fragmented from other such enclaves and disconnected from the larger ecosystem. This environmental scenario is referred to as "islandization." Habitat reserves often serve as oversized zoos or game farms, with landscapes and wildlife that have effectively been "tamed" to suit. Meanwhile, the larger surrounding ecosystem continues to be seriously degraded and transformed, while within the islandized habitat, species that are the focus of conservation efforts may not have sufficient range and may not be able to maintain healthy genetic variability.

As a consequence, many conservationists and preservationists have demanded that substantially larger portions of land be withheld as habitat reserves, and a network of biological corridors to connect continental reserves be established. While such efforts to combat islandization have considerable support in the [United States](#), how precisely such a program would be instituted, especially across national boundaries, remains a matter of debate. International conservationists and preservationists say without a network of reserves a massive loss of biodiversity will result.

The concept of islandization illustrates why conservation and preservation of wildlife and biodiversity must consider and adopt new, broader strategies. In the past, conservation and preservation efforts have been aimed at specific species, such as the spotted owl and grizzly bear in North America, the Bengal tiger in Southeast Asia, the panda in [China](#), elephants in Africa. Instead, the new approach is to simultaneously protect many and varied species that inhabit the same ecosystem. This method, referred to as "bio-regional conservation," may more efficaciously generate longer-term and more far-reaching results precisely because it is aimed at preserving entire ecosystems, and all the living things within.

More About Biodiversity Issues:

This section is directly taken from the United Nations Environmental Program: "[Biodiversity](#)"

Assessment"

The Global Biodiversity Assessment, completed by 1500 scientists under the auspices of United Nations Environmental Program in 1995, updated what is known (or unknown) about global biological diversity at the ecosystem, species and genetic levels. The assessment was uncertain of the total number of species on Earth within an order of magnitude. Of its working figure of 13 million species, only 13 percent are scientifically described. Ecological community diversity is also poorly known, as is its relationship to biological diversity, and genetic diversity has been studied for only a small number of species. The effects of human activities on biodiversity have increased so greatly that the rate of species extinctions is rising to hundreds or thousands of times the background level. These losses are driven by increasing demands on species and their habitats, and by the failure of current market systems to value biodiversity adequately. The Assessment calls for urgent action to reverse these trends.

There has been a new recognition of the importance of protecting marine and aquatic biodiversity. The first quantitative estimates of species losses due to growing coral reef destruction predict that almost 200,000 species, or one in five presently contributing to coral reef biodiversity, could die out in the next 40 years if human pressures on reefs continue to increase.

Since Rio, many countries have improved their understanding of the status and importance of their biodiversity, particularly through biodiversity country studies such as those prepared under the auspices of UNEP/GEF. The [United Kingdom](#) identified 1250 species needing monitoring, of which 400 require action plans to ensure their survival. Protective measures for biodiversity, such as legislation to protect species, can prove effective. In the USA, almost 40 percent of the plants and animals protected under the Endangered Species Act are now stable or improving as a direct result of recovery efforts. Some African countries have joined efforts to protect threatened species through the 1994 Lusaka Agreement, and more highly migratory species are being protected by specialized cooperative agreements among range states under the Bonn Agreement.

There is an emerging realization that a major part of conservation of biological diversity must take place outside of protected areas and involve local communities. The extensive agricultural areas occupied by small farmers contain much biodiversity that is important for sustainable food production. Indigenous agricultural practices have been and continue to be important elements in the maintenance of biodiversity, but these are being displaced and lost. There is a new focus on the interrelationship between agrodiversity conservation and sustainable use and development practices in smallholder agriculture, with emphasis on use of farmers' knowledge and skills as a source of information for sustainable farming.

Perhaps even more important than the loss of biodiversity is the transformation of global biogeochemical cycles, the reduction in the total world biomass, and the decrease in the biological productivity of the planet. While quantitative measurements are not available, the eventual

economic and social consequences may be so significant that the issue requires further attention.

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1994.

Online resources used generally in the Environmental Overview:

Environmental Protection Agency Global Warming Site. URL: <http://www.epa.gov/globalwarming>

Food and Agriculture Organization of United Nations: Forestry. URL: <http://www.fao.org/forestry/site/sofo/en/>

Global Warming Information Page. URL: <http://globalwarming.org>

U n i t e d N a t i o n s E n v i r o n m e n t a l P r o g r a m . U R L : http://www.unep.org/GEO/GEO_Products/Assessment_Reports/

United Nations Global Environmental Outlook. URL: <http://www.unep.org/geo/geo4/media/>

Note on Edition Dates:

The edition dates for textual resources are noted above because they were used to formulate the original content. We also have used online resources (cited above) to update coverage as needed.

Information Resources

For more information about environmental concepts, CountryWatch recommends the following resources:

The United Nations Environmental Program Network (with country profiles)

[<http://www.unep.net/>](http://www.unep.net)

The United Nations Environment Program on Climate Change

[<http://climatechange.unep.net/>](http://climatechange.unep.net)

The United Nations Environmental Program on Waters and Oceans

<http://www.unep.ch/earthw/Pdepwat.htm>

The United Nations Environmental Program on Forestry: "Forests in Flux"

<http://www.unep-wcmc.org/forest/flux/homepage.htm>

FAO "State of the World's Forests"

<http://www.fao.org/forestry/FO/SOFO/SOFO99/sofo99-e.stm>

World Resources Institute.

<http://www.wri.org/>

Harvard University Center for Health and the Global Environment

<http://www.med.harvard.edu/chge/the-review.html>

The University of Wisconsin Center for Sustainability and the Global Environment

<http://sage.aos.wisc.edu/>

International Environmental Agreements and Associations

International Policy Development in Regard to Global Warming:

Introduction

Regardless of what the precise nature of the relationship between greenhouse gas emissions and global warming may be, it seems that there is some degree of a connection between the phenomena. Any substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and global warming trends will likely involve systematic changes in industrial operations, the use of advanced energy sources and technologies, as well as global cooperation in implementing and regulating these transformations.

In this regard, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) stipulated the following objectives:

1. To stabilize "greenhouse gas" concentrations within the atmosphere, in such a manner that would preclude hazardous anthropogenic intervention into the existing biosphere and ecosystems of the world. This stabilization process would facilitate the natural adaptation of ecosystems to changes in climate.
2. To ensure and enable sustainable development and food production on a global scale.

Following are two discussions regarding international policies on the environment, followed by listings of international accords.

Special Entry: The Kyoto Protocol

The UNFCCC was adopted at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, and entered into force in 1994. Over 175 parties were official participants.

Meanwhile, however, many of the larger, more industrialized nations failed to reach the emissions' reduction targets, and many UNFCCC members agreed that the voluntary approach to reducing emissions had not been successful. As such, UNFCCC members reached a consensus that legally binding limits were necessitated, and agreed to discuss such a legal paradigm at a meeting in Kyoto, [Japan](#) in 1997. At that meeting, the UNFCCC forged the Kyoto Protocol. This concord is the first legally binding international agreement that places limits on emissions from industrialized countries. The major greenhouse gas emissions addressed in the Kyoto Protocol include carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, sulfur hexafluoride, and methane.

The provisions of the Kyoto Protocol stipulate that economically advanced nations must reduce their combined emissions of greenhouse gases, by approximately five percent from their 1990 levels, before the 2008-2010 deadline. Countries with the highest carbon dioxide emissions, such as the [United States](#) (U.S.), many of the European Union (EU) countries, and [Japan](#), are to reduce emissions by a scale of 6 to 8 percent. All economically advanced nations must show "demonstrable progress" by 2005. In contrast, no binding limits or timetable have been set on developing countries. Presumably, this distinction is due to the fact that most developing countries - - with the obvious exceptions of [India](#) and [China](#) -- simply do not emit as many greenhouse gases as do more industrially advanced countries. Meanwhile, these countries are entrenched in the process of economic development.

Regardless of the aforementioned reasoning, there has been strong opposition against the asymmetrical treatment assigned to emissions limits among developed and developing countries. Although this distinction might be regarded as unfair in principle, associations such as the Alliance of Small Island States have been vocal in expressing how global warming -- a result of greenhouse gas emissions - has contributed to the rise in sea level, and thus deleteriously affected their very

existence as island nation states. For this reason, some parties have suggested that economically advanced nations, upon returning to their 1990 levels, should be required to further reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by a deadline of 2005. In response, interested parties have observed that even if such reductions were undertaken by economically advanced nations, they would not be enough to completely control global warming. Indeed, a reduction in the rate of fossil fuel usage by developing nations would also be necessary to have substantial ameliorative effect on global warming. Indeed, a reduction in the rate of fossil fuel usage by developing nations would also be necessary to have substantial ameliorative effect on global warming.

As such, the Protocol established a "Clean Development Mechanism" which permits developed countries to invest in projects aimed at reducing emissions within developing countries in return for credit for the reductions. Ostensibly, the objective of this mechanism is to curtail emissions in developing countries without unduly penalizing them for their economic development. Under this model, the countries with more potential emissions credits could sell them to other signatories of the Kyoto Protocol, whose emissions are forecast to significantly rise in the next few years. Should this trading of emissions credits take place, it is estimated that the Kyoto Protocol's emissions targets could still be met.

In 1999, the International Energy Outlook projected that Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and Newly Independent States, as well as parts of Asia, are all expected to show a marked decrease in their level of energy-related carbon emissions in 2010. Nations with the highest emissions, specifically, the U.S., the EU and [Japan](#), are anticipated to reduce their emissions by up to 8 percent by 2012. By 2000, however, the emissions targets were not on schedule for achievement. Indeed, the U.S. Department of Energy estimates forecast that by 2010, there will be a 34 percent increase in carbon emissions from the 1990 levels, in the absence of major shifts in policy, economic growth, energy prices, and consumer trends. Despite this assessment in the U.S., international support for the Kyoto Protocol remained strong, especially among European countries and island states, who view the pact as one step in the direction away from reliance on fossil fuels and other sources of greenhouse gases.

In 2001, U.S. President, George W. Bush, rejected his country's participation in the Kyoto Protocol, saying that the costs imposed on the global economic system, and especially, on the US, overshadowed the benefits of the Protocol. He also cited the unfair burden on developed nations to reduce emissions, as another primary reasons for withdrawal from the international pact, as well as insufficient evidence regarding the science of global warming. Faced with impassioned international disapproval for his position, the U.S. president stated that his administration remained interested in dealing with the matter of global warming, but would endorse alternative measures to combat the problem, such as voluntary initiatives limiting emissions. Critics of Bush's position, however, have noted that it was the failure of voluntary initiatives to reduce emissions following the Rio Summit that led to the establishment of the Kyoto Protocol in the first place.

In the wake of the Bush administration's decision, many participant countries resigned themselves to the reality that the goals of the Kyoto Protocol might not be achieved without U.S. involvement. Nevertheless, in Bonn, [Germany](#), in July 2001, the remaining participant countries struck a political compromise on some of the key issues and sticking points, and planned to move forward with the Protocol, irrespective of the absence of the U.S. The key compromise points included the provision for countries to offset their targets with carbon sinks (these are areas of forest and farmland which can absorb carbon through the process of photosynthesis). Another compromise point within the broader Bonn Agreement was the reduction of emissions cuts of six gases from over 5 percent to a more achievable 2 percent. A third key change was the provision of funding for less wealthy countries to adopt more progressive technologies.

In late October and early November 2001, the UNFCCC's 7th Conference of the Parties met in Marrakesh, [Morocco](#), to finalize the measures needed to make the Kyoto Protocol operational. Although the UNFCCC projected that ratification of the Protocol would make it legally binding within a year, many critics noted that the process had fallen short of implementing significant changes in policy that would be necessary to actually stop or even slow climate change. They also maintained that the absence of U.S. participation effectively rendered the Protocol into being a political exercise without any substance, either in terms of transnational policy or in terms of environmental concerns.

The adoption of the compromises ensconced within the Bonn Agreement had been intended to make the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol more palatable to the U.S. In this regard, it failed to achieve its objective as the Bush administration continued to eschew participation in the international accord. Still, however, the Bonn Agreement did manage to render a number of other positive outcomes. Specifically, in 2002, key countries, such as [Russia](#), [Japan](#) and [Canada](#) agreed to ratify the protocol, bringing the number of signatories to 178. The decision by key countries to ratify the protocol was regarded as "the kiss of life" by observers.

By 2005, on the eve of a climate change conference in London, British Prime Minister Tony Blair was hoping to deal with the problems of climate change beyond the provisions set forth in the Kyoto Protocol. Acknowledging that the Kyoto Protocol could not work in its current form, Blair wanted to open the discussion for a new climate change plan.

Blair said that although most of the world had signed on to Kyoto, the protocol could not meet any of its practical goals of cutting greenhouse gas emissions without the participation of the United States, the world's largest polluter. He also noted that any new agreement would have to include India and China -- significant producers of greenhouse gas emissions, but exempt from Kyoto because they have been classified as developing countries. Still, he said that progress on dealing with climate change had been stymied by "a reluctance to face up to reality and the practical action needed to tackle problem."

Blair also touted the "huge opportunities" in technology and pointed toward the possibilities offered by wind, solar and nuclear power, along with fuel cell technology, eco-friendly biofuels, and carbon capture and storage which could generate low carbon power. Blair also asserted that his government was committed to achieving its domestic goal of reducing carbon dioxide emissions by 20 percent by 2010.

In the United States, President George W. Bush has said that global warming remained a debatable issue and despite conclusions reached by his own Environmental Protection Agency, he has not agreed with the conclusion that global warming and climate change are linked with human activities. Bush has also refused to ratify Kyoto on the basis of its economic costs.

Australia, an ally of the United States, has taken a similarly dim view of the Kyoto Protocol. Ahead of the November 2005 climate change meeting in Canada in which new goals for the protocol were to be discussed, Australia's Environment Minister, Ian Campbell, said that negotiating new greenhouse gas emission levels for the Kyoto Protocol would be a waste of time. Campbell said, "There is a consensus that the caps, targets and timetables approach is flawed. If we spend the next five years arguing about that, we'll be fiddling and negotiating while Rome burns." Campbell, like the Bush administration, has also advocated a system of voluntary action in which industry takes up new technologies rather than as a result of compelling the reduction of emissions. But the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) has called on its government to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, to establish a system of emissions trading, and to set binding limits on emissions. Interestingly, although it did not sign on to Kyoto, Australia was expected to meet its emissions target by 2012 (an 8 percent increase in 1990 levels in keeping with the country's reliance on coal). But this success has nothing to do with new technologies and is due to state-based regulations on land clearing.

Note: The Kyoto Protocol calls for developed nations to cut greenhouse emissions by 5.2 percent of 1990 levels by 2012.

Special Entry: Climate Change Summit in Copenhagen (2009) --

In December 2009, the United Nations Climate Change Summit opened in the Danish capital of Copenhagen. The summit was scheduled to last from Dec. 7-18, 2009. Delegates from more than 190 countries were in attendance, and approximately 100 world leaders, including British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and [United States](#) President Barack Obama, were expected to participate. At issue was the matter of new reductions targets on greenhouse gas emissions by 2020.

Despite earlier fears that little concurrence would come from the conference, effectively pushing significant actions forward to a 2010 conference in [Mexico](#) City, negotiators were now reporting that the talks were productive and several key countries, such as [South Africa](#), had pledged to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The two main issues that could still lead to cleavages were

questions of agreement between the industrialized countries and the developing countries of the world, as well as the overall effectiveness of proposals in seriously addressing the perils of climate change.

On Dec. 9, 2009, four countries -- the [United Kingdom](#), [Australia](#), [Mexico](#) and [Norway](#) -- presented a document outlining ideas for raising and managing billions of dollars, which would be intended to help vulnerable countries dealing with the perils of climate change. Described as a "green fund," the concept could potentially help small island states at risk because of the rise in sea level. [Bangladesh](#) identified itself as a potential recipient of an assistance fund, noting that as a country plagued by devastating floods, it was particularly hard-hit by climate change. The "green fund" would fall under the rubric of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, for which developed countries have been committed to quantifying their emission reduction targets, and also to providing financial and technical support to developing countries.

The [United Kingdom](#), [Australia](#), [Mexico](#) and [Norway](#) also called for the creation of a new legal treaty that would replace the Kyoto Protocol. This new treaty, which could go into force in 2012, would focus largely on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2020. But [Australia](#) went even further in saying that the successor treaty to the Kyoto Protocol, should be one with provisions covering all countries. Such a move would be a departure from the structure of the Kyoto Protocol, which contained emissions targets for industrialized countries due to the prevailing view that developed countries had a particular historic responsibility to be accountable for climate change. More recently, it has become apparent that substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions demanded by scientists would only come to pass with the participation also of significant developing nation states, such as [China](#) and [India](#). Indeed, one of the most pressing critiques of the Kyoto Protocol was that it was a "paper tiger" that failed to address the impact of the actions of emerging economies like [China](#) and [India](#), with its focus on the developed economies.

Now, in 2009, [China](#) -- as the world's biggest greenhouse gas emitter -- was responding this dubious distinction by vocalizing its criticism of the current scenario and foregrounding its new commitments. Ahead of the Copenhagen summit, [China](#) had announced it would reduce the intensity of its carbon emissions per unit of its GDP in 2020 by 40 to 45 percent against 2005 levels. With that new commitment at hand, [China](#) was now accusing the [United States](#) and the European Union of shirking their own responsibilities by setting weak targets for greenhouse gas emissions cuts. Senior Chinese negotiator, Su Wei, characterized the goals of the world's second largest greenhouse gas emitter -- the [United States](#) -- as "not notable," and the European Union's target as "not enough." Su Wei also took issue with [Japan](#) for setting implausible preconditions.

On Dec. 11, 2009, [China](#) demanded that developed and wealthy countries in Copenhagen should help deliver a real agreement on climate change by delivering on their promises to reduce carbon emissions and provide financial support for developing countries to adapt to global warming. In so doing, China's Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei said his country was hoping that a "balanced

outcome" would emerge from the discussions at the summit. Echoing the position of the Australian government, He Yafei spoke of a draft agreement as follows: "The final document we're going to adopt needs to be taking into account the needs and aspirations of all countries, particularly the most vulnerable ones."

China's Vice Foreign Minister emphasized the fact that climate change was "a matter of survival" for developing countries, and accordingly, such countries need wealthier and more developed countries to accentuate not only their pledges of emissions reduction targets, but also their financial commitments under the aforementioned United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. To that end, scientists and leaders of small island states in the Indian Ocean, the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea, have highlighted the existential threat posed by global warming and the concomitant rise in sea level.

China aside, attention was also on [India](#) -- another major player in the developing world and a country with an industrializing economy that was impacting the environment. At issue was the Indian government's decision to set a carbon intensity target, which would slow emissions growth by up to 25 percent by the 2020 deadline. This strong position was resisted by some elements in [India](#), who argued that their country should not be taking such a strong position when developed wealthy countries were yet to show accountability for their previous commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The matter grew so heated that the members of the opposition stormed out of the parliament in protest as Indian Environment Minister Jairam Ramesh defended the policy. But the political pressure at home in [India](#) was leaving the Indian delegation in Copenhagen in a state of chaos as well. In fact, India's top environmental negotiator refused to travel to Copenhagen in protest of the government's newly-announced stance.

China and [India](#) were joined by [Brazil](#) and [South Africa](#) in the crafting of a draft document calling for a new global climate treaty to be completed by June 2010. Of concern has been the realization that there was insufficient time to find concurrence on a full legal treaty, which would leave countries only with a politically-binding text by the time the summit at Copenhagen closed. But Guyana's leader, President Bharrat Jagdeo, warned that the summit in [Denmark](#) would be classified as a failure unless a binding document was agreed upon instead of just political consensus. He urged his cohorts to act with purpose saying, "Never before have science, economics, geo-strategic self-interest and politics intersected in such a way on an issue that impacts everyone on the planet."

Likewise, [Tuvalu](#) demanded that legally binding agreements emerge from Copenhagen. Its proposal was supported by many of the vulnerable countries, from small island states and sub-Saharan Africa, all of whom warned of the catastrophic impact of climate change on their citizens. [Tuvalu](#) also called for more aggressive action, such as an amendment to the 1992 agreement, which would focus on sharp greenhouse gas emissions and the accepted rise in temperatures, due to the impact the rise in seas. The delegation from [Kiribati](#) joined the call by

drawing attention to the fact that one village had to be abandoned due to waist-high water, and more such effects were likely to follow. Kiribati's Foreign Secretary, Tessie Lambourne, warned that the people of [Kiribati](#) could well be faced with no homeland in the future saying, "Nobody in this room would want to leave their homeland." But despite such impassioned pleas and irrespective of warnings from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change that the rise in sea level from melting polar ice caps would deleteriously affect low-lying atolls such as such as [Tuvalu](#) and [Kiribati](#) in the Pacific, and the [Maldives](#) in the Indian Ocean, the oil-giant [Saudi Arabia](#) was able to block this move.

Meanwhile, within the developed countries, yet another power struggle was brewing. The European Union warned it would only agree to raise its target of 20 percent greenhouse gas emissions reductions to 30 percent if the [United States](#) demonstrated that it would do more to reduce its own emissions. It was unknown if such pressure would yield results. [United States](#) President Barack Obama offered a "provisional" 2020 target of 17 percent reductions, noting that he could not offer greater concessions at Copenhagen due to resistance within the [United States](#) Congress, which was already trying to pass a highly controversial "cap and trade" emissions legislation. However, should that emissions trading bill fail in the Senate, the [United States](#) Environment Protection Agency's declaration that greenhouse gases pose a danger to human health and the environment was expected to facilitate further regulations and limits on power plants and factories at the national level. These moves could potentially strengthen the Obama administration's offering at Copenhagen. As well, President Obama also signaled that he would be willing to consider the inclusion of international forestry credits.

Such moves indicated willingness by the Obama administration to play a more constructive role on the international environmental scene than its predecessor, the Bush administration. Indeed, ahead of his arrival at the Copenhagen summit, President Barack Obama's top environmental advisors promised to work on a substantial climate change agreement. To that end, [United States](#) Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Lisa Jackson said at a press conference, "We are seeking robust engagement with all of our partners around the world." But would this pro-engagement assertion yield actual results?

By Dec. 12, 2009, details related to a draft document prepared by Michael Zammit Cutajar, the head of the Ad-hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action, were released at the Copenhagen climate conference. Included in the document were calls for countries to make major reductions in carbon emissions over the course of the next decade. According to the Washington Post, industrialized countries were called on to make cuts of between 25 percent and 40 percent below 1990 levels -- reductions that were far more draconian than the [United States](#) was likely to accept. As discussed above, President Obama had offered a provisional reduction target of 17 percent. The wide gap between the released draft and the United States' actual stated position suggested there was much more negotiating in the offing if a binding agreement could be forged, despite the Obama administration's claims that it was seeking greater engagement on this issue.

In other developments, the aforementioned call for financial support of developing countries to deal with the perils of climate change was partly answered by the European Union on Dec. 11, 2009. The European bloc pledged an amount of 2.4 billion euros (US\$3.5 billion) annually from 2010 to 2012. Environment Minister Andreas Carlgren of [Sweden](#) -- the country that holds the rotating presidency of the European Union at the time of the summit -- put his weight behind the notion of a "legally binding deal." Meanwhile, Yvo de Boer, a top United Nations climate change official, focused less on the essence of the agreement and more on tangible action and effects saying, "Copenhagen will only be a success if it delivers significant and immediate action that begins the day the conference ends."

The division between developed and developing countries in Copenhagen reached new heights on Dec. 14, 2009, when some of the poor and less developed countries launched a boycott at the summit. The move, which was spurred by African countries but backed by [China](#) and [India](#), appeared to be geared toward redirecting attention and primary responsibility to the wealthier and more industrialized countries. The impasse was resolved after the wealthier and more industrialized countries offered assurances that they did not intend on shirking from their commitments to reducing greenhouse gases. As a result, the participating countries ceased the boycott.

Outside the actual summit, thousands of protestors had gathered to demand crucial global warming, leading to clashes between police and demonstrators elsewhere in the Danish capital city. There were reports of scattered violence across Copenhagen and more than 1,000 people were arrested.

Nevertheless, by the second week of the climate change summit, hopes of forging a strong deal were eroding as developed and developing nations remained deadlocked on sharing cuts in greenhouse gases, and particularly on the matters of financing and temperature goals. In a bid to shore up support for a new climate change, [United States](#) President Barack Obama joined other world leaders in Copenhagen. On Dec. 14, 2009, there was a standoff brewing between the [United States](#) and [China](#). At issue was China's refusal to accept international monitoring of its expressed targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The [United States](#) argued that China's opposition to verification could be a deal-breaker.

By the close of the summit, the difficult process eventually resulted in some consensus being cultivated. A draft text called for \$100 billion a year by 2020 to assist poor nations cope with climate change, while aiming to limit global warming to two degrees Celsius compared with pre-industrial levels. The deal also included specific targets for developed countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and called for reductions by developing countries as a share of their economies. Also included in the agreement was a mechanism to verify compliance. The details of the agreement were supported by President Barack Obama, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva.

This draft would stand as an interim agreement, with a legally-binding international pact unlikely to materialize until 2010. In this way, the summit in Copenhagen failed to achieve its central objective, which was to negotiate a successor to the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gas emissions.

Editor's Note

In the background of these developments was the growing global consciousness related to global warming and climate change. Indeed, as the Copenhagen summit was ongoing, it was clear there was enormous concurrence on the significance of the stakes with an editorial on the matter of climate change being published in 56 newspapers in 45 countries. That editorial warned that without global action, climate change would "ravage our planet." Meanwhile, a global survey taken by Globescan showed that concern over global warming had exponentially increased from 1998 -- when only 20 percent of respondents believed it to be a serious problem -- to 64 percent in 2009. Such survey data, however, was generated ahead of the accusations by climate change skeptics that some climate scientists may have overstated the case for global warming, based on emails derived in an illicit manner from a British University.

Special Entry: Climate change talks in Doha in [Qatar](#) extend life of Kyoto Protocol (2012)

December 2012 saw climate talks ensue in the Qatari city of Doha as representatives from countries across the world gathered to discuss the fate of the Kyoto Protocol, which seeks to minimize greenhouse gas emissions. The summit yielded results with decisions made (1) to extend the Kyoto Protocol until 2020, and (2) for wealthier countries to compensate poorer countries for the losses and damage incurred as a result of climate change.

In regards to the second matter, Malia Talakai of [Nauru](#), a leading negotiator for the Alliance of Small Island States, explained the necessity of the compensation package as follows: "We are trying to say that if you pollute you must help us."

This measure was being dubbed the "Loss and Damage" mechanism, and was being linked with [United States](#) President Barack Obama's request for \$60 billion from Congress to deal with the devastation caused by Hurricane Sandy months before. The sight of a hurricane bearing down on the northern Atlantic seaboard, along with the reality of the scope of reconstruction, appeared to have illustrated the economic costs of climate change -- not so much as a distant environmental issue -- but as a danger to the quotidian lives of people. Still, there was blame to be placed on the [United States](#) and European countries -- some of world's largest emitters -- for failing to do more to reduce emissions.

To that latter end, there was in fact little progress made on the central issue of reducing greenhouse

gas emissions. Had those emissions been reduced, there would have been less of a need to financially deal with the devastation caused by climate change. One interpretation was that the global community was accepting the fact that industrialization was contributing to global warming, which had deleterious effects on the polar ice caps and concomitantly on the rise of sea level, with devastating effects for small island nations. Thus, wealthier countries were willing to pay around \$10 billion a year through 2020, effectively in "damages," to the poor countries that could be viewed as the "collateral damage" of industrial progress. But damages today could potentially be destruction tomorrow, leaving in place the existential challenges and burdens to be born by some of the world's smallest and least wealthy island countries.

Perhaps not surprisingly, the representative for the small island nation states at the Doha summit responded with ire, characterizing the lack of progress on reducing emissions as follows: "We see the package before us as deeply deficient in mitigation (carbon cuts) and finance. It's likely to lock us on the trajectory to a 3,4,5C rise in global temperatures, even though we agreed to keep the global average temperature rise of 1.5C to ensure survival of all islands. There is no new finance (for adapting to climate change and getting clean energy) -- only promises that something might materialize in the future. Those who are obstructive need to talk not about how their people will live, but whether our people will live."

Indeed, in most small island countries not just in the Pacific, but also the Caribbean and Indian Ocean, ecological concerns and the climate crisis have been dominant themes with dire life and death consequences looming in the background for their people. Small island nations in these region are already at risk from the rise of sea-level, tropical cyclones, floods. But their very livelihoods of fishing and subsistence farming were also at risk as a result of ecological and environmental changes. Increasingly high storm surges can wipe out entire villages and contaminate water supplies. Accordingly, the very existence of island nations, such as [Kiribati](#) and [Tuvalu](#), are at severe risk of being obliterated from the map. Yet even with the existential threat of being wiped off the map in the offing, the international community has been either slow or restrictive in its efforts to deal with global warming, climate change, economic and ecological damage, as well as the emerging global challenge of environmental refugees.

A 2012 report from the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the Pacific Regional Environment Program underlined the concerns of small island nations and their people as it concluded that the livelihoods of approximately 10 million people in Pacific island communities were increasingly vulnerable to climate change. In fact, low-lying islands in that region would likely confront losses of up to 18 percent of gross domestic product due to climate change, according to the report. The report covers 21 countries and territories, including [Fiji](#), [Kiribati](#), [Samoa](#) and [Tonga](#), and recommended environmental legislation intended to deal with the climate crisis facing the small island countries particularly. As noted by David Sheppard, the director general of the Pacific Regional Environment Program that co-sponsored this study: "The findings... emphasize the need more than ever to raise the bar through collective actions that address the

region's environmental needs at all levels."

Regardless of the failures of the summit in [Qatar](#) (discussed above), the meeting did facilitate a process starting in 2015, which would bind both wealthy and poor countries together in the mission of forging a new binding treaty that would replace the Kyoto Protocol and tackle the central causes of climate change.

For more information on the threats faced in small island nations by climate change and the measures being undertaken to lobby for international action, please see the Alliance for Small Island States available online at the URL: <http://aosis.org/>

Special Report

COP 21 summit in Paris ends with historic agreement to tackle climate change; rare international consensus formed on environmental crisis facing the planet (2015) --

In mid-December 2015, the highly-anticipated United Nations climate conference of parties (COP) in Paris, [France](#), ended with a historic agreement. In fact, it would very likely be understood as the most significant international agreement signed by all the recognized countries of the world since the Cold War. Accordingly, the Paris Agreement was being distinguished as the first multilateral pact that would compel all countries across the world to cut its carbon emissions -- one of the major causes of increasing greenhouse gas emissions, which contribute to global warming, and its deleterious effects ranging from the dangerous rise in sea level to catastrophic climate change.

The accord, which was dubbed to be the "Paris Agreement," was the work of rigorous diplomacy and fervent environmental advocacy, and it aimed to address the climate change crisis facing the planet. As many as 195 countries were represented in the negotiations that led to the landmark climate deal. Indeed, it was only after weeks of passionate debate that international concurrence was reached in addressing the environmental challenges confronting the world, with particular attention to moving beyond fossil fuels and reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

The success of the COP 21 summit in Paris and the emergence of the landmark Paris Agreement was, to some extent, attributed to the efforts of France's Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius who presided over the negotiations. The French foreign minister's experience and credentials as a seasoned diplomat and respected statesman paid dividends. He skillfully guided the delegates from almost 200 countries and interest groups along the negotiations process, with ostensibly productive results and a reasonably robust deal to show for it.

On Dec. 12, 2015, French Foreign Minister Fabius officially adopted the agreement, declaring: "I

now invite the COP to adopt the decision entitled Paris Agreement outlined in the document. Looking out to the room I see that the reaction is positive, I see no objections. The Paris agreement is adopted." Once Foreign Minister Fabius' gavel was struck, symbolically inaugurating the Paris Agreement into force, the COP delegate rushed to their feet with loud and bouyant cheers as well as thunderous applause.

In general, the Paris Agreement was being hailed as a victory for enviromental activists and a triumph for international diplomats, while at the same time being understood as simply an initial -- and imperfect -- move in the direction of a sustainable future. China's chief negotiator, Xie Zhenhua, issued this message, saying that while the accord was not ideal, it should "not prevent us from marching historical steps forward."

United States President Barack Obama lauded the deal as both "ambitious" and "historic," and the work of strenuous multilateral negotiations as he declared, "Together, we've shown what's possible when the world stands as one." The [United States](#) leader acknowledged that the accord was not "perfect," but he reminded the critics that it was "the best chance to save the one planet we have. "

Former [United States](#) Vice President Al Gore, one of the world's most well known environmental advocates, issued a lengthy statement on the accomplishments ensconced in the Paris Agreement. He highlighted the fact that the Paris Agreement was a first step towards a future with a reduced carbon footprint on Planet Earth as he said, "The components of this agreement -- including a strong review mechanism to enhance existing commitments and a long-term goal to eliminate global-warming pollution this century -- are essential to unlocking the necessary investments in our future. No agreement is perfect, and this one must be strengthened over time, but groups across every sector of society will now begin to reduce dangerous carbon pollution through the framework of this agreement."

The central provisions of the Paris Agreement included the following items:

- Greenhouse gas emissions should peak as quickly as possible, with a move towards balancing energy sources, and ultimately the decrease of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century
- Global temperature increase would be limited to 1.5 degrees Centigrade above pre-industrial levels and would be held "well below" the two degrees Centigrade threshold
- Progress on these goals would be reviewed every five years beginning in 2020 with new greenhouse gas reduction targets issued every five years
- \$100 billion would be expended each year in climate finance for developing countries to move forward with green technologies, with further climate financing to be advanced in the years beyond

It should be noted that there both legally binding and voluntary elements contained within the Paris Agreement. Specifically, the submission of an emissions reduction target and the regular review of that goal would be legally mandatory for all countries. Stated differently, there would be

a system in place by which experts would be able to track the carbon-cutting progress of each country. At the same time, the specific targets to be set by countries would be determined at the discretion of the countries, and would not be binding. While there was some criticism over this non-binding element, the fact of the matter was that the imposition of emissions targets was believed to be a major factor in the failure of climate change talks in Copenhagen, [Denmark](#), in 2009.

In 2015, the talks faced challenges as several countries, such as [China](#) and [India](#), objected to conditions that would stymie economic and development. In order to avoid that kind of landmine, a system Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) was developed and formed the basis of the accord. As such, the Paris Agreement would, in fact, facilitate economic growth and development, as well as technological progress, but with the goal of long-term ecological sustainability based on low carbon sources. In fact, the agreement heralded as "the beginning of the end of the fossil fuel era." As noted by Nick Mabey, the head of the climate diplomacy organization E3G, said, "Paris means governments will go further and faster to tackle climate change than ever before. The transition to a low carbon economy is now unstoppable, ensuring the end of the fossil fuel age."

A particular sticking point in the agreement was the \$100 billion earmarked for climate financing for developing countries to transition from traditional fossil fuels to green energy technologies and a low carbon future. In 2014, a report by the International Energy Agency indicated that the cost of that transition would actually be around \$44 trillion by the mid-century -- an amount that would render the \$100 billion being promised to be a drop in the proverbial bucket. However, the general expectation was that the Republican-controlled Senate in the [United States](#), which would have to ratify the deal in that country, was not interested in contributing significant funds for the cause of climate change.

A key strength of the Paris Agreement was the ubiquitous application of measures to all countries. Of note was the frequently utilized concept of "flexibility" with regard to the Paris Agreement. Specifically, the varying capacities of the various countries in meeting their obligations would be anticipated and accorded flexibility. This aspect presented something of a departure from the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which drew a sharp distinction between developed and developing countries, and mandated a different set of obligations for those categories of countries. Thus, under Kyoto, [China](#) and [India](#) were not held to the same standards as the [United States](#) and European countries. In the Paris Agreement, there would be commitments from all countries across the globe.

Another notable strength of the Paris Agreement was the fact that the countries of the world were finally able to reach consensus on the vital necessity to limit global temperature increases to 1.5 degrees Centigrade. Ahead of the global consensus on the deal, and as controversy continued to surface over the targeted global temperature limits, the leaders of island countries were sounding

the alarm about the melting of the Polar ice caps and the associated rise in sea level. Prime Minister Enele Sopoaga of [Tuvalu](#) issued this dismal reminder: “Tuvalu’s future ... is already bleak and any further temperature increase will spell the total demise of [Tuvalu](#). No leader in this room carries such a level of worry and responsibility. Just imagine you are in my shoes, what would you do?” It was thus something of a victory for environmental advocates that the countries of the world could find consensus on the lower number -- 1.5 degrees rather than 2 degrees.

A significant weak point with regard to the Paris deal was a "loss and damage" provision, which anticipates that even with all the new undertakings intended to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and move to a low carbon future, there would nonetheless be unavoidable climate change consequences. Those consequences ranged from the loss of arable land for farmers as well as soil erosion and contamination of potable water by sea water, to the decimation of territory in coastal zones and on small islands, due to the rise in sea level, with entire small island countries being rendered entirely uninhabitable. The reality was that peoples' homes across the world would be destroyed along with their way of life.

With that latter catastrophic effect being a clear and present danger for small island countries, the Association of Small Island States (AOSIS) demanded that the developed world acknowledge its responsibility for this irreversible damage.. Despite the fact that greenhouse gas emissions and the ensuing plague of global warming was, indeed, the consequence of development in the West (the [United States](#) and Europe) and the large power house countries, such as [Russia](#), [China](#) and [India](#), there was no appetite by those countries to sign on to unlimited liability. Under the Paris Agreement, there was a call for research on insurance mechanisms that would address loss and damage issues, with recommendations to come in the future.

The call for research was being regarded as an evasion of sorts and constituted the weakest aspect of the Paris Agreement. Not surprisingly, a coalition of small island nations demanded a "Marshall Plan" for the Pacific. Borrowing the term "Marshall Plan" from the post-World War II reconstruction effort, the coalition of Pacific island nation, which included [Kiribati](#), [Tuvalu](#), [Fiji](#), and the [Marshall Islands](#), called for an initiative that would include investment in renewable energy and shoreline protection, cultural preservation, economic assistance for economies in transition, and a plan for migration and resettlement for these countries as they confront the catastrophic effects of the melting of the Polar ice caps and the concomitant rise in sea level. The precise contours of the initiative remained unknown, unspecified, and a mere exercise in theory at the time of writing. Yet such an initiative would, at some point, have to be addressed, given the realities of climate change and the slow motion calamity unfolding each day for low-lying island nations across the world.

As noted by Vice President Greg Stone of Conservation International, who also functions as an adviser to the government of [Kiribati](#), “Imagine living in a place where you know it’s going to go away someday, but you don’t know what day that wave’s going to come over and wash your

home away." He added, "It's a disaster we know is going to happen." Meanwhile, the intervening years promised to be filled with hardship for small island nations, such as [Kiribati](#). Stone explained, "For every inch of sea-level rise, these islands lose 10 feet of their freshwater table to saltwater intrusion," Stone explained. "So it's not just about the day the water finally goes over the island; it's also about the day that there's just not enough water left and everyone has to move off the island." Presaging the future for island nations that could face submersion, Stone said, "If you look ahead 50 years, a country like [Kiribati](#) could become the first aqueous nation. possibility of migration. That is, they own this big patch of ocean, and they administer it from elsewhere."

Foreign Minister Minister Tony Debrum of the [Marshall Islands](#) emerged as the champion advocating on behalf of small island nation states and a loose coalition of concerned countries from the Pacific to the Caribbean, but with support from the [United States](#). He addressed the comprehensive concerns of small island nations regarding the weaknesses of the deal, while simultaneously making clear that the Paris Agreement signified hope for the countries most at risk. In a formal statement, Debrum declared: "We have made history today. Emissions targets are still way off track, but this agreement has the tools to ramp up ambition, and brings a spirit of hope that we can rise to this challenge. I can go back home to my people and say we now have a pathway to survival." Debrum highlighted the imperatives of Pacific island nations, saying, "Our High Ambition Coalition was the lightning rod we needed to lift our sights and expectations for a strong agreement here in Paris. We were joined by countries representing more than half the world. We said loud and clear that a bare-bones, minimalist agreement would not fly. We instead demanded an agreement to mark a turning point in history, and the beginning of our journey to the post-carbon era."

Debrum of the [Marshall Islands](#) espoused the quintessential synopsis of the accord and its effects for those most likely to be affected by climate change as he noted, "Climate change won't stop overnight, and my country is not out of the firing line just yet, but today we all feel a little safer."

Editor's Entry on [Environmental Policy](#):

The low-lying Pacific island nations of the world, including [Kiribati](#), [Tuvalu](#), the [Marshall Islands](#), [Fiji](#), among others, are vulnerable to the threats posed by global warming and climate change, derived from carbon emissions, and resulting in the rise in sea level. Other island nations in the Caribbean, as well as poor countries with coastal zones, were also at particular risk of suffering the deleterious effects of climate change.

Political policy in these countries are often connected to ecological issues, which have over time morphed into an existential crisis of sorts. Indeed, ecological concerns and the climate crisis have also been dominant themes with life and death consequences for the people of island nations in the Pacific. Indeed, the very livelihoods of fishing and subsistence farming remain at risk as a result of

ecological and environmental changes. Yet even so, these countries are threatened by increasingly high storm surges, which could wipe out entire villages and contaminate water supplies. Moreover, because these are low lying island nations, the sustained rise in sea level can potentially lead to the terrain of these countries being uninhabitable at best, and submerged at worst. Stated in plain terms, these countries are at severe risk of being obliterated from the map and their plight illuminates the emerging global challenge of environmental refugees. In these manifold senses, climate change is the existential crisis of the contemporary era.

Since the time of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, there have been efforts aimed at extending the life of that agreement, with an eye on minimizing greenhouse gas emissions, and thus minimizing the effects of climate change. Those endeavors have largely ended in failure, as exemplified by the unsuccessful Copenhagen talks in 2009 and the fruitless Doha talks in 2012 respectively. The success of the COP 21 talks in [France](#), with the adoption of the landmark Paris Agreement in 2015, was regarded as the first glimmer of hope. Not only did the Paris Agreement signify the triumph of international diplomacy and global consensus, but it also marked the start of the end of the fossil fuel era, with the path forward toward a low carbon future reliant on greener technologies. Most crucially, the Paris Agreement stood as the first significant response in recent times to the central challenge of climate change and its quotidian effects on the lives of real human beings across the world.

1. Major International Environmental Accords:

General Environmental Concerns

Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Espoo, 1991.

Accords Regarding Atmosphere

Annex 16, vol. II (Environmental Protection: Aircraft Engine Emissions) to the 1044 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Montreal, 1981

Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP), Geneva, 1979

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), New York, 1992

Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Vienna, 1985 including the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Depleted the Ozone Layer, Montreal, 1987

Accords Regarding Hazardous Substances

Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movements and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa, Bamako, 1991

Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Caused during Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels (CRTD), Geneva, 1989

Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (Basel Convention), Basel, 1989

Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, Helsinki, 1992

Convention to Ban the Importation into Forum Island Countries of Hazardous and Radioactive Wastes and to Control the Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within the South Pacific Region (Waigani Convention), Waigani, 1995

European Agreement Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR), Geneva 1957

FAO International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides, Rome, 1985

2. Major International Marine Accords:

Global Conventions

Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (London Convention 1972), London, 1972

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by Protocol of 1978 relation thereto (MARPOL 73/78), London, 1973 and 1978

International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1969 (1969 CLC), Brussels, 1969, 1976, and 1984

International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage 1971 (1971 Fund Convention), Brussels, 1971

Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of

Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea (HNS), London 1996

International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response, and Co-operation (OPRC), London, 1990

International Convention Relation to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties (Intervention Convention), Brussels, 1969

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Montego Bay, 1982

Regional Conventions

Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft (Oslo Convention), Oslo, 1972

Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-based Sources (Paris Convention), Paris, 1974

Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention), Paris, 1992

Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (1974 Helsinki Convention), Helsinki 1974

Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (1992 Helsinki Convention), Helsinki 1992

Conventions within the UNEP Regional Seas Programme

Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea against Pollution, Bucharest, 1992

Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region, Cartagena de Indias, 1983

Convention for the Protection, Management, and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Eastern African Region, Nairobi, 1985

Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution, [Kuwait](#), 1978

Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment and Coastal Region of the Mediterranean Sea (Barcelona Convention), Barcelona, 1976

Regional Convention for the Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Environment, Jeddah, 1982

Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region, Noumea, 1986

Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and Coastal Area of the South-East Pacific, Lima, 1981

Convention for Co-operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the West and Central African Region, Abidjan, 1981

3. Major Conventions Regarding Living Resources:

Marine Living Resources

Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), Canberra, 1980

International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), Rio de Janeiro, 1966

International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW), Washington, 1946

Nature Conservation and Terrestrial Living Resources

Antarctic Treaty, Washington, D.C., 1959

Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (World Heritage Convention), Paris, 1972

Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), Nairobi, 1992

Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS), Bonn, 1979

Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), Washington, D.C., 1973

Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar Convention), Ramsar, 1971

Convention to Combat Desertification (CCD), Paris 1994

FAO International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, Rome, 1983

International Tropical Timber Agreement, 1994 (ITTA, 1994), Geneva, 1994

Freshwater Resources

Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Helsinki, 1992

4. Major Conventions Regarding Nuclear Safety:

Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (Assistance Convention), Vienna, 1986

Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (Notification Convention), Vienna, 1986

Convention on Nuclear Safety, Vienna, 1994

Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, Vienna, 1963

5. Major Intergovernmental Organizations

Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD)

European Union (EU): Environment

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)

Global Environment Facility (GEF)

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES)

International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)

International Labour Organization (ILO)

International Maritime Organization (IMO)

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds (IOPC Funds)

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Environment Policy Committee (EPOC)

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)

United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)

United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)

United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)

World Bank

World Food Programme (WFP)

World Health Organization (WHO)

World Meteorological Organization (WMO)

World Trade Organization (WTO)

6. Major Non-Governmental Organizations

Atmosphere Action Network East Asia (AANE)

Climate Action Network (CAN)

Consumers International (CI)

Earth Council

Earthwatch Institute

Environmental Liaison Centre International (ELCI)

European Environmental Bureau (EEB)

Forest Stewardship Council (FSC)

Friends of the Earth International (FoEI)

Greenpeace International

International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)

International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)

International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF)

International Solar Energy Society (ISES)

IUCN-The World Conservation Union

Pesticide Action Network (PAN)

Sierra Club

Society for International Development (SID)

Third World Network (TWN)

Water Environment Federation (WEF)

Women's Environment and Development Organization (WEDO)

World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD)

World Federalist Movement (WFM)

World Resources Institute (WRI)

World Wide Fund For Nature (WWF)

7. Other Networking Instruments

Arab Network for Environment and Development (RAED)

Global Legislators for a Balanced Environment (GLOBE)

Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe (REC)

United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison Service (UN-NGLS)

Appendices

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Methodology Note for Demographic Data:

The demographic numbers for cities and national populations listed in CountryWatch content are derived from the Geoba.se website, which analyzes data from the World Bank. The current demographic numbers displayed on the Countrywatch website are reflective of the latest available estimates.

The demographic information for language, ethnicity and religion listed in CountryWatch content is

derived from a mix of sources including the Altapedia, Central Intelligence Agency Factbook, Infoplease, and State Department Background Notes.

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-- See also list of News Wires services below, which are also used for research purposes. --

Note on Edition Dates:

The earlier edition dates are noted above because they were used to formulate the original Country Reviews and serve as the baseline for some of the information covered. Later editions have been used in some cases, and are cited as such, while other more recent online resources (cited above) contain recent and ever-updated data sets used for research.

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Note on Edition Dates:

The earlier edition dates are noted above because they were used to formulate the original country reviews and serve as the baseline for some of the information covered. Later editions have been used in some cases, and are cited as such, while other more recent online resources (cited above) contain recent and ever-updated data sets used for research.

Methodology Notes for Economic Data:

Estimates by CountryWatch.com of GDP in dollars in most countries are made by converting local currency GDP data from the International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook to US dollars by market exchange rates estimated from the International Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics and projected out by the CountryWatch Macroeconomic Forecast. Real GDP was estimated by deflating current dollar values by the US GDP Implicit Price Deflator.

Exceptions to this method were used for:

- Bosnia-Herzegovina
- Nauru
- Cuba
- Palau
- Holy See
- San Marino
- Korea, North
- [Serbia](#) & Montenegro
- Liberia
- Somalia
- Liechtenstein
- Tonga
- Monaco
- Tuvalu

In these cases, other data and/or estimates by CountryWatch.com were utilized.

Investment Overview

C o r r u p t i o n a n d T r a n s p a r e n c y I n d e x . U R L :
<http://www.transparency.org/documents/cpi/2001/cpi2001.html#cpi>
<<http://www.transparency.org/documents/>

Deloitte Tax Guides. URL: <http://www.deloittetaxguides.com>

Trade Policy Reviews by the World Trade Organization . URL: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp_rep_e.htm#bycountry

United States Department of Energy, Country Analysis Briefs. URL: <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/contents.html>

United States Department of State, Background Notes. URL: http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/index.html

United States Department of State, Country Commercial Guides. 1996-2006. Washington, D.C. U n i t e d S t a t e s o f A m e r i c a . U R L : http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/business/com_guides/index.html

World Bank: Doing Business. URL: <http://www.doingbusiness.org>

World Bank: Governance Indicators. URL: <http://info.worldbank.org/governance>

Social Overview

Borden, G.A., Conaway, W.A., Morrison, T. 1994. *Kiss, Bow, or Shake Hands: How to do Business in Sixty Countries*. Holbrook, Massachusetts, 1994.

Center for Disease Control. URL: <http://www.cdc.gov>

Eldis Country Profiles. URL: <http://www.eldis.org/country/index.htm>

Ethnologue. URL: <http://www.ethnologue.com/>

Government of Australia Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. URL: <http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo>

Government of Canada Foreign Affairs and International Trade. URL: http://www.voyage.gc.ca/consular_home-e.htm

Library of Congress Country Studies. URL: <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html>

Lonely Planet. URL: <http://www.lonelyplanet.com/worldguide/>

Steve Kropla's Online Help For World Travelers. URL: <http://www.kropla.com/>

[United Kingdom](http://www.fco.gov.uk/) Ministry of Foreign and Commonwealth Office. URL: <http://www.fco.gov.uk/>

United Nations Human Development Report. URL: <http://www.undp.org/hdro>

UNICEF Statistical Database Online. URL: <http://www.unicef.org/statis/atoz.html>

[United States](http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html) Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook. 2001. Washington, D.C.: Printing and Photography Group. URL: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>

United States Department of State, Background Notes. URL: http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/index.html

United States Department of State, Commercial and Business Affairs: Travel Tips. URL: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/business/cba_travel.html

United States Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs. URL: <http://travel.state.gov/>

World Health Organization. URL: <http://www.who.int/home-page/>

World News Connection, National Technical Information Service. Springfield, Virginia, USA.

Internet News Service, Xinhua News Agency (U.S.) Inc. Woodside, New York. URL: <http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/>

Note on Edition Dates:

The earlier edition dates are noted above because they were used to formulate the original country reviews and serve as the baseline for some of the information covered. Later editions have been used in some cases, and are cited as such, while other more recent online resources (cited above) contain recent and ever-updated data sets used for research.

Methodology Notes for the HDI:

Since 1990, the United Nations Development Programme, in concert with organizations across the globe, has produced the [Human Development Index](#) (or HDI). According to the UNDP, the index measures average achievement in basic human development in one simple composite index, and produces from this index a ranking of countries. The HDI is a composite of three basic components of human development: longevity, knowledge and standard of living. Longevity is measured by life expectancy. Knowledge is measured by combination of adult literacy and mean

years of schooling. Standard of living is measured by purchasing power, based on real GDP per capita (in constant US\$) adjusted for differences in international living costs (or, purchasing power parity, PPP). While the index uses these social indicators to measure national performance with regard to human welfare and development, not all countries provide the same level of information for each component needed to compute the index; therefore, as in any composite indicator, the final index is predicated on projections, predictions and weighting schemes. The index is a static measure, and thus, an incomplete measure of human welfare. In fact, the UNDP says itself the concept of human development focuses on the ends rather than the means of development and progress, examining in this manner, the average condition of all people in a given country.

Specifically, the index is calculated by determining the maximum and minimum for each of the three components (as listed above) and then measuring where each country stands in relation to these scales-expressed as a value between 0 and 1. For example, the minimum adult literary rate is zero percent, the maximum is 100 percent, and the reading skills component of knowledge in the HDI for a country where the literacy rate is 75 percent would be 0.75. The scores of all indicators are then averaged into the overall index.

For a more extensive examination of human development, as well as the ranking tables for each participating country, please visit: <http://www.undp.org>

Note on [History](#) sections

In some CountryWatch Country Reviews, open source content from the State Department Background Notes and Country Guides have been used.

Environmental Overview

Environmental Profiles: A Global Guide to Projects and People. 1993. Linda Sobel Katz, Sarah Orrick, and Robert Honig. New York: Garland Publishing.

The Environment Encyclopedia and Directory, 2nd Edition. 1998. London: Europa.

Environmental Protection Agency Global Warming Site. URL: <http://www.epa.gov/globalwarming>

Food and Agriculture Organization of United Nations: Forestry. URL: <http://www.fao.org/forestry/site/sofo/en/>

Global Warming Information Page. URL: <http://globalwarming.org>

Introduction to Global [Environmental Issues](#), 2nd Edition. 1997. Kevin Pickering and Lewis Owen.

London: Routledge.

Trends: Compendium of Data on Global Change. URL: http://cdiac.esd.ornl.gov/trends/emis/em_cont.htm

United Nations Environmental Program. URL: http://www.unep.org/GEO/GEO_Products/Assessment_Reports/

United Nations Global Environmental Outlook. URL: <http://www.unep.org/geo/geo4/media/>

United States Department of Energy, Country Analysis Briefs. URL: <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/contents.html>

World Climate Data Online. URL: <http://www.worldclimate.com>

World Directory of Country Environmental Studies. 1996. The World Resource Institute.

World Factbook. US Central Intelligence Agency. Washington, D.C.: Printing and Photography Group.

1998-1999 World Resources Guide to the Global Environment by the World Resources Institute. May, 1998.

1998/1999 Yearbook of International Cooperation on Environment and Development. 1998. London: Earthscan Publications.

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Other Sources:

General information has also been used in the compilation of this review, with the courtesy of governmental agencies from this country.

News Services:

CANA Daily Bulletin. Caribbean Media Agency Ltd., St. Michael, [Barbados](#).

Central and Eastern Africa Report, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa.

Daily News, Panafrican News Agency. Dakar, [Senegal](#).

PACNEWS, Pacific Islands Broadcasting Association. Suva, [Fiji](#).

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Washington D.C. USA.

Reuters News. Thomson Reuters. New York, New York. USA.

Southern Africa Report, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Integrated Regional Information Network for Southern Africa.

Voice of America, English Service. Washington D.C.

West Africa Report, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Integrated Regional Information Network for West Africa. 1998-1999

Note: Some or all these news services have been used to research various sections of this Country Review.

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MLA STYLE OF CITATION

Commentary

For items in a "Works Cited" list, CountryWatch.com suggests that users follow recommended patterns for indentation given in the *MLA Handbook*, 4th edition.

Individual Works

Basic form, using an Internet protocol:

Author/editor. *Title of Print Version of Work*. Edition statement (if given). Publication information (Place of publication: publisher, date), if given. *Title of Electronic Work*. Medium. Available Protocol (if applicable):Site/Path/File. Access date.

Examples:

Youngblood-Coleman, Denise. *Country Review: France*. 2003. Houston, Texas: CountryWatch Publications, 2003. *Country Review:France*. Online. Available URL : http://www.countrywatch.com/cw_country.asp?vCOUNTRY=61 October, 12, 2003.

Note:

This is the citation format used when the print version is not used in the reference.

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Author/editor. "Part title." *Title of Print Version of Work*. Edition statement (if given). Publication information (Place of publication: publisher, date), if given. *Title of Electronic Work*. Medium. AvailableProtocol (if applicable): Site/Path/File. Access date.

Examples:

Youngblood-Coleman, Denise. "People." *CountryWatch.com: France*. 2003. Houston, Texas: CountryWatch Publications, 2003. *CountryWatch.com: France*. Online. Available URL : http://www.countrywatch.com/cw_topic.asp?vCOUNTRY=61&SECTION=SOCIAL&TOPIC=CLPEO&TYPE=TEXT. October 12, 2003.

Note:

This is the citation format used when the print version is not used in the reference.

For further source citation information, please email: editor@countrywatch.com or education@countrywatch.com.

CountryWatch

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